Bradley vs. Lill, Nolan, Supervisor, &c., 33 New York, 161. These cases were both reversed by the United States Supreme Court, on the ground that the state can only impose a tax upon the shares of national bank stock where it taxes the shares and not the capital of a state bank in the aggregate. Bradley vs. The People, 4 Wallace, 459; Van Allen vs. The Assessors, 3 do., 573. See also Tappan, Collector, &c., of Chicago, vs. Merchants' National Bank. 6 Legal News, 253, October Term, 1873.—[Reporter. HENRY BRADLEY vs. WILLIAM LILL. CIRCUIT COURT.-NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.—MARCH, 1861. 1. NOTE PAYABLE IN EXCHANGE.-The fact that a note is made payable in exchange does not prevent its being a promissory note, even though the rate of exchange is not specified. 2. COMPUTATION OF EXCHANGE.-The exchange, like interest, is an incident to the principal sum, and the rate is subject to proof; but when the proof is in, then the amount is a matter of computation. 3. AUTHORITY OF STATE DECISIONS.-On a commercial question this court is not bound to follow the decisions of the State Supreme Court, especially when contrary to the opinion of the mercantile community and the general opinion of the profession. Case of Lowe vs. Bliss, 24 Illinois, 168, disapproved. 4. The Illinois Statute of February 12, 1857, does not apply to a contract where no rate of interest is fixed by agreement. This was an action upon the following promissory note : $2,583 51. CHICAGO, ILL., Sept. 30th, 1859. One year after date, I promise to pay to the order of myself, two thousand five hundred and eighty-three dollars and fifty-one cents in exchange at the office of Messrs. Ashley & Norris, No. 52 Exchange Place, New York. Value received. (Signed) WILLIAM LILL. (Indorsed) William Lill. Bradley vs. Lill. The objection was taken that, being a note made in Illinois, although payable in New York, the note was governed by the Act of the Legislature of this state of Feb. 12, 1857, though the note did not on its face bear interest. It was also objected that the exchange was an uncertain and indefinite sum, and that a recent decision of the Supreme Court of this state, Lowe vs. Bliss et al., 24 Illinois, 168, rendered it inoperative as a note. The statute referred to is as follows: Where any contract or loan shall be made in this state, or between citizens of this state and any other state or country, bearing interest at any rate which was or shall be lawful according to any law of the state of Illinois, it shall and may be lawful to make the amount of principal and interest of such contract or loan payable in any other state or territory of the United States, or in the city of London, in England, and in all such cases such contract or loan shall be deemed and considered as governed by the laws of the State of Illinois, and shall not be affected by the laws of the state or country where the same shall be made payable.1 Davenport & Wilder, for plaintiff. Scates, McAllister & Jewett, for defendant. DRUMMOND, J.-The statute of Feb. 12th, 1857, does not apply to this case, because that contemplates a case where there was an amount of interest fixed by the agreement of the parties, in which event, if the rate was legal according to the laws of Illinois, the contract might be enforced, notwithstanding the money was made payable in another state or country, and the rate of interest greater than there allowed. This court has always held that the fact that a note is made payable in exchange, does not prevent its being a promissory note, and with all due respect to the Supreme Court of this state, I cannot concur in the opinion expressed in the case of Lowe vs. Bliss, recently decided. 24 Illinois, 168. 1 1 Gross' Statutes, Chap. 54, § 13; R. S., 1874, p. 615, § 9. Bradley vs. Lill. An instrument of writing by which A, at Chicago, promised to pay to B within a certain time one thousand dollars with the current rate of exchange on New York at maturity, is a promissory note, notwithstanding the rate of exchange was not specified. I admit that under the general law a note must be payable absolutely, in money. In the example given a thousand dollars was the sum payable; the exchange, like interest was an incident merely to the principal sum, and it was not the less on that account an agreement to pay a fixed sum. If a note be executed in England, payable "with interest" and a suit be brought on it here, the amount of the verdict or judgment is not a mere matter of computation, but proof must be introduced of the rate of interest in England, and the amount of the verdict or judgment, even after the proof is made, is greater or less, depending upon the fact whether the verdict is rendered to-day, next week or next year, the amount of interest increasing regularly by efflux of time; but when the proof is in, and the time established, then the amount becomes a matter of computation. So, when the proof as to exchange is in, and the time fixed, then also the amount is a matter of computation. principal amount and the time and control and determine the aggregate the other. If this suit were brought in the courts of this state, being a note payable in New York, the amount for which judgment would be rendered would have been ascertained, not from the face of the note itself, but by evidence before the court or jury of the law of New York as to interest. It would be only when that was done that the amount could become a matter of computation. In the one case the rate fixed by evidence, sum, and equally so in This court, therefore, till overruled by the Supreme Court of the United States, adheres to the view that it has always taken of this point, that an instrument of this kind is a promissory note. This is a commercial question, and this court is not bound to follow a decision of the Supreme Court of this state on this branch of the law; the more especially Bradley vs. Lill, when it is contrary to the opinion of the whole mercantile community, as shown by uniform practice, and contrary also to the general opinion of the profession. Demurrer overruled. The decision in the case of Lowe vs. Bliss, above referred to, was made by a divided court, and with reference to the statute of Illinois concerning negotiable paper, and was afterward commented upon in the case of Bilderback vs. Burlingame, 27 Illinois, 338, in which case it was further held, that an instrument admitting a certain sum to be due, which may be paid in merchandise in a fixed price, becomes an absolute money demand, on failure of the payee to deliver the merchandise when it is called for. A note expressed to be payable with current rate of exchange, at the place where it is drawn and is to be discharged, is payable in coin, and there is no rate of exchange connected with it. The words, "with current rate of exchange,” in such a note, are without significance. Hill vs. Todd, 29 Illinois, 101; Clauser vs. Stone, Ibid, 114. Where the note provides "the current rate of exchange to be added,” it is not a valid promissory note, even for the principal amount in the note. Philadelphia Bank vs. Newkirk, 2 Miles (Penn.), 442.-[Reporter. Smith vs. Tribune Co. GERRIT SMITH vs. TRIBUNE COMPANY. CIRCUIT COURT.-NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.-JULY, 1867. PLEADING ON LIBEL. 1. JUSTIFICATION.-A plea of justification must be as broad as the libel, and answer every material part of the declaration. 2. MATERIALITY OF ALLEGATION.-An allegation that the plaintiff, in order to avoid arrest for participation in an offense, feigned insanity, and took refuge in a lunatic asylum, is a material part of the libel. 3. SEPERATE PLEAS TO SEVERAL ALLEGATIONS.-It is not necessary that one particular plea answer the whole libel, if the whole is answered by the different pleas. The defendant may justify separately and distinctly, but in such case the pleas should purport to answer only the particular charges. 4. NEWSPAPER PRIVILEGE.-It is not a good plea that the plaintiff was a public man, a lecturer and speaker, and professed to be an educator of the public, and that the defendant, a public journal, made the publication complained of with good intent, having reason to believe it to be true; a journal has no right to make specific charges against a man, unless they were actually true, and honesty of motive is not a sufficient de. fense. 5. A demurrer to a count must take the innuendoes as alleged. 6. Plea of not guilty puts in issue the question whether the proof supports the innuendoes. Farwell & Smith, for plaintiff. Wirt Dexter and John Van Arman, for defendant. DRUMMOND, J.-The declaration contains various counts, among others one referring, by proper innuendoes, to the raid of John Brown into Virginia, the offense that he committed there, and his arrest, trial and execution for the offense; and the statement in these counts is that the libel which is refered to and set forth in them intended to convey |