ive; that the passage from Cienfuegos to a point about twenty-four miles south of Santiago was made "with as much dispatch as was possible while keeping the squadron a

unit"; finally, that "Commodore Schley was the senior officer of our squadron off Santiago when the Spanish squadron attempted to escape on the morning of July 3, 1898.

He was in absolute command, and is entitled to the credit due to such commanding officer for the glorious victory which resulted in the total destruction of the Spanish ships."

This verdict was so emphatic against Admiral Schley that his partisans and friends were dissatisfied and talk of action by Congress was general. Finally Schley himself appealed to President Roosevelt for a rehearing of the case. The President's reply was published February 19, 1902. He informed Schley that he had carefully read his appeal and its answer by the Navy Department, that he had examined all the testimony taken before the court and the statements of the respective counsel, including all the official reports relating to the Santiago naval campaign, beside which he had had before him the four surviving captains of the five ships, aside from those of the two admirals, that were actively engaged at Santiago.

The President referred to the fact that the court of inquiry was unanimous in its findings of fact, and unanimous in its expression of opinion of most of the findings of fact. "No appeal is made to me from the verdict of the court on these points where it was unanimous. I have, however, gone carefully over the evidence on these points also. I am satisfied that on the whole the court did substantial justice. It should have specifically condemned the failure to enforce an efficient night blockade at Santiago while Admiral Schley was in command. On the other hand, I feel that there is a reasonable doubt whether he did not move his squadron with sufficient expedition from port to port. The court is a unit in condemning Admiral Schley's actions on the point where it seems to me he most gravely erred: his 'retrograde movement' when he abandoned the blockade and his disobedience of orders and misstatement of facts in relation thereto. It should be remembered, however, that the majority of these actions which the court censures occurred five weeks or more before the fight itself; and it certainly seems that if Admiral Schley's actions were censurable he should not have been left as second in command under Admiral Sampson. His offenses were in effect condoned when he was not called to account for them. Admiral Sampson, after the fight, in an official letter to the Department alluded for the first time to Admiral Schley's ' reprehensible conduct' six weeks previously. If Admiral Schley was guilty of reprehensible conduct of a kind which called for such notice from Admiral Sampson, then Admiral Sampson ought not to have left him as senior officer of the blockading squadron on the 3d of July, when he (Sampson) steamed away on his proper errand of communication with General Shafter."

The President then proceeded carefully to analyze the testimony upon which the court based its finding and summed up as follows:

"The question of command is in this case nominal and technical. Admiral Sampson's ship, the New York, was seen at the outset of the fight from all the other ships except the Brooklyn. Four of these five ship captains have testified that they regarded him as present and in command. He signaled 'Close in' to the fleet as soon as the first Spanish ship appeared, but his signal was not seen by any American vessel. He was actually under fire from the forts, and himself fired a couple of shots, at the close of the action with the torpedo boats, in addition to signaling the Indiana

just at the close of the action. But during the action not a single order from him was received by any of the ships that were actively engaged.

"Admiral Schley at the outset of the action hoisted the two signals of 'Clear ship' and Close in,' which was simply carrying out the standing orders of Admiral Sampson as to what should be done if the enemy's ships attempted to break out of the harbor. Until after the close of the first portion of the fight at the mouth of the harbor, and until after he had made his loop and the Spanish ships were fleeing to the westward, not another American ship noticed a signal from him. When the western pursuit had begun the Oregon, and the Oregon only, noticed and repeated one of his signals of command. The captain of the Oregon then regarded him as in command, but did not in any shape or way execute any movement or any action of any kind whatsoever in accordance with any order from him.

"In short, the question as to which of the two men, Admiral Sampson or Admiral Schley, was at the time in command is of merely nominal character. Technically Sampson commanded the fleet, and Schley, as usual, the western division. The actual fact, the important fact, is that after the battle was joined not a helm was shifted, not a gun was fired, not a pound of steam was put on in the engine room aboard any ship actively engaged, in obedience to the order of either Sampson or Schley, save on their own two vessels. It was a Captains' fight.

"Therefore the credit to which each of the two is entitled rests on matters apart from the claim of nominal command over the squadron; for, so far as the actual fight was concerned, neither one nor the other in fact exercised any command. Sampson was hardly more than technically in the fight. His real claim for credit rests upon his work as Commander-in-Chief; upon the excellence of the blockade; upon the preparedness of the squadron; upon the arrangement of the ships head-on in a semicircle around the harbor and the standing orders in accordance with which they instantly moved to the attack of the Spaniards when the latter appeared. For all these things the credit is his.

"Admiral Schley is rightly entitled--as is Captain Cook-to the credit of what the Brooklyn did in the fight. On the whole she did well; but I agree with the unanimous finding of the three Admirals who composed the court of inquiry as to the 'loop.' It seriously marred the Brooklyn's otherwise excellent record, being in fact the one grave mistake made by any American ship that day. Had the Brooklyn turned to the westward, that is, in the same direction that the Spanish ships were going, instead of in the contrary direction, she would undoubtedly have been in more dangerous proximity 'to them. But it would have been more dangerous for them as well as for her! This kind of danger must not be too nicely weighed by those whose trade it is to dare greatly for the honor of the flag. Moreover, the danger was certainly not as great as that which, in the selfsame moment, menaced Wainwright's fragile craft as he drove forward against the foe. It was not, in my judgment, as great as the danger to which the Texas was exposed by the turn as actually made. It certainly caused both the Brooklyn and the Texas materially to lose position compared to the fleeing Spanish vessels. But after the loop had once been taken Admiral Schley handled the Brooklyn manfully and well.

She and the Oregon were thenceforth the headmost of the American vessels-though the Iowa certainly, and seemingly the Texas also, did as much in hammering to a standstill the Vizcaya, Oquendo, and Teresa; while the Indiana did all her eastward position and crippled machinery permitted. In the chase of the Colon the Brooklyn and Oregon share the credit between them.

"Under such circumstances it seems to me that the recommendations of President McKinley were eminently proper and that so far as Admirals Sampson and Schley were concerned, it would have been unjust for him to have made other recommendations. Personally, I feel that in view of Captain Clark's long voyage in the Oregon and the condition in which he brought her to the scene of service, as well as the way in which he actually managed her before and during the fight, it would have been well to have given him the same advancement that was given Wainwright. But waiving this, it is evident that Wainwright was entitled to receive more than any of the other commanders; and that it was just to Admiral Sampson that he should receive a greater advance in numbers than Admiral Schley-there was nothing done in the battle that warranted any unusual reward for either. In short, as regards Admirals Sampson and Schley, I find that President McKinley did substantial justice, and that there would be no warrant for reversing his action.

"Both Admiral Sampson and Admiral Schley are now on the retired list. In concluding their reports the members of the court of inquiry, Admirals Dewey, Benham, and Ramsay, unite in stating that they recommend that no further action be had in the matter. With this recommendation I most heartily concur. There is no excuse whatever from either side for any further agitation of this unhappy controversy. To keep it alive would merely do damage to the navy and to the country."

The closing scene of this most unfortunate controversy came on May 6, 1902, when at five o'clock in the afternoon, Rear-Admiral Sampson died at his home in Washington, where he had lived with his family ever since his detachment from duty as commandant of the Boston Navy Yard. He had been in poor health for a year, and the illness increased to such an extent that his mind partially gave way. His sad condition was probably due in part to the distress caused by the controversy of which you have just read the account.

The question of the promotion of Admirals Sampson and Schley was pending from the official close of the war until the spring of 1901. Meanwhile, Admiral Sampson had served as a member of the Commission to Cuba to reorganize the government after the war and had been assigned to the command of the Boston Navy Yard, from which time until his death he had been in poor physical condition. The facts in his career previous to the close of hostilities have been given in a preceding chapter.

CHAPTER XIV.

ROOSEVELT'S FIRST ADMINISTRATION,

TH

1901-1904-CONTINUED-VISITS BY PRINCE

HENRY OF GERMANY AND THE SPECIAL EMBASSY FROM FRANCE.

HE sincerity of the professed friendship between nations is open to great doubt. The rulers of the powers address one another as "great and good friends," refer eloquently to the traditional love that has existed between them from time immemorial, and are sure that no cloud can ever cast a shadow over those delightful relations. But, though there may be a touch of genuine sentiment now and then, there is little honesty in such professions. Each sovereign or ruler is thinking chiefly of the interests of his own country, and should the one whom he is greeting so effusively interfere with any of his projects, he will let slip his dogs of war upon him just as quickly as he can cut the leashes.

When the Czar of Russia falls upon the neck of the President of France, and the happy thousands fling up their hats and shout for joy at the pretty picture, the whole theatrical exhibition is arranged for some selfish purpose. There is as much jealousy among nations as among private citizens. It may seem ungracious to smile at the professions of friendship of the German Emperor for the United States. It was a graceful act when he asked the daughter of President Roosevelt to christen his new yacht at its launching, and this fiery, impulsive and brilliant member of the house of Hohenzollern, in many respects not unlike our own President, gave a still more significant expression of his friendship, when he sent his brother Henry as a guest of the great Republic across the Atlantic. Some suspect that the cultivation of our good will was inspired in the case of Emperor William by resentment toward Great Britain, and a friendship born of dislike to a third person can never ring true.

Prince Henry arrived in New York, February 23, 1902, as the representative of his august brother, at the launching of the emperor's private yacht Meteor at Shooter's Island. Reaching the city on the North German Lloyd steamship Kronprinz, he boarded the Hohenzollern, the emperor's yacht, which had come into port some days before. On this yacht, Prince Henry received the greetings of the delegates of President Roosevelt and of the municipal government. His frank, democratic ways, his good nature and patience, and his unaffected geniality made him popular from the first, and everybody who saw or came in contact with the Prince declared him to be one of the best fellows that ever lived.

The first day after his arrival he was welcomed to the United States by President Roosevelt at the White House, and in the evening was entertained at a state dinner. The toasts and speechmaking were of the most happy character and the Prince established himself in the good graces of all. The Meteor was launched February 25, the christening being done by Miss Alice Roosevelt, eldest daughter of the President.