was plainly intended to cover the whole subject embraced by both,
and to prescribe the only rules in respect to that subject which are
to govern. Tracy v. Tuffly, 206.

2. Upon the construction of the constitution and laws of a State this
court, as a general rule, follows the decisions of the highest court of
the State, unless they conflict with, or impair the efficacy of some
provision of the federal constitution, or of a federal statute, or a
rule of general commercial law; and this is especially the case when
a line of such decisions have become a rule of property, affecting title
to real estate within the State. Gormley v. Clark, 338.

3. When there is an ambiguity in a section of the Revised Statutes, resort
may be had to the original statute from which the section was taken,
to ascertain what, if any, change of phraseology there is, and whether
such change should be construed as changing the law. United States
v. Lacher, 624.

4. Penal statutes, like all others, are to be fairly construed according to
the legislative intent, as expressed in the act. Ib.

1

TAX AND TAXATION.

1. The plaintiff in error failed to make a return of its loans to the state
authorities as required by law, whereupon the auditor general, under
direction of state law, made out an account against it containing the
following charge: "Nominal value of scrip, bonds and certificates of
indebtedness held by residents of Pennsylvania, $539,000— tax three
mills-$1617.00." The company appealed from this court to the
Court of Common Pleas, which decided in its favor, and the Common-
wealth from thence to the Supreme Court of the State, which rendered
a judgment in favor of the Commonwealth for $666. Among the
grounds for the appeal was, that the tax was in violation of section
one of the Fourteenth Amendment, because the assessment was for the
nominal value, and not for the real value of the bonds; because the
owners of the bonds had no notice, and no opportunity to be heard ;
because the company was taxed for property that it did not own; and
because the deduction of the tax from the interest due the bondholders
in Pennsylvania took their property without due process of law, and
denied to them the equal protection of the laws. The case being
brought to this court from the state court by writ of error, a motion
was made to dismiss for want of jurisdiction; to which was united a
motion to affirm; Held, (1) That there was clearly a federal question
raised, and the writ could not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction;
(2) That although it was doubtful whether, under the rules, there was
sufficient color for the motion to dismiss to justify the court in con-
sidering the motion to affirm, yet, as the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, in its opinion, did not seem to have expressly passed upon the
federal question, which was clearly in the record, the court could con-
sider that there was color for making that motion; (3) That the
provision for the assessment of the tax upon the nominal or face value
of the bonds, instead of upon their actual value, was a part of the
state system of taxation, authorized by its constitution and laws,
and violated no provision of the Constitution of the United States;
(4) That the failure to give personal notice to the owners of the bonds
involved no violation of due process of law, when executed according
to customary forms and established usages, or in subordination to the
principles which underlie them; (5) That it was not true, in point of
fact, that the corporation was taxed for property which it did not own.
Bell's Gap Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232.

2. The power conferred by the statutes of Missouri upon counties within
the State, to levy and collect annually a tax of one-half of one per
cent upon all the taxable wealth of the county for county revenue, is
not exhausted by a levy of thirty cents on every one hundred dollars
of taxable property for county purposes, and the levy of twenty cents
on the same by the board of townships for township and bridge pur-
poses; and a judgment creditor of such a county has a right to require

it to impose further taxation within the limit of the unexhausted

power, for his benefit. Macon County v. Huidekoper, 332.

3. The validity of a state tax upon corporations created under its laws, or
doing business within its territory, can in no way be dependent upon
the mode which the State may deem fit to adopt in fixing the amount
for any year which it will exact for the franchise. Home Ins. Co. v.
New York, 594.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 17, 18;

EQUITY, 10;

JURISDICTION, A, 11.

TAX-TITLE.

The provision in the constitution of Louisiana declaring a tax-title to be
prima facie valid is intended to be applied to cases in which the tax-
title is attacked for alleged informalities in the proceedings; but not
to cases in which it is attacked for fraud and collusion in effecting the
sale. Mendenhall v. Hall, 559.

See EQUITY, 10.

TENDER.

See EQUITY, 10.

TRUST.

1. A trustee of real estate, after a court of equity, on his own motion, has
discharged him and relieved him of his trust and appointed another
trustee in his place, has no remaining interest in the property which he
can convey by deed. Kenaday v. Edwards, 117.

2. A trustee of real estate, appointed by the court, subject to its control
and order, cannot give good title to the trust estate by a deed made
without the consent of the court. Ib.

TRUSTEE.

See APPEAL 4.

VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE.
See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 1, 2.

WARRANTY.

See CONTRACT, 8, 9, 10, 11.

WILL.

A testatrix, residing in South Carolina, who died in July, 1866, left a will
made by her in 1863, by a codicil to which, made in January, 1866, she
bequeathed to her daughter, then married to C., three-fourths of her
interest in a bond and mortgage debt, to be vested in a trustee, who
was appointed, and to be enjoyed by the daughter during her life,

power being given to the daughter, to dispose of such "bequest" as
she pleased, "by a last will and testament duly executed by her." In
September, 1875, the daughter died, leaving a will executed in Septem-
ber, 1871, which recited that she was "entitled to legacies" under the
will of her mother, and to a distributive share in the estates of a sister
and a brother, "and notwithstanding my coverture, have full testa-
mentary power to dispose of the same," and then bequeathed to her
husband, C., “the entire property and estate to which I am now in any
wise entitled and which I may hereafter acquire, of whatever the same
may consist," "absolutely and in fee simple;" Held, (1) The court is
authorized to put itself in the position occupied by the daughter when
she made her will, in order to discover from that standpoint, in view of
the circumstances then existing, what she intended; (2) The will of
the daughter was intended by her to be, and was, a full execution
of the power, because it referred expressly to the subject matter of the
power; (3) The statement in it as to "full testamentary power"
referred to the fact that, although she was a married woman, she had
power to "dispose of the same " by a will, such power being given to
her by the will of her mother, and did not refer to the provision of the
constitution of 1868 of South Carolina, and the legislation consequent
thereon, enabling married women to dispose of their own property by
will; (4) Outside of her interest in the bond and mortgage, she had
practically no property. Lee v. Simpson, 572.

See EVIDENCE, 1, 2, 3;

JURISDICTION, A, 2.

WITNESS.

See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 3.