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adjoined, and abutted upon the part of the street requiring the above work.

Due notice in writing was given by the plaintiffs to the defendant upon the 20th Sept. 1862, according to the statute, requiring the defendant to sewer, level, pave, flag, and channel, the parts of the said street on which his lands and premises abutted within the time specified in the notice. The defendant did not execute the said work. The plaintiffs, under the powers given to them by statute, thereupon proceeded to execute the said work, and their surveyor, upon the 6th Sept. 1865, settled the proportion of the expenses incurred by the plaintiffs in executing the above works to be paid by the defendant, according to the frontage of his premises, at the sum of 131. 188., and no dispute ever arose between the plaintiffs and the defendant as to the amount.

On the 5th Jan. 1872, the plaintiff's demanded the said sum from the defendant.

No proceedings were taken by the plaintiffs against the defendant until this action was brought on the 26th May 1875.

The defendant gave notice of a special defence, that the cause of action did not arise within six years.

Upon the hearing, it was contended before the said County Court judge, on the part of the plaintiffs, that the action was founded on a statute, and that the period of limitation was twenty years. On the part of the defendant, that it was the same as upon a summary application before justices, and that the option given by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 61, s. 24, must be exercised within six months, and that the plaintiffs were accordingly barred.

In order to enable the case to be put in train for discussion, the judge decided all the points in favour of the defendant, but gave the plaintiffs leave to appeal, it being agreed that the court should have power to make such order as he ought to have made.

The question for the opinion of the court was whether, upon the facts above stated, the right of the plaintiffs to recover the amount was barred by lapse of time. Judgment was to be made as the court should direct.

Day, Q.C. (with him W. G. Harrison) argued for the plaintiffs, the appellants.-The sole question is what period of limitation governs an action of this kind. The plaintiffs are right if the ordinary period in respect of a debt upon a statute-viz., twenty years, is the only limitation (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 3; see Shepherd v. Hills, 25 L. J., Ex. 6.) The Public Health Act 1848 (11 & 12 Vict., c. 63), s. 69, enacts that in case any present or future street, or any part thereof (not being a highway) be not sewered, levelled, paved, flagged, and channelled to the satisfaction of the Local Board of Health, such board may, by notice in writing to the respective owners or occupiers of the premises fronting, adjoining, or abutting upon such parts thereof as may require to be sewered, levelled, paved, flagged, or channelled, require them to sewer, level, pave, flag, or channel the same within a time to be specified in such notice. And if such notice be not complied with, the said local board may, if they shall think fit, execute the works mentioned or referred to therein; and the expenses incurred by them in so doing shall be paid by the owners in default, according to the frontage of their respective premises, and in such

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proportion as shall be settled by the surveyor, or, in case of dispute, as shall be settled by arbitration (having regard to all the circumstances of the case) in the manner provided by this Act, and such expenses may be recovered from the last mentioned owners in a summary manner, or the same may be declared by order of the said local board to be private improvement expenses, and be recoverable as such in the manner hereinafter provided." By 11 & 12 Vict., c. 43, s. 11, it is enacted, "That in all cases where no time is already or shall hereafter be specially limited for making any such complaint or laying any such information in the Act or Acts of Parliament relating to each particular case, such complaint shall be made and such information shall be laid within six calendar months from the time when the matter of such complaint or information respectively arose." Under these two statutes this debt was created, and a special remedy supplied, subject to a six months' limitation. [BLACKBURN, J.—And no action for the debt could lie.] Perhaps so. Then by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 61, s. 24, Proceedings for the recovery of demands below twenty pounds, which local boards are now empowered by law to recover in a summary manner, may, at the option of the local board, be taken in the County Court as if such demands were debts within the cognisance of such courts.' The demand in this case must be treated as any other debt of like kind, that is, a debt upon a statute. The limitation of six months was a mere incident of the summary remedy, and no part of the cause of action. When another remedy was given, there was no application of the limitation to the new remedy. It could not be contended that if the summary remedy had been abolished simply that the debt could not be recovered at all; and in that case the previous limitation would go with the remedy.

Grantham, appeared for defendant.

BLACKBURN, J.-We need not call upon the other side. It is clear to us that the County Court Judge was right in deciding for the defendant. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 63, s. 69 enacted that these expenses might be recovered in a summary manner, and gave no other remedy. The Legislature thereby limited the period of such recovery to that which was incident to a summary remedy. Mr. Day argues that if the summary remedy given by this Act had been repealed without any further enactment concerning the debt, an action would lie for twenty years; and, therefore, when a power to recover by action is added to the summary remedy, the result is the same. Whatever might have been the effect of a simple repeal of the summary remedy we need not consider. The later Act, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 61 s. 24, gives local boards an option to recover demands below £20 either in a County Court or in a summary manner as before. It says proceedings may be taken in the County Court as if such demands were debts within the cognisance of such courts. It does not say that a local board may have its choice of the limitation to its demand; such a power to choose would be unreasonable; and there would follow this unreasonable and absurd effect, that if the demand were over £20 the limitation would be six months, if under 20l. it would be twenty years. I think the statutes themselves sufficiently show by the words used that the six months' limitation applies to recovery in a County Court as well as in a summary manner, and this

absurdity in the effect of any other conclusion confirms my opinion It seems to me, too, that such demands ought not to be recoverable after six months.

FIELD, J.-I am of the same opinion, and on the same grounds. I observe that by the new Public Health Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), s. 150, the old state of things is re-established, and the recovery of expenses can now be only in a summary

manner.

Judgment for defendant, the respondent. Solicitors for the plaintiffs, Hillearys. Solicitors for defendant, Wood and Hare.

Tuesday, Dec. 21, 1875.

REG. v. JUSTICES OF TYNEMOUTH. Justices-Discretion to refuse summons- -Sufficient explanation of grounds of refusal-11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, 8. 9.

Justices were applied to for summonses for a conspiracy to break the peace and to do grievous bodily harm to persons at a public meeting, upon statements which those who made them were present to swear. The statements, if true, clearly established such conspiracy, but the justices refused the summonses. Upon a rule for a mandamus to hear and determine the matter, the justices answered by affidavit that they heard the application at length, fully considered and discussed it amongst themselves for about fifty minutes, and then came to the determination that they should not be justified in granting summonses for conspiracy, as the facts before them were not in their opinion sufficient to establish that charge. They further said that two summonses for assault, crising out of the same events, had been granted against some of the persons charged with this conspiracy, and had both failed; that the applicant did not desire to be bound over to prosecute on the refusal of the summonses; and that they were willing to grant further assault summonses if the applicant had so requested.

Held that the evidence in the statements was so strong that the justices must have acted upon some extraneous consideration; that they thereby practically declined to exercise their jurisdiction on the merits of the matter; that their answer was not a sufficient explanation; and that the rule must be made absolute.

THIS was a rule nisi obtained by Philbrick, Q.C. on the 18th Nov., calling upon the mayor and other magistrates of the borough of North Shields, in the county of Northumberland, and also fourteen persons whose names were stated, to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue, directed to the said magistrates, commanding them or some of them to proceed to hear and determine the matter of an application by Roland Kiley for a summons against the said fourteen persons for unlawfully and wilfully combining and conspiring to break the peace and to do grievous bodily harm to several persons at the Albion Assembly Rooms, the Albion Hotel, and elsewhere at North Shields on the 14th Oct. last.

It appeared from affidavits that on the 2nd Nov. last, Mr. Edmund Kimber, the solicitor of the said Roland Kiley, the prosecutor, appeared before the said magistrates at their court of petty sessions, and read over certain written statements

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made and signed by the prosecutor and five other persons, all of whom were there present and prepared to swear to the truth of the same. He applied for summonses against the said fourteen persons upon the charge stated in the rule, but the magistrates refused the application.

The prosecutor's statement was that he was a member of the Magna Charta Association, and that the association had hired the Albion Assembly Rooms for the evening of the 14th Oct. for the purpose of a lecture by Dr. Kenealy upon the Tichborne case. The meeting was advertised by public placards, and the charges for entrance were 28, 18, and 6d. The rooms were much crowded at the time of the lecture, and before it commenced a general row and free fight took place, in which the said fourteen persons charged were all concerned. They were in time turned out of the rooms, but they waylaid and assaulted the prosecutor and Dr. Kenealy, as the latter afterwards entered the Albion Hotel, where they were staying.

It

One of the other persons who made statements alleged that he picked a piece of gun cotton out of a crevice between the floor and skirting board, by which some of these fourteen persons had attempted to set the assembly rooms on fire. Another alleged that he saw one of them throwing cayenne pepper about the place, making many persons sneeze violently, and others letting off crackers and other fireworks in the rooms. was also alleged by two of the persons, whose statements were read, that one of the fourteen charged, named Short, invited thein beforehand to join his party; that Short before the meeting stood liquor at the Albion Hotel to about twenty people, and gave them instructions to go to the meeting and kick up a row. He also said "You must get hold of Dr. Kenealy and break his head; kill him if you can. You need not be frightened, as I will pay all damages and expenses." Some of these twenty people were afterwards seen dividing some money which Short had given them. One of the statements was made by John Mitcheson, the keeper of the hall and assembly rooms, who corroborated what the others stated concerning the rioting at the meeting, and added that one of the fourteen named Pye assaulted him and was summoned by him in consequence; that Pye's solicitor came to him the day before the hearing of the summons and offered him 21. to withdraw the case; that at the last moment Pye would not agree to the terms proposed by his solicitor, and in consequence his (Mitcheson's) witnesses were not all present when the case came on to be heard. The Bench refused an adjournment and dismissed the

case.

The justices of the peace for the borough of North Shields, who were sitting at petty sessions on the 2nd Nov., made an affidavit in answer to the rule.

After setting out the charge and application for summonses, this affidavit proceeded :

3. North Shields is in the borough of Tynemouth, and there is no borough of North Shields. 4. The said E. Kimber addressed us at considerable length, and referred to facts which he stated he was in a condition to prove, and read to us at length the whole of the statements comprised in the exhibit to the affidavits of R. Kiley and others dated the 4th Nov. last, and referred to in the rule in this case. He commented upon such statements, and argued that we ought to grant

summonses against the persons charged for the offence mentioned. He also addressed us as to the law of conspiracy.

5. At the conclusion of the address of the said E. Kimber, we retired to consider the application, we fully considered and discussed amongst ourselves and with our clerk the matters brought before us by the said E. Kimber for about fifty minutes, and then came to the conclusion that we should not be justified in granting summonses against any of the said persons for the offence of conspiracy, as the facts brought before us were not in our opinion sufficient to justify us in summoning the said persons, or any of them, to answer for such offence. On our return into court this deponent, H. E. P. Adamson (the then mayor), informed the said E. Kimber that the bench declined to grant the application.

6. We further say that we did, on the 2nd Nov. last, fully hear and determine the matter of the application made by the said R. Kiley through his solicitor the said E. Kimber for a summons against the said persons charged with the offence mentioned.

7. No sworn informations were laid before us in due form, but we did not refuse the application on that ground, as the said E. Kimber stated that the persons who had signed the statements which he read to us were prepared to swear to the truth of them.

8. We further make oath and say that no application was made to us on the refusal of the summonses or at any other time to take the recognisances of the said R. Kiley or any other person to prosecute the said persons charged with the offence, mentioned, under and in pursuance of 22 & 23 Vict. c. 17.

9. In answer to the statement of J. Mitcheson referred to in the said affidavit of R. Kiley and others, we say that on the 15th Oct. last the said J. Mitcheson informed the said E. Young, one of the deponents that J. Pye did, on the 14th Oct. last in the said borough, assault and beat the said J. Mitcheson. The assault referred to being an assault which was alleged to have been committed by the said J. Pye on the said J. Mitcheson at the meeting held at the Albion Assembly Rooms, and referred to in the affidavits and statements on which the rule was moved. The said E. Young at once granted a summons against the said J. Pye which was returnable on the 20th Oct. last at the police court aforesaid.

10. On that day the said J. Pye duly appeared in pursuance of the said summons before the said H. E. P. Adamson, one of the deponents, and others of Her Majesty's justices of the peace for the said borough, being the justices of the peace for the said borough then assembled and sitting, and the said J. Mitcheson and one T. Ellison were called as witnesses in support of such summons and others, G. Hodge and R. Atkinson, were called as witnesses on behalf of the defendant. After hearing the said case the said justices then sitting dismissed the said summons on the merits.

11. We further say that we were not aware that any offer had been made to settle that case out of court. An adjournment of the case was refused by the said justices then sitting, because they were of opinion that the complainant had had every opportunity of preparing his case between the date of the application for the summons, viz. 15th Oct. last, and the said 20th Oct. last, and further

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that there was no sufficient cause shown to them why the same should be adjourned.

12. In addition to the summons before referred to, the said E. Young, one of the deponents, granted a summons against R. Kidd the younger, on the said 15th Oct. last for an assault, alleged to have been committed by him on the said R. Kiley at the said meeting on the 14th Oct. last.

13. This summons was returnable on the 20th Oct. last at half past ten o'clock in the forenoon, and the defendant duly appeared in pursuance thereof, when it was called on in its turn for hearing at about eleven o'clock; but the said R. Kiley, the informant, although duly called, did not appear by himself or his attorney, but some person in court, a barber by trade, applied to the justices then sitting, as a friend of the said R. Kiley, to adjourn the hearing of the summons. The said defendant objected to the adjournment, and stated that he was there ready with his witnesses to go into the case on the merits, and as no notice of an intended application for an adjournment had been previously given, and as no sufficient reason was given why the said R. Kiley was not in attendancs to support his information, the said summons was dismissed.

14. And we further say that we were willing to grant summonses against any persons who had committed any assault or breach of the peace at the said meeting, and to fully hear and determine the case on the merits, but we declined to grant any summonses for conspiracy as requested, on the ground that the said R. Kiley had failed to satisfy us that there was sufficient evidence to warrant us in so doing.

15. No other summonses were applied for than those before mentioned.

Poland (with him Hawkins, Q.C.) showed cause. -Justices are the sole judges of whether a primâ facie case is made out; and if they hear and determine the matter, no appeal lies from their decision. The words with which sect. 9 of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42 commences are "That upon such information and complaint being so laid as aforesaid, the justice or justices receiving the same may, if he or they shall think fit, issue his or their summons or warrant respectively as hereinbefore is directed, to cause the person charged as aforesaid to be and appear before him or them". . . " to be dealt with according to law." Here the justices did not think fit to issue summonses, and this court cannot interfere. Even if it be considered that these statements disclose an indictable offence, the justices, being without limit as to their discretion, might well have applied their knowledge obtained on the previous assault summonses, and have deemed the statements so exaggerated as to be insufficient to establish even a primâ facie case. A further objection to this rule is that another remedy was open to the prosecutor. He might have applied to be bound over to prosecute under the Vexatious Indictments Act 1859. [BLACKBURN, J.-Does that provision apply where the summons is refused?] By the second section (22 & 23 Vict. c. 17) it is enacted "That where any charge or complaint shall be made before any one or more of Her Majesty's Justices of the Peace that any person has committed any of the offences aforesaid within the jurisdiction of such justice, and such justice shall refuse to commit or to bail the person charged with such offence to be tried for the same, then in case the prosecutor shall

desire to prefer an indictment respecting the said | offence, it shall be lawful for the said justice and he is hereby required to take the recognizance of such prosecutor to prosecute the said charge or complaint, and to transmit such recognizance, information, and depositions, if any, to the court in which such indictment ought to be preferred, in the same manner as such justice would have done in case he had committed the person charged to be tried for such offence." [BLACKBURN, J.-Can a prosecutor claim to be bound over when a summons is refused ?] The words "depositions, if any," in this section go to show that the provision was intended to apply before as well as after the taking of depositions. With respect to this section, in the case of Ex parte Wason (L. Rep. 4 Q. B. 573), Cockburn, C.J., said, "I entirely agree that, supposing the matter brought before the magistrate had been matter cognisable by the criminal law, and upon which an indictment might have been prepared, the magistrate would have had no discretion, but would have been bound to proceed as directed by the statute; and if in such a case the magistrate had refused to receive the information, it would have been the duty of this court ex debito justitiae to grant a rule or issue a mandamus commanding the magistrate to take the recognizances."

The Solicitor General (Sir Hardinge Giffard, QC.) supported the rule.-Sect. 9 of Jervis's Act no doubt gives to magistrates a discretion as to granting or refusing summonses; but in this case it may be said they exercised no discretion at all, or at any rate on no legal grounds. This distinction was drawn in Reg. v. Boteler (4 B. & S. 959), where justices had refused to issue a warrant against the overseer of an extra-parochial place, which had just been made a parish, for levying the amount of a contribution order by the Union under 2 & 3 Vict. c. 84, s. 1. Justices are thereby empowered to issue such warrant if they "shall think fit." The only objection by the overseer was that the order was unjust and unreasonable, the new parish having no paupers of its own; the justices refused the warrant, as they stated, in the exercise of their discretion. Cockburn, C.J., asked during the argument, "Is not the refusal to issue the warrant virtually declining jurisdiction ?" And he said in his judgment, at p. 364, "I do not intend in the slightest degree to encroach upon the doctrine that, where magistrates have a discretionary power to decide whether they will do an act or not, this Court will not order them to do it when they have exercised their discretion upon the merits of the matter. But it is clear upon the facts of the present case that they have not exercised that discretion which in law they would have been justified in exercising." In all these cases the limit of discretion must be a question of degree, and here the statements so clearly establish a prima facie case of conspiracy that the justices must have acted upon some other than legal grounds in refusing summonses. [COCKBURN, C.J.-We might think the magistrates were wrong, but can we review their decision? Can there be an appeal in this way from an erroneous act of discretion ? BLACKBURN, J.-Probably the magistrates thought it better to put a stop to any further litigation about the matter. May not they exercise their discretion on that ground? Poland. That is not the ground they give. They say they decided upon the merits.

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[BLACKBURN, J.-Unless these statements are false, there was clearly a conspiracy.] It is not for magistrates to put a stop arbitrarily to legal proceedings. They here give no grounds for this exercise of their discretion. Why are they to be, therefore, in a better position than if their admitted grounds were insufficient? They probably thought the applicant did not deserve any favour from them; but they ought not to have refused him justice.

COCKBURN, C. J.-Upon the whole, although this is a mattter of some perplexity, I am of opinion that the rule should be made absolute. Nothing can be more clear than that this court has no appellate jurisdiction to review a decision of magistrates on a question of fact, after they have once heard and decided it in a manner within their authority. In a case like this, in which the statutes have given us no appellate power, if I could see my way to the conclusion that the magistrates had considered and acted upon this evidence, I should certainly say that, in conformity with the principles upon which we have always acted, we could not interfere further nor send the matter before the magistrates again. The Solicitor General, however, has called our attention to the statements upon which the charge was made, and it appears to me that the evidence they contain is very strong. And I cannot help thinking that when the magistrates refused to issue summonses upon it, they must have acted upon something of an extraneous and extra-judicial character which ought to have influenced their decision. If so, they have practically declined to exercise their jurisdiction on the merits of the matter as it was then before them. If they had this evidence from the witnesses on oath, after having issued the summonses, and had then determined that the witnesses were not trustworthy, and they did not believe their sworn testimony, the matter would have been one entirely in which they were the sole judges, and this court would have been precluded from interfering. But our conclusion is, that the magistrates here did not so consider the trustworthiness or credibility of the evidence before them. I dare say they thought they were acting rightly and for the good of the community; they were probably of opinion that the sooner the whole affair was buried in oblivion, the better for everybody concerned; and they were probably somewhat influenced by a perhaps justifiable distaste for the particular views and doctrines of the persons who were instigating them to move the law against their opponents. But these are considerations which ought not to have affected them at all. A meeting, convened for any purpose which is not a violation of the law, is entitled to the protection of the law, and persons holding such a meeting are not to be put down by clamour and violence, or by a breach of the peace. On the evidence contained in these statements we think the magistrates ought to have issued summonses to answer the charge preferred; in refusing to do so, they must have been influenced by extraneous considerations, and their answer to the rule is not a sufficient explanation. They have therefore declined the jurisdiction which they ought to have exercised. I think it would be more satisfactory if the matter could be taken before other magistrates than these, whose minds must be imbued with their previous knowledge; but that is for the consideration of the prosecutor. All we have

to say is that the answer of the magistrates is not sufficient to lead the court to believe that they have exercised their discretion upon the facts presented to them.

BLACKBURN, J.-I have hesitated a good deal, but I agree that we may be justified in interfering. By the early law, which is re-enacted by Jervis's Act, when a magistrate refuses to hear a matter within his jurisdiction, we can clearly compel him; but when he hears and determines a matter we cannot overrule the exercise of his discretion. My difficulty here is to see how it can be that the magistrates have not exercised their discretion. If the charge preferred were that of attempting to blow up the Albion Assembly Rooms, or of a conspiracy to kill Dr. Kenealy, the justices might fairly say this is not evidence even for the granting of summonses; but it seems to me that these statements contain very clear evidence of a conspiracy to commit a breach of the peace. The magistrates do not say they disbelieve the statements, but they seem to have acted on the impression that they did not disclose even a primâ facie case. Whether or not they have exercised some discretion in what they have done, we can sufficiently see that they must have acted upon some grounds not contained in the evidence before them, and the effect is the same as if they had declined jurisdiction. I fully concur in my Lord's recommendation to take further proceedings before other magistrates.

FIELD, J.-I am of the same opinion. I should be the last person to come to a determination which could tend to make us a court of appeal from magistrates on questions of fact. I think, however, that the magistrates in this case did not consider and determine the question submitted to them. They had to say whether these statements made a prima facie case of conspiracy against the persons charged. Had the magistrates been able to say they did not believe the statements, I would not have interfered with them. But I think they must have acted upon impressions produced from outside, and have not heard and determined the point before them upon the evidence. Rule absolute. Solicitor for prosecutor, E. Kimber. Solicitors for defendants, Redpath and Holdsworth.

Friday, Feb. 4, 1876.

MEDWAY NAVIGATION v. BROOK.

River tolls-Fractional parts of mile-Description of boundaries-Local Act.

By the plaintiffs' Local Act of 1739, sect. 23, the plaintiffs are empowered to take from every person conveying goods upon the said river between Maidstone and Forest-row, or any part thereof (which all person and persons should and might lawfully do), such rates and duties for lockage and riverage as the plaintiffs should think fit, not exceeding the sum of 4d. per mile for every ton weight of goods from Maidstone up the river to Branbridge, and not exceeding the sum of 6d. per mile for every ton weight of goods from Branbridge up the river to Forest-row, and so in proportion for a greater or less quantity. By sect. 28, the plaintiffs are from time to time to publicly fix up the duties for lockage and riverage charged by them.

By sect. 31, nothing in the Act is to be construed to

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extend the plaintiffs' authority to the execution of any works below Mrs. Edmonds' wharf in Maidstone.

By sect. 38, any action, suit, or information for anything done in pursuance of this Act, or in relation to the premises, shall be commenced within three months after the facts committed. Maidstone extends along the river upwards about three furlongs from Mrs. Edmonds' wharf to the College lock, constructed by the plaintiffs, Maidstone bridge being between the two. Plaintiffs, besides other works on the river, had scoured a shoal between the said bridge and Mrs. Edmonds' wharf, and on their annual survey they always disembarked at that wharf.

In 1874, plaintiffs amended their toll list, so as to charge, for the first time, tolls proportioned to a fractional part of a mile traversed.

Defendant, owner of oil mills situate on the Medway, less than a mile above the College lock, but more than a mile above Mrs. Edmonds' wharf, refused to pay to the plaintiffs any toll upon barges coming up the river to his mills.

Held that the plaintiffs were entitled to charge tolls proportioned to a fractional part of a mile traversed since the amendment of their list, without reference to the three months' limitation provided by sect. 38.

Held (per Blackburn, J.) that they could charge only from Jollege lock.

Held (per Lush, J.), that they could charge from Mrs. Edmonds' wharf.

THIS was an action to recover the amount of certain tolls and dues claimed by the plaintiff's from the defendant as being payable in respect of the navigation by the defendant of a certain portion of the River Medway under the circumstances hereinafter mentioned.

The writ in the action was issued on the 12th Jan. 1875.

The declaration was for money payable by the defendant to the plaintiffs for certain tolls, rates, and duties, due and by right payable by the defendant to the plaintiffs for lockage and riverage under and by virtue of an Act of Parliament made and passed in the 13th year of the reign of his late Majesty King Geo. the Second, intituled "An Act to revive, explain, and amend an Act made and passed in the 16th and 17th years of the reign of his late Majesty King Charles the Second, intituled "An Act for making the River of Medway navigable in the Counties of Kent and Sussex,' ,"" and otherwise for and in respect of goods, wares, merchandizes, commodities, and other things carried and conveyed by or caused to be carried and conveyed by upon and along the said river and navigation within the limits of the said navigation for the use whereof, within such limits, the plaintiffs are authorised by the said Act to charge such rates, tolls, and duties by the defendant, to and from certain mills known as the Tovil Oil Mills upon the said river and navigation; and for the use by the plaintiffs' permission of the said river and navigation within the limits appointed by the said Act.