and a brief statement of the points generally understood to have been adjudged.*

The cases in the Supreme Court of the United States are-Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 200; M'Millen v. M'Neill, 4 Wheat. 209; Farmers & Mechanics' Bank of

Penn. v. Smith, 6 Wheat. 131; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Peters, 635; Cook v. Moffat, 5 Howard, 295; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 Howard, 311.

their operation upon the existing contract, and is not confined to their operation upon an existing judgment lien. The opinion of the court, per Swayne, J., says: "If the remedy is a part of the obligation of a contract, a clearer case of impairment can hardly occur than is presented in the record before us. The effect of the act in question, under the circumstances of this judgment, does not, indeed, merely impair, it annihilates the remedy. There is none left "-(p. 622). Again: "The legal remedies for the enforcement of a contract, which belong to it at the time and place where it is made, are a part of its obligation. A State may change them, provided the change involve no impairment of a substantial right. If the provision of the Constitution, or the legislative act of a State, fall within the category last mentioned, they are to that extent utterly void. The constitutional provision and statute here in question are clearly within that category, and are therefore void ”—(p. 623).

This decision plainly overrules many of the cases cited above from the State reports. See, per contra, Snydor v. Palmer, 32 Wisc. 406, 411; Watson v. Railroad Co. 47 N. Y. 157.

Arrest. The right of arrest and imprisonment for debt may be taken away. People v. Carpenter, 46 Barb. 619; Maxey v. Loyal, 38 Geo. 531, 540.

Limitation of Actions.-The period of limitation may be extended before the right of action has become barred. Billings v. Hall, 7 Cal. 1; Holcomb v. Tracy, 2 Minn. 241; Cook v. Kendall, 13 Minn. 324; Pleasants v. Rohrer, 17 Wisc. 577; Edwards v. McCaddon, 20 Iowa, 520. But not after the right of action has become barred. Sprecker v. Wakeley, 11 Wisc. 432; Hill v. Kricke, Ib. 442; Parish v. Eager, 15 Wisc. 532; see also Ball v. Wyeth, 99 Mass. 338; per contra, see Swickard v. Bailey, 3 Kans. 507; Page v. Mathews, 40 Ala. 547; Cassity v. Storms, 1 Bush, 452; Bender v. Crawford, 33 Tex. 745. The period may be shortened provided a reasonable time is allowed. Smith v. Packard, 12 Wisc. 371 (nine months held reasonable); Howell v. Howell, 15 Wisc. 55; Osborn v. Jaines, 17 Wisc. 573; Auld v. Butcher, 2 Kans. 135; State v. Jones, 21 Md. 432; Stephens v. St. Louis &c. B'k, 43 Mo. 385; Adamson v. Davis, 47 Mo. 268; Kenyon v. Stewart, 44 Penn. St. 179; Korn v. Browne, 64 Penn. St. 55; O'Bannon v. Louisville &c. R. R. 8 Bush, 348 (six months held reasonable); see Morgan v. Reed, 2 Head (Tenn.) 276; Johnson v. Bond, 1 Hempstead, 533. Thirty days was held too short a time, in Berry v. Ransdall, 4 Metc. (Ky.) 292. See Sohu v. Waterson, 17 Wal. 596, 599.

It seems that the time elapsing between the passage of the statute and its taking effect will be considered as part of the time of limitation. Smith v. Morrison, 22 Pick. 430; Lockhart v. Yeiser, 2 Bush, 231; Stine v. Bennett, 13 Minn. 153; per contra, see Price v. Hopkin, 13 Mich. 318.

Where a State land lottery was drawn, and there was no limitation as to the time within which the grant should be taken out, it was held that the Legislature might afterwards establish such limit. McKenny v. Compton, 18 Geo. 170.

For a case where a short statute of limitations in a certain class of cases, viz., actions to recover property sold under judicial sales void for want of proper parties, was held unconstitutional as a "partial" law, see Morgan v. Reed, 2 Head (Tenn.) 276.

It appears then to have been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, that the power of Congress to pass a

Recording Acts.-Acts requiring instruments to be recorded, and giving priority to a recorded deed, have been held valid in their application to past contracts. Stafford v. Lick, 7 Cal. 479. Also an act requiring claims of homestead to be recorded on pain of forfeiture. Noble v. Hook, 24 Cal, 638. But a statute declaring that certain classes of debts shall be barred if not registered within a certain time, was held void. Robinson v. Magee, 9 Cal. 81.

Methods and Instruments of Administering Justice.—It is necessary that the Legislature should, for the public good, have power to alter from time to time the laws regulating courts, pleadings, forms of action, parties, practice, and evidence, within reasonable limits, and such changes do not impair the obligation of the contracts which they may affect.

Courts.-A law abolishing an existing court, and thereby delaying remedies on contracts, is valid, provided a substantial remedy is left. Newkirk v. Chapron, 17 Ill. 344. As to costs, see Rader v. Road-Dist. 7 Vroom, 273.

Pleadings.-A statute allowing defence of want of consideration to be set up in action on a sealed instrument is valid. Williams v. Haines, 27 Iowa, 251; Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 304. So of change of form of affidavit to stay proceedings to oust tenant. Lockett v. Usry, 38 Geo. 345.

Forms of Action or Proceeding.—A statute taking away scire facias and leaving creditor to his common law remedy on his judgment is valid. Parker v. Shannonhouse, Phil. (N. C.) Law, 209. The remedy against stockholders of an insolvent corporation may be changed from bill in equity to an assessment by receivers. Commonwealth v. Cochituate B'k, 3 Allen, 42; Story v. Furman, 25 N. Y. 214. And an act forbidding suit after the appointment of a receiver is valid. Leathers v. Shipbuilders' B'k, 40 Me. 386.

The Legislature may take away a particular common-law remedy, if another efficient remedy remains-e. g., may abolish distress for rent, leaving the landlord to his action. Van Rensselaer v. Snyder, 9 Barb. 302; 13 N. Y. 299; Guild v. Rogers, 8 Barb. 502. And this even though the parties have stipulated for distress in their lease. Conkey v. Hart, 14 N. Y. 22; see Billmeyer v. Evans, 40 Penn. St. 324.

Parties to Sue or to be Sued.—A statute subjecting a mortgagee who takes possession after its passage to a personal suit for taxes was held valid, such taxes always having been a lien on the lands, and it being merely a change of remedy. Andrews v. Worcester &c. Ins. Co. 5 Allen, 65. An equitable owner may be empowered to sue in his own name. Van Rensselaer v. Hayes, 19 N. Y. 68. And such provision may be again revoked provided adequate remedy be left. Van Rensselaer v. Reed, 26 N. Y. 558. The right of action may be restricted to the real party in interest. Hancock v. Ritchie, 11 Ind. 48. But an act allowing equities to be set up against the bona fide holder for value before maturity of negotiable paper would be invalid. Cornell v. Hichens, 11 Wisc. 353; and see Philbrick v. Philbrick, 39 N. H. 468.

Practice.-An act extending the privilege of new trial to cases where it did not before exist is valid. Johnson v. Semple, 31 Iowa, 49.

Evidence. Reasonable changes may be made in the law of evidence, and applied to existing causes of action. Cowan v. McCutchen, 43 Miss. 207; Neass v. Mercer, 15 Barb. 318. For example, parties may be made witnesses. Little v. Gibson, 39 N.

bankrupt law is not exclusive; that the exercise of that power by the States, as to future contracts, does not impair their ob

H. 505; Rich v. Flanders, Ib. 304. And a statute is valid providing that no action shall be maintained on a new promise of a bankrupt not in writing. Kingley v. Cousins, 47 Me. 91; per contra, Saunders v. Carroll, 14 La. Ann. 27. And also a statute to the effect that part payment shall not be an admission of debt. Parsons v. Carey, 28 Iowa, 431. But it seems that an act prohibiting parol evidence of leases would be void as applied to past contracts. McDonald v. Steward, 18 La. Aun. 90.

A statute providing that a tax deed shall be prima facie evidence only of the regularity of the proceedings, when, by the law at the time of the sale, it was conclusive evidence, has been held unconstitutional in its application to existing deeds. Smith v. Cleveland, 17 Wisc. 556; Nelson v. Rountree, 23 Wisc. 367. The Legislature may, however, prescribe the form of deed to be given, even under past sales, provided it does not impair the effect of the deed. Lain v. Shepardson, 18 Wisc. 59. But cannot annex new conditions to the issuing of the deed when the right to it has become vested, Knox v. Hundhausen, 23 Wisc. 508, unless a reasonable time is allowed within which the deed can be obtained on the old terms. Knox v. Hundhausen, 24 Wisc. 196; Kearns v. McCarville, 24 Wisc. 457; Curtis v. Morrow, 24 Wisc. 664.

A law requiring the holder of a tax certificate to notify any occupant of the land before taking out a tax deed is valid. Curtis v. Whitney, 13 Wal. 68.

Scaling Laws.-Laws have been passed in most of the Southern States intended to relieve parties from having to pay in United States currency sums based on Confederate currency, and these laws have generally been held valid. Their most usual form is, perhaps, to allow it to be shown that Confederate currency was intended by the parties in making the contract, and what is the value of that currency in United States currency. Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wal. 1; Slaughter v. Culpepper, 35 Geo. 25; Herbert v. Easton, 43 Ala. 547; Woodpin v. Sluder, 1 Phil. (N. C.) L. 200; Neeley v. McFadden, 2 Rich. N. S. 169; Harmon v. Wallace, Ib. 208; see also Kirtland v. Molton, 41 Ala. 548; Rutland v. Copes, 15 Rich. Law, 84; Pharis v. Dice, 21 Gratt. 303. A statute allowing the value of the property sold to be considered, irrespective of the currency agreed to be paid for the same, has been held valid. King v. W. & W. R. R. 66 N. C. 277. And a statute allowing juries to reduce debts according to the equities of the case, &c. Cutts v. Hardee, 38 Geo. 350; but, per contra, Leach v. Smith, 25 Ark. 246; Woodruff v. Tilley, Ib. 309.

But an act allowing set-off of losses during the war would be unconstitutional. Gunn v. Hendry, 43 Geo. 556; Solomon v. Lowry, 44 Geo. 290. And so of an act allowing a return of the property sold in full satisfaction. Abercrombie v. Baxter, 44 Geo. 36.

Redemption Laws.-The Supreme Court of the United States, in the cases cited in the text, has established the doctrine that such statutes giving mortgagors and owners and judgment debtors additional and new powers and opportunities for redeeming the property sold on foreclosure or execution, are void in their application to existing contracts; they interfere with and hamper the essential remedy by which the contract is made obligatory, and they thus impair the obligation of the contract. Many State courts have acquiesced in this doctrine. Others, however, have either rejected or evaded it.

ligation; that a contract made and to be performed in one State is not, as against a citizen of that State, discharged by a cer

The following cases hold such laws invalid as to existing contracts: Thorne v. San Francisco, 4 Cal. 127; Scobey v. Gibson, 17 Ind. 572; Iglehart v. Wolfin, 20 Ind. 32; Greenfield v. Dorris, 1 Sneed (Tenn.) 548; Maloney v. Fortune, 14 Iowa, 417; Oatman v. Bond, 15 Wisc. 20; Robinson v. Howe, 13 Wisc. 341; Goenen v. Schroeder, 8 Minn. 387. A statute which lessens the time for redemption after foreclosure sale was held void, in Cargill v. Power, 1 Mich. 369. But was held valid in Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill, 324; Robinson v. Howe, 13 Wisc. 341, 346; Smith v. Packard, 12 Wisc. 371. See, per contra, Ashuelet R. R. v. Elliott, 52 N. H. 387.

It was held, in Pennsylvania, that a law extending the time of redemption from execution sale, passed after a sale but before the deed was given, was valid in its application to such sales. Gault's Appeal, 33 Penn. St. 94; per contra, see Robinson v. Howe, 13 Wisc. 341 (a tax sale); see Tuolumne &c. Co. v. Sedgwick, 15 Cal. 515.

In some cases the right to extend the time of redemption has been asserted as to sales made under decree of court, distinguishing such sales from those made under a power in the mortgage. Stone v. Bassett, 4 Minn. 298; Heyward v. Judd, 4 Minn. 483.

A statute allowing a mortgagor six months instead of twenty days in which to answer, was held valid. Von Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wisc. 559; Starkweather v. Hawes, 10 Wisc. 125.

And a statute permitting the mortgagor to retain possession until the end of the time allowed for redemption was sustained in Berthold v. Holman, 12 Minn. 335; Berthold v. Fox, 13 Minn. 501. But a similar statute was declared void in Blackwood v. Vanvleet, 11 Mich. 252; Mundy v. Monroe, 1 Mich. 68, 76.

It seems a statute requiring the mortgagee to exhaust the mortgage security before suing on the note would be valid; but a statute that by suing the note he should forfeit the mortgage would not. Swift v. Fletcher, 6 Minn. 550.

Appraisement Laws.-Statutes providing that property shall not be sold on execution for less than its appraised value, or some fixed portion of that value, are void in their application to prior contracts. Rawley v. Hooker, 21 Ind. 144.

Miscellaneous Cases of Statutes affecting the Remedy.-To take away all remedy impairs the obligation. Penrose v. Erie Canal Co. 56 Penn. St. 46; and see many of the cases above cited. In Jackoway v. Denton, 25 Ark. 625, and McNealy v. Gregory, 13 Flor. 417, a clause of the State Constitution was pronounced void which declared that all past contracts for the purchase or sale of slaves were nullities. So a statute which does not leave a person a substantial remedy, as it existed when the contract was entered into, but clogs and hampers it, is invalid. Oatman v. Bond, 15 Wisc. 20. An act which reduces the time of publishing notice of sale in foreclosure, by advertisement under a power, from twenty-four weeks to twelve weeks, affects the procedure only and is valid. James v. Stull, 9 Barb. 482.

Acts providing that a judgment shall not be a lien have been held valid. New Orleans v. Holmes, 13 La. Ann. 502; Curry v. Landers, 35 Ala. 280; but see Tillotson v. Millard, 7 Minn. 513.

A statute releasing the individual liability of stockholders in corporations was sustained in Maine, in its application to existing corporations. Coffin v. Rich, 45 Me. 507. But this decision was overruled, and the same statute pronounced void, so far

tificate obtained under the laws of another State, though such laws were passed before the inception of the contract; that a

as it applied to existing corporations, by the U. S. Supreme Court, in Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wal. 10.

For a case sustaining a statute changing the mode of notifying indorsers, see Levering v. Washington, 3 Minn. 323. And as to levy of executions, see Grosvenor v. Chesley, 48 Me. 369; and see Sanders v. Hillsborough Ins. Co. 44 N. H. 238.

Changing, Improving, or Amplifying the Remedy.-Laws giving more efficacious remedies, or improving existing ones, or adding new ones, or removing disabilities. or penalties, do not impair the obligation of contracts. The following are illustrations: Gowen v. Penobscot R. R. 44 Me. 140 (new means of enforcing land damages); Portland &c. R. R. v. Grand Trunk R. R. 46 Me. 69 (commissioners to determine rights of connecting roads); Coosa R. St. B. Co. v. Barclay, 30 Ala. 120 (right of attachment against foreign corporation); New Albany &c. R. R. v. McNamara, 11 Ind. 543 (new method of service of process); Webb v. Moore, 25 Ind. 4 (shortening notice in foreclosure sales).

The Legislature may impose individual liability upon stockholders as to all future contracts. Coffin v. Rich, 45 Me. 507; Matter of Reciprocity B'k, 29 Barb. 369; sed qu. the case in New York, being under a power reserved to alter charters; and see Ireland v. Palestine &c. Co. 19 Ohio, N. S. 369. And the Legislature may increase the efficacy of the remedy against stockholders liable for past indebtedness. Smith v. Bryan, 34 Ill. 364.

A statute giving new remedies for breach of an administrator's bond is valid, even as against the sureties. Graham v. State, 7 Ind. 470. And one making it a criminal offence for a person who has contracted to keep a bridge in repair to neglect to do so. Blaun v. State, 39 Ala. 353. This last case must be confined to future neglects; if it applied to past neglects, it would be an ex post facto law and void.

An equitable remedy may be changed to a legal one, and an assignee of a rentcharge enabled to sell in his own name. Van Rensselaer v. Hayes, 19 N. Y. 68; Same v. Ball, Ib. 100; so the assignee of coupons, Augusta B'k v. Augusta, 49 Me. 507; so a sub-contractor, Peters v. St. Louis &c. R. R. 23 Mo. 107; Grannahan v. Hannibal &c. R. R. 30 Mo. 546; so of day laborers employed by sub-contractors, Branin v. C. & P. Riv. R. R. 31 Vt. 214.

A law giving a lien to mechanics, &c., is not objectionable as impairing the obligation of contracts. Gordon v. South Fork &c. Co. 1 McAll. C. C. (Cal.) 513; Miller v. Moore, 1 E. D. Smith, 739; but see Kinney v. Sherman, 28 Ill. 520. Though it may be objectionable as creating an obligation or lien where none existed before, and as thus taking property without "due process of law."

That a remedy for breach of warranty cannot be given prior to eviction, see Great Western &c. Co. v. Saas, 1 Cinn. Supr. Ct. R. 21. A statute taking away the disability of a married woman to convey land is valid. Jones' Appeal, 57 Penn. St. 369.

Laws validating contracts are not objectionable as impairing the obligation. Sparks v. Claffer, 30 Ind. 204; Welch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149; Thornton v. McGrath, 1 Duv. (Ky.) 349; and see People v. Mitchell, 45 Barb. 208. Such laws, however, might be obnoxious to other constitutional provisions-e. g., that requiring due process of law.