point of departure to his destination, since what he desires to do is to continue the original journey.21

In Pennington v. Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad 22 Justice Bryan said in the course of an excellent discussion: "The plaintiff was required to leave the cars at Back River Station, on his journey back to Baltimore from Perryman's. After he had left the cars and while on the platform he offered to pay the conductor his fare from that station to Baltimore, but the conductor refused to give him admission to the cars. The plaintiff had already accomplished a portion of the return journey to Baltimore without paying his fare. He clearly was not entitled to be conveyed from Perryman's to Baltimore without paying fare for the whole distance. If he had been carried from Back River Station to Baltimore, on payment of the fare only from that place, he would have escaped payment of a portion of the fare: and so, in fact, he would have accomplished the return trip at a reduced rate. The company was under no obligation to carry him for less than the full rate for the whole distance, and so he was properly excluded from the cars."

§ 679. Change of destination during the journey.

If a passenger takes a train intending to go to an intermediate station, but during his journey changes his mind and determines to go further, he is still proposing to take a single journey, and must pay the difference between the fare he has already paid and the entire fare for the whole journey he decides to take; but upon doing so he would, it seems, have a right to stay in the train and complete his journey.23 Such a

21 Manning v. Louisville & N. R. R., 95 Ala. 392, 11 So. 8, 36 Am. St. Rep. 225, 16 L. R. A. 55 (1891); Pennington v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. R., 62 Md. 95, B. & W. 147 (1883); Stone v. Chicago & N. W. R. R.. 47 Iowa, 82, 29 Am. Rep. 458 (1878); Swan v. Manchester & L. R. R., 132 Mass. 116, 42 Am. Rep. 432 (1882).

22 Supra.

23 See Louisville & N. R. R. v. Breckinridge, 99 Ky. 1, 34 S. W. 702 (1896).

case was supposed in the argument of an Australian case, and it was urged that the passenger might be obliged to wait at the intermediate station for the next train. The court, however, said: "He need do nothing of the kind. have to do would be to remain in his seat, and tell the guard that he wanted to go on to Dubbo, and pay the difference in the fare."24

All that he would

Even if he originally bought a ticket to the intermediate station he would not have a right to buy a ticket for the remaining portion of his journey; the railroad could insist that he pay the excess fare. On the other hand, the railroad could doubtless require that he buy a ticket for the remainder of his journey or else pay the fare for the entire journey, receiving back his ticket for the first part of it. In London & Northwestern Railway v. Hinchcliffe,25 the facts of which have already been stated, Mr. Justice Wills said: "I am inclined to think it does not make any difference whether the passenger originally intended to book for Manchester or only for Stalybridge, because when he elected to stay in the train at Stalybridge and go on in that train without rebooking, he elected to propose to the company that they should make it one through journey for him from Huddersfield to Manchester; and if so then the company, by accepting that altered state of things, instead of turning him out and requiring him to rebook, made a further contract that they would carry him the whole distance from Huddersfield to Manchester, and therefore were entitled to charge the whole fare."

§ 680. Second journey on same train.

It was seen earlier in this chapter that a single journey is treated as an entirety. It does not, however, necessarily follow because a person goes beyond his first destination on the same

24 Davies v. Williamson, 21 New So. Wales L. R. (Law) 124 (1899). 25 [1903] 2 K. B. 32.

train that there may not really be two separate journeys. If the train waits long enough at the intermediate station, the passenger may complete the object of his first journey and undertake another quite independent journey on the same train. Thus where the defendant bought a ticket from M to F, intending to remain at F long enough to transact some business there and then go on to X; and the train waited at F forty minutes, which proved to be long enough for the defendant to transact his business, and he therefore took the same train for X, he was held not to be guilty (under the rule recited above) of rebooking at an intermediate station while upon the same journey,26

§ 681. Non-payment of charges for prior carriages.

The payment of compensation for previous carriages cannot be made a condition of accepting a passenger. Where one holding a season ticket had insisted on one occasion on riding without showing his ticket, it was held that he could be ejected from that train rightfully, but that he could not on that account be refused the right (which was offered to the public generally) of purchasing another season ticket.27 The court considered such a refusal as inconsistent with the public duty of the common carrier, saying: "We think that this misconduct 'did not justify the company in excluding the relator thereafter from a privilege in which as a member of the community he was entitled to participate, in common with others of the public. Such a measure of punitive justice has not been granted by any statute, and if inflicted by any regulation of the company-which it is not-would be an unreasonable exercise of the company's power to make rules and regulations for the government of passengers.'

26 Flannery v. Hastings, 15 Austral. L. T. 1 (1893).

27 Atwater v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 48 N. J. Law, 55 (1886).

§ 682. Effect of repudiation upon the applicants' rights.

If, however, there has been a dispute about the correctness of past charges, on account of which they have not been paid, and the shipper gives notice that he will pay for the present shipment only the amount claimed by him to be due, the carrier may of course refuse to carry the goods. The case of Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad v. Searles,28 while not involving precisely this point, really covers it both in its reasoning and in the effect of the decision. This was a bill for a mandatory injunction commanding the carrier to deliver to the plaintiff upon his switch cars consigned to him. The plaintiff had refused to accept the assessment for demurrage made against him by the Louisiana Car Service Association, and to pay the amount of demurrage so assessed or assessed in future by the association; and the defendant carrier refused on that account to make further delivery upon the plaintiff's switch. The court refused the injunction. In the course of his opinion Mr. Justice Truly expressed the following views on the point under consideration:

"No past violation of contract on the part of a consignee can justify a carrier in failing to discharge a present duty. But in the case at bar, according to the testimony for the appellant, not directly denied by appellee, appellee not only arbitrarily refused to pay demurrage charges which had accrued in the past, but expressed his intention of persisting in his refusal even should such charges be justly incurred in the future. If this be true, appellant was warranted in its refusal to further switch and place cars at appellee's warehouse. By delivering the cars at the warehouse appellant would have lost its lien, and could only have collected its charges from appellee directly, and he had already evidenced his intention of not paying. We know of no principal of law under which any one can announce an intention of not paying for a particular service, and still rightfully demand that such service shall be rendered; particularly

28 85 Miss. 520, 37 So. 939 (1905).

where the charge for such service is admitted to be just and reasonable, and is in fact paid by all others who enjoy the benefit of it."

TOPIC C-THE SHIPMENT THE UNIT IN THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS.

§ 683. Maritime freight.

Freight is a single thing, and cannot be broken up into two or more separate claims. The carrier may be entitled to it, or he may not yet have entitled himself to it; but he is entitled to the whole or nothing. It becomes important, therefore, to examine more closely into the nature of freight, and determine when the right to it accrues.

In the maritime law, freight is a separate maritime interest, distinct from vessel and cargo, and like them dependent upon the safety of the voyage. It comes into being as an existent interest as soon as the voyage begins, that is, at the moment when the vessel "breaks ground;" 1 but it is not earned until the voyage is completed, and it is for that reason at risk until it is earned. It may be insured, libelled, or transferred as a separate interest.

1

§ 684. Right to compensation by agreement in case of carriage by sea.

Wherever there is an agreement, on the one side to carry and on the other to pay freight, it is a necessarily implied term of the contract that the carrier shall be allowed to fulfil the contract on his side and thus earn the freight; and if the shipper takes away his goods before the voyage begins, and thus prevents the carrier from earning freight, the carrier is entitled to

1 Curling v. Long, 1 Bos. & P. (Eng.) 634 (1797); Burgess v. Gun, 3 Har. & J. (Md.) 225 (1811); Bailey v. Damon, 3 Gray (Mass.), 92 (1854).