Opinion of the Court.

time of his recovery depends to some extent on the termination of this suit. From the medical testimony, and the apparent slight nature of the injury when it occurred, it would be difficult for any one, we think, to say that it is permanent. It is true, no one can determine with absolute certainty what the result of such an injury might be; but something more than mere conjecture, mere probabilities, should appear to warrant the giving of damages for future disabilities that may never be realized. Even appellee's physicians say he will probably continue to improve, but think he will never be fully recovered. He, it seems, recovered to a great extent in the first four months, so much as to be able to resume his usual occupation, at his former compensation.

Even if a permanent injury has been sustained, it does not seem to be of that serious nature which disqualifies appellee for business, and that disqualifies him from earning a livelihood. And in view of that, and other facts, we can not but regard this verdict as grossly excessive. Had this been a suit between individuals, we presume such a verdict would strike every one as being excessive We remember no case, or to have seen any reported, where a natural person was alone a defendant, where, for like injuries, so large a verdict was rendered. And the law does not know, and can not know, any difference in litigation, whether natural or artificial persons are parties. In the courts of justice, this class of corporations are entitled to the same measure of justice, and must be held to the same liability for wrong as individuals. If the acts of their agents are wanton, willful, or reckless of the personal rights of individuals while such employees are in the discharge of their duties, the company may be required to respond in damages to the same extent as individuals; but to no greater extent than would individuals for similar acts. The company are required to employ competent, faithful, and proper agents. If they fail in this requirement they must suffer for the neglect.

In this case, evidence was received of the pecuniary ability of the company for the purpose of enhancing the damages in case of a recovery. This was wrong; Moran was a defendant, 10-62D ILL.

62 146

153 202

Opinion of the Court. Syllabus.

and would be liable, individually, for any judgment that might be recovered. Then to have the judgment largely enhanced because his co-defendant was worth a million of money, would operate as great injustice if not oppression to him. This evidence, no doubt, contributed largely to this verdict, as we can not for a moment believe that had the suit been against Moran alone, it would have been more hundreds than it is thousands, if even so much. The introduction of that evidence must have operated greatly to the prejudice of Moran.

For the excessive finding of the jury, the judgment of the court below must be reversed. But, whether appellant Moran was justified in ejecting appellee from the car, or if not, whether there is ground for allowing punitive damages, we express no opinion, as those questions are for the consideration. of another jury. The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the cause remanded.

Judgment reversed.

WILLIAM C. HOBSON et al

v.

EVAN EWAN.

1. ADMINISTRATOR'S SALE OF LAND-grant of letters. In an action of ejectment, a sale of land by an administrator was claimed to be void on the ground that the intestate died in the State of Kentucky, and that the administrator appointed was neither a relative nor creditor, and not interested in the estate, and consequently letters could only be granted to the public administrator: Held, that this objection could not be raised in a collateral proceeding.

2. SAME-presumption. The county court being invested with complete jurisdiction of the subject of granting administration on the estates of deceased persons, its action in a case properly brought before it, however roneous it may be, must be regarded as valid and binding in every collateral proceeding until reversed. And where that court granted administration on the estate of one who died intestate, and was a non-resident, it will be presumed, in all collateral proceedings, that it had satisfactory evidence before it to justify its action.

Syllabus.

3. ADMINISTRATOR'S SALE-jurisdiction—notice of application. The following notice was given of the presentation of a petition of an administrator for an order to sell land to pay the debts of his intestate, to-wit: "To all persons interested: Take notice, that I intend to present a petition to the circuit court at its next term, to be holden in Monmouth, in the County of Warren, and State of Illinois, on the third Monday of October, A. D. 1853, praying said court for an order to sell all of the real estate belonging to the estate of Bushnell Willey, deceased, for the purpose of paying the debts against said estate." It was signed by the administrator, and dated Monmouth, Ill., August 2, 1853, and published for the time required by the statute: Held, that the notice was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction.

4. Under the statute in force in 1853, the administrator had the choice of two modes by which to bring the heirs into court, the one by serving a notice, with a copy of the account and petition, on each of the heirs or their guardian, and the other by publishing a notice, to all parties interested, in the nearest newspaper. Either mode was sufficient to bring the heirs and all interested parties into court, and thus give the court jurisdiction of their persons, and in neither was it necessary to state the names of the heirs, or other interested parties, in the notice.

5. ADMINISTRATOR'S SALE-notice of application. An administrator's sale of real estate, under an order of court, was attacked on the trial of an action of ejectment on the ground that the notice of the application was, that he would apply for an order to sell all the lands of the intestate, instead of "the whole, or so much thereof as will be sufficient to pay his debts:" Held, that as the statute prescribed no particular form of notice, and as the notice itself fully apprised all parties interested of the nature of the application, and the time and place when and where it would be made, the objection was not tenable.

6. So, also, when such notice was directed "to all persons interested," an objection that the notice did not request all persons interested in the estate to show cause why the land should not be sold to pay debts, was considered without force. The same strictness required in applications to sell lands for delinquent taxes does not apply in proceedings of this kind.

7. SAME-finding as to notice. When the circuit court on the petition of an administrator for an order to sell the lands of his intestate to pay the debts of the estate, finds in its decree that due notice of the application had been given by publication, it is at least prima facie evidence that the notice required by law had been given.

8. ADMINISTRATOR'S SALE-petition. Although the statute required the administrator to state in his petition for an order to sell real estate to pay debts "what real estate the testator or intestate died seized of, or so much thereof as will be necessary to pay his or her debts," yet when a petition, after stating that there remained no personal assets, and the existence of a large indebtedness, concluded in these words: "that to pay the debts there

Syllabus.

only remained the real estate belonging to the estate," describing it: Held, that the statement was equivalent to a technical allegation of seizin, and was sufficient.

9. PETITION-names of heirs. It is no objection that the names of the heirs are not stated in such a petition. Such omission will not invalidate the decree of sale.

10. SAME-address. It was objected in a collateral proceeding involving the question of title, that an administrator's petition for leave to sell lands of his intestate was addressed: "To the Hon. H. M. Wead, Judge of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, in chancery sitting," or to the equitable jurisdiction of the court: Held, that the petition was not addressed to the chancery side of the court, but to the judge; and that as no form was prescribed, if it contained the substantial requirements of the statute it was sufficient, and would be considered as presented and carried on under the statute.

11. SAME-account of personalty. Where the administrator's petition for a decree to sell real estate, avers that there was no personal estate, an objection that no account or inventory of the personal estate and debts was filed, is untenable.

12. ADMINISTRATOR'S SALE OF LAND-proof of indebtedness. In this case the only evidence before the circuit court of the existence of indebtedness against the estate, was a record from the county court of H. County, Ky., but the same had not been allowed by the county court in the county granting administration in this State. It was held, that if this were conceded to be error, yet it could not affect the jurisdiction of the court, and that the sale under the decree could not be questioned for such error in a collateral proceeding.

13. The statute in force in 1853, regulating sales of real estate by administrators, did not require that the court should confirm a sale made under its order.

14. STATUTE-construed. The word "seized" in sec. 103 of chap. of Wills, R. S. 1845, as used in reference to the lands of deceased persons, construed to mean possessed or owned. In this section and section 125, seizin and ownership are used as synonymous.

15. JUDGMENT OR DECREE-validity in a collateral proceeding. It matters not how erroneous the findings, judgments, and decrees of a court of general jurisdiction may be, when drawn in question collaterally, if the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties. They can not be questioned collaterally for mere errors or irregularities.

16. REVERSAL-effect on rights of purchaser. The law is well settled on grounds of public policy, that the rights of persons, not parties to the record, or privies, acquired under judicial sales, when the court had jurisdiction, will not be affected by a subsequent reversal of the decree or order under which they were acquired.

Syllabus. Opinion of the Court.

17. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEED. An objection that a deed admitted in evidence was defectively acknowledged will be obviated by proof of its execution.

18. ADMINISTRATOR'S DEED-to an assignee. On the trial of an action of ejectment, an administrator's deed was objected to, because it was not made to the purchaser at the sale, but to his assignee: Held, that this objection could not be made by the heirs of the intestate or those claiming under them. The title claimed by them was divested by the sale, and they had no interest in the question whether the purchaser or his assignee was entitled to the conveyance.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Warren County; the Hon. ARTHUR A. SMITH, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. GOUDY & CHANDLER, and Mr. J. M. KIRKPATRICK, for the appellants.

Messrs. MILLER, FROST & LEWIS, and Mr. JOHN J. GLENN, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE BREESE delivered the opinion of the Court:

The points made by appellants on this record, have been decided adversely to them by this court, as reference to cases will show.

Their first point is, that the decree of the Warren circuit court, and the sale thereunder to Duhme, and the deed by the administrator to Love, are null and void.

This point is based on the fact that, as the intestate died in the State of Kentucky, possessed of lands in this State, the statute then in force required administration on his estate to be committed to the public administrator, on the application of any person interested therein, if the deceased had no relative or creditor in this State, or having any, they declined to take the administration.

Paine, it is said, was neither a relative nor creditor, and not interested in the estate; his appointment was void, consequently, all acts done by him as such, are also void.

We do not think this objection, if it be one, can be raised here. If urged before the court granting the letters, it might