A party-rate ticket is not a mileage" or "excursion" ticket, within the provisions of this section; nor does it seem to be included in the phrase commutation ticket." The words "commutation ticket," in the language of the railway, are principally, if not wholly, used to designate tickets for transportation during a limited time between neighboring towns, or cities and suburban towns. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore & O. R. R., 145 U. S. 263, 36 L. Ed. 699, 12 Sup. Ct. 844, 4 Int. Com. Rep. 92 (1892).

Mileage tickets, issued under this clause, must be sold for a reasonable rate and without discrimination. Larrison v. Chicago & G. T. Ry., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 369, 1 I. C. C. 147 (1887); Troy Board of Trade v. Alabama M. Ry., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 1 (1894); Freight Bureau v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 195 (1895).

CHAPTER XXX.

DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN LOCALITIES.

§ 971. Provisions of the statute.

972. Amendments of 1906.

TOPIC A-UNDUE PREJUDICE.

§ 973. What constitutes undue prejudice.

974. Distance as a factor in the rate.

975. Group rates.

976. Difference between through and local rates.

977. Equalizing advantages.

978. Discrimination against staple industry of a locality.

979. Milling or compressing in transit.

980. Discrimination in facilities.

981. Instances of local discrimination.

TOPIC B-SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES AND

CONDITIONS.

§ 982. Substantial difference of conditions.

983. Competition.

TOPIC CLONG AND SHORT HAUL.

§ 984. General principles governing the section.

985. Competition.

986. Relief from operation of the section.

§ 971. Provisions of the statute.

Discrimination between localities.-Sec. 3. That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular descrip

tion of traffic, to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever. Interstate Commerce Act, section 3.]

Long and short haul clause.-Sec. 4. That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act to charge or receive any greater compensation in the aggregate for the transportation of passengers or of like kind of property, under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line, in the same direction, the shorter being included within the longer distance; but this shall not be construed as authorizing any common carrier within the terms of this act to charge and receive as great compensation for a shorter as for a longer distance.

Provided, however, that upon application to the Commission appointed under the provisions of this Act, such common carrier may, in special cases, after investigation by the Commission, be authorized to charge less for longer than for shorter distances for the transportation of passengers or property; and the Commission may from time to time prescribe the extent to which such designated common carrier may be relieved from the operation of this section of this Act. [Interstate Commerce Act, section 4.]

§ 972. Amendments of 1906.

That part of the Act which forbids discrimination between localities was untouched by the amendments of 1906, in spite of the fact that the administration of the long and short haul clause by the courts had given much dissatisfaction.

TOPIC A-UNDUE PREJUDICE.

[These matters are discussed fully in Chapter XXV.]

973. What constitutes undue prejudice.

It is not enough under the act that freight charges to a certain place should be reasonable. Rates must be relatively reasonable as compared

with those to other places in the same part of the country, in order to prevent unjust discrimination. Boards of Trade Union v. Chicago, M. & S. P. Ry., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 608 (1887); Detroit Board of Trade v. Grand Trunk Ry., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 199, 2 I. C. C. 315 (1888); Re Tariffs of Transcontinental Lines, 2 Int. Com. Rep. 203, 2 I. C. C. 324 (1888); Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce v. Flint & P. M. R. R., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 393, 2 I. C. C. 553 (1889); Manufacturers' & J. Union v. Minneapolis & S. L. Ry., 3 Int. Com. Rep. 115, 4 I. C. C. 79 (1890); Lynchburg Board of Trade v. Old Dominion S. S. Co., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 632 (1896); Phillips v. Louisville & N. R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 93 (1898). This discrimination may be made in other charges as well as transportation charges; for instance, demurrage charges. Pennsylvania Millers' State Assoc. v. Philadelphia & R. R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 531 (1900).

The prejudice is not illegal unless it is undue. New York Produce Exch. v. Baltimore & O. R. R., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 612 (1898). And whether this is the case is a question of fact. United States v. Tozer, 39 Fed. 369, 2 Int. Com. Rep. 597 (1889). In passing upon the question, it is not only legitimate, but proper, to take into consideration, besides the mere differences in charges, various elements, such as the convenience of the public, the fair interest of the carrier, the relative quantities or volume of the traffic involved, the relative cost of the services and profit to the company, and the situation and circumstances of the respective customers with reference to each other. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore & O. R. R., 145 U. S. 263, 36 L. Ed. 699, 12 Sup. Ct. 844, 4 Int. Com. Rep. 92 (1892); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago G. W. Ry., 141 Fed. 1003 (1905); Lincoln Board of Trade v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 98, 2 I. C. C. 155 (1888); Tifton v. Louisville & N. R. R., 9 I. C. C. Rep. 160 (1902).

In order to violate the Act, the prejudice alleged must result from the act of the carrier charged with it. Wilmington Tariff Assoc. v. Cincinnati, P. & V. A. R., 9 I. C. C. Rep. 118 (1902). A carrier cannot be said to discriminate against a town which it does not reach. Eau Claire Board of Trade v. Chicago, M. & S. P. Ry., 4 Int. Com. Rep. 65, 5 I. C. C. 264 (1892); nor is it responsible for rates made by a connecting road. Crews v. Richmond & D. R. R., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 703, 1 I. C. C. 401 (1888).

§ 974. Distance as a factor in the rate.

In comparing rates from two points to a common destination, distance is the first factor to consider, though it is not controlling or always the most important. As has often been stated, rates are not made on a toumile basis, and they cannot be expected to bear an exact proportion to the distance. La Crosse M. & J. Union v. Chicago, M. & S. P. Ry., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 9, 1 I. C. C. 629 (1888); Business Men's Assoc. v. Chicago, S. P. M. & O R. R., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 41, 2 I. C. C. 52 (1888); Business Men's Assoc.

v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 48, 2 I. C. C. 73 (1888); Lincolu Board of Trade v. Burlington & M. R. R., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 95, 2 I. C. C. 147 (1888); Poughkeepsie Iron Co. v. New York C. & H. R. R. R., 3 Int. Com. Rep. 248, 4 I. C. C. 195 (1890); James & M. B. Co. v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry., 3 Int. Com. Rep. 682 (1891); Board of Railway Comrs. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 304 (1899). If, however, the localities are neighboring ones and the conditions substantially the same distance should govern. James v. East Tenn., V. & G. R. R., 2 Int. Com Rep. 609, 3 I. C. C. 225 (1889); Eau Claire Board of Trade v. Chicago M. & S. P. Ry., 4 Int. Com. Rep. 65, 5 I. C. C. 264 (1892); Hill v. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 343 (1895); Brewer v. Louisville & N. R. R., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 224 (1897); Re Alleged Violations of Act, 8 I. C. C. Rep. 290 (1899). In any case the relative difference should not be arbitrary or unreasonable. Toledo Produce Exch. v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. R., 3 Int. Com. Rep. 830, 5 I. C. C. 166 (1891); Gerke Brew. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 4 Int. Com. Rep. 267, 5 I C. C. 596 (1893); Rea v. Mobile & O. Ry., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 43 (1897). The comparative distance should be tested by the distance over the shortest available routes from the place of shipment to the points in question. Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 481 ›(1898). Ante, §§ 622-632.

975. Group rates.

Group rates, by which neighboring stations are grouped with a competitive point and take the same rates, and the Southern system of basingpoints, by which non-competitive stations take the rate to the nearest competitive point plus the local rate thence, are legal, and do not unduly prejudice the non-competitive points. Ante, §§ 633-638. The system of basing-points was held illegal by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Hamilton v. Chattanooga, R. & C. R. R., 3 Int. Com. Rep. 482, 4 I. C. C. 686 (1890); Perry v. Florida, C. & P. R. R., 3 Int. Com. Rep. 740, 5 I. C. C. 97 (1891); Hill v. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 343 (1895); Gustin v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 277 (1899); Hampton Board of Trade v. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 503 (1900). The Supreme Court has, however, held that practice legal. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. R., 190 U. S. 273, 47 L. Ed. 1047, 23 Sup. Ct. 687 (1903).

976. Difference between through and local rates.

Since a rate for a longer haul may properly be lower in proportion than the rate for a shorter haul, it follows that a through rate over several roads may be proportionally smaller than the local rate over one of the roads; and in the division of a through rate one road may therefore properly accept a smaller amount than it would charge for a carriage only to