the words which the Legislature has employed to convey it." And, after saying that the object was to lay an embargo, and to prevent evasions of the law, and that certain acts had been prohibited, the court proceeded: "But should this court conjecture that some other act, not expressly forbidden, and which is in itself the mere exercise of power over property which all men possess, might also be a preliminary step to a violation. of the law, and ought therefore to be punished for the purpose of effecting the legislative intention, it would certainly transcend its own duties and powers, and would create a rule instead of applying one already made. It is the province of the Legislature to declare, in explicit terms, how far the citizen shall be restrained in the exercise of that power over property which ownership gives; and it is the province of the court to apply the rule to the case thus explicitly described, not to some other case which judges may conjecture to be equally dangerous." In a case on the English on the English bankrupt act, Lord Tenterden said, "The intention of this act certainly was to prevent voluntary preferences; the words may, probably, go beyond the intention; but if they do, it rests with the Legislature to make an alteration; the duty of the court is only to construe and give effect to the provision." † In another case where an effort was made to include a writ of pone or distringas under the term execution, which is confined to executions on judgments, the application was denied; and Lord Tenterden said, "Speaking for myself alone, I cannot forbear observing, that I think there is always danger in giving effect to what is called the equity of a statute, and that it is much safer and better to rely on and abide by the plain words, although the Legislature might possibly have provided for other cases had their attention been directed to them." + Where an English statute provided, that no indenture of apprenticeship should be "valid and effectual" unless "approved of by two justices of the peace, under their hands and seals," an indenture executed by the justices under their hands *Schooner Paulina's Cargo v. The United States, 7 Cranch, 52, 60. Notley v. Buck, 8 Barn. & Cres. 160, 164. Brandling v. Barrington, 6 Barn, & Cres. 467, 475. only was held void; and the King's Bench, per Bayley, J., said, "I do not know how to get rid of the words of this section of the act of Parliament, and where the Legislature, in a very modern act of Parliament, have used words of a plain and definite import, it is very dangerous to put upon them a construction, the effect of which will be to hold that the Legislature did not mean that which they have expressed." * In a case upon the English poor laws, which provided that, in order to gain a settlement, the rent of a tenement "should be paid for one whole year at least," it was insisted, with reference to the great inequality of rents, that this was very absurd and unjust; but the act was strictly construed, and the King's Bench said, "It is very desirable in all cases to adhere to the words of an act of Parliament, giving to them that sense which is their natural import in the order in which they are placed." + "We are bound," said Lord Denman, "to give to the words of the Legislature all possible meaning which is consistent with the clear language used. But, if we find language used which is incapable of a meaning, we cannot supply one. It is extremely probable that the alteration suggested would express what the Legislature meant, but we, looking at the word as judges, are no more justified to introduce that meaning than we should be if we added any other provision." + "The court," said Coleridge, J., "should decline to mould the language of an act for the sake of an alleged convenience, or an alleged equity, upon doubtful evidence of intention." I And again, the same learned and experienced judge said "If I thought the construction we are adopting, put any force on the meaning of the act, I should be the last to concur in it; for the longer I sit here the more I feel the importance of seeking only the meaning of a statute according to a fair interpretation of its words, and resting upon that." Says Patteson, J.,— "I see the necessity of not importing into statutes words which are not be found there. Such a mode of interpretation only The King v. Inhabs. of Stoke Damerel, 7 Barn. & Cres. 563, 568, 569. Green v. Wood, 7 Q. B. 178, 185. The King v. Poor Law Commissioners, King v. Inhabs. of Ramsgate, 6 Barn. 6 A. & E. 1, 7. & Cres. 712, 715. See also King v. Inhabs. of Barham, 8 Barn. & Cres. 99. 6 A. & E. p. 7. "Whether we gives occasion to endless difficulty.” * "We are required," says Lord Denman, "to add some arbitrary words to the section. We cannot introduce any such qualification; and I cannot help thinking that the introduction of qualifying words in the interpretation of statutes, is frequently a great reproach to the law." Tindal, C. J., says, "It is the duty of all courts to confine themselves to the words of the Legislaturenothing adding thereto, nothing diminishing." + The Court of Appeals in New York says, are considering an agreement between parties, a statute, or a Constitution, with a view to its interpretation, the thing we are to seek is, the thought which it expresses. To ascertain this, the first resort in all cases is to the natural signification of the words employed, in the order and grammatical arrangement in which the framers of the instrument have placed them. If thus regarded the words embody a definite meaning, which involves no absurdity, and no contradiction between different parts of the same writing, then that meaning apparent on the face of the instrument is the one which alone we are at liberty to say was intended to be conveyed. In such a case there is no room for construction. That which the words declare, is the meaning of the instrument; and neither courts nor Legis latures have the right to add to or take away from that meaning." | In Michigan it has been said, "It is only where a statute is ambiguous in its terms, that courts exercise the power of so controlling its language as to give effect to what they may suppose to have been the intention of the law-maker. In the statute before us, the language admits of but one construction. No doubt can arise as to its meaning. It must, therefore, be its own interpreter." T The result of this investigation then is, that for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the Legislature, no extrinsic. fact, prior to the passage of the bill, which is not itself a rule of law or an act of legislation, can be inquired into or in any *King v. Burrell, 12 A. & E. 468. the subject also discussed in McCluskey v. Cromwell, 1 Kernan, 593. ¶ Bidwell et al. v. Whitaker et al. 1 Mich. 469, 479. way taken into view. We now proceed with the inquiry, what are the means outside of the statute which we may legitimately employ to arrive at the desired result, viz., the legislative intent. Statutes in pari materia, to be taken together.-It is well settled, that in construing a doubtful statute, and for the purpose of arriving at the legislative intent, all acts on the same. subject-matter are to be taken together and examined, in order to arrive at the true result. (a) "All acts in pari materia," (a) In pari materia.—It will be presumed, where the sense is doubtful, that the Legislature did not intend to change the general principles of law; thus a statute allowing wills probated in another State to be recorded in Ohio, was held not to include a will probated in another State which ought to have been originally probated in Ohio, where the testator was domiciled. Manuel v. Manuel, 13 Ohio, N. S. 458. Acts in pari materia are to be taken as one law where they do not conflict; e. g., statutes of limitation passed successively. If the earlier is not inconsistent, it is not repealed, and the time runs under that as well as under the later statute. McLaughlin v. Hoover, 1 Oregon, 31. A statute changing county lines was construed in connection with a prior act as to collection of taxes, both forming parts of one system. Eskridge v. McGruder, 45 Miss. 294. Even repealed statutes are to be considered. Doe v. Avaline, 8 Ind. 6; Coffin v. Rich, 45 Me. 507; and a repealed proviso in construing the portion not repealed. Bank for Savings v. Collector, 3 Wall. 495. An amendatory act, and the act amended, are to be construed as one statute, and no portion of either is to be held inoperative, if it can be sustained without wresting words from their appropriate meaning. Harrell v. Harrell, 8 Flor. 46. In the same manner, constitutional provisions and statutes in pari materia are to be construed together, e. g., those as to duty of comptroller with regard to taxes. Billingsley v. State, 14 Md. 369. Statutes passed the same day on the same subject are to be construed as sections of one statute. St. Martin v. New Orleans, 14 La. Ann. 113; People v. Jackson, 30 Cal. 427. Statutes passed at the same session on the same subject are to be construed as one act; hence a criminal code repealing all other laws as to crimes, does not repeal a license law, with penalties, etc., passed at the same session, the code containing no provisions touching the subject of license. Cain v. State, 20 Tex. 355. The various statutes of N. Y. giving new powers to married women, though passed in different years, are to be construed as one act. Perkins v. Perkins, 62 Barb. 531. Where different degrees of murder were created, and it was provided that "the degree of murder shall be found by the jury," it was held by the aid of other sections in pari materia, that this requirement did not apply in a case where the accused plead guilty. Green v. Commonwealth, 12 Allen, 155. A statute conferring jurisdiction of a certain offence upon a police court, provided that the fine imposed should not exceed $100, and the imprisonment should not exceed one year; it was held, by referring to other statutes in pari materia, that this provision was a limit upon the punishment of either fine or imprisonment, but did not authorize the infliction of both for the same offence. Commonwealth v. Griffin, 105 Mass. 185. A subsequent statute may be consulted as to the meaning of a prior one, even in respect to its said Lord Mansfield, "are to be taken together, as if they were one law." "Where," he said, on another occasion, "there are different statutes in pari materia, though made at different times, or even expired, and not referring to each other, they shall be taken and construed together as one system, and as explanatory of each other." And in various cases before him, Lord Mansfield applied this doctrine to the laws concerning church leases, bankrupts, and the poor.† This sound rule has been frequently recognized in this country. On this principle, "in many instances," say the Court of Errors of the State of New York, "a remedy provided by one statute will be extended to cases arising on the same matter under a subsequent statute." And so it was held, that a provision for compensation embraced in an original act of 1817, extended to cases arising under an act passed in 1820, conferring additional powers on canal commissioners. The subject has been considered and explained in Connecticut; and it was there said, "Statutes are in pari materia, which relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things. The word par must not be confounded with the word similis. It is used in opposition to it, as in the expression, magis pares sunt quam similes; intimating not like * The Earl of Ailesbury v. Pattison, Doug. 30. Rex v. Loxdale, 1 Burr. 445; Duck v. Addington, 4 Term R. 447. Rogers v. Bradshaw, 20 J. R. 735, 744. application to transactions occurring between the dates of the two. Hart v. Reynolds, 1 Heisk. (Tenn.) 208; McAfee v. Southern R. R. 36 Miss. 669. The rule in pari materia does not, however, go to the extent of controlling the language of a statute by the supposed policy of previous enactments. Goodrich v. Russell, 42 N. Y. 177; nor can other statutes in pari materia be resorted to where the language of the one under consideration is plain and explicit. Ingalls v. Cole, 47 Me 530. Separate charters were granted to two companies to erect booms and to raft logs caught by such booms; afterwards the companies were consolidated; held that the charters must be construed separately, and that the powers conferred on each were not interchanged. Gould v. Langdon, 43 Penn. St. 365. For further illustrations of the rule, see Powers v. Shepard, 48 N. Y. 540 (bounties); Billingslea v. Baldwin, 23 Md. 85 (sales of infants' estates); Keeling's Road, 59 Penn. St. 358; Converse v. U. S. 21 How. 463; United States v. Collier, 3 Blatch. C. C. 325 (appropriation and revenue acts); Mitchell v. Duncan, 7 Flor. 13 (stay of execution); La Grange County v. Cutler, 6 Ind. 354; State v. Shaw, 28 Iowa, 67; Le Roy v. Chabolla, 2 Abb. U. S. R. 448. |