II.-STATE DIVISION

FOR THE ELECTION OF SENATORS.

By the act, entitled, " An act respecting the four great Senatorial Districts of this state," passed April 17, 1815, it is enacted, that from and after the first Tuesday in May, in the year one thousand eight hundred and fifteen, the four great districts of this state for the election of senators, shall respectively comprehend the following counties, to wit:

III-STATE DIVISION

FOR THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.

The act of 1813, for regulating the election of representatives for this state to congress, provides, that for the election of such representatives, this state shall be divided into the following districts, to wit:

First District. Suffolk, Queens, Kings, Richmond, and the first and second Wards of the city of New-York.

Second District. The third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth Wards of the city of New-York. Third District. Westchester and Rockland.

Fourth District. Putnam and Dutchess, exclusive of the towns of Redhook, Rhinebeek and Clinton.

Fifth District. Columbia and the towns of Redhook, Rhinebeek, and Clinton in Dutchess.

Sixth District.

Seventh District.

Eighth District.

Orange.

Ulster and Sullivan.
Greene and Delaware.

Ninth District. Albany County.

Tenth District.

Rensselaer.

Eleventh District. Saratoga.

Twelfth District. Washington, Warren, Essex and Clinton.
Thirteenth District. Schenectady and Schoharie.

Fourteenth District. Montgomery.

Fifteenth District. Otsego, Chenango and Broome.

Sixteenth District.

Seventeenth District.

Oneida.

Herkimer and Madison.
Lewis, Jefferson and St. Lawrence.
Nineteenth District. Onondaga and Cortland.

Eighteenth District.

Twentieth District. Cayuga, Seneca, Tioga and Steuben. Twenty-first District. Ontario, Allegany, Genesee, Niagara, Cattaraugus and Chatauque.

We subjoin that the ratio of representation in the House of Representatives in Congress, is one member for every 35,000 of the representative population of the United States. The members are apportioned, according to the third census, by the act of the 21st December, 1811, as follows:

OF THE GOVERNMENT AND LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK.

I. THE GOVERNMENT.

It is proper to remark, that there is a radical distinction between the government, and the administration of the body politic, inasmuch as the former is predicated on the fundamental principles of the constitution, and embraces all its provisions; whereas the latter implies the mere exercise of the powers which it derives from the former. A government may be good, when the administration is bad. The one may be compared to a fountain from whence the stream issues, and the other to the enjoyment of it. As long as a fountain remains pure, we know it will emit salutary waters; but the moment it is polluted, they become obnoxious. So with a government. While a people rally around it as the anchor of their rights and preserve inviolate their constitutional privileges, so long will they preserve the blessings of liberty. But where a depraved administration undermine or pervert the elementary ingredients of the government, there the rights of man are jeopardized.

The government of this state consists of three distinct branches: The Executive; the Legislative, and the Judicial. The first is committed to the management of the governor; the second to the senate and members of assembly, and the third to the judges and the courts of law, from the supreme court, down to the most inferior tribunals, according as it becomes the legal province of any of them to pronounce judgment.

It remains to be inquired how these three branches of our state government are constituted.

THE GOVERNOR. The seventeenth article of the constitution

declares, that the supreme executive power and authority of this state, shall be vested in a governor, and that statedly once in every three years, and as often as the seat of government shall become vacant, a wise and discreet freeholder of this state shall be by ballot elected governor by the freeholders of this state, possessed of freeholds of the value of one hundred pounds, over and above all debts and charges thereon.

The governor has a constitutional power to convene the assembly and senate on extraordinary occasions, to prorogue them from time to time, provided such prorogations shall not exceed sixty days in the space of a year; and at his discretion to grant reprieves and pardons to persons convicted of crimes, other than treason or murder, in which he may suspend the execution of the sentence, until it shall be reported to the legislature at their subsequent meeting; and they shall either pardon or direct the execution of the criminal, or grant a further reprieve. Con. N. Y.

No action lies against a governor of this state in the name of the people, to recover back any part of the money received by him, under the acts of the legislature, to defray the incidental charges arising in and about administering the government of this state; for what shall be deemed incidental charges, not being defined by law, they must necessarily be left to the discretion of the executive, under the control only of the legislature, and the propriety of the expenditures is not a subject of judicial cognizance. 7. Johns. Rep. 73.

THE SENATORS AND ASSEMBLYMEN. We have before seen how the senators and assemblymen were created our legislative body. We shall now subjoin that the former are elected by freeholders, possessing the same qualifications as those who may vote for governor, and that by the seventh article of the constitution, every male inhabitant of full age, who shall have personally resided within one of the counties of this state, for six months immediately preceding the day of election, shall at such election be entitled to vote for representatives of the said county in assembly, if during the time aforesaid, he shall have been a freeholder, possessing a freehold of the value of twenty pounds, within the said county, or have rented a tenement therein of the yearly value of forty shillings, and been rated and actually paid taxes in this state.

THE JUDICIARY. Our constitution does not expressly organise any of our courts of law, except the court for the trial of impeachments and the correction of errors. It, however, recognises the appointment of the officers of our respective legal tribunals, and designates the tenure and duration of their several offices. It will be found that no further provision on this subC

ject was necessary, when it is considered, that the founders of our constitution recognised the general principles of the ommon law of England, for the administration of which, courts had already been established under the colonial government, and which were in the full exercise of legal prerogatives at the time of the adoption of the constitution. The legislature have, however, the power to new model and regulate them as the public exigency and nature or spirit of our laws may require.

It is the business of the judges to explain and decide the laws as they find them, and not to agitate their constitutionality; because that would be to encroach on the powers of the legislature.* In fine, it is the duty of our legislature to make laws, of the judges to determine, and the governor to execute them. AGENCY OF THE THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT IN MAKING LAWS. All bills which have passed the senate and assembly, shall, before they become laws, be presented to the council of revision, (consisting of the governor for the time being, the chancellor and the judges of the supreme court, or any two of them together with the governor,) for their revisal and consideration. And if upon such revision and consideration, it should appear improper to the said council, or a majority of them, that the said bill become a law of this state, that they return the same, together with their objections thereto in writing, to the senate and house of assembly, in which soever the same shall have originated, who shall enter the objections sent down by the council, at large, in their minutes, and proceed to reconsider the said bill. But if after such reconsideration, two-thirds of the senate, or house of assembly shall, notwithstanding the said objections, agree to pass the same, it shall, together with the objections, be sent to the other branch of the legislature, where it shall be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of the members present, shall be a law. Provided, that if any bill

* When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be separated from the legislative and executive powers. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor. There would be an end of every thing, were the same man, or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and that of judging the crimes or differences of individuals.-Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws.