when proceeding to or coming from its trains, or than a carrier may charge the shipper for the use of its general freight depot in merely delivering his goods for shipment, or the consignee of such goods for its use in merely receiving them there within a reasonable time after they are unloaded from the cars. If the carrier may not make such special charges in respect to stockyards which itself owns, maintains, or controls, it cannot invest another corporation or company with authority to impose burdens of that kind upon shippers and consignees. The transportation of live stock begins with their delivery to the carrier to be loaded upon its cars, and ends only after the stock is unloaded. and delivered, or offered to be delivered, to the consignee, if to be found, at such place as admits of their being safely taken into possession." 11

8701. Terminals regarded as connections.

But despite these general principles, a scheme has been worked out which has received the sanction of the Supreme Court of the United States whereby the railroad may treat stockyards which have their own railways as connecting carriers and add their rates for their services to the railroad's rate for its service. In deciding the validity of this, Mr. Justice White for the court said:12 "As the right of the defendant carriers to divide their rates and thus to make a distinct charge from the point of shipment to Chicago and a separate terminal charge for delivery to the stock yards, a point beyond the lines of the respective carriers, was conceded by the Commission and was

11 See accord Union Trust Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 64 Fed. 992 (1894); and Butchers' & D. S. Y. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 67 Fed. 35 (1895). But see Walker v. Keenan, 73 Fed. 758, 19 C. C. A. 668 (1896); and Central S. Y. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 192 U. S. 568, 48 L. Ed. 565, 24 Sup. Ct. 339 (1905).

12 Interstate Com. Com. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 186 U. S. 320, 46 L. Ed. 1182, 22 Sup. Ct. 824 (1904), affirming 103 Fed. 249, 43 C. C. A. 209 (1900), and 98 Fed. 173 (1899).

upheld by the Circuit Court of Appeals, no contention on this subject arises. If, despite this concurrence of opinion, controversy was presented on the subject, we see no reason to doubt, under the facts of this case, the correctness of the rule as to the right to divide the rate, admitted by the commission and announced by the court below. This is especially the case in view of the sixth section of the act to regulate commerce, wherein it is provided that the schedules of rates to be filed by carriers shall'state separately the terminal charges and any rules or regulations which could in anywise change, affect or determine any part of the aggregate of the aforesaid rates and fares and charges.' Whether the rule which we approve as applied to the facts in this case would be applicable to terminal services by a carrier on his own line which he was obliged to perform as a necessary incident of his contract to carry, and the performance of which was demanded of him by the shipper, is a question which does not arise on this record, and as to which we are, therefore, called upon to express no opinion." 13

§ 702. Services after carriage is ended.

Common carriers by railroad in the United States have never followed a general custom of permitting their freight depots to be used for storage or general warehouse purposes, or of allowing their cars to be retained in the possession of shippers or consignees beyond a reasonable time for loading or unloading freight. It has been the common understanding, based upon specific rules and regulations issued by the carriers from time to time, that freight depots, cars, and sidings of carriers can only be kept in condition for the necessary reception and handling of goods in the daily course of transportation business by prompt

13 The issues in this case have been repeatedly before the Interstate Commerce Commission. See, especially, Cattle R. A. of Texas v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 83 (1904); Same v. Same, 11 I. C. C. Rep. 277 (1905).

forwarding of freights and quickly completing delivery of transported goods to the consignees. Among the rules or regulations commonly in force upon railways and intended to effectuate the prompt shipment, carriage and delivery of freights, are the following: (a) The loading of cars furnished for shipments within 24 hours or other short specified time, under penalty of a demurrage charge for detaining the cars, which is in most cases $1.00 for each additional day or fraction thereof; and a similar regulation is applied to the unloading of cars by consignees on team tracks or private sidings. (b) The removal of goods from freight houses within a specified time, usually 24 or 48 hours, after notice of arrival to consignee, under penalty of storage at the freight house or at public warehouse and collection of additional charges therefor.

In various ways these generally described regulations are specifically stated in published freight classifications, car service rules, rate schedules, special circulars, so-called billing instructions, or bills of lading forms. They amount to conditions imposed by the carriers upon the shipment, transportation, and delivery of freight, which are not to be disregarded by shippers or consignees without incurring liability to additional expense.14

703. Storage charges.

After transportation is at an end and the goods ready for delivery to the consignee the obligation of the common carrier ceases to a certain extent, and if the goods are left upon its hands for a time by the owners it would seem plain that having performed the services for which freight was paid it, it can make additional charges for storage of the goods with it. More than this, since to provide such storage is no part of the carrier's duty as such, it is not confined as it is in services during carriage to charge no more than the usual price for warehousing. This

14 See Miller v. Georgia Ry. & B. Co., 88 Ga. 563, 15 S. E. 316 (1891).

was pointed out to a complainant by the Interstate Commerce Commission in the quotation which follows:15

"We cannot agree with the contention of the complainant in this case that the defendants had no right to charge for the storage of the freight in question more than the usual public warehouse charge in force at Macon, Georgia and Columbia, South Carolina. A railroad freight depot and a public storage warehouse are buildings whose business and uses are wholly dissimilar. The former is planned and built to accommodate the current business of the railroad when expeditiously handled, and affords no facilities for storage during long periods of time. The storage warehouse is especially designed for storage purposes. The railway company imposes storage charges, not for gain especially, but in order that it may be enabled to clear its depots to the end that current business may not be blockaded."

704. Demurrage of cars.

Again, since the use of the cars at the end of the route is no part of the carrier's public undertaking, a charge for demurrage of cars is a charge distinct from the charge for carriage, and it may therefore be made as a separate charge.16 Indeed, so entirely distinct is it from the charge for carriage that by the weight of authority no lien exists to enforce it,17 unless of course there is an express contract permitting such a lien.

The extent of the limitations under which railroads by public announcements may make charges for demurrage of cars is well

15 Blackman v. Southern Ry., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 350 (1904).

16 Brown v. Grand Trunk Ry., 54 N. H. 535 (1874).

17 Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Jenkins, 103 Ill. 588 (1882); Cleveland, C., C. & S. L. Ry. v. Holden, 73 Ill. App. 582 (1898); Burlington & M. R. R. R. v. Chicago Lumber Co., 15 Neb. 390, 19 N. W. 451, B. & W. 290 (1884); Crommelin v. New York & H. R. R., 10 Bosw. (N. Y.) 77 (1868); East Tennessee V. & G. R. R. v. Hunt, 15 Lea (Tenn.), 261 (1885). Contra, Kansas Pac. Ry. v. McCann, 2 Wyo. 3 (1877).

discussed by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky 18 in the extract which follows: "Whether a charge of one dollar per day or fraction thereof, made for detention of cars and use of track on cars not unloaded within 48 hours after arrival, not including Sundays and legal holidays, and on empty cars not loaded within 48 hours after being placed, is a reasonable charge, and the time fixed for the loading and unloading, as required in the rule, is a reasonable time, are questions of fact, and on these issues the preponderance of the proof is clearly with the carriers. The rule must allow time enough to meet all cases likely to arise, and that such is the case here is abundantly shown by the testimony. That the rate of one dollar per day is also reasonable is conclusively shown. It may be somewhat more than the usual per cent. on the first cost of a car, but this is not the proper criterion. A railroad company does not construct cars for the purpose of storing property in them, and their use for transportation involves the use of costly railway tracks, and other expenditures. It may be true, as contended, that the shipper was not consulted in framing these rules. We think, however, if the rules are reasonable, this fact does not vitiate them. No complaint is made that there was an attempt to enforce them before ample notice had been given of their adoption. So, too, if the rules are reasonable, the fact there is not reciprocity of indemnity or counter penalties provided, cannot avail the appellant. If there is any principle of law well understood by shippers, it is that, for any dereliction of duty, the common carrier may be held accountable."

18 Kentucky Wagon Manufacturing Co. v. Ohio & M. Ry., 32 S. W. 595, 17 Ky. Law Rep. 726 (1895).