Opinion of the Court. Syllabus. and west through block 117, school section addition to Chicago. We have examined the several points made, and perceive no ground for reversal, except as to one point, viz; the want of authority in the city collector to apply for judgment. His authority in this behalf had been abrogated by the new constitution. Hills v. Chicago, 60 Ill. 86. The judgments must be reversed and causes remanded. Judgments reversed.* WILLIAM K. REED, impleaded, etc., บ. ERASMUS M. MOFFATT et al. 1. ELISOR. Where the office of sheriff of a county was vacant, and the duties of the office was being performed by the coroner, who was a party defendant to a bill in chancery filed: Held, that the facts justified the clerk of the court in the appointment of an elisor to serve the summons. The statute does not require an elisor to be sworn. 2. SERVICE-return construed. An officer's return of service of a summons *In conformity with this decision, the judgments of the court below are reversed in the cases of the following named appellants against the city of Chicago, all being rendered upon applications made by the city collector for orders to sell real estate for the payment of delinquent taxes and unpaid special assessments: John McGlashan, Wm. B. Snowhook, Frederick H. Winston et al., Henry H. Walker, A. T. Galt, Robert T. Lincoln et al. Alvin Salisbury, Joseph N. Barker, J. H. Dunham et al., Elizabeth W. Murray et al., Timothy Wright, Barnum Blake, Augustus J. Vaass et al., Pacific Hotel Co., J. Mason Parker, John C. Campbell et al., Andrew Garrison, Martin Andrews, Charles A. Gregory, George W. Gerrish, Charles Follansbee, Robert Rae, Henry Potwin, Walter N. Woodruff, Jacob Harris, Clara S. Mason, Mary Ann Hogarth, Charles V. Dyer, Brainard T. Smith, Henry H. Walker, P. D. Hamilton, Bridget O'Reilly, Francis M. Griffin, Philip Larmon, Francis Larned, Henry H. Walker, George F. Harding, Walter N. Woodruff, Bernard A. Stampoffski, Walter N. Woodruff, Charles Follansbee, Phoebe R. Miller, John R. Hoxie. Francis Larned, and Bridget O'Reilly. Syllabus. Opinion of the Court. in chancery issued against A and B was "served by delivering a copy of the within writ to A and B, this 15th day of September, 1870: " Held, that it showed a service on each defendant by copy. 3. PARTIES in chancery. Where a bill in equity to set aside a tax deed showed that the purchaser at the sale had parted with all his interest to one of the defendants, it was held that an objection that such purchaser was not made a party defendant, was not well taken. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. WILLIAM W. FARWELL, Judge, presiding. Mr. GEORGE SCOVILLE, for the appellant. Messrs. BLANCHARD & MILLARD and Mr. J. W. CHICKERING, for the appellees. Per CURIAM: The decree in this cause does not appear to be questioned on the merits. The principal objection made by appellant is, that he was improperly defaulted, as he had not been served with process. The process of summons was served by an elisor, appointed by the clerk of the circuit court, in whose office the bill was filed, in pursuance of section 18 of the act respecting sheriffs and coroners (R. S. 514), the fact being that the office of sheriff was vacant, and its duties discharged by the coroner, who was a party defendant to the bill. A case had occurred justifying the appointment of an elisor by the clerk. Beach v. Schmultz, 20 Ill. 185. It is objected that the elisor so appointed acted by deputy. The record shows no such fact. He made his return on the summons in his own name. It is probable a printed form was used, when, if the writ is served by a deputy, a blank is left in which to insert his name. It is further objected, that the return does not show that a copy of the writ was delivered to each of the defendants. The return is as follows: "Served by delivering a copy of the within writ to Wm. K. Reed and Benjamin L. Cleaves, this 15th day of September, 1870." A reasonable and proper construction of the meaning of this return is, that appellant 62 302 121 614 Opinion of the Court. Syllabus. was served by copy, and Cleaves also. Farnesworth v. Staples, 12 Ill. 482; Barnes v. Hazleton, 50 id. 429. Another objection is that the elisor took no oath, and made no return under oath. This is not required by the statute. As to the jurisdiction of a court of equity in a case like this, that is settled by this court in the case of bach and Gage v. Billings, 56 Ill. 262, 268. Gage v. Rohr As to the objection that Mulvey, in whose name the land was struck off at the tax sale, was not made a party, it is sufficient to say, the bill shows he had parted with all his interest to appellant, and the officer making the sale had no interest to be protected by making him a party. The default of appellant, he having been served with process, admitted all the material averments in the bill, and being true, the decree of the court was right, and it must be affirmed. Decree affirmed. A. G. WEBSTER v. CITY OF CHICAGO. 1. TAXATION-city taxes and assessments-who must apply for judgment. Under the fourth section of article nine of the constitution of 1870, a city collector is prohibited from making sales of real estate for the non-payment of taxes or special assessments, and, consequently, such officer is not authorized to apply for judgment. The application and sale must be made by some general officer having authority to receive State and county taxes. APPEAL from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. JOSEPH E. GARY, Judge, presiding. Mr. EDWARD ROBY, for the appellant. Mr. M. F. TULEY, for the appellee. Per CURIAM: At the March term of the Superior Court of Opinion of the Court. Cook County, in the year 1871, the collector of the city of Chicago having filed his report of unpaid taxes due upon the general tax warrant for city taxes, and given the notice required by law, application was made on behalf of the city of Chicago for judgment against the delinquent real estate mentioned in the tax list. The court below gave judgment in favor of the city, and this case was brought here by appeal. The principal question presented in this court is, whether, in view of the fourth section of article nine of the new constitution, judgment could be rendered upon the report of the city collector, the legal effect of which is to authorize such collector to sell the real estate in question. The fourth section of article nine is as follows: "The general assembly shall provide, in all cases where it may be necessary to sell real estate for the non-payment of taxes or special assessments, for State, county, municipal, or other purposes, that a return of such unpaid taxes or assessments shall be made to some general officer of the county having authority to receive State and county taxes; and there shall be no sale of the said property for any of said taxes or assessments, but by said officer, upon the order or judgment of some court of record." Upon a very careful consideration of the question, we have arrived at the conclusion that the prohibition in the last clause of the section is self-executing, and can not be distinguished from other prohibitory clauses in the same instrument. Legislation is necessary to carry the provision of the section in respect to municipal taxes or assessments into effect. But the prohibition in the last clause was clearly intended to require such legislation by stopping all sales for such taxes or assessments until the requisite legislation should be provided. The judgment of the court below must, therefore, be reversed and the cause remanded. It may not be improper to say that several cases upon the same general tax warrant, as well also upon divers warrants for special assessments, are before us upon appeals or writs of error, involving the same question, and in which full opinions Syllabus. Opinion of the Court. will be prepared and filed as soon as the business of the court will permit. Judgment reversed. JOHN FORSYTHE ข. CITY OF CHICAGO. 1. SPECIAL ASSESSMENT-prior assessment in bar. On application for judg ment against certain lots to enforce collection of a special assessment for opening a street, it was urged that the ordinance under which the assessment was made, was void on account of a prior proceeding for opening the street, and making an assessment therefor, which was claimed to be valid. The lot owner did not show that a warrant had ever issued on the first assessment: Held, that he should have introduced the record, showing that the first assessment was in conformity with the statute; because if there was not a valid confirmation of a valid assessment, it was not conclusive upon the city. APPEAL from the Superior Court of Chicago. Messrs. WILLIAMS & THOMAS, for the appellant. Mr. M. F. TULEY, for the appellee. Per CURIAM: The questions arising in this case are substantially the same as in the case of Burton v. City of Chicago, ante p. 179, except that it is claimed in the case at bar, that the second ordinance, which stands for the original in relation to this new assessment, was wholly void, on account of there having been, as it is alleged, a prior valid proceeding for opening the street, and making an assessment therefor. We think it should have been shown that a warrant was issued for such first assessment, or the full record should have been introduced showing that it was in conformity with the statute; for, unless there was a valid con |