TOPIC B-PROTECTION OF OTHERS SERVED. § 238. Exclusion of persons dangerous or annoying to other passengers. The right of a cominon carrier of passengers to exclude those who are actually dangerous to the others who are being served at the same time obviously must be an inherent right in all branches of public service. Insane persons, violent persons or those who are in delirium tremens, or who have contagious disease, are obvious examples. Such persons may not only be excluded at the outset, but may also be ejected if they show signs of violence. The justification in such cases is too plain for argument. If a person on a train becomes disorderly, profane, or dangerous and offensive in his conduct, it is the duty of the conductor to expel such guilty party, or at least to assign him to a car where he will not endanger or annoy the other passengers. Whatever rules tend to the comfort, order, and safety of the passengers, the company are fully authorized to make, and are amply empowered to enforce compliance therewith. But such rules and regulations must always be reasonable and uniform in respect to persons. § 239. Violent persons may be excluded. A square case in point, if one is needed, is Louisville & Nashville Railway v. Logan.1 The material facts follow: The deceased, at night, at Lebanon, got on a passenger train, bound from Louisville to Knoxville, to go to a station where he resided, 14 miles distant. Being at the time intoxicated, he stumbled or slipped and fell on the depot platform, was helped upon the car platform, and, in the opinion of two witnesses, was too drunk to take care of himself, though he was also boisterous, profane, and disposed to be quarrelsome. He refused with an oath to pay his fare,-saying that there were not men enough 188 Ky. 232, 10 S. W. 655, 21 Am. St. Rep. 332, 3 L. R. A. 80 (1889). on the train to put him off, at the same time pulling out his knife. This profane and threatening language caused general excitement among the passengers, some of whom were frightened, others were not. Thereupon the train crew, using only necessary force, ejected him from the train, not far from a farmhouse; he was later found dead upon the track, having been killed by some passing train. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky held the railroad justified in all that was done. In the beginning of his opinion Chief Justice Leeds said: "Although it has been held that a railroad company is not bound to receive and carry a person who is so intoxicated as to be offensive, the power to exclude one from the right of travelling on a train, who offers to pay his fare, and though intoxicated, has not been guilty of any conduct as passenger forfeiting the right, is always subject to be called in question, and the company cannot therefore be fairly held to a strict exercise of it, except where the rights of others are involved. But, eveu conceding the conductor could have forcibly, and without incurring any legal liability to him, kept the deceased off the train at Lebanon, and committed an error in failing to do it, we do not see how on that account the right was impaired, or the duty lessened, to put him off at any place or time afterwards when his behavior rendered it legal and necessary. And if the deceased, for whose drunken state the company was in no way responsible, acted so as to justify and require his expulsion, it would be a harsh rule to make the company liable, if not othewise so, merely because the conductor did not assume the risk and responsibility of deciding, even if aware of the fact, that he was too much intoxicated to be allowed to go upon the train at Leba non. The law makes it the duty of a railroad company to use all reasonable care in operating trains for both the safety and protection from molestation and insult of passengers; otherwise orderly and infirm persons and females, who, upon the faith of such protection, frequently travel unattended, would have no security against turbulent, bad men. And as it is obvious a train must be run with skill and system in order to assure safety and comfort, the conduct of any one who interferes with the management, or without just cause attempts to do bodily injury to, or put in fear, those in charge, is reprehensible, and unlawful." On this general principle one may be excluded who has or is on the verge of having delirium tremens.2 240. Insane persons may be excluded. As to the case of insane persons, some distinctions are necessary. These are well brought out in the case of Owens v. Macon & B. R. R. Co.,3 which was an action brought for refusal to transport a lunatic in charge of a guard. When they were about to board the train the lunatic made a great outery and began to swear, struggling all the while. The order was therefore given not to allow him to go on by this passenger train; but permission was given to take him by a freight train following. Mr. Justice Lamar, writing the opinion of the Supreme Court, held the carrier justified. His opinion follows: "This was a suit by one of the guards in charge of a lunatic, but it was conceded on the argument here that he could not recover if the company was justified in refusing to transport the lunatic, and we shall therefore consider what was the carrier's obligation to the insane man. The relation of carrier and passenger creates reciprocal duties. One is bound safely to transport; the other, to conform to all reasonable regulations, and so to conduct himself as not to incommode other passengers who have an equal right to a safe and comfortable passage. Those who so act as to be obnoxious may be refused transportation or ejected. The payment of fare and the possession of a ticket do not require the carrier to transport those who are noisy or boisterous, or who 2 King v. Ohio & M. Ry., 22 Fed. 413 (1884); Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. Weber, 33 Kan. 543, 6 Pac. 877, 52 Am. Rep. 543 (1885). 3119 Ga. 230, 46 S. E. 87 (1903). threaten the safety of, or occasion inconvenience to, others on the train. But in the case of unfortunates who are not responsible for their disorderly conduct, and who, at best, are involuntary passengers, a different question is presented, calling in each case for the exercise of a wise discretion. On the one hand, regard must be had for the safety and comfort of other travellers, and, on the other, to the fact that in losing his mind the lunatic has not lost the right to be transported. It may be vitally important that he be taken to a place where he can receive the attention and confinement rendered necessary by his mental state. The carrier cannot absolutely refuse transportation to insane persons, but it may in all cases insist that he be properly attended, safely guarded, and securely restrained. And even where such precautions have been taken, it is not bound to afford him, if violent, transportation in the cars in which other travellers are being conveyed. And while there may be cases in which the convenience of other passengers should yield to the necessities of the unfortunate, the company may decline to receive one who at the time of entering the train exhibits signs of violence which indicate that his presence and conduct would tend to the manifest annoyance of others. So to do would ordinarily be better than to receive him on the promise of his attendants that he would be quiet, and, on the disorder continuing, force upon the carrier the duty of deciding whether he should be ejected at a station where there might not be proper accommodations. Where, however, it becomes essential to transport one who, though violent and noisy, is not responsible for his actions, the company is entitled to seasonable notice, in order that it may make proper arrangements. The action of the defendant in the present case in offering transportation on a later train, whereon others would not be incommoded, was in strict fulfillment of its double duty to the lunatic and the general public. It could not be required to place him in the baggage car, which was not intended for passengers. If the attendants were unwilling for him to be taken in the cab of the freight train, they were at least bound to give the carrier an opportunity to make other arrangements.1 8241. How intoxicated persons must be treated. According to the general principles governing the proper conduct of a public service, it would seem plain that a carrier may be justified in refusing to transport an intoxicated person. Such persons are apt to be dangerous and likely to be unruly. If they are in such a state it would seem plain that they may be rejected. And it seems equally clear that if they show signs of being obnoxious they may be ejected. Upon this matter there is a considerable body of authority. One leading case is Vinton v. Middlesex Street Railway Co.5 This was an action brought for ejecting a passenger. The defendant railway introduced evidence tending to show that at the time of the expulsion the plaintiff, intoxicated and using loud and profane language, was attempting to strike at the conductor. At the trial the judge ruled that the conductor had no right to eject unless the actual conduct of the plaintiff at the time was offensive or annoying to the passengers. The Supreme Court-Mr. Chief Justice Bigelow writing the opinion-held this view too limited: "It being conceded, as it must be under adjudicated cases, that the defendants, as incident to the business which they carried on, not only had the power but were bound to take all reasonable and proper means to insure the safety and provide for the comfort and convenience of passengers, it follows that they had a right, in the exercise of this authority and duty, to repress and prohibit all disorderly conduct in their vehicles, and to expel or exclude therefrom any person whose conduct or condition was such as to render acts of impropriety, rudeness, indecency or disturbance, either inevi 4 Meyer v. St. Louis Ry., 54 Fed. 116, 4 C. C. A. 221, 10 U. S. App. 677 (1893), is to the same effect. 5 11 Allen (Mass.), 304, 87 Am. Dec. 714 (1865). |