government*. By the establishment of a religion, we understand not merely that it is endowed, but that it has received from the state certain political privileges; that it has a legal precedence of other persuasions, and that its clergy are raised above the clergy of any other denomination †, not only by their endowment, but also by their civil position. The Presbyterian church of Ulster affords a perfect example of a church which is endowed but not established. The same is likewise the case with the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches of Prussia. The king and court of Prussia are Protestant, but the Lutherans and Calvinists (who are now united into one church) have no legal precedence over the Catholics. There are certain private

* In strictness of speech, endowment would be confined to incomes permanently settled on the donees, and originally springing from private munificence. The following are the definitions of dos given by Ducange: -"Dos: donatio, res testamento donata." Dos ecclesiæ: quod ad sarta tecta et clericorum in ea deservientium sustentationum ab ædificatore confertur. Neque enim licet episcopo ecclesiam aut oratorium consecrare, nisi dos sufficiens clericis in eis deservituris ab ædificatoribus conferatur.” "Se putet inde Dei dotare manentia templa," is a verse cited by Ducange from Fortunatus, lib. viii. carm. 1. The same is the meaning of the word fondation in French. "On dit (says Turgot) fonder une académie, un collége, un hôpital, un couvent, des messes, des prix à distribuer, des jeux publics, &c. Fonder, dans ce sens, c'est assigner un fond ou une somme d'argent pour être employée à perpétuité à remplir l'objet que le fondateur s'est proposé, soit que cet objet regarde le culte divin ou l'utilité publique." This passage occurs in Turgot's very remarkable article fondation, in the Encyclopédie, in which are to be found all the doctrines on the mischievousness of charitable endowments, and the inexpediency of allowing testators to create perpetuities for public purposes, which have recently been brought forward so prominently into discussion.

+ Paley says that "the notion of a religious establishment comprehends three things: a clergy, or an order of men, secluded from other professions, to attend upon the offices of religion; a legal provision for the maintenance of the clergy; and the confining of that provision to the teachers of a particular sect of christianity.”—Mor. and Pol. Phil., b. vi. c. 10.

endowments belonging to the ministers of each persuasion, and when these are not sufficient, the government makes up the deficiency. Both churches are therefore endowed without either being established. On the other hand, the Established Church of England and Ireland has legal rights which a simply endowed church would not possess; such as that its prelates have a seat in one of the Houses of Parliament; that its members have an exclusive right of admission to the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, &c. Now it is to endowment, and not to establishment, that the voluntary church system is properly opposed*, and hence it would not be fair to infer that because a person disapproved of establishments, he therefore approved of the voluntary system: he might think it both unjust and inexpedient for the state to single out one persuasion as the object of its favour; he might likewise think it injurious to society that the ministers of religion should be left to depend on the bounty of their congregations, and therefore he might wish that the state should extend the principle of endowment to all.

We have already stated our opinion, that the state should hold itself perfectly impartial with respect to different religious persuasions. This impartiality may be observed either by endowing the clergy of all persuasions, or leaving them all to be maintained on the voluntary principle. We confess that if there were only two alternatives in Ireland, either to maintain the Established Church on its present exclusive system, or to leave all religious worship unprovided for, we should

* It has tended much to confuse the reasonings on this question, that an established church and an endowed church have been taken as synonymous. Such, for example, seems to be the use of the two terms in question, in Dr. Chalmers' able work on endowments.-See p. 109, seq.

without hesitation adopt the latter; being convinced that the Irish Roman Catholics will always remain disaffected to the state as long as the Protestant religion is made the object of its undivided favour. It seems to us, however, a far preferable course, instead of abolishing, to extend the bounty of the state, and to endow the Roman Catholic, as well as the Episcopalian Protestant, and Presbyterian clergy.

The objection usually made to this plan is, that it is the duty of rulers to advance the cause of true religion, and that a man cannot conscientiously assent to the endowment of a church, which he believes to teach false doctrine. The reasoning on this head is so important in its consequences, that we are induced to cite a passage from a recent defence of the Established Church, in which the orthodox doctrines are fully stated.

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"Pleading against the position, that it is the duty of a Christian ruler to provide for the spread of the Gospel among his people, a Dissenting writer says, If the obligation of the monarch to provide a religion for the people rests on his regal relation to them, then it is the duty of all sovereigns to do this; and the Sultan of Turkey must establish Mahomedanism, the Emperor of China Paganism, and the Emperor of Austria Popery.'. . . . . The objector (continues the defender of an Establishment) has confused himself, partly by forgetting the real point in dispute, but mainly by forgetting his own first principles. He falls into the modern liberal' style of talking, as though there were many religions of various degrees of value; and as though an argument which applied to one must of necessity apply to all. But this mode of speaking on these subjects is most fallacious and mischievous. There is but one true religion, and there never has been, nor ever will be, any other. All the rest are false, ruinous, and opposed to the honour of God. This cannot be too often or too strongly stated, or too

constantly kept in view.

The inferences are obvious. The

Christian who goes into a Pagan country and there attacks the existing religion, exposes the character of the false gods, and instigates the people to throw off their yoke, acts laudably and well. The unbeliever, on the other hand, who goes forth among our Christian population, assaults their faith, speaks evil of the Son of God, and aims to overthrow his worship, acts wickedly, and against the law of God. The magistrate who restrains and coerces, or punishes the first of these characters, opposes himself to God, and is a persecutor. The magistrate who restrains, coerces, or punishes the second, obeys the command of God, and is not a persecutor. So entirely are these matters governed by this one simple and eternal truth-that there is but one revelation of the will of God, and of the way of salvation; that such revelation is published to all mankind, with abundant evidence of its verity; and that to it universal obedience is due*."

This doctrine (which would clearly justify the massacre of St. Bartholomew and the Spanish Inquisition) proceeds upon the supposition that the members of your persuasion have rights against the rest of the community, but no duties; that the members of other persuasions have duties towards you, but no rights. This difference arises from your religious creed being true, and their religious creed being false; of which truth and falsehood you are the sole judge. "The doctrine," (says the Edinburgh Review)" which, from the very first origin of religious dissensions, has been held by all bigots of all sects, when condensed into a few words, and stripped of all rhetorical disguise, is simply this: -I am in the right, and you are in the wrong. When you are the stronger, you ought to tolerate me, for it is

* Essays on the Church, by a Layman, (second edit., 1834,) p. 22. It is clear that the writer, although he limits his argument to Paganism, means it to apply to all difference of faith.

your duty to tolerate truth; but when I am the stronger I shall persecute you, for it is my duty to persecute error*." In like manner the Protestants of England and Ireland say to the Roman Catholics-"We are the more numerous and stronger body, and therefore we give the church endowment exclusively to our own clergy; and as our form of Christianity is pure, and your form is corrupt, it is your duty to acquiesce, without repining, in this arrangement. But when you propose to us to allot a portion of the public revenue to the payment of your clergy, we tell you that we have a right not to contribute to the diffusion of religious error, and that we should be forcing our consciences if we voted money for the advancement of popery." It is clear that, in using this language, the English Protestants claim the benefit of a principle in their own favour which they will not admit in favour of others; that they hold it wicked in themselves to assist in teaching a religion which they believe to be false; but they do not hold it wicked in others to assist in teaching a religion which those others believe to be false. They compel the Dissenters, as being the minority, to do that which they, being the majority, refuse to do themselves. It is, in fact, an instance of the tyranny of the majority over the minority; a tyranny the more enduring, because it has not only numbers, but also a semblance of justice on its side. Nothing can be more inconsistent than the advocates of the high church principles on this subject. They press to the utmost their advantage of superior numbers, and constantly insist that England and Ireland being united, the Protestants ought to be considered as the majority, and

* On Sir J. Mackintosh's History of the Revolution, No. 124, p. 304.