fact, to the existence of this school that we owe some of the best specimens of French comedy and satire. The stinging rejoinders of Boileau and the Les Precieuses Ridicules of the brilliant Molière are sufficient illustrations of this. It was not the least important result of such a counter-movement that Italy herself—the old home of the conceits-caught from France the inspiration of a new literary life and went on to better things. If we ascend from Southern Europe to Germany, we find the presence of similar principles, more diffused, perhaps, throughout the entire history of the literature and yet clearly evident. If we adopt the classification of Gostwick, which divides the entire history into seven different periods, we shall find the dominance of the formal and obscure extending from the latter part of the fourth to the end of the fifth period-from the close of the sixteenth century on to the opening of the eighteenth. It was, as in Italy, a period of controversy following an era of excellence. It might be called, in a limited sense, the period of the Thirty Years' War. It was the age of the affected and imitative in so far as it was not altogether barren. In the Epic and Drama alike, true sublimity gave place to platitude while, even in the lyric, with the single exception of religious hymns, we fail to discover the element of ingenuous passion. As to the quality of the productions of second-rate authors, it is sufficient to say with Harrison, "that the road from Hamburg to Berlin is not flatter."

Such may be said to be a brief historical outline of the reign of artifice in the representative literatures of Modern Europe. It is very significant, moreover, that this development has been closely connected in every instance with areas of special excellence; at times, following; at times, preceding them. In Italy, we are at the time of Tasso and the learned court of Farrara; in Spain, with Cervantes and Lope de Vega; in France, at the brilliant era of Richelieu and Corneille; in Germany, under the influence of the classic prose of Luther and, in England, at the very opening of Elizabethan glory.

It must further be remarked, that, apart from these special periods, such a false style runs more or less through the entire content of these several literatures. It was so in Italy, Spain, France and Germany. In England, we find it in the age of

Henry the Eighth, of the Stuarts, in the days of Cromwell, Queen Anne and the Georges. Such is the tendency to what Bacon terms "the first distemper of learning," visible among all peoples and in all periods.

It is in fullest view of this growing tendency to the artificial in writing and upon the basis of Jonson's assertion that "nothing is lasting that is feigned" that Prof. Morley sounds in time the note of alarm to all who are tempted in this direction. With his usual felicity of expression he asserts the radical principle, "Absolute truth of manner is the life of literature and affected ornaments are those which can not arise out of the stir of a mind wholly intent upon its subject." However distant the day may be and however general the influence of literary conceits in the interval, the day will come when he will be regarded as the best writer who is content to express his thought with Saxon honestness, as "a plain, blunt man," speaking right on with simple aim and method. Such a period may be connected with the very highest destinies of the Anglo-Saxon race. If the English language is to be the chosen medium of the world's civilization and redemption, then the method of its use must be apostolic. There must be "great plainness of speech." Milton is right as he tells us that, "the very essence of truth is plainness and brightness."

T. W. HUNT.

ARTICLE IV.-THE ULTIMATE DISTINCTION IN PHILO. SOPHICAL METHODS.*

THE question is sometimes asked: What is the subjectmatter of philosophy? Astronomy investigates the phenomena of the heavens; Geology, the structure and physical history of the globe; Physiology, the organs of plants and animals and their functions; Psychology, the phenomena of mind. Sociology treats of human society; History, of past events and the progress of the race; Ethics, of duty; Theology, of God. What then is left for philosophy?

The answer to this question is not difficult to find. Every science has for its field a particular species of reality and deals with a special class of phenomena, but none of these sciences inquires into the nature of that reality in general which is common to many or to all. The business of philosophy, therefore, is to investigate the nature of those realities and relations which the various sciences assume to be true.

I. The three realities of philosophical inquiry.

What then are the realities with which philosophy deals? They are three in number-Man, Nature, and God. To state the same in technical language, the realities whose nature philosophy attempts to investigate are the Mind, the Cosmos, and the Absolute.

(a) Man, the finite Mind.—Whatever view one may hold of the existence of external objects and of God, no one can deny or doubt that he himself exists. For it is impossible to doubt one's own existence without being involved in a selfcontradiction. Doubt implies the subject which doubts. Descartes began his philosophical speculation with universal doubt. But he quickly came to the conclusion that he could not doubt his own existence. Accordingly he says: "While we reject all of which we can entertain the smallest doubt, and even imagine that it is false, we easily indeed suppose that there is neither * Read before the Philosophical Society of Yale University.

God, nor sky, nor bodies, and that we ourselves even have neither hands nor feet, nor finally, a body; but we cannot in the same way suppose that we are not, while we doubt of the truth of these things; for there is a repugnance in conceiving that what thinks does not exist at the very time when it thinks. Accordingly the knowledge, I think, therefore I am, is the first and most certain that occurs to one who philosophizes orderly." (Principles of Philosophy, Part I., vii., p. 195. Dr. Veitch's translation.)

(b) Nature, the Universe. The characteristic tendency of modern philosophy is idealistic. The characteristic tendency of modern physical science, on the other hand, is realistic. Modern physical science assumes not only that the universe exists but also that it is intelligible to us; that the phenomena of Nature can be explained by the laws of matter and motion. Prof. Huxley summarizes the modern scientific conception of Nature when he says: "If there is one thing clear about the progress of modern science, it is the tendency to reduce all scientific problems, except those which are purely mathematical, to questions of molecular physics; that is to say, to the attractions, repulsions, motions and coördinations of the ultimate particles of matter. "The phenomena of biology

and of chemistry are, in their ultimate analysis, questions of molecular physics. Indeed, the fact is acknowledged by all chemists and biologists who look beyond their immediate occupations." (The Scientific Aspects of Positivism-in Lay Sermons, p. 183.)

(c) God, the Absolute. The postulate that the Absolute exists is a necessity of thought. The Absolute is the unconditioned and is the necessary correlate of the conditioned. Therefore, no system of philosophy can consistently deny its existence. The only point of disagreement among different systems of thought is in regard to the nature of the Absolute. That the Absolute exists is admitted on all hands; what the Absolute is, is the only point of dispute. To Materialists the Absolute is matter; to Spinoza, substance with two attributesthought and extension; to the Theist, the Absolute is a conscious personality.

Mr. Spencer says: "Though the Absolute cannot in any

manner or degree be known, in the strict sense of knowing, yet we find that its positive existence is a necessary doctrine of consciousness; that so long as consciousness continues, we cannot for an instant rid it of this doctrine; and that thus the belief which this doctrine constitutes, has a higher warrant than any other whatever." (First Principles, § 27.)

The Universe, the Soul, and the Absolute these three then are the realities, whose nature philosophy seeks to interpret. They are not the creations of our imagination, nor the illusions of our fancy. They are the real objects of our knowledge. Philosophy does not create them but aims to understand them. In the words of Prof. Harris: "They do not exist because we know them; we know them because they exist."

II. The problem of philosophy.

Accordingly the problem of philosophy is simply to find the most rational and harmonious conceptions of these realitiesNature, Man, and God. In other words, the problem of philosophy in its last analysis is nothing else than the attempt to discover the most reasonable and consistent conceptions of the Universe, the Mind, and the Absolute. Therefore the questions which philosophy seeks to answer are:

(1.) What is Man, and what are his relations to Nature and to the Absolute ?

(2.) What is Nature, and what are its relations to Man and to the Absolute ?

(3.) What is the Absolute, and what are its relations to Man and to Nature?

III. The methods of philosophy.

There are several philosophical methods more or less familiar to us; for instance, the dialectic method, the dogmatic method, the empirical, the sceptical, the critical, and the mys-tical, etc. All these methods in their last analysis, however, resolve themselves into the following four:

(1.) That which makes the explanation of Nature the start-ing point of philosophical inquiry-the Cosmological Method..