"The time has come when there should be additional legislation for the Philippines. Nothing better can be done for the islands than to introduce industrial enterprises. Nothing would benefit them so much as throwing them open to industrial development. The connection between idleness and mischief is proverbial, and the opportunity to do remunerative work is one of the surest preventives of war. Of course, no business man will go into the Philippines unless it is to his interest to do so; and it is immensely to the interest of the islands that he should go in. It is therefore necessary that the Congress should pass laws by which the resources of the islands can be developed; so that franchises (for limited terms of years) can be granted to companies doing business in

them, and every encouragement be given to the incoming of business men of every kind.

"Not to permit this is to do a wrong to the Philippines. The franchises must be granted and the business permitted only under regulations which will guarantee the islands against any kind of improper exploitation. But the vast natural wealth of the islands must be developed, and the capital willing to develop it must be given the opportunity. The field must be thrown open to individual enterprise, which has been. the real factor in the development of every region over which our flag has flown.

"It is urgently necessary to enact suitable laws dealing with general transportation, mining, banking, currency, homesteads, and the use and ownership of the lands and timber. These laws will give free play to industrial enterprise; and the commercial development which will surely follow will afford to the people of the islands the best proofs of the sincerity of our desire to aid them."

CHAPTER XIII.

ROOSEVELT'S FIRST ADMINISTRATION, 1901-1904—CONTINUED THE SCHLEY AND

ΟΝΕ

SAMPSON CONTROVERSY.

NE of the most unpleasant incidents connected with the war with Spain was the bitter controversy that arose between the partisans of Rear-Admiral Schley and Admiral Sampson as to the respective credit due those commanders in the destruction of Cervera's fleet on the 3d of July, 1898. You will recall that at the time of this battle Admiral Sampson was absent, holding a conference with General Shafter. Upon hearing the sound of the cannon he rushed for the scene of the struggle, but did not arrive until it was virtually over. The mistake made by him, to which I cannot help thinking the subsequent wrangle was mainly due, was that in his first dispatch to the government announcing the crushing victory, he was not chivalrous enough to give the actual participants the glory that was rightly theirs. A simple reading of this dispatch, with no other knowledge of the occurrence, would make one suppose that Sampson was present and personally directing operations. Had he been as magnanimous and tactful as Admiral Dewey or other commanders and ascribed the credit to his subordinates, though technically it belonged to himself, the American nation would have been quick to bestow unstinted praise upon him, and the unseemly quarrel that followed never would have taken place.

But the censure of Commodore (now Rear-Admiral) Schley, in official reports and in the public press, and especially in Maclay's excellent "History of the Navy," became so sharp that on July 19, 1901, the publisher of the Baltimore American, a warm friend of Schley, who, as you know, is a native of Maryland, addressed a letter to President McKinley, complaining that the work alluded to was a semi-officially recognized textbook in the Naval Academy, and that it charged Rear-Admiral Schley with being a coward, a liar, a caitiff, an incompetent and insubordinate. The author, in an interview published in the same paper, said that proofs of the offending volume were submitted to Secretary Long and Admiral Sampson, and approved by them in advance of publication, and further, Long gave him his situation of Navy Department clerk attached to the Brooklyn Navy Yard, after reading the attack upon Admiral Schley. Admiral Dewey, however, refused to read the proofs that were also submitted to him.

The Secretary of the Navy immediately ordered the rejection of Maclay's history as a text-book at the Naval Academy, and declared that he had not read the proof of the work as a whole, but only the chapter relating to the mobilization of the fleets, and that he did not see Maclay's account of the battle of Santiago until after it was published. In an interview given a few days later in the Boston Transcript, Admiral Sampson said: "In one way, possibly, I was responsible for the statements made in the history. I was commander-in-chief of the squadron, and was responsible, so far as reading the proofs

goes. If the historian has taken facts from my official reports to the Navy Department, that is all well and good. I stand by first reports and official communications. I would welcome an investigation of this whole matter by Congress or by the Navy Department, but I see no hope of its being taken up."

On the day of this interview, Admiral Schley wrote to the Secretary of the Navy saying that he had refrained heretofore from all comment upon the innuendos of his enemies, muttered or murmured in secret, but he thought the time had come to take such action as would bring the entire matter under the clearer and calmer review of his brothers in arms, and he asked such action at the hands of the department as it might deem best to accomplish that purpose.

In reply, Secretary Long approved the request of Schley, and, on July 25, the Secretary named the following members of the court of inquiry: Admiral Dewey (president), with Rear-Admirals Lewis Ashfield Kimberley and Andrew Kennedy Benham, the court to assemble in Washington September 12. Soon after Judge-Advocate General Lemley, of the navy, was named judge-advocate for this inquiry. Age and infirmity compelled Admiral Kimberley to retire, and in August Rear-Admiral Henry L. Howison (retired) was chosen as his substitute.

Ten points of inquiry were specified for the court, which, however, was given full discretion to "make its examination into this matter, as requested by the officer at whose instance it is convened."

To judge of the character of Maclay's criticism the following brief extracts are given from his comments, the first referring to the reasons of Schley for his temporary withdrawal from before Santiago:

"In his report about the coal supply of the vessels under his command, Schley exhibited either a timidity amounting to absolute cowardice or a prevarication of facts that were intrinsically falsehoods . . . Schley . . . turned in caitiff flight from the danger spot toward which duty, honor, and the whole American people were most earnestly urging him."

Concerning the famous "loop" made by the Brooklyn, Maclay said: Schley hastily ordered the helm aport. 'But that will carry us into the Texas,' said the officer. Let the Texas take care of herself,' was the heartless reply, and the shameful spectacle of an American warship, supported by a force superior to the enemy's a warship whose commander had expended such vast quantities of ammunition on target practice in the presence of a fashionable hotel at Hampton Roads in order to meet a worthy foe-deliberately turning tail and running away, was presented. . . Cervera nobly threw down the gauntlet. Schley cravenly declined to take it up."

In an interview published in another Boston paper, Admiral Howison was represented as condemning the action of Schley before Santiago. The alert counsel of Schley called the admiral to account. In reply, he said he had no recollection of the interview quoted, but did not deny that he had expressed his opinion on the question to his friends, for every intelligent man must have an opinion, but his mind was open and he was ready to listen to testimony and facts, and judge conscientiously all questions

brought before him. Nevertheless, formal objection was brought against the admiral, and the court excused him from service, and Rear-Admiral Ramsay, retired, was named as the third member of the court.

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An adjournment of the court was had until September 20, when, until the 9th of October following, the witnesses brought forward by the judge-advocate gave their testimony. This touched the following points: Schley's conduct off Cienfuegos; his slow progress in his voyage to Santiago; the retrograde movement toward Key West; the bombardment of the Cristobal Colon; the blockade of Santiago; and the Brooklyn's 'loop." On each of these points the witnesses in their direct examination gave testimony tending to prove the charge of "reprehensible conduct" on the part of Schley, but in every instance the cross-examination brought out facts much more favorable to the conduct of Schley. To illustrate, although a system of signaling had been arranged by Captain McCalla of the Marblehead with the Cuban insurgents near Cienfuegos, and though they were understood by a number of officers, yet they had not been communicated to Schley, who saw the fires on the shore, but was without the means of knowing their significance.

The hearing of testimony was finished on the last day of October, and all that remained to be done was its correction by witnesses, and the arguments of the advocates on both sides. The specifications regarded as the most important related to the retrograde movement of the flying squadron from Santiago, and the propriety of the "loop" made by the Brooklyn at Santiago at the opening of the battle which ended with the destruction of Cervera's fleet.

Concerning the retrograde movement from Santiago, the government witnesses, with the exception of Commander Miller and Captain Sigsbee, testified that they could at any time have coaled at sea. Lieutenant Dyson swore that there was not a vessel in the squadron that could not have stayed on blockade duty a week longer and still have enough coal left to steam to Key West, with the single exception of the Marblehead. It was shown by the log of the coaler Merrimac that on every day after her arrival off Santiago the ships were coaling from her and that it was done at Cienfuegos.

On the other hand, Admiral Schley's witnesses declared that when he turned westward he had no knowledge that the Spanish ships were at Santiago. The flying squadron arrived off that port as May 26 was closing in. Schley's witnesses testified that the weather was rough and squally with heavy seas, and that the coaler Merrimac had broken down. Captain Sigsbee was sure that coaling would have been dangerous on May 26. The Merrimac was repaired to that degree that she was capable of making four or five miles an hour when the retrograde movement began. Late on May 27, when the weather had cleared, the Texas commenced to take coal from the Merrimac while other vessels were coaled by boat or otherwise. It was also shown that Captain Wise failed to communicate to Commodore Schley a dispatch received by him from the department regarding the arrival of Cervera at Santiago. It was stated further that Captain Sigsbee boarded the Brooklyn and told Schley that though he had been scouting off Santiago for a full week he had seen nothing of the Spanish fleet. Admiral Schley himself swore that the dispatch of May 27 from the department, which definitely

located the Spanish at Santiago, did not reach him until June 20, which testimony was corroborated by several witnesses.

Regarding the "loop," Commander Heilner of the Texas said it was a more serious menace to his ship than the guns of the enemy, while Admiral Evans and other officers of the Iowa asserted that they were in danger of running into the Texas as she was stopping and backing, because of which stopping and backing the Texas, according to her commander, lost about three miles. Admiral Evans, Captain Taylor, and other officers saw nothing on the part of the Spanish vessels which indicated an intention of ramming the Brooklyn.

Commander Hodgson on behalf of Schley testified as navigator of the Brooklyn that she swung clear of the Texas, and at no time was there danger of collision, and that the Vizcaya and Maria Teresa sheered off as if with the intention of ramming the Brooklyn, because of which he regarded the "loop" as the crucial point of the battle. Captain Cook of the Brooklyn testified that it was not Schley but himself who ordered this "tactical movement made necessary by the position of Cervera's ships." Admiral Schley confirmed this testimony, adding that had not Captain Cook ordered the "loop" he would have done so himself at the moment it was made.

The official findings of the court were published December 13. They consisted of two parts, the first of which was voluminous and was signed: "George Dewey, Admiral U. S. N., president; Sam C. Lemly, Judge-Advocate General, U. S. N." They found all allegations against Rear-Admiral Schley proved, with the exception of the charge of cowardice.

Schley did not proceed with the utmost dispatch to Cienfuegos nor did he blockade Cienfuegos as closely as possible. He made no effort to ascertain whether the Spanish squadron was there. In proceeding from Cienfuegos to Santiago he did not use all dispatch and he did not dispose his vessels with a view to intercept the enemy should Cervera attempt to pass the flying squadron. He should not have made the retrograde movement with his squadron. He should have obeyed the Navy Department's order of May 25. On May 29 and 30 he should have endeavored to capture or destroy the Spanish ships anchored at the entrance of Santiago harbor. When he attacked on May 31 he did not do his utmost with the force he had. In the "loop movement " he caused the Brooklyn to lose distance and position; that movement caused the Texas to back and stop her engines. Schley did injustice to Captain Hodgson in publishing only a portion of their mutual correspondence. Schley's conduct throughout the Santiago campaign prior to June 1, 1898, " was characterized by vacillation, dilatoriness, and lack of enterprise." His official reports regarding coal supply for the squadron "were inaccurate and misleading." But "his conduct during the battle of July 3 was self-possessed and he encouraged, in his own person, his subordinate officers and men to fight courageously."

After signing this report, Admiral Dewey expressed his individual opinion :

That the passage from Key West to Cienfuegos "was made with all possible dispatch," Schley being impressed with the importance of arriving off Cienfuegos with as much coal as possible in the ships' bunkers; that the blockade of Cienfuegos was effect