due on a security within the description of an agent authorised to sell, negotiate, transfer, or pledge, although, I think, there is little doubt but that the framers of the section by the use of the latter words imagined that they had exhausted every means of converting securities into money. I do not, however, think it necessary to deal with that difficulty, since my judgment is based not upon subtleties of language, but upon the broad ground that according to the true construction of the section, cases which, if there had been a written direction would have fallen within the first branch, do not in the absence of such written direction fall within the second branch of the section. In fact, I think that the cardinal principle of the section is that such an agent is only in the absence of a written direction to be criminally responsible for moneys which may come into his hands by some unauthorised act of his own. This construction of the section was adopted and formed the ground of an unanimous decision of the Court of Appeal consisting of five judges, in Reg. v. Cooper (L. Rep. 2 C. C. 127), and I think we are bound by that authority, even if it be the fact, as is alleged, that there was another ground unnoticed by the counsel who argued, or the Judges who decided the case, which might have supported the decision. Upon the other point argued before us as to the sufficiency of the evidence in point of fact to support the conviction, I will only say that I find it very difficult to understand what, if anything, the learned judge has referred to us beyond the legal question on which I have already expressed my opinion. If he meant to ask us whether the facts stated in the case justified the findings of the jury, I should say they did not, for I can find in the facts as stated no evidence at all of the special purpose stated in the indictment, and consequently none of the alleged conversion.

BRETT, J. and FIELD, J. acquiesced in the judg ment of AMPHLETT, B., and ARCHIBALD, J. died during the Long Vacation.

POLLOCK, B.-In so far as the decision of this case depends upon the proper construction to be put upon the section of the statute under which the prisoner was indicted, the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 75, I entertained during the argument, and still entertain, considerable doubt. I have had, however, the advantage of seeing the judgments which have been prepared by my learned brothers, and thinking as I do that the conviction was unsatisfactory for reasons to which I will presently refer, I am not prepared to differ with the view which has been taken by the majority of the court upon the construction of a statute which is undoubtedly capable of more than one interpretation.

If it could be assumed that the construction of the statute which was insisted upon by the prosecution was correct, it appears to me that having reference to the duty of the prisoner to pay over to the prosecutors the sums of money which he had received in payment of the policies, and also to the false statement made by the prisoner to the prosecutor after he had received these sums, there may have been evidence which might and ought to have been submitted to the jury with a view to their finding whether or no the prisoner, who undoubtedly had the money, had converted it to his own use or benefit within the meaning of the statute. But the prisoner was not a mere clerk of the prosecutors, he was an iusurance broker carrying on an independent business.

[C. CAS. R.

It must be assumed that he had many other principals for whom he acted besides the prosecutors, and it does not appear what had been the previous course of dealing between the prosecutors and the prisoner as to the payment of or accounting by the latter for money received by him on the settlement of losses. These are matters having an essential bearing upon the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, and yet they do not appear to have been explained by the evidence or brought to the attention of the jury, who, by their answer to the third question, appear to have assumed that the duty of the prisoner was to pay over the money forthwith without having their attention called to or having entered on the consideration of the facts from which such a duty could be properly inferred. Under these circumstances, when I have to answer the question which has been submitted to us by the learned Commissioner, I cannot say that I consider the facts as proved were sufficient to constitute the offence mentioned in the statute, and therefore, in my judgment the conviction should be quashed. Conviction quashed.

Saturday, Nov. 25, 1876.

(Before COCKBURN, C.J., Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., CLEASBY and POLLOCK, BB, and FIELD, J.) REG. v. GALE.

Embezzlement-Proceeds of cheque-For or on account of master-Indictment-24 & 25 Vict. c. 76, 8. 68.

The head office of an insurance company was at L., and there were branch offices at M. and G. The local managers at M. and G. having moneys to remit to the head office, paid them into local banks, obtaining cheques thereon for the amount payable to the order of the prisoner (the chief manager, at the head office), and forwarded the cheques by letter to the head office. It was the prisoner's duty to open the letters at the head office, receive the remittances, and hand the same over to the cashier. The local managers at M. and G. remitted by letter two such cheques for 2001. and 4001. respectively to the head office, which the prisoner duly received. He indorsed the bills, got them discounted by friends of his own, instead of handing them to the cashier to pay into the company's bank, and converted the proceeds to his

own use:

Held, that the prisoner received the proceeds for and on account of his masters, and that he was properly indicted for embezzling the money. Ar the quarter sessions for the borough of Liverpool, James Edward Gale was tried before me upon an indictment consisting of two counts, in the first of which the prisoner was charged with having, on the 19th May 1874, when a clerk and servant to the London and Lancashire Fire Insurance Company (Limited), embezzled 400l., the property of his said masters, and in the second of which he was charged with having, when in the same capacity and on the same day, embezzled 2007., also the property of his said masters.

The evidence in support of the charge, so far as the same is material, was as follows:

The said company's head office is in Liverpool. There are branch offices at Manchester, Glasgow, and elsewhere. The prisoner was the head manager of the company, and was their clerk and

C. CAS. R.]

servant. In ordinary course he opened all letters and received all remittances sent to the head office, and handed the remittances to the cashier, who kept the ordinary books under the superintendence of the prisoner as manager, and those books were from time to time submitted to and checked by Mr. Blenham, the company's accountant at Liverpool.

It frequently happened that the managers of the provincial offices remitted cash or cheques to the prisoner as chief manager, which it was the duty of the prisoner to hand on receipt to the cashier, and in the case of cheques it was the duty of the prisoner to indorse them, if they were payable to his order, and they were then paid into the company's bankers by the cashier, and accounted for in the books.

On the 19th May 1874, the prisoner received on account of the company, by post from Glasgow, a cheque dated the 18th May 1874, for 400l., drawn by the manager of the Glasgow branch upon the Commercial Bank of Scotland, payable to the prisoner's order. On the same day the prisoner also received on account of the company, by post from Manchester, a cheque for 2001., dated the 19th May 1874, drawn by the manager of the Manchester branch upon the Manchester and County Bank (Limited), payable to the prisoner's order.

The prisoner did not hand over either of these cheques to the cashier, or inform him or anyone else of their receipt, except that he acknowledged the receipt of them to the Glasgow and Manchester managers respectively.

On the same day, the 19th May, the prisoner indorsed and cashed both the cheques through private friends of his own, who gave him the cash and paid the cheques into their own banks. Later in the day the prisoner paid 6001. in bank notes and gold, which was probably the produce of the cheques, to the cashier of the company, saying that he wished it to go against his salary, which was then overdrawn to that amount. The cashier, supposing the money to be the prisoner's own, received it from him, and handed back to the prisoner I.O.U.s for the amount which he had received from the prisoner in respect of the overdraft.

Shortly after sending the cheques, the Glasgow and Manchester managers, according to their usual practice, sent to the prisoner financial statements, which among other things contained entries of the sending of these cheques. These statements should have been handed to the accountant by the prisoner, who, however, suppressed them both.

The prisoner's salary was 1500l. a year.

The fact of the prisoner having received the cheque for 2001. was not known to the company or the accountant till about a month later. The prisoner, when questioned, said he would put it all right, and nothing was done in respect of it at that time. The remittance of the cheque for 4001. was not known to the company or the accountant till about four months afterwards, when the prisoner was no longer in the company's service. The prisoner became bankrupt, and the company proved upon his estate for the amount of the cheques. The prisoner never accounted for either the cheques or the money.

At the close of the case for the prosecution, counsel for the prisoner submitted that the pri

[C. CAS. R. soner could not be properly convicted of embez zling either of the sums charged in the indictment, inasmuch as the cheques were sent to the prisoner payable to his order, and required his indorsement, and the prisoner was entitled to cash the cheques and receive the cash which was paid to him in respect of them, and, therefore, there was no embezzlement by him of the said sums or either of them. It was also submitted that there was no embezzlement, because the identical money received for the cheques was paid to the cashier, although it was so paid as the prisoner's own money and in discharge of so much of his own overdraft.

I ruled that there was evidence of embezzlement, but consented to reserve the questions for the consideration of the Court for Crown Cases Reserved.

The jury convicted the prisoner. I did not sentence him, but remanded him until the decision of the Court to the borough gaol at Liverpool.

The question for the Court is, whether there was evidence of embezzlement which I was justified in leaving to the jury.

JOHN B. ASPINALL, Recorder of Liverpool. 14th Nov. 1876,

Torr, Q.C. (Kennedy with him) for the prisoner. --The prisoner was improperly convicted of embezzlement. There was no embezzlement here, but it was a mere transference of the cheques from the master to the prisoner, and like the case where a master hands money to one servant to give to another for a specific purpose, and that other applies the money to his own use. [CockBURN, C.J.-No; here the prisoner receives a piece of paper from his master, which he is to convert into money.] The cheque was not payable until the prisoner put his name on it. [Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., referred to Reg. v. Keena, 11 Cox C. C., 123; L. Rep. 1 C. C. R. 113, to show that where a servant has embezzled a cheque and converted it into money, he may be indicted either for embezzling the cheque or the money.] The contention is that this was not a case of embezzlement, but, if anything, one of larceny, and the prisoner was not indicted or convicted for larceny. In the present case, the prisoner indorsed the cheques, and got cash for them from his own friends, not from the banks on which the cheques were drawn. This cash was not paid to the prisoner for or in the name or on account of his masters within the meaning of the stat. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 76, s. 68. The cheques were sent by the local managers as a means of forwarding money which was constructively in possession of the masters through them. [COCKBURN, C.J.-How does this case differ from that of a servant who gives a receipt before a customer will pay?] The following cases were then referred to:

Reg. v. Wilson, 9 Car. & P. 27;

Reg. v. Beaumont, 6 Cox C. C. 269; 23 L. J. 54, M. C.:
Reg. v. Harris, 6 Cox C. C. 363;

C.;

Reg. v. Thorp, 8 Cox C. C. 29; 27 L. J. 264, Reg. v. Cullum, 11 Cox C. C. 469; L. Rep. 2 C. . R. 28. Again, the money in this case was received on the prisoner's own account, and not, in the language of the statute, "for or on account of masters." The cheques may have been received by him by virtue of his employment, but the money was received on his own account.

Reg. v. Masters, 3 Cox C. C. 178; 2 Car. & Xir. 930. No counsel appeared for the prosecution.

COCKBURN, C.J.-I entertain no doubt that this conviction must stand. The principal facts appear to be these: The prisoner was the chief manager at the head office of a Fire Insurance Company, at Liverpool, which had branch offices at Manchester, Glasgow, and elsewhere, and when money was to be remitted from the branch offices to the principal one under the management of the prisoner, the mode of remittance was by paying the money into a local bank and obtaining a cheque upon that bank payable to the prisoner's order, and then forwarding the cheque in a letter to the principal establishment. It was the prisoner's duty to open the letters and receive all remittances sent to the head office, and hand the remittances to the cashier. That being his duty, the prisoner opened the letters containing the two cheques remitted by the managers of the Manchester and Glasgow branches, and he then indorsed them and got them discounted by intermediate parties, and then paid the amount to the cashier to go against his salary, which was then overdrawn to that amount. Upon these facts there can be no doubt that the prisoner was intrusted with the cheques with a knowledge of the purpose for which they had been received, and that he might have been found guilty on an indictment for embezzling the cheques. But instead of that he has been found guilty of embezzling the money, the proceeds of the cheques. The only difficulty in the case, which however is a superficial one, is that the cheques were cashed not by the banks on which they were drawn, but by intermediate persons. It was ingeniously argued that inasmuch as the cheques were discounted for the prisoner's convenience by intermediate persons with a knowledge that they were not his cheques, the money so obtained was not paid on account of his masters. That is not the right way to construe the matter. The question is whether the prisoner received the proceeds on account of his master? The case may be illustrated thus: A man, intrusted with a cheque to cash, meets a friend in the street and says to him, it is not convenient for me to go to the bank, will you cash this cheque for me? and the friend does cash it. That is like the present case. The moment the prisoner got the cash for the cheque it was his duty, both morally and legally, to take and hand it over to his masters. That is the common sense view: and I entertain no doubt that the money was received by the prisoner in this case on account of his masters, and that the conviction for embezzlement was right.

Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-I am of the same opinion. I will only add that the words of the statute "for or in the name, or on account of his master," seem to refer to cases where it is the known duty of the servant to pay the money received over to the master.

CLEASBY, B.-I am of the same opinion. If the prisoner had received the cash from the banks there could have been no doubt that he received it for and on account of his masters, and I think it can make no difference that instead of receiving it from the banks he got it from another person. In both cases the money was obtained for his employers.

POLLOCK, B.-I am of the same opinion. The words " or by virtue of such employment," which were in the previous statute of embezzlement, the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, s. 47, were omitted in the

[C. CAS. R.

recent statute, with the view of meeting cases where the money was obtained not by virtue of the employment, but as here, on account of the

master.

FIELD, J.-I am of the same opinion.

Conviction affirmed.

Saturday, Dec. 2, 1876. (Before COCKBURN, C.J., Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.,

CLEASBY and POLLOCK, BB., and FIELD, J.)

REG. V. LANGTON.

Evidence To refresh memory- Document not written by witness-Limited Joint Stock Company.

It was the prisoner's duty, as a timekeeper, to give to a clerk (not the pay clerk) a list of the number of days on which each workman had worked, and it was the clerk's duty to enter these times in the time book, and the amount of wages due to each workman according to such returns; and from the time book at the time of paying the wages it was the prisoner's duty to read out aloud the number of days each man had worked, and the wages were then paid to the workman by the pay clerk. The prisoner had wilfully falsified the list by overstating the time one of the workmen had worked, and the false statement was entered in the time book by the clerk, and wages calculated accordingly. On the pay day the entries were read out aloud by the prisoner, and the amount of wages so represented paid to the workman. On an indictment against the prisoner for false pretences, the pay clerk was called as a witness, and not remembering the particulars of the entries, he was allowed to refresh his memory by reference to the time book, because he saw the entries at the pay time when they were read out by the prisoner, and knew that the prisoner then read the entries correctly, and that he, witness. had paid the sums mentioned in those entries, although the entries were not made by himself,

Held, that the time book was properly admitted to refresh the witness's memory.

Parol evidence that a Joint Stock Company Limited has acted as an incorporated company is sufficient evidence of its incorporation as a limited company on an indictment for false pretences in which the property obtained is alleged to be the property of the A. B. Company, Limited. THE prisoner, Edward Langton, was tried before me at the adjourned Quarter Sessions of the Peace held at Kirkdale, in the County of Lancaster, on the 11th July last past, upon an indictment charging him in the first and second counts with obtaining by false pretences from Thomas Chitson certain money of the Tawd Vale Colliery Company, Limited, with intent to defraud; and in the third count with obtaining by false pretences from Samuel Higginbottom certain other money of the said company with intent to defraud.

A copy of the indictment accompanies and is to be taken as part of this case.

The prisoner was in the service of the said company as one of their time keepers, and it was his duty to give in to another clerk fortnightly a list of the number of days on which the workmen in the employ of the company had worked during the preceding fortnight. It was the duty of the clerk to enter in the time book these numbers and the amount of the wages due to each workman

according to the number of days worked, and from this time book at the time of paying the workmen's wages it was the prisoner's duty to read out aloud the number of the days each man had worked, and the wages were then paid to the workmen by the pay clerk accordingly. Robert Aspinwall, a workman in the employ of the company, kept a provision shop on his own account, at which the prisoner dealt, and at the time when the prisoner made the false pretences charged in the indictment, he was indebted to the said Robert Aspinwall. The 14th April last past was the day on which the wages earned during the fortnight preceding the 11th April became payable. During that fortnight Aspinwall had worked twelve days and no more, and there was due to him in respect of his said work the sum of 21. 118, and no more, his wages, being 4s. 3d. a day. At some time between the said 11th and 14th April the prisoner asked Aspinwall how many days he had worked during the fortnight. Aspinwall told him as the fact was, that he had worked twelve days. The prisoner then asked Aspinwall how much money he, the prisoner, owed Aspinwall in respect of provisions bought of him by the prisoner, and on Aspinwall telling him the amount, the prisoner said, "I will put it down to your time." There was no evidence of the time list handed in by the prisoner in respect of that fortnight; but the time book was made up apparently according to the same course, and in the time book the number of fifteen days and a half day was entered as the time which Aspinwall had worked during that fortnight, and the sum of 31. 58. 10d., being at the rate of 48. 3d. per day for fifteen days and a half day, was entered as the amount of the wages due to him. These entries the prisoner read out aloud at the pay time on the said 14th April, and the pay clerk, the said Thomas Chitson, then handed to Aspinwall, in the presence of the prisoner, the sum of 31. 58. 10d. accordingly. The 12th day of the following month of May was the day on which the wages earned during the fortnight preceding the 9th May became payable. During that fortnight Aspinwall had worked twelve days and no more, and there was due to him in respect of such work, at the same rate of 48. 3d. a day, the sum of 21. 11s., and no more. On the said 9th May the prisoner asked Aspinwall what time he had worked during that fortnight, and how much he, the prisoner, owed Aspinwall. Aspinwall then told the prisoner, as the facts were, that he, Aspinwall, had worked twelve days, and that the prisoner owed Aspinwall the sum of 18s. 6d., which he had paid for the prisoner at his request. The prisoner then said that he would put the said sum of 188. 6d. to Aspinwall's time. At the pay time on the said 12th May, the number of days' work entered in the time book to the credit of Aspinwall was sixteen days and a half day, and the sum of 31. 108. 1d. was entered as the amount due to him in respect of such work. These entries the prisoner read out aloud at the said pay time, and the said pay clerk then handed to Aspinwall the sum of 31. 108. 1d. accordingly.

The 9th day of the following month of June was the day on which the wages earned during the fortnight preceding the 6th June became payable. During that fortnight Aspinwall had worked twelve days, and no more, and there was due to him in respect of such work, at the same rate of

[C. CAS. R.

48. 3d. a day, the sum of 21. 118., and no more. On the said 6th June the prisoner asked Aspinwall what time he had worked during that fortnight, and what the prisoner owed Aspinwall for provisions. Aspinwall then told the prisoner, as the facts were, that he, Aspinwall, had worked twelve days, and the amount which the prisoner owed Aspinawll for provisions, upon which the prisoner said to Aspinwall that he, the prisoner, would put down to Aspinwall's time the amount so owing by the prisoner to Aspinwall. On the said 6th and 9th June, Samuel Higginbottom, the secretary of the said company, was acting as and for the pay clerk, and made up the time book for the wages which became payable on the said 9th June, and the prisoner gave in the number of fourteen days and three quarters of a day as the time which Aspinwall had worked during the said fortnight. The time book was then made up by Higginbottom according to the usual practice, and on the said 9th June the prisoner, at the pay time read out from the said time book fourteen days and three quarters of a day as Aspinwall's time, and 31. 28. 8d. as the sum owing to Aspiwnall in respect of such work. As to all the charges against the prisoner, Aspinwall proved the sums of money he had received on the said pay days and the number of the days for which he had been so paid wages, but in respect of the charges mentioned in the first and second counts Thomas Chitson, the pay clerk, was called as a witness before Aspinwall gave his evidence. The prisoner's counsel objected to Chitson being allowed to refer to the time book to enable him to say for how many days work and what amounts of money he had paid Aspinwall on the said 14th April and 12th May. The counsel contended that as Chitson had not made the entries in the time book he ought not to be allowed to refer to it to refresh his memory, but as Chitson proved that he had seen those entries whilst the prisoner was reading out aloud at the pay time, and that though at the time of the trial he did not remember the particulars of the entries without referring to the book, yet he knew that at the pay time the prisoner read the entries correctly, and he, Chitson, had paid the sums which were mentioned in those entries.

I allowed his evidence to go to the jury, reserving the point for the opinion of this court.

As to all the counts the prisoner's counsel contended that it was necessary in support of the indictment to prove that the Tawd Vale Colliery Company (Limited) was an incorporated company; that this could not be proved by parol evidence only, and that as there was only the parol evidence of witnesses, who swore that the company was incorporated, I ought to direct an acquittal of the prisoner.

To this the counsel for the prosecution, replied that as by virtue of sect. 88 of the statute 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, the indictment would be sufficient without alleging any ownership of the money, that the references to the company might have been omitted without vitiating the indictment, and that the allegations as to the company might, therefore, be rejected as surplusage

I declined to direct an acquittal, and left the evidence to the jury accordingly, but I reserved s case on this point also for the opinion of this

court.

The jury found the prisoner guilty.

The court sentenced him to twelve months'

imprisonment with hard labour, subject to the opinion of this court as to whether I was right in overruling the objection raised on behalf of the prisoner by his counsel.

EDWARD GIBBON, Chairman.

No counsel appeared on either side. COCKBURN, C.J.-As to the first point, whether under the circumstances the time book could be

looked at by the pay clerk to refresh his memory, it appears to me that it could. It would be very dangerous to allow such a course where the entry has only been seen by the witness in the absence of the prisoner, but in this case the witness had actually seen the entry at the time it was read out aloud by the prisoner, and knew that the prisoner had read it correctly, and that he had paid the wages according to the entry. The witness was, therefore, properly allowed to refresh his memory from the time book. As to the second point, it was not necessary to prove strictly that the company was a limited company under the Joint Stock Companies Act. Evidence that the company had acted as such was sufficient.

Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., CLEASBY, B., POLLOCK, B., and FIELD, J. concurred.

Conviction affirmed.

Supreme Court of Judicature.

COURT OF APPEAL.

SITTINGS AT WESTMINSTER. Reported by W. APPLETON, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. (Before COLERIDGE, CJ., MELLISH, L.J., BRETT, and AMPHLETT, JJ.A.) Tuesday, Nov. 7, 1876.

REG. ON THE PROSECUTION OF HARGRAVES AND OTHERS v. STEEL AND OTHERS.

Appeal in criminal cases-Proceedings on Crown side of Queen's Bench Division-Order for costs on a criminal information-Judicature Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66), 88, 19, 47; Judicature Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 77), s. 19, Order LXII., 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 8.

The Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875 have not changed the practice and procedure in criminal cases; there is therefore no appeal in such cases unless there is error of law upon the record, or unless a point has been reserved for the consideration of the Court of Crown Cases Reserved. An order for costs made on the trial of a criminal information is a procedure in a criminal cause, and therefore such an order made on the Crown side of the Queen's Lench Division cannot be the subject of an appeal.

THIS was an appeal from an order made by the Queen's Bench Division (on the Crown side), discharging a rule calling on the defendants to show cause why the taxation of the defendant's costs should not be reviewed. A criminal information had been filed against the defendants for an alleged libel, and the trial had resulted in a verdict of not guilty. The defendants were accordingly entitled under the provisions of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, 8. 8, "to recover from the prosecutors the costs sustained by the defendant by reason of such

[CT. OF APP.

information," and the master had allowed the defendants certain items to which the prosecutors had objected; they had accordingly obtained the above rule, and on its being discharged they appealed to this court. On the appeal being called

on

C. Russell, Q.C. with him Crompton, for the respondents, objected to the jurisdiction of the court. This case is a criminal case, and in such a case there is no appeal, therefore the Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction to entertain this case. The order discharging the rule is an order made on the Crown side of the Queen's Bench Division, and is therefore an order in a criminal cause. A criminal information is the alternative given in the statute (6 & 7 Vict. c. 96 s. 8), for an indictment, and as on an indictment there can be no appeal save for some matter of error on the record, so on this order there can be no appeal. [MELLISH, L.J.-If there is an appeal in this case, would there not also be an appeal if the court were to refuse a rule for a criminal information?] It would seem so. The contention for the appellants would seem to be that sect. 19 of the Judicature Act 1873, gives a general right of appeal and that there is no provision in either of the Jndicature Acts limiting that right, but it will be found that sect. 47 of the Act of 1873 expressly provides that "no appeal shall lie from any judgment of the High Court in any criminal cause or matter save for some error of law upon the records," and sect. 19 of the Act of 1875 provides that the practice and precedure in criminal cases shall be the same as it was before the passing of the Judicature Acts.

Aspinall, Q.C.(with him Sutton), for the appellants. It is submitted that the general right of appeal given by sect. 19 of the Act of 1873, is not limited by sect. 47 of the same Act, nor by Order LXII, for they only apply to cases reserved for the Court of Criminal Appeal, and not to criminal proceedings in any other court. Further, this is not a criminal matter, it is merely a question of costs; a question which arises on the conclusion of all criminal and penal proceedings. The criminal proceedings were between the Crown and the defendants, whereas this is a civil right between the prosecutors and the defendants.

The following are the sections of the Acts of Parliament referred to in the argument:

Judicature Act, 1873, sect. 19. The said Court of Appeal shall have jurisdiction and power to hear and determine appeals from any judgment or order, save as hereinafter mentioned, of Her Majesty's High Court of Justice, or of any judges or judge thereof subject to the provisions of this Act, and to such rules and orders of court for regulating the terms and conditions on which such appeals shall be allowed, as may be made pursuant to this Act. For all the purposes of and incidental to the hearing and determination of any appeal within its jurisdiction, and the amendment, execution, and enforcement of any judgment or order made on any such appeal, and for the purpose of every other authority expressly given to the Court of Appeal by this Act, the said Court of Appeal shall have all the power, authority, and jurisdiction by this Act vested in the High Court of Justice.

Sect. 47. The jurisdiction and authorities in relation to questions of law arising in criminal trials which are now vested in the justices of either bench, and the Barons of the Exchequer by the Act of the session of the eleventh and twelfth years of the reign of Her present Majesty, chapter seventy-eight, intituled "An Act for the further amendment of the administration of the Criminal Law," or any Act amending the same, shall and may be exercised after the commencement of this Act by the judges of the High Court of Justice, or five