In re Drummond. terms it applies to "any person" who accepts "any prefercnce," having reasonable cause to believe that the same was made or given by the debtor "contrary to any provisions" of the Bankrupt Act. This language as plainly and as strongly applies to involuntary as to voluntary bankruptcy; and to confine it to voluntary cases only, would be doing violence to the express words of the section. Secondly. Such a construction would be unfair and unjust as between preferred creditors. The creditor who receives a preference from a debtor, who is afterwards forced into involuntary bankruptcy, is certainly chargeable with no greater wrong than the creditor who receives a like preference from a debtor who subsequently becomes a voluntary bankrupt. In equity and conscience, they occupy the same ground. And if they both repair the wrong, by delivering up to the assignee whatever they received by way of preference, and thus equally put everything in statu quo, it would be most unfair to hold that in the voluntary case the creditor shall have his dividend, and that the creditor in the involuntary case shall be utterly precluded from asserting any claim on the estate of the bankrupt. Such a construction is so glaringly inequitable, that I cannot presume that Congress intended it. Counsel for Keen & Co. suggest that the provision cited from the 39th section is applicable only to such preferred creditors as do not voluntarily deliver up the money or property by which they obtained the preference, but hold to it till it is forced from them by a lawsuit. I am inclined to adopt this interpretation. It does no violence to the language of the provisions in question; and it reasonably reconciles the portions of them which on first view would seem repugnant. Moreover, I think the language cited from the 39th section will fairly bear this construction. That language is that “the assignee may recover back the money or other property so paid, conveyed, assigned, sold, or transferred, contrary to this act, provided the person receiving such payment or conveyance had reasonable cause to beleive that a fraud on this act In re Drummond. was intended, or that the debtor was insolvent; and such creditor shall not be allowed to prove his debt in bankruptcy. Now, whom does the phrase "such creditor," in this provision, comprehend? Does it mean all preferred creditors in bad faith? Or does it only refer to such creditors, as in bad faith have received a preference, and have refused to disgorge it till it was forced from them by a lawsuit? The phrase "such creditors" must refer to some creditors named before in the act. Grammatically, it is in the nature of a relative pronoun; and, like a relative pronoun, it has reference to an antecedent; and the rule in law, as in grammar, is that it generally refers to the last antecedent to which it may fairly apply. Here the last antecedent is obviously the preferred creditor whom the assignee in an action at law has forced to give up the money or property by which such creditor acquired a preference. To this sort of creditor only, I think, does the phrase "such creditor" apply; and surely it does no violence to any words or provisions of the act, so to apply it. On the contrary, I think that such a construction aids the other provisions in question by giving force and effect to them all, and is, at the same time, fairly consistant with all the words of the 39th section. No unfair, unjust, or absurd consequences follow this construction. It leaves the locus pœnitentiæ to every preferred creditor, whether in a case of voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy. It in effect says to him, If you will voluntarily surrender the property or money by which you obtained a fraudulent preference, and thereby put all parties interested in statu quo, you may have a fair dividend in the bankrupt's assets; but if you hold on to your unjust preference till it is forced from you by a lawsuit, and thus delay the proceedings in bankruptcy, to the injury of honest creditors, you shall, as a just punishment for your obstinacy and your fraud, be entirely precluded from asserting any claim on the assets of the bankrupt arising out of your fraudulently preferred debt. In re Drummond. I think, therefore, that the following rules are fairly deducible from these two sections of the Bankrupt Law: 1. Every creditor, who receives a preference by way of payment of his debt, or security for it, having at the time. reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent, or intends by such preference to violate any of the provisions of the Bankrupt Law, shall take no benefit by such preference. 2. Every creditor, receiving any fraudulent preference, who, after adjudication of bankruptcy, and before he is sued on account of such preference, shall voluntarily surrender to the assignee all property, money, benefit, and advantage received by him under such preference, may prove his debt and have his dividend, in like manner as if no preference had ever been given him. 3. Every creditor receiving any fraudulent preference, and not voluntarily surrendering the property, money, &c., which gave him such preference, or not surrendering the same till he is forced to do so by suit, shall, as a punishment for his fraud and obstinacy, forfeit all right to prove the debt so preferred, or to claim any dividend thereon. With these views I must decide, as I do, that on the supposition of the truth of all the matters set out in the written statement filed by the creditors who oppose the allowance of the claim of Keen & Co., they are nevertheless entitled to have their claim allowed, and to have their just dividend thereon. It follows that there is no necessity for me to try the issue of fact certified to me; for, even if that issue were decided against Keen & Co., they would be allowed their claim and dividend. It is ordered that the clerk certify this decision to the register. The surrender of a fraudulent preference must be made before judgment, but it lies in the discretion of the court to allow the creditor to surrender after suit brought and before judgment. In re E. R. Stephens, vol. 3, p. 187 of this Series. See In re Kipp, 4 Bankruptcy Register, 190. The Lewellen, A voluntary surrender, absolves the creditor from fraud and allows him to prove his debt, but not otherwise. In re Davidson, 3 Bankruptcy Register, 106; In re Hunt, et al., 5 do., 433. A fraudulent conveyance cannot be surrendered so as to allow the creditor to prove his claim. Bingham, assignee, vs. Richmond, 6 do., 127; same vs. Frost, and same vs. Williams, Id., 130. Paying a judgment recovered against the creditor is no surrender. In re Tonkin and Trewartha, 4 do., 13.-[Reporter. THE LEWELLEN. DISTRICT COURT.-DISTRICT OF INDIANA.-MAY, 1868. 1. JURISDICTION ON OHIO RIVER.-The admiralty jurisdiction of the national courts extends over the river Ohio. 2. POWER OF CONGRESS.-The power granted by the Constitution to Congress "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the sev eral states," includes the authority, not only to pass laws regulating trade, but also navigation and intercourse. 3. ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION.-The United States district courts have exclusive original jurisdiction of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime cognizance 4. The act of July 4, 1864, must be regarded as a navigation law. 5. NEGLECT TO PUT SYNOPSES OF LAWS ON STEAMER-PENALTY.— A proceeding in rem is the proper mode of prosecution for the violation of the 8th section of the act of July 4, 1864, charging a neglect to post up in conspicuous places in a steamer, synopses of the laws relating to the carriage of passengers, as required by that section. 6. PRACTICE-SEIZURE.-In proceedings in rem against vessels for penalties and forfeitures under acts of Congress, it is a general rule that a seizure of the vessels must precede the filing of the libels, in order to give jurisdiction The Lewellen. to the court; and that consequently such precedent seizure must be averred in the libel. But, if under the act of Congress, the owners execute delivery bonds, they thereby waive the objection of the want of a prior seizure. 7. DUTY OF STEAMER AS TO POSTING SYNOPSES OF LAWS.-The act of July 4, 1864, requiring that two copies of the synopsis of the laws relating to passengers on steamers, shall be posted up in every licensed and enrolled vessel carrying passengers, one copy thus posted up is no defense against a prosecution for a violation of the act. 8. Held, also, that if the owners of the steamer could not procure copies of the synopsis elsewhere, they were bound, at their peril, to apply for them to the Secretary of the Treasury; and that if they failed to do so, and proceeded on a voyage without the copies, the penalty was thereby incurred. A. Kilgore, U. S. District Attorney, and C. E. Marsh, for United States. Hanna & Knefler, for respondents. MCDONALD, J.-The libel in this case charges, that, on the 3d of September, 1867, at Evansville, Indiana, a port of delivery, the steamer Lewellen, being engaged in navigating the Ohio River along the coast of Indiana, carrying cabin and steerage passengers for hire, and being then and there temporarily landed and moored to the shore at Evansville in the regular course of passage on said river, and being wholly propelled by steam and subject to enrolment and license under the laws of the United States, the master and owners of said boat then and there wrongfully and unlawfully failed, neglected and refused to place and keep in conspicuous places on the boat two copies of a synopsis of such of the laws of the United States relating to the carriage of passengers and their safety on board of vessels propelled in whole or in part by steam, as had been theretofore prepared and published by the Secretary of the Treasury. The libel avers that said synopsis had been published and printed, and that copies of it might readily have been obtained by said master and owners. The libel alleges that, by reason of said negligence, a penalty of one hundred dollars has been forfeited to |