Volunteer Police Officers

it does not attempt in any way to interfere with trust property until it is demandable. Only after the expiration of the time fixed within which it was demandable and not received does the Act operate upon it. Such property cannot be said to be demandable until the proper Court has adjudicated the trust estate and specifically awarded it. From that time on it is demandable, and if it is not received by the owner during the period fixed by the Act it is subject to its provisions. This interpretation relieves the provisions from the criticism to which they are subjected, and according to the well known rule of construction must be adopted. The provisions were intended to meet a situation which was well known. They relate to moneys which were awarded by the Courts but were never paid to or received by the distributees and still remained in the hands of the fiduciaries.

We have carefully considered the Act in view of the objections raised to its constitutionality so far as the objections have been urged upon us and argued, but we are not convinced that it should be stricken down. The provisions are capable of being enforced so as not to infringe the constitutional prohibitions and that they will be so enforced must be assumed. We find no intention on the part of the Commonwealth to impair the obligation of the contracts of its citizens or to take their private, individual property and appropriate it to itself. On the contrary, the intention is clear that it is only in the case of property without an owner that it proposes to exercise its power to escheat.

Ŵe direct this opinion, the following decree, the exception thereto and the ruling on the exception, to be entered in each of the cases considered.

This cause came on to be heard upon demurrer to the bill of complaint and was argued by counsel; and now upon consideration thereof, it is October 12, 1918, ordered, adjudged and decreed that the demurrer to the bill of complaint is sustained and the bill dismissed.

VOLUNTEER POLICE OFFICERS

Volunteer Police Officers-Expiration of term of office

The terms of Volunteer Policemen, appointed under the Act of July 18, 1917, will expire when peace is declared between this Country and the Countries with which it has been at war.

Attorney General's Department. Opinion to Martin G. Brumbaugh, Governor of Pennsylvania.

Collins, Deputy Attorney General, December 24, 1918.

I am in receipt of a communication from your Private Secretary of the 4th inst., enclosing communication to you of the

Employment of Women

27th inst. from Samuel W. Jeffries, Superintendent Volunteer Police, Allegheny County, asking to be advised as to when the commissions of volunteer police officers will expire,-whether on "the day peace is declared" or when "the army has returned and is demobilized."

The Act of July 18, 1917, P. L. 1062, in pursuance of which volunteer policemen are appointed, provides in Section 1 thereof, inter alia, as follows:

"That upon application to the Governor of the Com-
monwealth, the said Governor is hereby authorized,
immediately after the passage of this Act, and at
any time during the continuance of the present war
with Germany, or in any war in which this Nation
may become involved, to appoint and commission, at
his discretion * *
volunteer police officers. *

The unmistakable intent of this provision, read in the light of the entire Act and the purposes thereby sought to be affected, is that volunteer police officers may be commissioned during and only for the continuance of a war in which our country is engaged. In harmony with this view, the existing commissions that have been issued under the Act are, as I understand, made to run for the term of the present war. Consequently, the termination of the war will, under the law and their terms, work their expiration. The return and demobilization of the armies called into existence to prosecute the war will not necessarily mark the ending of the war, as this may, in part, take place both before and after its conclusion in the legal sense. You are advised that the aforesaid existing commissions issued to volunteer police officers, pursuant to said Act, will expire, and the powers and duties vested in the holders thereof under said Act cease, when Peace has been duly declared between this Nation and the countries with which it is at war.

EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN.

Employment of Women-Interstate Commerce.

A State statute, regulating the employment of women, may apply as well to those within the State who are engaged in Interstate Commerce as to others, until such time as Congress assumes exclusive control of the precise subject matter.

Attorney General's Department. Opinion to Walter McNichols, Acting Commissioner of Labor and Industry.

Brown, Attorney General, December 11, 1918.

I have your communication of the 25th ult. requesting an opinion as to whether the Pennsylvania Female Labor Act of

Employment of Women

July 25, 1913, P. L. 1024, applies in the case of women within the State employed by railroads engaged in doing interstate commerce business. It appears that the particular class of railroad employment occasioning this industry is that of "leverman."

The said statute is an exercise of the police power of the State in the public interest. Such an exercise of this power has been repeatedly upheld as a reasonable regulation and one within the inherent right of the State to safeguard the health and morals of its citizens and promote the general welfare. It has been said that this power is not a fixed quantity, but must be allowed to expand to reach the needs of developing social and economic conditions.

Railroad Commission of Indiana vs. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company, 100 N. E. 852.

Laws limiting the hours of employment of women have been upheld as a valid and reasonable exercise of the police power.

Riley vs. Massachusetts, 232 U. S. 671.

Muller vs. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412.

There is a wealth of cases dealing with the question of State laws, enacted under the police power, as they may conflict with, or trench upon, the power delegated to the Federal government to regulate interstate commerce. It may be stated, as a general rule, that a State statute, passed in pursuance of the police power, which does not undertake to regulate interstate commerce but merely affects it incidentally, is valid where Congress has not assumed an exclusive control over the precise subject matter in question. If it is a reasonable regulation, having for its object the welfare of the citizens of the State, and is not directly or actually inconsistent with some Federal statute covering the same subject, it is not to be set aside although it may indirectly affect interstate commerce.

In the case of Southern Railway Co. vs. Railroad Commission, 100 N. E. 337, there is an extensive review of the cases dealing with the subject of the applicability to the instrumentalities of interstate commerce of State regulations in a field where Congress has not assumed exclusive control. Among the conclusions there reached was one to the effect that— "Until, and unless Congress does act, and its action covers the subject-matter the states may act."

In Austin vs. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343, the Court said, in part, as follows:

"We have had repeated occasion to hold, where state legislation has been attacked as violative either of the

Employment of Women

power of Congress over Interstate Commerce, or of
the 14th Amendment to the Constitution, that, if the
action of the state legislature were a bona fide exercise
of its police power, and dictated by a genuine regard
for the preservation of the public health or safety, such
legislation would be respected, though it might inter
fere indirectly with Interstate Commerce."

and quoted Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, that the police power

"May be lawfully resorted to for the purpose of preserving the public health, safety, or morals, or the abatement of public nuisances, and a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests."

It was likewise held in Sligh vs. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52, that it is competent for a State

"To provide local measures in the interest of the safety and welfare of the people * * * although such regulations incidentally and indirectly involve Interstate Commerce."

In the Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, Mr. Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court, says in the course of the opinion:

* * *

*

*

"There necessarily remains to the States until Con-
gress acts, a wide range for the permissible exercise of
power appropriate to their territorial jurisdiction, al-
though Interstate Commerce may be affected.
It is competent for a State
to adopt protec-
tive measures of a reasonable character in the interest
of the health, safety, morals and welfare of its people,
although Interstate Commerce may incidentally or in-
directly be involved. * * Where the subject is
peculiarly one of local concern, and from its nature be-
long to the class with which the State appropriately
deals in making reasonable provision for local needs
it cannot be regarded as left to the unrestrained will of
individuals because Congress has not acted, al-
though it may have such a relation to Interstate Com-
merce as to be within the reach of the Federal power."

*

A well known instance of the constitutional exercise of the police power of a State operative therein upon those engaged in interstate commerce is that of the so-called Full Crew Laws. It was held that a State statute prescribing a minimum number

Employment of Women

of brakemen for trains was applicable to the trains of interstate carriers operating within the State.

Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company vs. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 433.

In this case the Court said:

"The statute in question is not directed against Interstate Commerce. Nor is it, within the meaning of the Constitution, a regulation of commerce, although it controls, in some degree, the conduct of those engaged in such commerce."

Citation is made therein also to the case of Sherlock vs. Alling, 93 U. S. 99, wherein Mr. Justice Matthews said:

"Legislation, in a great variety of ways may affect commerce and persons engaged in it without constituting a regulation of it within the meaning of the Constitution. * * * And it may be said generally, that the legislation of a state, not directed against commerce or any of its regulations, but relating to the rights, duties, and liabilities of citizens, and only indirectly and remotely affecting the operations of commerce, is of obligatory force upon citizens within its territorial jurisdiction, whether on land or water, or engaged in commerce, foreign or interstate, or in any other pursuit."

The foregoing citations furnish abundant authority for the conclusion that a State statute regulating the employment of women may apply as well to those within the State who are engaged in the work of interstate commerce as to others, until such time as Congress may assume exclusive control of this precise subject matter.

The question here submitted consequently further turns upon the question whether Congress has so assumed exclusive control of this precise subject matter as to exclude the applicability of our State statute. Does the Federal "hours of service" Law of March 4, 1907, prescribing the hours of employment upon railroads in various in various capacities, constitute such an occupying of the field as to render our State law regulating the employment of women inoperative as to those employed by railroads doing an interstate commerce business? A careful consideration of the matter leads me to the conclusion that such is not the case. The case of Eric Railroad Company vs. People of the State of New York, 233 U. S. 870, has not been overlooked. Reversing the opinion of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, the Supreme Court of the United States there held invalid a New York statute that fixed