Another exception also occurs when the superior courts are sitting in courts of appeal from courts of subordinate jurisdiction. In this instance each court is governed by prior decisions of its own, and is not in the habit of reversing these and conforming to conflicting decisions of other courts exercising the like appellate jurisdiction. In Boon v. Howard, 22 W. R. 540, Brett, J., observed: "Where the court has a final and exclusive jurisdiction and its personality must be changed, the action of the court is injured, unless all the judges determine to follow loyally, as has been said, the previous decisions of the court." A remarkable example of the point under consideration is to be found in the course of decision in this province upon the provisions of the first and fourth sections of the act respecting mortgages and sales of personal property. C. S. U. C., cap. 45. The question came up in several appeals from the county court as to the effect of non-registration within five days from the execution of the instrument. The court of common pleas uniformly held that until registry the instrument was void as against creditors, and that registration would not make it valid unless it took place within the five days. See Feehan v. Bank of Toronto, 10 C. P. 32; Shaw v. Gault, Ib. 240; Haight v. McInnes, II C. P. 518. On the other hand, the Court of Queen's Bench, has uniformly held that the filing related back to the execution, and if the instrument was filed within the five days, the assignee or mortgagee was entitled as against a writ against goods placed in the sheriff's hands after the execution of the instrument, but before its registration. See Feehan v. Bank of Toronto, 19 U.C.Q.B. 474; Balkwell v. Beddeme, 16 U.C.Q.B. 206. This conflict was so pronounced and irreconcileable that the legislature had at last to interfere, and then declared that the law, as expounded by the Queen's Bench, ought to prevail, by enacting in 26 Vic., c. 46, 1, that every such instrument shall operate and take effect upon, from and after the day and time of

the execution thereof.

"

great saving of expense to the parties, and the judgment of the court is equally entitled to weight and authority." The present Master of the Rolls in England (Sir George Jessel) has expressed his intention of always following this practice: and so, where a question is fairly raised on demurrer, he does not hesitate to decide it, though many judges before his time were in the habit of reserving it for a hearing.

Where the question before the court is one not involving principle, but is a mere matter of practice, the courts will follow the practice as expounded in the last decision. In such cases certainty is of the greatest importance, and the court will not enquire into the foundation of the practice, or investigate the reason of its adoption. See Bancroft v. Greenwood, 1 H. & C. 778. To conclude this part of our subject, we may advert to the decisions where the court consists of a single judge only, as in England in the bail court, and in Ontario in the practice court. As might be expected, these cases do not force the right which attaches to the adjudicating of a bench of judges. In Edwards v. Bennett, 5 Prac. R. 164, Gwynne, J., says: "The case decided by the full court appears to me to settle the point, and greater weight must be attributed to the decision being that of the full court, than to any of the cases decided by a single judge in the

bail court."

INNKEEPERS' LIEN ON GOODS of Guest.—A question of great practical importance to innkeepers and their guests came before the Court of Error in the Exchequer Chamber on the 3d inst., in the case of Threlfall v. Borwick. The character of the question will be at once seen from a short summary of the facts. In December, 1870, a man named Butcher hired some rooms at the hotel of the defendant for himself and family at a fixed rate, and also agreed to pay a sum for his board. He brought with him a piano, which he had hired from the plaintiff. In January, 1871, Again: in cases where the liberty of the subject is directly in- he left the hotel, being indebted at that time to the landlord in the volved (e. g., application for habeas corpus), each court is accussum of £52 for board and lodging. He left the piano behind, retomed, and, indeed, considers itself bound to exercise its jurisdic-marking that Threlfall would send for it. The innkeeper thought tion according to its own view of the law. See Re Timson, L. R. the piano belonged to Butcher, and some time appears to have 5 Exch. 261. This was also exemplified in one of the causes cel- elapsed before he learnt that the real owner was the plaintiff. ebres of Canada, Re John Anderson, II C. P. 9, and 20 U.C. However, having discovered the whereabouts of the piano, the Q.B. 124. plaintiff demanded it, and upon his claim being resisted, brought an action for its recovery. At the trial, before Mr. Justice Lush, the point of law as to the innkeeper's right of lien was reserved, and the Court of Queen's Bench decided it in favor of the defendant. This decision has been upheld by the Court of Exchequer Chamber. "It was admitted," says Lord Coleridge, "that the innkeeper has a lien on the goods his guest brings with him, and that he has the same lien on the goods, whether they are his guest's or another's. The only question is whether he has a lien on the goods, not the less because he was not bound to receive them." But, as his lordship pointed out, this assumed that he was not bound to receive them; whereas when a person went with an instrument such as that for which the action was brought, and intended to spend some months at an hotel, the innkeeper, if he had room for it, would be bound to receive it. "The guest,' his lordship continues, "might be in the habit of taking the musical instrument with him, for the purpose of reasonable recreation. But however that may be, having taken it, and having safely kept it for a certain time, it is too clear to be doubted that the innkeeper had a lien upon it, and both upon principle and authority the judgment must be affirmed." It would certainly be difficult to come to any other decision than this, upon the facts of the case; nor is it in the slightest degree inconsistent with the principles laid down in Calye's case.-[The Law Times.

An interlocutory order in a suit in equity is usually deemed of less authority than the final judgment given at the hearing of the cause. As remarked by Richards, C. B., in Drew v. Harman, 5 Price, 322, an injunction is but an interlocutory order made for the sake of security, and very often the court ultimately decides exactly the other way." So in Ball v. Storie, 1 Sim. & Stu. 214, it was said by the court : "An interlocutory order of the Court of Chancery in Ireland can only be regarded here as an authority, and not as binding upon the court; although a final judgment of that court, in a case in which it has concurrent jurisdiction, might be entitled to different consideration." But there are motions, interlocutory in form, which in truth go to the whole merits of the case. When, for instance, on an injunction motion, the rights of the parties depend, not upon a conflict of evidence, but upon a question squarely arising upon the pleadings, as touching the construction of a document, or the like,-in these cases the decision, though interlocutory in form, is in effect of as much weight as a judgment given at the hearing. This distinction was brought out by Lord Manners, in Revell v. Henry, 2 B. & B. 286 His language is as follows: "But it has been said that this was an opinion on a motion for an injunction, and not a deliberate judgment on a hearing on pleadings and proofs. Where all the facts appear upon the bill and answer, and there is nothing in dispute between the parties but the law of the court, it is very common, both in this country and in England, to decide the question upon motion. There are many instances in the reports in Lord Redesdale's time, and in the contemporary reports. It is a reports published by our contemporary, the London Law Times,

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PAROL AGREEMENTS COLLATERAL TO CONTRACTS WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.-In a recent number of the valuable

a case appears which is of very considerable practical importancestroyed by the appellant, the respondent sued him for damage in illustrating the law connected with lettings of furnished houses, done to the land demised. Evidence of the parol agreement was and which should be carefully considered both by the profession admitted by the judge, and the question was left to the jury as to and by that large class of persons, such as auctioneers and house whether the lease had been signed on the faith of it. Upon appeal, agents, who are constantly engaged in contracts of this nature, on the ground of misreception of evidence, it was held by the but who are frequently in the habit of acting without employing Court of Exchequer that the evidence was properly admitted, the professional advice. The danger of adopting such a course can parol agreement being collateral to the written lease. In deciding not be better illustrated than by the present case, where, on a let- the present case (Angel v. Duke) the court acquiesced in the docting of an exceedingly simple nature, a question arises of a char- trine laid down in Morgan v. Griffith, Cockburn, C. J., holding acter such as can not be presumed to be within the compass of that the present case could not be distinguished from Morgan v. the legal knowledge of any person who has not made a study of Griffith, but that, independently of the authority of that case, the law. The result of such a practice very frequently is the expen- agreement upon which the action was brought was not within the diture of a sum of money in litigation, exceeding twenty times section of the statute of frauds, and need not be in writing: “The the amount which would have been spent in originally obtaining first agreement, involving the plaintiff's becoming tenant of the the advice of a professional man. The facts of the case-Angel premises, was antecedent to that upon which the breach is here v. Duke, 32 L. T., N. S. 25-were as follows: The action was averred. The agreement to repair and furnish, in consideration brought by the plaintiff upon an agreement, before the making of of the tenancy having been commenced, is posterior and collatwhich negotiations had been in progress between him and the de- eral to that which, in order to have been sued upon, must have fendant, for the letting by the defendant to the plaintiff of a house, been in writing." In that view of the case entertained by the lord with the furniture and effects therein. The plaintiff objected to chief justice, the other members of the Court of Queen's Bench becoming a tenant of the house, on the ground that the premises unanimously coincided; and Archibald, J., said that "the part of were in imperfect order, and not sufficiently furnished for the the contract, the breach of which is alleged, is severable from any comfort of his family. The defendant, then, in order to induce contract to become a tenant. The defendant's agreement was the plaintiff not to break off the negotiations, promised verbally conditional upon the tenancy, and became binding when he made that if the plaintiff would enter into the premises without requir- his promise again in consideration of the accomplished fact. ing the defendant to do any works or repairs, or send any addi- This was no agreement concerning land, and was collateral to tional furniture into the house previous to the commencement of that which could have been binding only if in writing." We the proposed tenancy, he would, within a reasonable time after think there can be little doubt that the decision in the the commencement of the tenancy, do such works and repairs, case of Angel v. Duke is of a satisfactory nature; it and send into the house such furniture as should be necessary for is by no means desirable that those provisions in the the convenient use and occupation of the house. The plaintiff statute, which are so expressly worded as to clearly manifest the acquiesced in these terms, and entered into possession of the intention of the legislature that they should only apply to land, house, without the repairs being made or any furniture sent in by should extend to matters savoring so little of reality as the subthe defendant, but, when the defendant was called upon to fulfil ject of this contract.-[The Irish Law Times. the contract as to these matters as he had stipulated to do in his verbal agreement, he altogether declined to do so. The plaintiff then brought the present action, and the defendant raised, on demurrer, the question as to whether the agreement did not fall under the 4th section of the statute of frauds, which enacts "that no action shall be brought whereby to charge any person upon any contract for sale of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them, unless the agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, signed by the parties to be charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized."

He also contended that, even granting that the contract need not be in writing, the consideration consisted of an executed promise, and that therefore the contract could not stand, there being nothing to support it. The case principally relied on by the defendant was Mechelin v. Wallace (7 A. & E. 49), which was a case very closely resembling the case under consideration, except that the consideration there was an executed, and not an executory promise, and there it was held that the defendant's agreement to send in furniture was an inseparable part of a contract for an interest in land, and came under the provisions of section 4 of the statute of frauds. The plaintiff explained away the effect of that case by the fact that the contract there was based entirely on the agreement to let the house; but here the agreement was collateral to the agreement for a tenancy, which brought it within the authority of Morgan v. Griffith (L. R., 6 Ex. 70), in which case the respondent agreed to hire of the appellant grass land on the terms of a lease to be signed at some future time. The respondent, having entered on the land, found it overrun with rabbits, and on the lease being presented to him for execution, declined to execute it unless the appellant would promise to destroy the rabbits. The appellant declined to insert a clause in the lease to that effect, but agreed by parol that he would destroy the rabbits. The lease was then executed. Afterwards, the rabbits not having been de

Correspondence.

NATURALIZATION OF ALIENS.

ABERDEEN, MISS., April 21, 1875. EDITORS CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL:—I have read with some interest your views, and those of various correspondents, as to the action of Judge McKean in refusing naturalization to the Norwegian who "knew no constitutional law against polygamy."

Though I am inclined to think Justice McKean a hasty man, not always keeping his passions under the control of a cool judgment, yet I may be permitted to say I entirely agree with, and applaud his action, in re the "unlearned" Norwegian.

It must be borne in mind, that in the matter of naturalization there is no question of jeopardy of life or liberty, no question of guilt or innocence. Admitted or rejected, the applicant is still entitled to all the protection the law guarantees to the native citizen.

But the question is a higher one-a question of worth and qualification for the responsible position of citizen of the United States. In such case the courts are not only permitted, but are by law compelled to occupy a higher moral ground than when the life or liberty of the party are involved in the investigation.

alien to the privilege of naturalization the court must be satisfied that the applicant has “behaved as a man of good, moral character, attached to the principles of the constitution of the United States, and well-disposed to the good order and happiness of the

By the act of Congress of April 14, 1802, before admitting any

same."

Now the court can only ascertain this disposition of the applicant by questioning him and others as to the peculiar views he holds in relation to questions of order, morals and good govern

Mayor, etc., p. 19. The owner of a building standing on the line of a lot in a city, can not acquire, by lapse of time, a prescriptive right to the lateral support of the adjacent soil of a public street, as against the municipal corporation.

Negligence-Damages- Comity of State Laws.-Selma, Rome and Dalton R. R. v. Lacey, p. 106. By Warner, Ch. J.-Where a widow sues, in Georgia, for damages for the killing of her husband in Alabama, by the negligence of a railroad company, operating its line in both states, the court will be governed by the laws of Georgia as to procedure, but as to .the rights of the parties, by the laws of Alabama, where the act complained of was done. By McCay and Trippe, JJ.Where, by the laws of Alabama, the personal representative of a party killed by the wrongful act or negligence of another, is entitled to an action for damages therefor, no other person than such legal representative can bring such action in Georgia, when the act complained of was done in Alabama. The widow can not maintain such action in her own name.

Street-Railway-Charter-Exclusive Privilege.-West End and Atlanta Street R. R. Co. v. Atlanta Street R. R. Co., p. 151. The act of incorporation of the defendant in error, provided that said company shall have exclusive power and authority to survey, lay out, construct and equip, use and employ street railroads in the city of Atlanta, subject to the approval of the city council thereof for each route selected, first had and obtained, before the work thereon shall be commenced." Held, that no unconditional, exclusive power and authority to construct and use street-railroads in all the streets of the city was granted; but that the charter privilege applied only to such actual routes as might be selected by the company and approved by the council. A charter subsequently granted to the plaintiff in error, conferring "all the powers and privileges" of the defendant in error, was subject to the same restrictions, an where routes were selected under the latter charter, not identical with those previously selected under the former, there was held to be no infringement of the rights under the former charter.

Tax on Wholesale Dealers-Bohler v. Schneider, p. 195. The act of legislature, imposing a special tax on wholesale dealers in malt liquors, is not in violation of the constitutional requirement, that "taxation on property shall be ad valorem only, and uniform on all species of property taxed." It is a tax, not on the property, but on the business or occupation, or privilege. Citing Burch v. Mayor, etc., 42 G. 596. Nor is such tax void for uncertainty, because the law does not define what a wholesale dealer is. This can easily be determined, as any other fact, by evidence.

Criminal Law - Continuance - Defences - Newly-Discovered Evidence. Malone v. The State, p. 210. Motion for continuance, on the ground that the defendant was too sick to engage in the trial, was supported by evidence of physicians, and the case passed. When called again at the same term, the motion was submitted without evidence, the counsel for defence stating that they had nothing further to allege in support of their motion. Held no error for the court below to overrule the motion." This court announces to the public, with all the emphasis its judgment can impart, that provocation by words, threats, menaces or contemptuous gestures will, in no case, be sufficient to free a person who kills another by shooting him, from the guilt and crime of murder."--Newly-discovered evidence, which is merely cumulative, is is no ground for a new trial.

Municipal Corporation-Liability for Damages Caused by Negligence of Contractors in Repairing Streets. Mayor, etc., v. Waldner, p. 316. Suit was brought to recover damages for injury sustained by reason of an exposed and unprotected excavation in a city street, into which the plaintiff (below) fell, with the horse he was riding, at night The opening was for a sewer, for the building of which the city authorities

had contracted with Van Horn, who in turn had let out the contract to others. Held, that the duty of the city authorities to use precautionary measures to prevent accident and injury, while public works on the streets of a city are being prosecuted, renders the city liable for injuries sustained by reason.of neglect to use such measures, not founded on the doctrine of respondeat superior, but on the general authority of the city government over its streets, and its police powers, to protect the public against obstructions and nuisances.

purpose of giving jurisdiction to the federal courts), and the county was there-
fore subject to sue and be sued in the federal court: Citing Railway Co. v.
Whitton, 13 Wall. 290; City of Lexington v. Butler, 14 lbid. 293.
Will-Construction of Legacies.-Tennille v. Phelps, p. 532. A tes-
tatrix, in her will, directed that her executors should keep up her plantation
and work the slaves thereon, "for the purposes herein after mentioned." In
the same clause she directed that if the plantation should prove unprofitable,
or there should be danger of a depreciation of property, the executors should
sell the same, and reinvest the proceeds. Another clause gave certain money
legacies to nephews and nieces, to be paid out of the plantation without
interest, after paying all expenses arising from its prudent management." An-
other clause gave the use of her estate to her son, with appointment of her
husband as trustee aud guardian. The slaves were emancipated shortly after
the death of testatrix, in 1864. Held, that the intention was that the legacies to
nephews and nieces were only to be paid out of the profits of the plantation, and
as this became impossible by the emancipation of the slaves, the legacies failed,
and the corpus of the estate went to the son, free from any charge to pay said
legacies. Citing 1 Atkins, 508; 1 P. W. 549; Pulsford v. Hunter, 3 Brown's
ch. ca. 416; Page v. Leapring, 18 Vesey, 463.

Insurance - Principal and Agent.- Underwriter's Agency v. Sea-
brook, p. 563. Bill to enforce liability against insurance company for loss of
cotton caused by sinking of a steamboat, on the ground that the agent of the
company had fraudulently misled the owners to induce them to believe the
cotton was insured by the said company. Evidence that the agent was also
agent of several other companies, and nothing in the proof to show which of
them the agent was acting for at the time he did the acts from which the
fraud was sought to be inferred-verdict against the company set aside, and a
new trial ordered.
C. A. C.

Book Notices.

LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS. By JOSEPH K. ANGELL and SAMUEL
AMES. Tenth Edition. Edited by JOHN LATHROP of the Boston Bar.
Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1875.
On the general subject of the Law of Private Corporations, the work of
Angell & Ames is practically the only one we have. It was originally pub-
lished in 1831. Since then, Chief Justice Ames, of Rhode Island, one of the
authors, and Mr. Angell, the other, have died, the former, after supervising
the preparation of the seventh edition, in 1866. The subsequent editions, in-
cluding the present, have been edited by Mr. Lathrop. To this edition 226
cases have been added, and the citation of cases is brought down to the pres-
ent time.

The work itself needs no praise from us. It has occupied the field for more than the third of a century without a rival, and in the American Law of Private Corporations it is to-day' without a competitor. While conceding this, we feel constrained to add that the development of corporation law in England and in this country, within the last 25 years, has been so rapid that it has, in many of its most important branches, outgrown the work which treats of it, notwithstanding the labors of the authors and editors. The latter has been hampered by the desire to preserve the frame of the original treatise, and the changes in the law and the additions to the law which have been made, have been incorporated into the work as best they might, sometimes by a sentence in the text, but generally by the way of notes. Topics, which have become vastly important since the death of Mr. Angell, and ever since that of Judge Ames, are not presented with that fullness which they deserve, and can not be while the editor considers himself bound to leave the original structure intact. During the last ten years, for example, the law on the subject of the liability of shareholders has been much modified, indeed, almost created by the adjudications in Great Britian, which greatly out-number those in this country; and whoever wishes to do that subject justice, must build anew, using freely all the material at his hand for the purpose. If the reader will compare what is presented in this work upon ultra vires, with the late English work of Mr. Brice, he will see how far short the former falls of giving a complete view of the law on this subject. We could instance other illustrations of a similar character. This is not the fault of the editor; for Mr. Lathrop has done his work carefully and well. We make these observations in the

Jurisdiction-Removal of Causes to Federal Court.-Board of hope that in the next edition the function of the editor may be enlarged into that of author, and that the whole work may be thoroughly revised, and all useless material thrown out and all that is useful skilfully incorporated into a

Commissioners of Floyd County v. Hurd, p. 462. Suit by Hurd, a citizen of
Connecticut, against Floyd County, on bonds of said county. Petition of Hurd

to remove cause to U. S. Circuit Court. Held, that Floyd county having been symmetrical treatise, which shall be as relatively perfect now as Angell &

made by act of legislature a body corporate, with power to sue and be sued in any court of the state, the provision of the constitution of the U. S. that the citizens of each state shall be " entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states," applies to said county as a "citizen " (under the decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court, that a corporation is a citizen, for the

Ames' work was when originally produced.

J. F. D. THE HISTORY OF LAWYERS, ANCIENT AND MODERN. BY WILLIAM FORSYTH, author of History of Trial by Jury," etc. New York: James Cockcroft & Co. 1875.

This handsome volume, bound in cloth, and uniform with the late editions

of Campbell's Lives of the Chief Justices, from the same publishers, will doubtless be heartily welcomed and largely read by the profession in this country. The reputation of the author is already well established by his other works, and the charming style and interesting matter of the present work will commend it to all readers, lay and professional, into whose hands it may fall. The author extends his researches far back into the time of the Roman Republic, and the "palmy days of Greece," for bits of history and biography relating to the ancient and honorable profession, and traces its growth down through all the ages that have gone, to the present time. The ancient forms and practice in the conduct of trials; the rules of etiquette and evidence which obtained; the styles of forensic eloquence which were adopted; the officers and appendages of the courts of justice; and the modes of procedure which existed in the olden time, are all pleasantly and gracefully portrayed. Not the least interesting passages in the book are the biographical sketches of many of the noted advocates of Greece and Rome; their manner, their acquirements and their successes. Accounts of celebrated trials are frequent and well-written. For" summer reading," during the "long vacation," no more entertaining book could have been presented to the profession; while to the student at law, the information contained in its pages will

be found invaluable.

Our readers must not, however, suppose that the book is a new one by any means. It was first published in London, by Murray, in 1849, under the title of "Hortensius; Duty and Office of an Advocate."

The publishers have apparently assumed to improve upon the author, and have taken the liberty of reprinting his book under a new name. Of course this can work no injury to the intrinsic value of the book, but it certainly does the publishers no credit, but rather the reverse; for it has the appearance of an effort to palm off the book upon the public as a new work, prepared expressly for them by the distinguished author. The bungling marner with which the thing is done, is almost as bad as the act itself; for on page 130, of this edition, the author says: "Of the more immediate contemporaries of Cicero, no advocate approached him in reputation so nearly as Hortensius; and as his name has been chosen to give the title to the present work, we may indulge in some detail of his biography."

Thus it appears that this attempt to palm off an old book as a new one does not even possess the respectability of a skillful forgery; for the text of the book itself is inadvertently left unaltered to accuse the trickery which could attempt such a fraud upon an enlightened and honorable profession.

Messrs. Cockcroft & Co., have, in this instance, however, been kind enough to allow the name of the learned author of Hortensius, Mr. Forsyth, to stand on the title page of his book, and have correctly reproduced his preface, discreetly omitting, however, the date. They were not so kind to Sir G. Stephen, when they recently reprinted his most excellent and readable little book, "Adventures of an Attorney in Search of Practice," accrediting it to Samuel Warren, an author much more widely known in this country. We have long entertained the candid and conscientious conviction that those American publishers (we do not now refer to the publishers of the volume before us) who are in the habit of reprinting the works of English authors without paying them an adequate copyright, because the state of the law permits them to do so, are, in the eye of justice and sound morals, no better than horsethieves, and as little deserving of recognition among gentlemen. Practices like the present, while perhaps not equally injurious to individuals, are equally calculated to bring us into disrepute among honest foreigners, and to make American gentlemen ashamed to look in the face their cousins on the other side of the Atlantic.

partnership, consisting of a father and son, carried on business under the firm name of H. S. & Co. H. S., the father, who was a man of means, and gave, the firm its credit, sold his interest in the firm to his partner and another sOD, who, by agreement with the father, continued the business as theretofore in the firm name of H. S. & Co. In an action by a creditor who had trusted the new firm on the faith that the father was a member: Held, That the father, by allowing his name to be so used, held himself out as a member of the new firm, and was thereby estopped from denying the fact, although publication had been made of the dissolution of the old, and the formation of the new firm, of which the creditor had, in fact, no notice. 2. An objection on the ground of variance between the proof and the pleading, should be taken on the trial. Where this has not been done, it is too late, on error to make the objection.

Interpretation-Corporation-"Person."-The State v. Cincinnati Fertilizer Company. [24 Ohio St. 611.] A corporation is not a "person" within the meaning of the act of April 15, 1857, to prevent nuisances, and therefore not liable as such to be indicted and punished for violation of the provisions of said act.

Parol Proof to Show that Absolute Deed was made on a Trust.—Mathews v. Leaman. [24 Ohio St. 615.] In this state, notwithstanding the statute of frauds, it is competent to establish, by parol evidence, that a deed of conveyance, absolute in form, was executed upon the consideration that the property conveyed was to be held in trust for the grantor, and reconveyed on demand.

LEGAL GAZETTE (PHILA., KING & BAIRD) FOR APRIL 9. National Banks-Special Deposits.-Wiley v. First National Bank of Brattleboro, Supreme Court of Vermont, Feburary Term, 1875, opinion by Wheeler, J. [7 Leg. Gaz, 116]. The taking of special deposits to keep, merely for the accommodation of the depositor, is not within the authorized business of national banks, and their cashiers have no power to bind them to any liability on any express contract accompanying, or any implied contract arising out of such taking.

The editor of the Legal Gazette comments on this important decision as follows: "This involves the same point with regard to national banks as was decided in the case of our own state banks in Lloyd v. The West Branch Bank, 3 Harris, p. 172, viz. : that the act of the cashier in receiving such deposits not being authorized or ratified by the stock-holders, nor within the general usage, custom, or practice of the bank, must be shown to be within the legally authorized course of business of the institution, in order to render it liable for their safety.

'The general question of the responsibility of national banks for the loss of special deposits, has been before both our own supreme court and the United States Circuit Court for this district. See Scott & Bro. v. The National Bank of Chester Valley, 22 P. F. S. 471; Scull v. Kensington National Bank, tried before Justice Williams, at nisi prius. March 17th, 1873, together with the opinion of the court in banc on a rule for a new trial; and White v. Commonwealth National Bank, tried before Cadwalader, J, in the United States Circuit Court, 4 Brewster, 234. In all these cases however, the cashier or other officer receiving the special deposits, in so doing was acting directly within the scope of his authorized employment by the bank, and in pursuance of its known practice, and hence the question discussed in the Vermont case was not raised."

Constitutional Law-Power of the Legislature to Impose on the Courts Extra-Judicial Duties. In the matter of the application to appoint a board of assessors for the city of Pittsburg. Court of Common Pleas, No. 2, of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, opinion by White J. [7 Leg. Gaz. 117.] 1. The Legislature has no power to impose upon the 2. The

What we feel obliged to say in this instance is said more in sorrow than in
anger, and with the sincere desire of doing the enterprising publishers of the
book before us a service. We venture to suggest to them that no well-read
person can long be deceived by such practices, and that they grossly misin-
terpret the sentiments of the profession to which they chiefly look for patron-judges of the court duties which are in their nature extra-judicial,
age, if they suppose that such devices can be practiced upon them without

condemnation.

VICK'S FLORAL GUIDE. No. 3, for 1875. JAMES VICK, Rochester, N. Y. We are much obliged to Mr. Vick for this. Next to the study of Fearne on Remainders, nothing is so calculated to delight the mind as the culture of flowers; and Mr. Vick tells us all about this-and where we can get the seeds. We are curious to know where this was printed. It is the best specimen of printing we have ever seen.

Summary of Our Legal Exchanges.
Estoppel against Retiring Partner who Permits Continued
Use of his Name.-Speer v. Bishop et al. [24 Ohio St. 598.] 1. A co-

objection to the conferring or exercising of such powers does not rest on a constitutional prohibition, but is based on the fundamental structure of the government, by which such powers and duties belong to the other departments, and not to the judiciary. 3 Where the constitution has provided that the jurisdiction and powers now vested in the district courts and courts of common pleas, shall be in Allegheny vested in the two distinct and separate courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction: Quære, can jurisdiction be subsequently given by the legislature of certain proceedings to one court only ? 4. A law making a special provision for cities of the second class, is local and special legislation within the constitutional prohibition, it being notorious that the city of Pittsburg is the only city of the second-class in the state. 5. The act of the assembly passed March 18th, 1875, requiring the judges of Common Pleas, No. 2, of Alleghany county, to appoint a board of assessors, held unconstitutional.