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How the gerrymander

operates.

This secures a rep

to remain unchanged until the next census.
resentation based upon the actual number of inhabitants disclosed
at each census, according to the ratio of representation fixed by the
Congress of the United States. No innovation has been made upon
this rule since 1845 and then but a partial one. Parties have
changed in numerical strength within that period, political suprem-
acy has alternated from one to the other of the great parties, partisan
hate has been intense and bitter, party necessities have been great
and overshadowing. The majority force has existed many times
before, in both political parties, but no Ohio Legislature from 1845
to 1878 was found so reckless of principle and precedent as to
destroy these political subdivisions between the decennial periods.

This action alone, it seems to me, is sufficient, when rightly understood, to react upon its authors and secure for them a crushing defeat. It can not be too frequently brought to the attention of the people, nor too severely denounced. It works a vital disfranchisement of a large body of Republicans under color of law by a shameful abuse of power and in violation of the spirit of the Constitution of the State and of the United States.

Under the new law, taking the vote of 1876 as a basis, when the Republicans carried the State by over 6,000, the Democrats will have twelve Congressmen and the Republicans eight. The redistricting was not in the interest of fairness, but to increase Democratic representation, in violation of every principle of fairness. It was not the work of the masses of the Democratic party in the State; it was not the creation of the better class of our political opponents; it met with opposition from the order-loving and law-abiding citizens alike of both parties. It was ordered by designing politicians at Washington, to secure power in the next House, right or wrong; and the Ohio Legislature, which had before always stood with a "face of flint" against every species of revolution, yielded, basely yielded, principle and justice for purely party ends...

91. The Law Governing the Election of Senators

The Constitution states that the two Senators from each commonwealth shall be elected by the legislature thereof, and authorizes Congress to make regulations regarding the time and manner of the election. For more than half a century the states were left to their several devices, but in 1866 Congress passed this statute prescribing the precise method to be followed in each case:

election.

SEC. 14. The legislature of each State which is chosen next Time of preceding the expiration of the time for which any Senator was elected to represent such State in Congress shall, on the second Tuesday after the meeting and organization thereof, proceed to elect a Senator in Congress.

election.

SEC. 15. Such election shall be conducted in the following Mode of manner: Each house shall openly, by a viva-voce vote of each member present, name one person for Senator in Congress from such State, and the name of the person so voted for, who receives a majority of the whole number of votes cast in each house, shall be entered on the journal of that house by the clerk or secretary thereof; or if either house fails to give such majority to any person on that day, the fact shall be entered on the journal. At twelve o'clock meridian of the day following that on which proceedings are required to take place as aforesaid, the members of the two houses shall convene in joint assembly, and the journal of each house shall then be read, and if the same person has received a majority of all the votes in each house, he shall be declared duly elected Senator.

But if the same person has not received a majority of the votes in each house, or if either house has failed to take proceedings as required by this section, the joint assembly shall then proceed to choose, by a viva-voce vote of each member present, a person for Senator, and the person who receives a majority of all the votes of the joint assembly, a majority of all the members elected to both houses being present and voting, shall be declared duly elected. If no person receives such majority on the first day, the joint assembly

Vacancies.

Certificate of election.

The

Senate a check on the lower house.

shall meet at twelve o'clock meridian of each succeeding day during the session of the legislature, and shall take at least one vote, until a Senator is elected.

SEC. 16. Whenever on the meeting of the legislature of any State a vacancy exists in the representation of such State in the Senate, the legislature shall proceed, on the second Tuesday after meeting and organization, to elect a person to fill such vacancy, in the manner prescribed in the preceding section for the election of a Senator for a full term.

SEC. 17. Whenever during a session of the legislature of any State a vacancy occurs in the representation of such State in the Senate, similar proceedings to fill such vacancy shall be had on the second Tuesday after the legislature has organized and has notice of such

vacancy.

SEC. 18. It shall be the duty of the executive of the State from which any Senator has been chosen, to certify his election, under the seal of the State, to the President of the Senate of the United States.

SEC. 19. The certificate mentioned in the preceding section shall be countersigned by the secretary of state of the State.

92. The Original Purpose of the Senate*

Now that the Senate has been subjected to rather severe criticisms in many quarters,' and attempts to alter its character have been made in many states by the establishment of popular election, it seems well to inquire into the original position which the framers intended to give the Senate in our political system. These passages are from The Federalist.

... Second. The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies, to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions. Examples on this subject might be cited without number; and from proceedings within the United States, as well as from the

1 Reinsch, American Legislatures and Legislative Methods, pp. 79 sqq.

history of other nations. But a position that will not be contradicted, need not be proved. All that need be remarked, is, that a body which is to correct this infirmity, ought itself to be free from it, and consequently ought to hold its authority by a tenure of considerable duration.

Third. Another defect to be supplied by a senate, lies in a want The long term gives of due acquaintance with the objects and principles of legislation. the Senator It is not possible that an assembly of men, called for the most part, experience. from pursuits of a private nature, continued in appointment for a short time, and led by no permanent motive to devote the intervals of public occupation to a study of the laws, the affairs, and the comprehensive interests of their country, should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety of important errors in the exercise of their legislative trust. It may be affirmed, on the best grounds, that no small share of the present embarrassments of America is to be charged on the blunders of our governments; and that these have proceeded from the heads, rather than the hearts of most of the authors of them. What indeed are all the repealing, explaining, and amending laws, which fill and disgrace our voluminous codes, but so many monuments of deficient wisdom; so many impeachments exhibited by each succeeding, against each preceding, session; so many admonitions to the people, of the value of those aids, which may be expected from a well constituted senate?

is

elections

Fourth. The mutability in the public councils, arising from Frequent a rapid succession of new members, however qualified they may be, lead to points out, in the strongest manner, the necessity of some stable rapid changes. institution in the government. Every new election in the states, found to change one half of the representatives. From this change. of men must proceed a change of opinions; and from a change of opinions, a change of measures. But a continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule of prudence, and every prospect of success. The remark is verified in private life, and becomes more just as well as more important, in national transactions.

The Senate will gain

the esteem of foreign powers.

The Senate gives continuity of policy.

A fifth desideratum, illustrating the utility of a senate, is the want of a due sense of national character. Without a select and stable member of the government, the esteem of foreign powers will not only be forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy, proceeding from the causes already mentioned; but the national councils will not possess that sensibility to the opinion of the world, which is perhaps not less necessary in order to merit, than it is to obtain, its respect and confidence. Yet however requisite a sense of national character may be, it is evident that it can never be sufficiently possessed by a numerous and changeable body. It can only be found in a number so small, that a sensible degree of the praise and blame of public measures, may be the portion of each individual; or in an assembly so durably invested with public trust, that the pride and consequence of its members may be sensibly incorporated with the reputation and prosperity of the community. The objects of government may be divided into two general classes; the one depending on measures, which have singly an immediate and sensible operation; the other depending on a succession of well chosen and well connected measures, which have a gradual and perhaps unobserved operation. The importance of the latter description to the collective and permanent welfare of every country, needs no explanation. And yet it is evident that an assembly elected for so short a term as to be unable to provide more than one or two links in a chain of measures, on which the general welfare may essentially depend, ought not to be answerable for the final result, any more than a steward or tenant, engaged for one year, could justly be made to answer for plans or improvements, which could not be accomplished in less than half a dozen years. Nor is it possible for the people to estimate the share of influence, which their annual assemblies may respectively have on events resulting from the mixed transactions of several years. It is sufficiently difficult, at any rate, to preserve a personal responsibility in the members of a numerous body, for such acts of the body as have an immediate, detached, and palpable operation on its constitu

ents. . .

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