other writers, I shall confine myself substantially to the Constitution of the United States as it stands; to the complicated organization of political agents to whom the management of the government is confided; to the capacities, incapacities, rights, powers, and duties which have been conferred upon those agents; to the questions which have arisen and have been settled; and to those which have been discussed, but have not yet been put to rest. Or, to quote the language of Falck, I propose to answer, in respect to the United States, the three questions: In what hands has the exercise of the sovereign power been placed? To what law has this exercise been subjected? By what means and combinations has the observance of this law been assured?

§ 16. How must such a design be accomplished? In what method and by what materials must such a purpose be carried out? The Constitution of the United States is peculiar; no other one has existed in times past, or exists now, resembling it. The manner, form, and means of its study and exposition must therefore be very different from those which would be employed in treating of the Political Law of any other nation. The Constitution of England is unwritten and traditional; it has grown up by a historical development, and the historical element must enter largely into its discussion. The Constitution of France is written and formal, so far as the mere organization of the departments of government is concerned; but, in respect to the law which limits those departments, it is vague and indeterminate. And so, if we should examine the organic law of all the European nations, even when that law is written, none would be found which resembles our own.

The Constitution of the United States is peculiar in that it is all written; that it has nothing of tradition. The government and the people go to the instrument itself as the embodiment of all granted functions; the past is resorted to only for explanation and interpretation of the written word. It is, indeed, in all respects, a statute, a statute of vast and solemn import, enacted in the name of the people, and accepted by them as the basis of all other legislation, and therefore infinitely transcending all in importance and compulsive force;

but it is none the less a statute, an expression of legislative will in a written form.

The Constitution is peculiar in that, while it is full and extends over a wide field, and contains a large amount of detail, and expresses in a written form all the powers that are conferred upon the government, it is nevertheless not complete and exhaustive. It does not range through the entire extent. of governmental action. Conferring powers of a high national character, and absolutely supreme as far as they are granted, it withdraws a very large portion of governmental powers from the agents which it establishes, and thereby causes the juridical relations between these agents and the people, in respect to the matters thus withdrawn, to be a mere negation. In short, the Constitution is a written code creating functions perfect as far as they go; but the code is partial, not complete; in respect to much which occupies the attention of European governments, it is silent.

The Constitution is peculiar in that this written scheme not only organizes and constitutes the various departments of government, but defines and limits with care and precision all the capacities with which they are clothed. It establishes a law for them which is the formal and authoritative utterance, in a written form, of the will of the people, who possess sovereign power; and it provides efficient means for assuring the obser vance of that law.

Finally, the Constitution is peculiar in that it furnishes a method by which the people, in a legal and constitutional manner, may partially or wholly change the form and character of their government; obviating the necessity of revolutionary measures in case the plan adopted should fail of accomplishing the high purpose for which it was designed.

§ 17. In discussing, therefore, the powers, capacities, incapacities, rights, and duties of the governmental agents, all appeals to general ideas of civil polity, all references to the analogies of other forms and other nations from whom we may be supposed to have drawn some of our methods, all purely historical deductions, are and must be constantly restrained and limited by the letter itself of the written instrument. On the

other hand, this written instrument is so much one of enumeration rather than of description; is so much an expression of general grants of power rather than the embodiment, in a codified form, of minute detail, that an appeal to history, to the analogies of other political organizations, and to fundamental ideas of civil polity, of justice and equity, is not entirely superseded, nay, is often absolutely necessary. The work of the interpreter is not alone verbal; he may, to a considerable extent, strengthen his conclusions by a reference to the doctrines of General Political Law.

§ 18. The science of Political Law, as applied to the Constitution of the United States, demands from the student, the citizen, and the legislator, methods and qualities similar to those which are requisite for the lawyer and the judge in interpreting and expounding the terms of an ordinary statute. The reasons of this are obvious and imperative. The canons of verbal interpretation are everywhere the same in substance; they only vary in respect to the character of the writing to whose explanation they are applied. The method and habit of the lawyer are essentially identical with those of the historical critic or the biblical student. In the practical application of legal principles in the common affairs of life, the written agreement, the deed, the testament, the statute, are construed by the aid of the same rules, simply because they are written. The written constitution, merely because it is a constitution, can form no exception. The most that can be said is, that, as greater interests are involved which affect the state rather than the individual, all narrow and technical construction should, as far as possible, be avoided; the nature of the writing as an organic law should be allowed its full effect. Still, the truth remains, that the habit of thought of the lawyer is necessary to a correct understanding of the Constitution; and as, by our peculiar organization, the courts are called upon to apply this fundamental law to the acts of legislatures and executives, in testing the validity of these acts, it follows that the most authoritative expositions of the Constitution have been, and are, made by men trained in their profession and office to the lawyer-like habit.

It is no reproach to the Political Law of the United States that this method of study is necessary. Certain theorists have complained because the legal spirit has influenced legislators, judges, and jurists in their exposition of the Constitution. These persons have entirely failed to comprehend the nature of our form of government; to discern the essential differences between it and all others existing or past.

It may be that an unwritten, traditional, elastic constitution, capable of continuous development, able, like the Common Law, to adapt itself to the changing needs of society and the state, is superior to the written. It may be that an organic law cast in the mould of an iron code has intrinsic defects which expose the body-politic to grave dangers. Upon this question there may be difference of opinion. But one thing is sure, that the American people are unanimous in preferring their own written form. Indeed, so far from abandoning the plan, their tendency has constantly been to extend and enlarge it; and state constitutions, as remodelled from time to time, have been made more unyielding, more minute, more like an elaborate code. This tendency is no doubt to be regretted; its effects have been evil; it should, if possible, be resisted; but it conclusively shows that a written constitution, with all its results, be they good or evil, is preferred now even more decidedly than when the Convention submitted their labors to the country for approval. It cannot be denied that, by deciding in favor of a fundamental law contained in a written instrument, the people necessarily adopted with it the consequence that this instrument must be read, interpreted, expounded, in the same manner, by the same means and methods, which are appropriate to all other legislative acts. Indeed, the very advantage claimed for our American form of constitution is, that all powers, capacities, and duties are precisely defined by the written word; that there is no room left for sudden or even gradual encroachments upon the rights of the citizen; that, the writing remaining unaltered, the various departments of the government can ever be held to these plain utterances of the people's will.

§ 19. But, while it is necessary that the Constitution should,

from its very nature, be read and expounded by the aid of processes which the lawyer uses in interpreting a statute, the lawyer's technical and professional knowledge, training, experience, and skill are by no means required. In fact, the rules and principles of verbal criticism are essentially the same when applied to all writings: they are not arbitrary, but are based upon reason, and may be easily appreciated and employed by all persons of common understanding. The layman may comprehend the true meaning of a testament or of a statute as readily as a lawyer; but both would arrive at the result in the same manner; both would consciously or unconsciously apply the same rules to the resolution of a doubt, or the clearing up of an obscurity. The great mass of citizens, the electors who represent and act in the name of this body, the legislators who are chosen to carry on the constructive work of the government, are alike competent to approach the organic law in the true spirit, and interpret it with accuracy. This is the chief merit of our type of constitution, a merit which is often claimed for codes of private law. All may read, all may understand; the only uncertainty will be that which must always inhere in language, which can never be an absolutely perfect medium for the expression of thought.

§ 20. But, while this careful, textual, lawyer-like mode is indispensable in construing the fundamental law of the United States, there is still room for the more free, wide, and statesmanlike methods. The letter of the instrument is not so imperative as to shut out all but a verbal criticism. The whole field of political action not being occupied, the question constantly arises, what is the limit beyond which the government may not pass. The grants of power being rather enumerated than described, the inquiry must continually recur, what special acts may be done by virtue of these general concessions. To answer these all-important questions may well demand the highest resources of statesmanship in the legislators who make, in the executives who administer, and in the courts who expound, the laws, may well require of those who choose these representatives an education in the principles of civil polity far beyond that needed by any other people. The lessons