Texas.-"Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State. All property in this State shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as directed by law, except such property as two thirds of both houses of the Legislature may think proper to exempt from taxation. The Legislature shall have power to lay an income tax, and to tax all persons pursuing any occupation, trade, or profession, provided that the term 'occupation' shall not be construed to apply to pursuits either agricultural or mechanical." * Arkansas." All property subject to taxation shall be taxed according to its value; that value to be ascertained in such manner as the General Assembly shall direct, making the same equal and uniform throughout the State. No one species of property from which a tax may be collected shall be taxed higher than another species of property of equal value; provided, the General Assembly shall have power to tax merchants, hawkers, peddlers, and privileges, in such manner as may from time to time be prescribed by law; and provided further, that no other or greater amounts of revenue shall at any time be levied than required for the necessary expenses of government, unless by a concurrence of two thirds of both houses of the General Assembly. No poll-tax shall be assessed for other than county purposes. No other or greater tax shall be levied on the productions or labor of the country, than may be required for expenses of inspection." † Missouri.-" All property subject to taxation in this State shall be taxed in proportion to its value." Massachusetts." And, further, full power and authority are hereby given and granted to the said General Court, from time to time, to impose and levy proportionable and reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes, upon all the inhabitants of, and persons resident and estates lying within, the said commonwealth; and also to impose and levy reasonable duties and excises upon any produce, goods, wares, merchandises, and commodities whatsoever, brought into, produced, manufactured, or being, within the same." || (a) *Constitution of Texas, art. vii, § 27. nue, § 2. Constitution of Missouri, art. xi, § 19. (a) Uniformity of Taxation.-The Constitutions of many other States require that taxation shall be uniform and equal. It has been shown that these provisions have generally been held applicable to taxation for general purposes only, and not to local assessments. Licenses. They have also been generally held inapplicable to licenses, especially when evidently imposed for police purposes. Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. 449; Baker v. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio, N. S. 534; New Orleans v. Turpin, 13 La. Ann. 56; so of fees of a gauger. Addison v. Saulnier, 19 Cal. 82. The California Constitution says: "Taxation shall be equal and uniform, and all property shall be taxed in proportion to its value," and "All laws of a general nature shall be uniform in their operation." These provisions do not make it necessary to tax all occupations or none, and a license tax on the business of auctioneers was held valid. People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46; but see People v. McCreery, 34 Cal. 432. A license tax graded on amount of sales, $10 on monthly sales of $1,000, $12 50 on monthly sales of In construing these provisions it has been held, in many of the States, that the words "equal and uniform" apply only to $2,000, &c., is not unconstitutional as being unequal in its operations. Sacramento v. Crocker, 16 Cal. 119. Uniformity must be such as is compatible with the subjectmatter, and as to licenses the only uniformity required is that the tax shall be the same on all those in the same business, and the carrying on of the business of insurance as agent for a foreign insurance company, is, it seems a different business from that of agent for domestic insurance companies. Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 13 Gratt. 767; see also Ducat v. Chicago, 48 Ill. 172. The same was held by the U. S. Supreme Court in Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410; Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. 566; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168. The requirement that foreign insurance companies doing business within the State should pay a percentage of their premiums to the fire department, was sustained in Wisconsin as an exercise of the police power. Fire Department v. Helfenstein, 16 Wisc. 136. A tax on the insurance companies of a particular city was held invalid, in State v. Merchants' Ins. Co. 12 La. Ann. 802; but it would seem that a license tax may be imposed by a particular city. New Orleans v. Turpin, 13 La. Ann. 56. A license law which fixed different rates for different localities, but did not discriminate as to persons, was held valid on the ground that a license is not a tax! East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 46 Ill. 392. A tax on all persons keeping over fifty pounds of powder was held not uniform, and therefore void. Police Jury v. Cochran, 20 La. Ann. 373. A license by the State to pursue a particular calling does not prevent a municipality from also imposing a license tax on the same, the power to lay such taxes being given to such municipality by statute. New Orleans v. Turpin, 13 La. Ann. 56. License to pursue a particular calling, does not exempt the person licensed from a tax on the income thence derived. Drexel v. Commonwealth, 46 Penn. St. 31. County Taxation.-These provisions as to uniformity have been held not to apply to taxation for county purposes. A provision of the Virginia Constitution that "taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the commonwealth, and all property shall be taxed in proportion to its value," was held not to apply to taxation for county purposes, and a special tax on the office of sheriff was sustained. Gilkeson v. Frederick Justices, 13 Gratt. 577. But when the provision of the Constitution was that "laws shall be passed taxing by a uniform rule all moneys, &c., and also all real and personal property according to its true value in money," held to apply to county and municipal taxation as well as State. Zanesville v. Muskingum Co. 5 Ohio, N. S. 589; but not to local assessments. Hill v. Higdon, Ib. 243. * * Exemptions and Commutations.—It was held in Illinois, that the constitutional requirements of "uniformity" do not take away the power of exempting from taxation or of commuting a tax, the Constitution also providing that "the General Assembly shall have power to tax peddlers * toll bridges and ferries and persons using and exercising franchises and privileges, in such manner as they shall from time to time direct." Ill. Cent. R. R. v. County of McLean, 17 Ill. 291; Hunsaker v. Wright, 30 Ill. 146; Board of Supervisors &c. v. Campbell, 42 Ill. 490; and the same was held in Michigan, where the Constitution contains no such special provision, the State receiving an equivalent for the exemption. People v. Auditor General, 7 Mich. 84. See also Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wisc. 454, 691; Atty. Gen. v. Winnebago &c. Pl. R. Co. 11 Wisc. 35; Milwaukee &c. R. R. v. Super a direct tax on property; and that the clause in regard to uniformity of taxation does not limit the power of the Legislature visors, 9 Wisc. 431. But a municipality cannot exempt. Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wisc. 242. But in California, where the Constitution provides that "all property in this State shall be taxed in proportion to its value to be ascertained as directed by law," and "taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State," it has been held that exemption of private property is prohibited, and that the rule for State purposes must be uniform. People v. McCreery, 34 Cal. 432. The city of La Salle being situate in, and being a part of the township of La Salle, an act exempting the inhabitants of the city from taxation, in support of the township roads outside of the city was held invalid. O'Kane v. Treat, 25 Ill. 557. But an assessment of labor for repair of roads is not a tax. Pleasant v. Kost, 29 Ill. 490. Under a provision that "no property shall be exempt from taxation except property of schools of the United States, the State, counties and municipalities, it was held that the Legislature had no power to commute taxes. Life Association &c. v. Board of Assessors, 49 Mo. 512. What Violates the Requirement of Uniformity.-A statute providing that farming lands outside villages should only be taxed at one-half the rate of village lots does. Knowlton v. Supervisors, 9 Wisc. 410; and an act taxing the real estate of a city exclusively for the payment of the municipal debt. Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510; and in Nevada, the Constitution requiring "a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation," an act taxing three-fourths of the value of the products of mines prescribes an unequal rate, as the whole should be taxed. State v. Eastabrook, 3 Nev. 173; State v. Kruttschnitt, 4 Nev. 178. Railroads cannot be taxed at a higher rate than individuals. Bureau County v. Chicago &c. R. R. 44 Ill. 229; Chicago &c. R. R. v. Boone Co. 16. 240. A provision in a city charter empowering the collector to impose without notice five per cent. additional amount to the tax for delay, conflicts with the requirement of uniformity, and is void. Scammon v. Chicago, 44 Ill. 269; Clayton v. Chicago, Ib. 280. Effect of Omissions.-That omissions of property will not vitiate the tax where "uniformity" is required, see Merritt v. Farris, 22 Ill. 303; Dunham v. Chicago, 55 Ill. 358; High v. Shoemaker, 22 Cal. 363; People v. McCreary, 34 Cal. 432; People v. Gerke, 35 Cal. 677; but it has been held otherwise if the omission is intentional in Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wisc. 242; see Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wisc. 454. What does not Violate the Requirement of Uniformity.—A statute that abuttors should keep the street in front of their lands in repair, is as uniform a distribution of the burden as the nature of the case will permit. Hart v. Gaven, 12 Cal. 476. Assessing a tax according to the valuation of the preceding year is not invalid. Kelsey v. Nevada, 18 Cal. 629; nor assessing bank shares as of a different date from other property. McVeigh v. Chicago, 49 Ill. 318. A statute making the tax on a certain species of property-e. g., proceeds of mines-assessable and payable quarterly, does not violate the rule of uniformity. State v. Manhattan &c. Co. 4 Nev. 318. Nor is the rule of "uniform rate" violated by allowing a deduction of debts owed to be made from the valuation of other property but not from that of national bank shares. McVeigh v. Chicago, 49 Ill. 318. It is held in Wisconsin, that a tax upon shares in the national banks, there being no tax on shares in State banks, but in place thereof, an equivalent tax on the capital of State banks is valid. The as to the objects of taxation, but is only intended to prevent an arbitrary taxation of property, according to kind or quality, decision was put upon the ground, that the United States Constitution is controlling, and overrides the rule of valuation in the State Constitution in that particular case, and that the national bank shares are a new species of property created by the United States, and governed by the rules established by Congress to which the State law must yield. Van Slyke v. State, 23 Wisc. 655. An act for equalizing assessments by taking averages, &c., was held constitutional, in People v. Solomon, 46 Ill. 333. A statute requiring the city of New Orleans to pay one-half its election expenses, and the State the other half, it was held that the city could not complain of this as unequal taxation without showing that the law worked injustice to it. State v. New Orleans, 15 La. Ann. 354. The Legislature may impose a tax for the current year on property not before taxable. De Pauw v. New Albany, 22 Ind. 204; and may lay an income tax based on the profits or income of the preceeding year. Drexel v. Commonwealth, 46 Penn. St. 31; see Murchison v. McNeil, 1 Wins. (N. C.) No. 1 (Law), 220; and may lay a tax according to a previous assessment, and such tax will not be retrospective nor ex post facto. Locke v. New Orleans, 4 Wall. 172; and may authorize the reassessment of taxes. Tallman v. Janesville, 17 Wisc. 71; Cross v. Milwaukee, 19 Wisc. 509; McVeigh v. Chicago, 49 Ill. 318. "Uniform and equal rate of assessment and valuation" does not require a uniform method of valuation of property; e. g., a bank officer may be made the representative of the owners in the listing and valuation of bank stock. Whitney v. Ragsdale, 33 Ind. 107. Reassessments are valid where former one was void for some irregularity. Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wisc. 400; Evans v. Sharp, 29 Wisc. 564; Dill v. Roberts, 30 Wisc. 178; Dean v. Borchsenius, 30 Wisc. 236. See Hale v. Kenosha, 29 Wisc. 599, as to what taxes are within the requirement of uniformity. Taxation and Representation.—It is often said that taxation and representation go together. This does not imply that a person must have the right of suffrage before he can be taxed. Thus, the personal property of an unmarried woman may be taxed, though she cannot vote. Wheeler v. Wall, 6 Allen, 558. Nor is the consent of local representatives necessary. Thus, it has been held that the Legislature may compel a municipality to raise by taxation money to pay a claim against it, Newman v. Justices, 5 Sneed (Tenn.), 695, and even though such claim is not valid at law. Guilford v. Chenango County, 13 N. Y. 143; Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116; Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343; Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal. 525; see, also, Beals v. Amador Co. 35 Cal. 624; People v. Haws, 34 Barb. 69. But where the Constitution provided that "the corporate authorities of counties, &c., may be vested with power to assess and collect taxes for municipal purposes,” it was held that the Legislature could not compel a municipality to impose a tax. People v. Chicago, 51 Ill. 58. And the same was held in Minnesota, where the Constitution requires that taxes shall be as nearly equal as may be. Sanborn v. Rice, 9 Minn. 273. And where a tax has been levied by a municipality for a particular purpose, it has been held that the Legislature cannot divert it to another purpose, Nashville v. Towns, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 186; State v. Haben, 22 Wisc. 660; but that the Legislature may direct the application of part of the revenues raised by a county to the payment of the police expenses of a city in such county, see State v. St. Louis County Court, without regard to value. Specific taxes have therefore been sustained as a valid exercise of the legislative power. Thus a 34 Mo 546. That the State may authorize commissioners appointed by the State to levy a city tax, see Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376. But see People ex rel. McCagg v. Chicago, 51 Ill. 17; Lovingston v. Wider, 53 Ill. 302; People v. Salomon, 51 Ill. 37. State and National Taxation.—Agencies of the United States Government cannot be taxed. Thus, an act of Congress exempting United States bonds from taxation is valid, and it seems the exemption would have existed without such act. Newark City Bank v. Assessors, 1 Vroom, 13; Bank of Commerce v. New York, 2 Black, 620; Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. 200; Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573; People v. Commissioners, 4 Wall. 244; Bradley v. People, Ib. 459; The Banks v. Mayor, 7 Wall. 16; Bank v. Supervisors, Ib. 26; State v. Jackson, 33 N. J. 450. It seems a succession tax on an estate consisting in part of United States securities is good. Strode v. Commonwealth, 52 Penn. St. 181; but see People ex rel. Babbitt v. Comm'rs of Taxes of N. Y. cited at p. 64 of Wells' Report on Revision of Tax Laws. It was held in New York that the exemption does not extend to the United States treasury notes and certificates of indebtedness, People v. Hoffman, 37 N. Y. 9; but this and other cases were reversed and the doctrine overruled by the United States Supreme Court, and such property was pronounced exempt in The Banks v. The Mayor, 7 Wall. 16, and Bank v. Supervisors, Ib. 26. In People v. Comm'rs, 37 Barb. 635, it was held that the exemption does not extend to United States securities issued before the act, but this must be considered as entirely overruled by the cases cited above. A tax on the capital of a bank is a tax on such securities, if the capital is invested in them. Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. 200; Whitney v. Madison, 23 Ind. 331; otherwise, of a tax on the shares of individual stockholders, Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573. But as the national banks are instrumentalities of the Government, the shares in such banks can only be taxed by consent of Congress, and in the manner that Congress prescribes. Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573. Many State decisions are opposed to this position, but their protest against the doctrine is of course unavailing. See Utica v. Churchill, 33 N. Y. 161; People v. Barton, 44 Barb. 148; Pittsburg v. First National Bank, 55 Penn. St. 45; People v. Bradley, 39 Ill. 130; McVeigh v. Chicago, 49 Ill. 318. The Union Pacific Railroad is not a United States instrumentality, and so exempt from State taxation. Union Pac. R. R. v. Lincoln Co. 1 Dillon C. C. 314; Thompson v. Pacific R. R. 9 Wall. 579. In this case the Supreme Court said, that the railroad is at most an agent which Congress employs or may employ, and the general property of United States agents is not exempt from State taxation. But, in Massachusetts, the road-bed of a railroad has been held exempt from local taxation, on the ground that it was public property. Worcester v. Western &c. R. R. 4 Metc. 564. On the other hand, the United States cannot tax agencies and instruments of the State Governments. Thus, a stamp tax on writs and process of the State courts is invalid. Craig v. Dimmock, 47 Ill. 308; Warren v. Paul, 22 Ind. 276; Jones v. Estate of Keep, 19 Wisc. 369; Fifield v. Close, 15 Mich. 505; Smith v. Short, 40 Ala. 385; Union B'k v. Hill, 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 325. Nor can Congress, as very generally held by the State courts, prescribe rules of evidence for State courts, or prescribe that a contract shall there be held invalid for want of a stamp. Craig v. Dimmock, 47 Ill. 308; Carpenter v. Snelling, 97 Mass. 452; Clemens v. Conrad, 19 Mich. 170; Haight v. |