continuous carriage or shipment, from a place in the United States to a place in an adjacent foreign country. The common carriers engaged in such transportation are subject to the provisions of the act in respect to the printing of schedules of rates, fares, and charges for the traffic they carry, the posting and filing with the Interstate Commerce Commission of copies of such schedules, the notice of advances or reductions, and the maintenance of the rates, fares, and charges established and published and in force at the time; and to the provisions of the act in respect to joint tariffs of rates, fares, and charges for continuous lines or routes. It was therefore held by the Commission that the Grand Trunk Railway of Canada violated the act by allowing a rebate on goods shipped from Buffalo to Canadian points. Re Grand Trunk Ry., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 496, 3 I. C. C. 89 (1889). But in order to violate the act the giving of the rebate or other violation must take place within the United States, since an act of Congress cannot affect the legality of anything done outside its jurisdiction. Therefore the giving by an international carrier of special rates outside the United States cannot be punished under the act. United States v. Knight, 3 Int. Com. Rep. 801 (1891). Nor can discrimination between places in Canada. Cist v. Michigan Central R. R., 10 Int. Com. Rep. 217 (1904). And the regulation of the transportation of foreign merchandise from a port of entry to a place within the United States upon a through bill of lading does not extend to the control of rates made in the foreign port for its carriage to the port of entry of the United States or to a foreign country adjacent. New York Bd. of Trade & Transp. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 3 Int. Com. Rep. 417, 4 I. C. C. 447 (1890).

TOPIC B-WHAT IS INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

[See chapter XLII as to the constitutional questions involved.]

§ 895. What are States?

Commerce between an Indian reservation and other parts of the State in which it is situated is not interstate commerce. Selkirk v. Stevens, 72 Minn. 335, 75 N. W. 386, 40 L. R. A. 759 (1898). But commerce between the District of Columbia and the State of Maryland is interstate, and may constitutionally be regulated by the act. Willson v. Rock Creek R. R., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 83 (1897).

896. Nature of interstate traffic.

The purely internal commerce of a State is that which is confined within its limits, which originates and ends within the State. The question, what is the entire transit upon which goods or passengers are being car

ried, has already been discussed (ante, Chap. XX); and the question whether a certain transaction constitutes interstate commerce must be determined by ascertaining, on the principles heretofore discussed, what the real transit is, and whether that traffic is or is not between separate States. Whenever a commodity has begun to move as an article of trade from one State to another, commerce in that commodity between the States has commenced. The fact that several different and independent agencies are employed in transporting the commodity, some acting entirely in one State and some acting through two or more States, in no respect affects the character of the transaction. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 19 L. Ed. 999 (1871). A train composed of empty coal cars, although destined for a point in another State to procure a load, is not engaged in transporting articles of interstate commerce so as to be beyond the control of State laws. Norfolk & W. R. R. v. Com., 93 Va. 749, 24 S. E. 837, 34 L. R. A. 105 (1896).

§ 897. Termini within a single State, route passes through

a second State.

The Interstate Commerce Commission has held that commerce between points in the same State, but which in being carried from one place to the other passes through another State, is interstate commerce, and subject to regulation by the provisions of the act to regulate commerce. New Orleans Cotton Exch. v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 519, 2 I. C. C. 375 (1889); Milk Producers' Protective Assoc. v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 92 (1897). The same doctrine has been held in a few of the State courts. State v. Chicago, S. P., M. & O. R. R., 40 Minn. 267, 2 Int. Com. Rep. 519, 3 L. R. A. 238 (1889); Delaware & H. C. Co. v. Com. (Pa.), 2 Int. Com. Rep. 222 (1888); Sternberger v. Cape Fear & Y. V. R. R., 29 S. C. 510, 2 Int. Com. Rep. 426 (1888). But it has been finally decided that such commerce, since it does not involve intercourse or exchange between different States, is not interstate commerce. Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U. S. 192, 36 L. Ed. 672, 12 Sup. Ct. 806, 4 Int. Com. Rep. 87 (1892); United States v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 115 Fed. 373 (1902); Seawell v. Kansas City, F. S. & M. R. R., 119 Mo. 222, 24 S. W. 1002, 5 Int. Com. Rep. 262 (1893); Dillon v. Erie R. R., 19 N. Y. Misc. 116, 43 N. Y. Supp. 320 (1897). See, however, Kansas City S. Ry. v. Railroad Comrs., 106 Fed. 353 (1901).

§ 898. Breaking continuity of interstate shipment.

If the transporting of goods or passengers to an ultimate destination in another State has begun, interstate commerce has begun, and no device to break up the transit into intra-state portions will affect its real naturc. So where transportation of goods destined for a point without the State has been actually begun, temporary stoppage within the State, without the

intention of abandoning the original movement (which movement is ultimately completed), will not deprive the transportation of the character of interstate commerce. Delaware & H. C. Co. v. Com. (Pa.), 2 Int. Com. Rep. 222 (1888). And so if the goods are first billed to a point in the State of shipment, and at that point are rebilled to their ultimate destination in another State, without breaking of bulk, the whole constitutes a single carriage. Cutting v. Florida Ry. & Nav. Co., 46 Fed. 641, 4 Int. Com. Rep. 424 (1891); Texas & P. Ry. v. Avery (Tex. Civ. App.), 33 S. W. 704 (1895); Houston D. & N. Co. v. Insurance Co., 89 Tex. 1, 32 S. W. 889, 30 L. R. A. 713, 59 Am. St. Rep. 17 (1895); Mexican Nat. R. R. v. Savage (Tex. Civ. App.), 41 S. W. 663 (1897); State v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. (Tex. Civ. App.), 44 S. W. 542 (1898).

The continuity of the carriage of freight over a line formed by two or more roads is not broken in fact and cannot be broken in law by the charge of a local rate by one or more of such roads as its proportion of the through rate; nor can the obligations imposed by the statute be evaded by the demand of the local charge for the haul over its own road by one or more of such carriers or by the declaration on the part of one or more of said carriers that as to the transportation over its road it is a local and not a through carrier. Troy Board of Trade v. Alabama Midland Ry., 4 Int. Com. Rep. 306, 6 I. C. C. Rep. 1 (1894). Neither is the continuity of the shipment broken by a sale of the goods in transitu. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Fort Grain Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 72 S. W. 419 (1903). If, however, the goods are consigned to a dealer and he, selling them before arrival, rebills to the purchaser without breaking bulk, the two carriages are distinct. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. State, 97 Tex. 274, 78 S. W. 495 (1904).

$899. End of the interstate transit.

On the principle already examined, the transit is a single unit, continuing from the time of the original shipment to the ultimate end of the carriage; and where the beginning and end are in different States, the entire transit from beginning to end is interstate. It does not cease to be interstate when the goods finally enter the State of destination; it continues an interstate transit even within that State, until delivery. Cattle Raisers' Assoc. v. Fort Worth & D. C. Ry., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 513 (1898); State v. Southern K. Ry. (Tex. Civ. App.), 49 S. W. 252 (1899).

TOPIC C-CONTINUOUS CARRIAGE UNDER COMMON CONTROL.

[See generally as to through transportation, chapter XIX.]

$900. Common arrangement.

When goods are shipped under a through bill of lading from a point in one State to a point in another, are received in transit by a State common

carrier, under a conventional division of the charges, such carrier must be deemed to have subjected its road to an arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment, within the meaning of the act. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 184, 40 L. Ed. 935, 16 Sup. Ct. 700, 5 Int. Com. Rep. 391 (1896); Louisville & N. R. R. v. Behlmer, 175 U. S. 648, 44 L. Ed. 309, 20 Sup. Ct. 209 (1899); United States v. Seaboard Ry., 82 Fed. 563 (1897); Interstate S. Y. Co. v. Indianapolis U. Ry., 99 Fed. 472 (1900); Troy Board of Trade v. Alabama Midland Ry., 4 Int. Com. Rep. 348, 6 I. C. C. 1 (1894); Daniels v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 458 (1895); Pennsylvania Millers' State Assoc. v. Philadelphia & R. R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 531 (1900). The receipt successively by two or more carriers for transportation, of traffic shipped under through bills for continuous carriage over their lines, is assent to such a "common arrangement;" and previous formal arrangement between them is not necessary to bring such transportation under the terms of the Interstate Commerce Law. Trammell v. Clyde Steamship Co., 4 Int. Com. Rep. 120, 5 I. C. C. 324 (1892).

In the case of carriage of passengers a similar interpretation will be made; assent by a carrier to the issue of a through ticket over several railroads constitutes an arrangement for continuous carriage. Carrey v. Spencer, 72 N. Y. State Rep. 108, 36 N. Y. Supp. 886, 5 Int Com. Rep. 636 (1896); Missouri, K. & T. R. R. v. Fookes (Tex. Civ. App.), 40 S. W. 858 (1897).

The through billing and rating is the usual but by no means the only method of manifesting a common arrangement. Thus such common arrangement exists in a case where the initial carrier furnishes the shipper with a car specially fitted up for his business, which is taken over connecting roads on special through time tables. Boston Fruit & P. Exch. v. New York & N. E. R. R., 3 Int. Com. Rep. 493, 4 I. C. C. 664 (1890). So where a short line of railroad, entirely within a State, was operated entirely by an interstate railroad as a link in interstate carriage, there was common control. Heck v. East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 775, 1 I. C. C. 495 (1887).

TOPIC D-CARRIERS SUBJECT TO THE ACT.

[See generally as to common carriage, chapter III-VI.]

§ 901. Kind of carrier subject to the Act.

A carrier of passengers is as much subject to the Act as a carrier of goods. Louisville, N. O. & T. T. R. R., v. State, 66 Miss. 662, 6 So. 203, 2 Int. Com. Rep. (1888). A street railway is subject to the act. Willson v. Rock Creek R. R., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 83 (1897).

An express business conducted by a railroad company is subject to the act, but not an independent express company. Re Express Companies, 1

Int. Com. Rep. 22, 1 I. C. C. 349 (1887); United States v. Morsman, 42 Fed. 448, 3 Int. Com. Rep. 112 (1890); Southern Ind. Exp. Co. v. United States Exp. Co., 88 Fed. 659, affirmed 92 Fed. 1022, 35 C. C. A. 172 (1898, 1899). Independent express companies are made subject to the Act by the Act of 1906.

A company which supplies a roadbed only, over which other companies carry, and not being itself a carrier, is not subject to the act. So of a bridge company. Kentucky & I. Bridge Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 37 Fed. 567, 2 L. R. A. 289, 2 Int. Com. Rep. 351 (1889), appeal dismissed 149 U. S. 777, 37 L. Ed. 964, 13 Sup. Ct. 1048 (1892). So of a stock-yards company. Cattle Raisers' Assoc. v. Fort Worth & D. C. Ry., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 513 (1898). If, however, such a company is chartered as a carrier, it appears to be subject to the Act, though the transportation is actually furnished by another. Heck v. East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 775, 1 I. C. C. 495 (1887).

Similarly a company which simply furnishes cars for another company to haul, not being a carrier, is not subject to the act. Burton Stock Car Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 329, 1 I. C. C. 132 (1887).

902. Carriage wholly within the State.

Even though passengers or goods are being carried between two States, a carrier transporting them may nevertheless not be engaged in interstate commerce. Though a carrier receives goods directed to a point outside the State, he is not an interstate carrier if he is only to carry within the State and there deliver to an entirely independent succeeding carrier, with whom he has no common arrangement. Missouri & I. R. R. T. & L. Co. v. Cape Girardeau S. W. Ry., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 607, 1 I. C. C. 30 (1887); Ex parte Koehler, 30 Fed. 867, 1 Int. Com. Rep. 28 (1887). So if the carrier receives within the State of destination goods brought from without the State by an entirely independent carrier, the receiving carrier is not engaged in interstate commerce. Fort Worth & D. C. Ry. v. Whitehead, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 595, 26 S. W. 172 (1894).

This is commonly the case where the intrastate carrier does not issue a through bill of lading, or receive freight upon through bills issued by an interstate carrier. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Bellaire, Z. & C. Ry., 77 Fed. 942 (1897); United States v. Chicago, K. & S. R. R., 81 Fed. 783 (1897).

So where goods were shipped in New Jersey, directed to a consignee in New York, but carried only to Jersey City and there received by the consignees, the shipment is not interstate. New Jersey Fruit Exchange v. Central R. R., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 84, 2 I. C. C. 142 (1888).

A mere switching company which transfers goods from one carrier to another within the State, entirely without reference to their final destination, is not engaged in interstate commerce, whatever the destination of