were no further outrages by submarines, and in view of the concessions already secured, the Administration probably feared that it would seem too insistent if, by reason of potential dangers, it pressed for definitions. More than that, an admission had been obtained that the legal position taken by the United States was unassailable, and the German argument had been boiled down to her assertion in the Lusitania note of May 28th, that the Imperial Government acted "in just self-defense when it seeks to protect the lives of its soldiers by destroying munitions destined for the enemy with the means of war at its command." The disavowal of the Arabic and the pledges, although not entirely satisfactory, seemed to clear the way for a settlement of the Lusitania controversy between Ambassador Bernstorff and Secretary Lansing.

CHAPTER VI

THE TRADE IN MUNITIONS OF WAR

IN the communications from the German Government to the United States concerning the war zone decree and submarine blockade which have already been referred to, there occur occasional references to the extensive trade in munitions of war carried on by American citizens. Thus, in the German reply to President Wilson's "strict accountability" note of February 10th, attention was directed "very particularly and with the greatest emphasis" to the fact that a trade in arms exists between American manufacturers and Germany's enemies which is estimated at many hundred million marks." No formal breach of neutrality was charged, but Germany professed herself “at a great disadvantage through the fact that the neutral powers have hitherto achieved no success or only an unmeaning success in their

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assertion of the right to trade with Germany, acknowledged to be legitimate by international law, whereas they make unlimited use of their right to tolerate trade in contraband with England and our other enemies. Conceded that it is the formal right of neutrals not to protect their legitimate trade with Germany and even to allow themselves knowingly and willingly to be induced by England to restrict such trade, it is on the other hand not less their good right, although unfortunately not exercised, to stop trade in contraband, especially the trade in arms, with Germany's enemies.”

The same argument was made by the German Ambassador in a memorandum which he presented to the State Department on April 4, 1915. After complaining against the British trade restrictions and asserting that the lack of success on the part of the United States in securing a relaxation of the measures taken justified the assumption that the violations of international law were acquiesced in, he adverted to the attitude of the United States on the munition question. Here consideration should be given not only to the formal aspect of the case

but also to "the spirit in which neutrality is carried out." He recognized that an obvious retort was that in previous wars Germany had supplied arms to belligerents, but the situation now was different, for, he said, "then it was not a question whether war material should be supplied to the belligerents, but who should supply it in competition with other nations. In the present war all nations having a war material industry worth mentioning are either involved in the war themselves or are engaged in perfecting their own armaments, and have therefore laid an embargo against the exportation of war material. The United States is accordingly the only neutral country in a position to furnish war materials. The conception of neutrality is thereby given a new purport, independently of the formal question of hitherto existing law. In contradiction thereto, the United States is building up a powerful arms industry in the broadest sense, the existing plants not only being worked but enlarged by all available means, and new ones built. The international conventions for the protection of the rights of neutral nations doubtless sprang

from the necessity of protecting the existing industries of neutral nations as far as possible from injury in their business. But it can in no event be in accordance with the spirit of true neutrality if, under the protection of such international stipulations, an entirely new industry is created in a neutral state, such as is the development of the arms industry in the United States, the business whereof, under the present conditions, can benefit only the belligerent powers.

Assuming a theoretical willingness to supply Germany, the case would not be altered. If America desired a true neutrality, the United States could prevent this one-sided trade or at least utilize the weapon which it offered, and by declaring an embargo protect legitimate trade with Germany, particularly in foodstuffs, it being probable that Great Britain could thus be made to acquiesce. Finally, the memorandum requested that the spirit of "genuine neutrality" that had actuated the United States in putting an embargo on the shipment of arms to Mexico should dictate a similar policy in