Mason v. 1824. those claiming under him. What title have they which they could assert against a disseizor, or one claiming under a title foreign to that of Jennings? Muncaster. A mere estoppel against a particular grantor and and his heirs, constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable title to lands. This Court declares that the deed conveys no title, but merely an estoppel by force of the clause of warranty. But, even admitting that this estoppel is a title, it belongs to all the episcopal members of the parish of Fairfax, whose rights are precisely the same as if no part of the parish had ever been separated from Virginia. It is quite clear, that the former decision of the Court proceeded on the ground of the plaintiffs in that suit being considered as the regular successors of the original cestui que trusts; and that, if it had appeared otherwise, and that there was another church in the parish, or other parishioners who were not represented by them, the decree would have been different." To connect themselves with this deed, therefore, the parties are bound to show that they are the successors. If they are not, the connexion between them is broken, and they have no title under it. The parish of Fairfax forms about one half of the county, which is equally divided into the parishes of Fairfax and Truro; the former comprehending the northern half, the latter the southern. This parish had but one Vestry, but it was the Vestry of the whole parish, elected by the whole body of the parishioners, charged with the common interests of the whole parish, a 9 Cranch, 52, 53. Mason V. Muncaster. and of both the churches equally. The funds 1824. with which the glebe was bought were levied from the whole parish, and consequently belonged to the whole parish; and in the case of a vacancy of the parsonage, this Court say, the parish was entitled to the profits of the glebe. It therefore follows, that previous to the separation of a part of this parish from the State of Virginia, its interests were one and identical throughout. No part of the parishioners could, by themselves, do any act affecting the interests of the whole, without giving the whole a voice in the measure, either by themselves or their representative agents. It is laid down, that although the Church of England, in its aggregate description, is not deemed a corporation, yet the Church of England, of a particular parish, is a corporation for certain purposes, although incapable of asserting its rights and powers, except through its parson regularly inducted." And in the judgment of this Court in the former case, it is strongly intimated, that the corporate character conferred on the Vestries in 1784, could be taken away at pleasure, without any fault in the corporation. If then the parish of Fairfax was a corporation, its name becomes a part of its identity, and those who call themselves successors, must have the same name. it was a corporation, all the corporators have equal rights, and no part of them could exercise the rights which belong to the whole. But, suppose a Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch, 292.325. b Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 51, 52. If Mason 1824. it not to have been a corporation, it was å definite body; it had a unity and identity which separated V. it from all others. It had a technical identity." Muncaster. It consisted of all the Episcopal members within the territorial limits. It was represented by a Vestry chosen by the voice of the whole of that parish, in which election no other parish could interfere. Those who claimed to be their successors, must, before the separation of the District of Columbia from the State of Virginia, have shown these qualifications; and it is determined that the separation has produced no change in the unity and identity of the parish, so far as the rights of property are concerned. The Vestry and Church-Wardens of the Episcopal Church of Alexandria, cannot be the regular successors of the Vestry and Church-Wardens of the parish of Fairfax, because they have a disunct name, which it would have been needless to assume, unless from a consciousness of a distinct origin and,nature. In fact, they have a different origin, different powers, and different duties. In the period which intervened from 1796 to 1803, there was no incumbent. What then were the rights of the parties? This Court has answered. that "the fee remained in abeyance, and the profits of the parsonage were to be taken by the parish, for their own use." What parish? Most certainly the a 2 Henn. Stat. at large, 218. ¿ Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 53. c Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 47. Westohv. Hunt, 2 Mass. Rep. 502. See also, 1 Tuck. Bl. Com. Part 2. App. 118 Mason Muncaster. parish of Fairfax, to which it belonged. The 1824. Vestries chosen in 1804, and subsequently, cannot be deemed the Vestries of the parish of Fairfax, but must be considered as the Vestries of the Episcopal Church of Alexandria, because, in the parish books, the entries constantly style them the Vestry of the Protestant Episcopal Church at, or in, or of, Alexandria, and not the Vestry of the parish of Fairfax. The congregation of Christ's Church actually separated themselves, in 1803, from the parish of Fairfax, and formed a distinct Episcopal Church; and the elections were made by subscribers and contributors to the Episcopal Church in Alexandria, and not by the parishioners at large of the parish of Fairfax. 2. This defect in the title being thus made out, it follows that the appellant has a right to require that the contract should be rescinded, unless there be some special objection to preclude him. As to the sale being under a decree, the English practice on this subject relates to objections arising on the abstract which is presented to the purchaBut defects subsequently discovered, may be objected, and if it appears that the vendor can make no title, the bill will be entertained. ser. 'As to notice, there is no proof of actual notice; and the circumstances are not sufficient to infer constructive notice. Nor has the objection to the title been varied by taking possession. The doctrine is, that if the vendee has knowledge of the defects before he takes possession, it is considerea as a waiver of the objection, and it will be found that all the cases turn upon this distinction. 200 Chests of Tea. 1824. scription from the contents of the entry. The fibel states the facts specially, but contains no allegation of an intention to defraud the revenue. Upon this state of the case, the libel is assailed for a supposed defect, arising from the absence of such an allegation. But we think this objection cannot be sustained. The libel follows the language of the enacting clause of the act, which inflicts the forfeiture; and the exemption from forfeiture, when the collector or the Court shall be satisfied that the difference between the entry and the packages "proceeded from accident or mistake, and not from an intention to defraud the revenue," being found in a separate proviso, is properly matter of defence, to be asserted and proved by the claimant, and is not, according to the course of adjudications in this Court, essential to the structure of the libel itself. This objection, then, may be dismissed without further observation. Another question, of more serious importance, is, whether the examination and seizure authorized by the 67th section of the act, are not limited to the collector of the district where the goods were originally entered and the dutics secured, upon importation; and so the case made by the libel is not within the purview of the act, whatever might be the authority of the collector to seize for forfeitures generally, and to assert the claim in a libel, properly framed for such a purpose. The decision of this question would require a very minute and critical examination of the whole revenue and coasting acts; and as the Court can satisfac |