An example set for the future. The origin and fall of the caucus system. portion of the country against another, the great and essential interests of all are the same. They believed that the coming together of representatives of the people from the extremity of the union, would have a tendency to soothe, if not to unite, the jarring interests, which sometimes come in conflict, from the different . sections of the country. They considered the individuals, who might be selected as candidates for office, to be of much less consequence than the principle on which they are designated; they thought it important to ascertain the fact, whether the people themselves, or those who would frustrate the voice of the people, should succeed in our elections. They believed that the example of this convention would operate favorably in future elections; that the people would be disposed, after seeing the good effects of this convention in conciliating the different and distant sections of the country, to continue this mode of nomination. 50. Benton's Criticism of the Convention System The convention system which appeared to be such a popular institution, compared with the congressional caucus, nevertheless encountered the same objections; namely, that it was a mode by which a small group of politicians could control presidential nominations. Senator Benton advanced this view shortly after the convention had been adopted as a permanent institution. This presidential election of 1824 is remarkable under another aspect as having put an end to the practice of caucus nominations for the Presidency by members of Congress. This mode of concentrating public opinion began to be practised as the eminent men of the Revolution, to whom public opinion awarded a preference, were passing away, and when new men, of more equal pretensions, were coming upon the stage. It was tried several times with success and general approbation, public sentiment having been followed, and not led, by the caucus. It was attempted in 1824, and failed, the friends of Mr. Crawford only attendingothers not attending, not from any repugnance to the practice, as their previous conduct had shown, but because it was known that Mr. Crawford had the largest number of friends in Congress and would assuredly receive the nomination. All the rest, therefore, refused to go into it: all joined in opposing the "caucus candidate," as Mr. Crawford was called; all united in painting the intrigue and corruption of these caucus nominations, and the anomaly of members of Congress joining in them. By their joint efforts they succeeded, and justly in the fact though not in the motive, in rendering these Congress caucus nominations odious to the people, and broke them down. vention into an offic seekers' device. They were dropped, and a different mode of concentrating The conpublic opinion was adopted that of party nominations by con- degenerates ventions of delegates from the States. This worked well at first, the will of the people being strictly obeyed by the delegates, and the majority making the nomination. But it quickly degenerated, and became obnoxious to all the objections to Congress caucus nominations, and many others besides. Members of Congress still attended them, either as delegates or as lobby managers. Persons attended as delegates who had no constituency. Delegates attended upon equivocal appointments. Double sets of delegates sometimes came from the State, and either were admitted or repulsed, as suited the views of the majority. Proxies were invented. Many delegates attended with the sole view of establishing a claim for office, and voted accordingly. The twothirds rule was invented, to enable the minority to control the majority; and the whole proceeding became anomalous and irresponsible, and subversive of the will of the people, leaving them no more control over the nomination than the subjects of kings have over the birth of the child which is born to rule over them. King Caucus is as potent as any other king in this respect; for whoever gets the nomination no matter how effected-becomes the candidate of the party, from the necessity of union against the opposite party, and from the indisposition of the great States to go into the House of Representatives to be balanced by the small ones. The selec tion of the President has gone to an irresponsible assembly. Benton's remedy for the evils of convention methods. This is the mode of making Presidents, practised by both parties now. It is the virtual election! and thus the election of the President and Vice-President of the United States has passed - not only from the college of electors to which the constitution confided it, and from the people to whom the practice under the constitution gave it, and from the House of Representatives which the constitution provided as ultimate arbiter but has gone to an anomalous irresponsible body, unknown to law or constitution, unknown to the early ages of our government, and of which a large proportion of the members composing it, and a much larger proportion of interlopers attending it, have no other view either in attending or in promoting the nomination of any particular man, than to get one elected who will enable them to eat out of the public crib - who will give them a key to the public crib. The evil is destructive to the rights and sovereignty of the people, and to the purity of elections. The remedy is in the application of the democratic principle — the people to vote direct for President and Vice-President; and a second election to be held immediately between the two highest, if no one has a majority of the whole number on the first trial. But this would require an amendment of the constitution, not to be effected but by a concurrence of two-thirds of each house of Congress, and the sanction of threefourths of the States - a consummation to which the strength of the people has not yet been equal, but of which there is no reason to despair. The great parliamentary reform in Great Britain was only carried after forty years of continued, annual, persevering exertion. Our constitutional reform, in this point of the presidential election, may require but a few years; in the meanwhile I am for the people to select, as well as elect, their candidates, and for a reference to the House to choose one out of three presented by the people, instead of a caucus nomination of whom it pleased. The House of Representatives is no longer the small and dangerous electoral college that it once was. Instead of thirteen States we now have thirty-one; instead of sixty-five representatives, we have now about two hundred. Responsibility in the House is now well-established and political ruin, and personal humiliation, attend the violation of the will of the State. No man could be elected now, or endeavor to be elected (after the experience of 1800 and 1824) who is not at the head of the list, and a choice of the majority of the Union. The lesson of those times would deter imitation and the democratic principle would again crush all that were instrumental in thwarting the public will. There is no longer the former danger from the House of Representatives, nor anything in it to justify a previous resort to such assemblages as our national conventions have got to be. The House is legal and responsible, which the convention is not, with a better chance for integrity, as having been actually elected by the people; and more restrained by position, by public opinion, and a clause in the constitution, from the acceptance of office from the man they elect. . . . 51. Lincoln's Defense of the Convention as a State Party Institution The state convention, which began to supersede the legislative caucus during the Jackson contests, especially in the East, was for a time regarded with dislike by many political leaders in the South and West, but at last they were brought to employ it for reasons that are nowhere more cogently set forth than in a paper drafted by Lincoln in 1843 in defense of the adoption of the system by the Whigs of Illinois. vention must be self-defense The sixth resolution recommends the adoption of the convention The consystem for the nomination of candidates. This we believe to be of the very first importance. Whether the system is right in itself adopted in we do not stop to inquire; contenting ourselves with trying to show that while our opponents use it, it is madness in us not to defend ourselves with it. Experience has shown that we cannot successfully defend ourselves without it. For example, look at the elections of last year. Our candidate for governor, with the approbation of a large portion of the party, took the field without a nomination, and in open opposition to the system. Wherever in the counties the Whigs had held conventions and nominated A house divided against itself cannot stand. candidates for the legislature, the aspirants who were not nomi- We do not mention the fact of many of the Whigs opposing the convention system heretofore for the purpose of censuring them. Far from it. We expressly protest against such a conclusion. We know they were generally, perhaps universally, as good and true Whigs as we ourselves claim to be. We mention it merely to draw attention to the disastrous result it produced, as an example forever hereafter to be avoided. That "union is strength" is a truth that has been shown, illustrated, and declared in various ways and forms in all the ages of the world. That great fabulist and philosopher, Æsop, illustrated it by his fable of the bundle of sticks; and he whose wisdom surpasses that of all philosophers has declared that "a house divided against itself cannot stand." |