MR. LLOYD C. GRISCOM.

(New American minister to Japan.)

through a period when the foreign relations of the United States have been of exceptional importance, and have therefore required in the State Department men of Dr. Hill's great knowledge of international law and diplomatic history. It is well known in Washington that the Presi dent offered Dr. Hill the post of minister to Japan after that position had been declined by Mr. John Barrett; but for reasons of a personal and family nature, Dr. Hill found it more convenient to go to Switzerland, where due attention to his public duties will not prevent the carrying on of important study and writing in the field of diplomatic history. At the State Department, Dr. Hill is succeeded by Mr. Francis B. Loomis, who brings to our diplomatic headquarters in Washington much experience and knowledge that will be of particular value

HON. CHARLEMAGNE TOWER. (Who succeeds Dr. Andrew D. White as ambassador to Germany.)

language. The various recent changes in the foreign service of the United States have indicated a strong tendency to professionalize our diplomacy. Thus, our readers were last month reminded of the fact that Mr. Bowen, who succeeded Mr. Loomis at Venezuela, had performed conspicuous service as United States consulgeneral at Barcelona, Spain. Mr. Charlemagne Tower, who succeeded Dr. Andrew D. White at Berlin, was transferred from St. Petersburg. His place at St. Petersburg has been filled by the transfer of Mr. Robert S. McCormick from

Vienna. Mr. Bellamy Storer is promoted from the post of minister to Spain, following a previous service as minister to Belgium, by being made ambassador at Vienna. Mr. Arthur S. Hardy, in turn, goes to Madrid, thus vacating the position in Switzerland to which Dr. Hill has been appointed. Before going to Switzerland, Mr. Hardy had been minister to Greece, and before that, minister to Persia. The post of minister to Japan, made vacant by the sudden death of Mr. Buck, in December, has been filled by the appointment of Mr. Lloyd C. Griscom, of Philadelphia, who thus obtains a remarkably rapid promotion from the post of minister to Persia, to which he had recently been appointed after having rendered brief but prominent service as secretary of legation at Constantinople. Mr. Richmond Pearson succeeds Mr. Griscom as minister to Persia, being promoted from the consulate at Genoa, Italy.

Service.

Two things are important in our forAn Excellent eign service; first, that the men we send abroad,-whether as ambassadors, ministers and secretaries of legations, or as consular officials,-should be, personally, men belonging to the highest type of American citizenship; second, that they should have those qualities of directness and practical efficiency that belong to the American method of doing public and private business. It is, of course, desirable, though less important, that they should be versed in the conventionalities of European diplomacy. It may now fairly be said for our foreign service as a whole that it probably meets all these tests to a higher degree, on the average, than at any time for many years past. We ought by all means to pay our representatives abroad much better salaries, and to provide permanent quarters for them in the principal capitals. Appreciation of the work of the State Department found expression in a remarkable dinner in honor of Secretary Hay, last month, given by the Ohio Society of New York. Our more recent diplomatic negotiations with foreign countries have had to do, in the main, with commercial affairs. With England, we have negotiated a treaty to obviate a misunderstanding about our construction and control of an isthmian ship canal, and have effected a reciprocity treaty on behalf of Newfoundland. immediately important of these commercial negotiations has been that with Cuba, by virtue of which a treaty was completed agreeing upon mutual trade concessions between the governments of the two republics, ratified by the Cuban lawmaking body, and wholly assured, last month, of acceptance by our Congress at Washington.

The most

Cuban

Assured.

HON. FRANK B. LOOMIS, OF OHIO. (First Assistant Secretary of State.)

The delay of reciprocity with Cuba Reciprocity caused great anxiety in this country last year, and was productive of much bitter feeling in Cuba toward the United States. Fortunately for Cuba and for our good relations with that republic, there has come about an amazing change in economic conditions, due to a marked increase in the world's market price of sugar. This radical change in price was due to several causes, important among which may be mentioned a comparative shortage in the beetsugar crop of Europe, and the anticipated working of the Brussels agreement, by virtue of which the principal European sugar-exporting countries have agreed to give up the system of export bounties. With profitable prices for their products, the Cubans could borrow money, and engage hopefully in agriculture and industry. What has thus become a fairly comfortable situation would, of course, be still more improved and better safeguarded by a tariff reduction of 20 per cent. on Cuban sugar and other products entering the ports of the United States. inasmuch as the advance in the world's prices of sugar has been highly profitable to the American. producers of sugar from the beet root, there was last month a corresponding withdrawal of opposition to the plan of Cuban reciprocity. So far as this country is concerned, the real grounds of urgency for the Cuban reciprocity treaty are no longer the needs of Cuba, but the benefits to be

conferred upon our own producers and traders by giving them a preferred position in the markets of a rich island which can buy increasing quantities of flour, textiles, machinery, and various other products of farm and factory.

The most difficult as well as the most Negotiating for the Ship far-reaching of all the commercial Canal. negotiations with which our government has been occupied is that which is necessary in order to clear the way for constructing a transoceanic ship canal. Some of our readers will remember distinctly what legislation was adopted by Congress last June before the long session of the present Congress ended, but others may like to be reminded again of its exact nature. The great and elaborate canal commission appointed by President McKinley, under the chairmanship of Admiral Walker, had reported in favor of the Nicaragua route. It had, however, also reported that the Panama route had some engineering and other advantages, but was out of the question because of the impossibility of dealing on reasonable terms with the French company, which had practically abandoned the situation, but clung to the assets. The commission stated that in its judgment the work actually performed by the old and new Panama companies, together with the stock owned by those companies in the Panama Railroad and all other assets, including maps, plans, and the like, would not be worth more than $40,000,000 to a purchaser proposing to complete the canal, whereas the French company had been demanding about three times as much. When this report became public, as everybody will remember, the French company immediately sent its agents to Washington with the proposal to sell out at the commission's figure of $40,000,000. Whereupon the President referred the matter back again to the Walker commission, which promptly changed its report and recommended Panama instead of Nicaragua.

The House of Representatives, under The the lead of Mr. Hepburn, had with Spooner Act. practical unanimity passed a bill adopting the Nicaragua route and appropriating a large sum of money for construction. The Senate, however, was impressed by the new situation, and after much discussion it finally agreed upon a compromise measure introduced by Senator Spooner, which was duly accepted by the House, and became a law by the President's sig nature on June 28. This measure, entitled "An Act to Provide for the Construction of a Canal Connecting the Waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans," authorized the President (1) to

buy out the assets of the new Panama Canal Company of France for a sum not greater than $40,000,000, and (2) to secure perpetual control and jurisdiction over a strip of territory not less than six miles wide, by negotiation with the Republic of Colombia, such strip, of course, to comprise territory on both sides of the canal route as well as the Panama Railroad, and the ports of Colon on the Caribbean Sea and Panama on the Pacific Ocean. The Spooner act appropriated $40,000,000 with which to make payment in full to the French company, and further authorized the President to pay whatever sum might be needed to Colombia for territorial concessions. It was provided, however, in this Spooner act, that if the President should not be able to obtain a satisfactory title to the property of the French company, or should not be able to make acquisition of territory from Colombia "within a reasonable time and upon reasonable terms," then the President, having obtained territorial concessions from Nicaragua and Costa Rica upon terms that he should regard as reasonable, might proceed without further authority from Congress to build the Nicaragua Canal. The remainder of the act made provision for the creation of an isthmian canal commission to have charge of construction, provided for bond issues for the estimated cost of a canal, and contained all other provisions necessary to enable the President, without further legislation, to acquire a route and proceed to dig a canal deep enough for the largest ships afloat. The great merit of the Spooner act lay in the fact that it finally placed on the statute books legislation authorizing a canal, and giving practically equal sanction to two possible routes. But it threw a heavy responsibility on the President and his executive advisers.

at Panama.

A

The difficulties and delays that have Our Position ensued have arisen in a somewhat unexpected quarter. It had been supposed that there might be trouble on the score of the imperfections of the French title; but Attorney-General Knox took this matter in hand and made a report declaring the title to be in all respects valid, so that the President might feel justified in paying over the $40,000,000. deadlock occurred in bargaining with Colombia for acquisition of the desired property. Our State Department has been negotiating on the basis of the lease of a strip of land six miles wide. It is to be noted that the Spooner act distinctly declared that "the President may acquire such additional territory and rights from Colombia as in his judgment will facilitate the general purpose hereof." Colombia, for a long while past, has been subject to revolutions so frequent and so persistent that it may fairly be said that revolution and disorder are chronic in that country. Under a treaty made by us a long time ago, when the Panama Canal was built, we have acquired both the right and duty to maintain order on the Isthmus of Panama for the sake of the effective operation of the railroad. During the whole of the period through which the discussion of this Panama Canal subject has extended, the maintenance of order on the Isthmus of Panama has been due solely to our active or potential efforts. The railroad would have been seized, first by the insurgent faction and then by the government faction, but for the presence of our warships at Colon and the occasional patrolling of the railroad line by our marines.

the Isthmus.

At the present moment there seems Colombia and to be something of a lull in revolu. tionary activity, but there is no reason to suppose that peace and civic order are at hand. The government at Bogota, the capital of Colombia, is absolutely unable to regulate affairs in the Isthmus of Panama, for several reasons, among which is the fact that the Panama Railroad is farther from Bogota, by the actual time it takes to reach it, than it is from St. Petersburg, or even from Constantinople. It takes two or three weeks to ascend the Magdalena River from the seacoast to Bogota, the capital of Colombia. The republic is of such territorial conformation that the Isthmus of Panama is no more an essential part of its normal and appropriate area than Alaska was an essential part of the area of Russia. The complete cession of the Isthmus of Panama to the United States need not involve any national sentiment whatsoever. Panama owes such development and importance as it possesses solely to the construction of an

American railroad across it, and to the transshipments due to the existence of that route, and not at all to its connection with Colombia.

Colombia's

a Canal.

It should be remembered that the Benefits from great canal we propose to build is not for anybody's pecuniary profit, and it is to be open to the ships of the whole world. In so far as Colombia, which, like our own country, lies on both oceans, may in future develop a merchant marine and a navy, it is of the highest importance that such a canal should be built. And it is certainly desirable for Colombia that the canal should be in the hands of a friendly power that could have no motive for aggression, and that could guarantee to Colombia the most favorable possible use of the passage for her public vessels, and for her coasting trade and merchant marine. For the United States to take charge of the Isthmus, thus protecting Colombia against revolutionary disturb ances in that remote region, and for the United States, further, to build a canal and give Colombia the use of it, would be beneficial in the highest sense, through many centuries to come, to the people of the South American republic. Nothing else could promise so much for the stability and development of the great latent. resources of Colombia as to have the United States as a firmly established neighbor on the Isthmus, with the great canal open to the peaceful traffic of the whole world.

Thus, if Colombia were a responsible Terms of a Proper Bar- country, with a normal public opingain. ion and a stable government, a proposition like this might be in order: Colombia would agree to make over to the United States, for purposes of permanent protection and necessary jurisdiction, the isthmian district known as the State of Panama, on consideration that the United States should build a ship canal and give perpetually to the government and people of Colombia the same privileges in the use of that canal as those enjoyed by the government and people of the United States. This would be a splendid bargain for Colombia. Yet, instead of taking such a view of the matter, certain of ficials, apparently possessing a technical authority to represent Colombia, have been presuming upon the determination of the American people to complete a canal at any cost, and have been blocking negotiations by holding out, not only for a ten-million-dollar payment to begin with, as consideration for a lease of a six-mile strip, but are also demanding a permanent annual payment of many hundreds of thousands of dollars as rental money.

In view of the chaos existing upon We Might Have Occupied the Isthmus and the total inability of Panama. Colombia to maintain governmental institutions there, we should have been abundantly justified, long ago, in assuming an indefinite occupancy of the Isthmus pending the establishment of a responsible and constitutional government in the republic. The present gov ernment is nothing better than an arbitrary dictatorship. As against the demands of these Colombian officials, it would not seem to be a straining of our rights under international law to make a reckoning of the actual cost to which we have been subjected, in recent years, by the necessity of protecting life and property on the Isthmus, and maintaining the operation of the Panama Railroad. It is important that the preliminaries should be arranged in a proper way before we spend perhaps $200,000,000 in constructing a canal. That we should be charged That we should be charged in perpetuity a high rental for constructing a public work on Colombian soil that will be of the highest benefit to Colombia, is a financial proposition with hardly a parallel in all history for its absurdity. Meanwhile, fresh doubts seem to have been thrown upon the engineering feasibility of the alternative Nicaragua route, and the whole situation is befogged and extremely

unsatisfactory. A right solution is far more to be desired than a prompt one. It is natural that there should be strong pressure brought to bear on our government to conclude any sort of arrangement with Colombia by the various interests, legal, journalistic, and otherwise, that are serving the cause of a French company which expects to get $40,000,000 in cash out of the United States Treasury in pay for the assets of an abandoned enterprise, and for franchises which on their face were originally non-transferable, and which had expired some time ago, although renewed for a short term by means which would hardly bear investigation.

The

Railroad.

It is a relief to turn from this Panama Tehuantepec scheme, which suggests infinite confusion, if not infinite lobbying and corruption, to note the progress of a clean, honorable, and business-like undertaking further north, at the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, in Mexico. It will be remembered that the great American engineer, Captain Eads, proposed, as the crowning work of his life, the construction of a ship railroad across that isthmus. Whatever the engineering possibilities of his novel project, it was dropped, after his death, as experimental and hazardous. More than sixty years ago, the