mate to inquire how other statutes differently worded have been construed. I will only say that in sect. 211, sub-sect. 1 (b), of the Public Health Act 1875, on the construction of which Purser v. The Local Board of Health for Worthing (56 L. T. Rep. 447; 18 Q. B. Div. 818) was determined, not only is there an absence of the antithesis between agricultural land" and "buildings which is the very foundation of the present Act, but the word " buildings" is not even used at all. 66 WILLIAMS, L.J.-I regret to say that I differ from the other members of the court. I think that the judgment of Collins, L.J. was perfectly right. The Act is very difficult to construe; there seems to me no construction which does not lead to results which it is difficult to suppose the Legislature could have intended; and in such a case one must, in my judgment, be guided by the words of the section, aud not by balancing the difficulties of the, results one against the other. The question in this case is whether that part of the land occupied as a market garden which is covered with gasshouses of the character stated in the case, comes within the exemption mentioned in sect. 1, sub-sect. 1, of the Agricultural Rates Act 1896, so as to render the occupier liable to pay one-half only of the rate in the pound payable in respect of buildings and other hereditaments. I think that the land in question does fall within the exemption. I agree with Collins, L.J. that the cases of Purser v. The Local Board of Health for Worthing (56 L. T. Rep. 447; It 18 Q. B. Div. 818) and The London and North-Western Railway Company v. The Llandudno Improvement Commissioners (75 L. T. Rep. 659; (1857) 1 Q. B. 287) show that prima facie this land covered with these glasshouses is part and parcel of the market garden, and therefore agricultural land, the occupier of which is entitled to the benefit of this exemption. The form and collocation of words used in this Act is not new as defining partial exemptions in rating cases. is to be found as early as the Public Health Act 1848 and in the Public Health Act 1875, and seems to have been frequently used in local Acts, and has uniformly received such a construction that the hereditaments catalogued in the definition have been held to include the buildings thereon whenever the buildings in question are part and parcel of the specified hereditament. The buildings in such a case are treated as being practically incapable of beneficial occupation independently of the defined hereditament. remains to consider if there is anything in the tenour, and details of this Act to lead to the conclusion that " market garden and the other collocated words, "market gardens exceeding one quarter of an acre, nursery grounds, orchards, or allotments" ought to receive a different construction in this Act, so as to exclude from agricultural land the buildings on each hereditament whatever their character. I see nothing in the tenour of the Act or in its details sufficient to lead to such a conclusion, and if it had been the intention of the Legislature, when employing this old precedent for the definition of hereditaments to be partially exempt from rates, to use the words in a new sens, and exclude from the exemption all land covered with buildings, it would have been very easy to do so, and this has not been done. I will now deal with the sections chiefly It [CT. OF APP. relied on in arguments at the bar as indicating an intention by the Legislature to use these words in this new sense. Sect. 1, sub-sect. 1, says, following the words at the beginning of the section, Shall be liable in the case of every rate to which this Act applies to pay one-half only of the rate in the pound payable in respect of buildings and other hereditaments," which the occupier of agricultural land is liable as compared with the occupier of buildings or other hereditaments to be assessed to or to pay in proportion of onehalf or less than one-half. It is argued toat in this section and sub-section there is a manifest intention to contrast agricultural land with buildings; that is, with the buildings thereon. I think not. There is a contrast, but it is a contrast b tween "agricultural land" as defined and buildings and other hereditaments "-a contrast, that is to say, between different classes of rateable hereditaments. The right inference from this contrast seems to me not to be that all buildings are to be excluded from agricultual land, but on y such buildings as can by the existing law properly be dealt with for rating purposes as separate hereditaments. Next it is argued that sect. 5 shows an intention to exclu te all buildings from "agricultu al land"-I think not. It is a diffi cult section to construe, but it seems to me to be a sectio giving directions as to the separation in valuation lists and the bases of county rates, &c., of agricultural land as a rateable hereditament from buildings and other rateable hereditaments. Clause (a) deals with lists specifying the separate hereditaments in detail, clause (b) with lists dealing only with totals, clause (c) deals with the entry in the detailed valuation lists of the rateable hereditaments which form parts of a hereditament consisting partly of agri cultural land and partly of building; that is, in in my opinion, build ngs which ought by (a) to be rated as separate rateable hereditaments. Clause (c) itself says "rental of buildings when valued separately in pursuance of this Act from the agricultural land," and the only provision providing for such a separate valuation is clause (a) of this sect. 5. Both the agricultural land and the hereditament consisting of buildings will each of them appear in the valuation 1st as separate rateable hereditaments. The entire hereditament of which they are parts will not appear in the valuation list at all. The rateable value of each of th se parts together with the respective gross estimated rental will have to appear in the valuation list; for the rateable value is the gross rental less certain deductions, which rental and deductions have by law both to appear in the valuation list. The clause says that the gross estimated rental of the buildings shall, while the buildings are used only for the cultivation of agricultural land, be calculated on the rent at which they would be expected to let to a tenant from year to year, and not on structural cost. This at first looks like a very useless direction, since the rent to be expected from the hypothetical tenant, and not structural cost, is always the basis of valuation in rating. But the section goes on to say that the total gross estimated rental of the entire hereditament shall not be increased by the separate valuation of the parts. This shows that the valuer, in addition to making a separate valuation of the rateable hereditament consisting of buildings, must make a valuation of the gross estimated rental of the entire hereditament, which latter valuation will however not appear in the valuation list at all; and then apparently he is to deduct from the gross rental of the entire hereditament the value of the rateable hereditament constituted by the buildings, and the gross estimated rental of the agricultural land will apparently be the residue. Then from the gross rentals of these several hereditaments constituted by the agricultural land and the buildings respec. tively will have to be made the ordinary deductions for repairs, &c., to arrive at the rateable value. This latter part of the section and the dual valuation which it necessarily imports makes intelligible the portion relating to valuing not on the structural cost but on the rent which the hypothetical tenant might be expected to give; because, however plainly this may be the course to pursue according to the ordinary law, it is not so clearly the course to pursue when the Legislature directs that the value of a hereditament shall be ascertained in reference to the gross rental of an entirety of which the hereditament to be valued is only a part; that is, in other words, in a case where the valuation is arrived at partly by the apportionment of the sum of another and larger valuation. Now, what are the buildings which are to be separately valued according to these directions in clause (c)? Collins, L.J. thinks that they are buildings not part and parcel of the agricultural land, not part and parcel, that is, in the present case, of the market garden, but used in connection with it; and no doubt such buildings, although not forming part of the market garden or other agricultural land, might in rating law be described as a part of a hereditament consisting partly of agricultural land and partly of buildings, for there is no law which requires a separation of hereditaments according to the titles under which the occup er hold, or the use which the occupier makes of the parts, and unity of personal occupation and unity of parish is all that is Lecessary to constitute and determine the rating hereditament; and if once you arrive at the conclusion that the definitions of agricul tural land cover and include the buildings part and parcel thereof, it is not easy to avoid the conclusion that the buildings spoken of in this section must be some buildings other than those falling within the definition. One mode of avoiding this conclusion would be to read the words "partly of agricultural land and partly of buildings to mean partly of agricultural land uncovered with buildings and partly of agricultural land covered by buildings; but this would be a somewhat violent construction, and, in my opinion, it cannot be accepted as the true construction, nor can I bring myself to think that, if apart from sects. 1 and 5 the definition of agricultural land or of market garden ought to be construed as including the buildings erected on the land for the cultivation of it, the provisions of sect. 5, which can be construed consistently with such construction, ought to make one reject it. Moreover, I do not think that to read clause (c) of sect. 5 as applying only to hereditaments not part and parcel of the agricultural land, leads to any result inconsistent with the apparent intention of the Legislature, for, suppos ng some building to have been erected which in addition to its use in assisting the cultivation of the agricul tural land would serve another purpose-for instance, a house which would serve as a residence for the farmer and his family-I do not think that there is anything in the cases which would necessitate or justify holding such a building to be part and parcel of the agricultural land, although it would clearly be part of a hered tament consisting partly of agricultural land and partly of buildings. It would, however, be, according to the general law of rating, a single hereditament, because occupied under one occupation by the same person or persons. On the other hand, a hay barn in a meadow, or a cowshed, would be part and parcel of the agricultural land as serving the cultivation thereof, and nothing else. I understand the decision in the Llandudno case (ubi sup.) to have been based on this principle. It is more reasonable to suppose that the Legislature intended such a result, than to put a construction on the Act which necessitates treating a hay barn or a cowshed as a rateable hereditament separate from the agricultural land, and capable of separate beneficial occupation. I think, therefore, that the conclusion of Collins, L.J. is right, and that sect. 5 (c) only applies to buildings outside the definition of agricultural land, and gives a qualified exemption to such buildings while used only for the cultivation of land, and that there is nothing in this section to prevent the definition of agricultural land being read in accordance with previous decisions. Sect. 6 only Ideals with the returns to the Local Government Board, and seems to me to follow exactly the lines of sect. 5 and clause (c), and throws no further light on the construction of the definition clause, The only remaining section which throws any light on the matter is the 9th section, which contains the definition. I have already dealt generally with the words of the definition, and judicial decisions thereon so far as the old precedent has been followed; but some index to the meaning of the Legislature is to be gathered from the words of the definition itself, both those which appear in the old form and those which are supplementary to it. First, there is the word "only," which qualifies "arable, meadow, and pasture ground," and nothing else in the category. If you treat the word "only" as intended to exclude buildings on such land from agricultural land as defined, and from the benefit of the exemption, then it would seem to follow that in the case of market gardens, &c., buildiogs will not be excluded; but I do not think that the word only affects the question of the inclusion or exclusion of buildings from the definition. "Only" is meant to cover and exclude that class of cases in which the land, although used as arable, meadow, or pasture ground, might be used for some other ultimate purpose, and does not, in my judgment, cover the use of arable, meadow, or pasture ground as the site of a house in which the farmer shall live, or the stables in which horses or cows shall stand, or a hay barn in which the hay shall be stored, such user merely being means to the user of the arable, meadow, or pasture ground as such. As to the words "but does not include land occupied together with a house, as a park, gardens other than as aforesaid," I think "other than as aforesaid means other than market gardens and cottage gardens; and it would seem to follow that the definition of agricultural land does include land occupied, together with a house, as cottage gardens or market gardens. If this is so, it is CT. OF APP.] ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. MAYOR, ALDERMEN, &C., OF TYNEMOUTH. [CT. OF APP. Tynemouth. At a meeting of the watch committee of the council of the corporation of the borough of Tynemouth, held on the 13th Aug. 1895, a resolutio was passed authorising the chief constable of the borough to obtain legal assistance at the ensuing Brewster sessions for the borough. A like resolution was passed at the meeting of the council held on the 21st Aug. 1895. difficult to suppose that the Act meant land | defendants were the corporation of the borough of occupied, together with a house, as arable, meadow, or pasture ground, not to fall within the definition of agricultural land. The conclusion at which I have arrived on the question raised by the case, viz., whether that part of the land occupied as a market garden which is covered with glasshouses of the character stated in the case comes within the 'exemption mentioned in sect. 1, sub-sect. (1) of the Agricultural Rates Act 1896 so as to render the occupier liable to pay one-half only of the rate payable in respect of buildings and other hereditaments, is that such land does come within the exemption, because these buildings are part and parcel of the market garden which by the terms of the definition is agricultural land, and are buildings used for the purpose of the cultivation of the agricultural land and no other purpose. I think therefore that the judgment of the Queen's Bench Division and the Court of Quarter Sessions ought to stand. Appeal allowed. Solicitor for the appellant, The Solicitor of Inland Revenue. Solicitors for the respondents, Ravenscroft, Hills, and Woodward, agents for Melvill Green and Charles, Worthing. Feb. 8 and March 11, 1898. (Before SMITH, CHITTY, and COLLINS, L.JJ.) THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. MAYOR, AlderMEN, AND BURGESSES OF TYNEMOUTH. (a) APPEAL FROM THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. Municipal corporation - Borough fund Chief constable-Respondent in licensing appealCosts of appeal-Municipal Corporations Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 50), ss. 140, 141, 142, and 143; schedule V., part II., clause 5 (d)-Municipal Corporations (Borough Funds) Act 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 91), s. 2. Where there is no surplus from its borough fund, a municipal corporation cannot pay out of such fund the costs incurred by the chief constable as a litigant in a licensing appeal at quarter sessions. THIS was an appeal from a judgment of the The action was commenced by a writ whereby the plaintiffs claimed (1) a declaration that any agreement by the defendant corporation to indemnify the chief constable against any costs he may have, or may have had, to bear or pay in connection with licensing appeals from the borough justices to quarter sessions, and any payment pursuant thereto or any payment of such costs by the defendant corporation is ultra vires and void; and (2) an injunction restraining the defendants from making or acting on any such agreement, or from making any such pay ment The plaintiffs, the Newcastle Breweries Limited, were ratepayers in the borough of Tynemouth, and as such were and are interested in preventing any misapplication of the borough funds; and the (a) Reported by E. MANLEY SMITH, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. At the Brewster sessions held at North Shields on the 23rd Aug. 1895, the chief constable raised objection to the renewal of certain ale house or full licences under the Licensing Acts for the salof intoxicating liquors held by persons in respect of premises situate in the borough of Tynemouth. After hearing such objections the justices at such sessions refused to renew the licences, and thereupon the hold rs of five of the licences gave notice of appeal from such refusal to the quarter session.. On the 27th Sept. 1895, at a meeting of the watch committee, it was resolved, That the opinion of counsel be obtained whether the watch committee or the council have power to autho rise the chief constable to act as respondent in the several licensing appeals; and also, if the chief constable be ordered by the Court of Quarter Sessions to pay his own costs or the appellants' costs, in any of the cases, whether the council have power to pay out of the borough funds or borough rates the costs which he may be ordered to bear or pay. On the 10th Oct. 1895 the opinion of counsel was received by the watch committee, who refused to authorise the chief constable to act as respondent in the licensing appeals, or to indemnify him against any costs which he might have to bear or pay. On the 15th Oct. 1895, at a meeting of the council of the borough, it was resolved, That the chief constable who is the respondent in the licensing appeals be authorised to oppose such appeals, and that the council agree to indemnify him against any costs which he may have to bear or pay in connection with the appeal as such respondent. On the hearing of the appeals the chief constable appeared by counsel, and opposed the appeals, which were dismissed with costs. The costs incurred by the chief constable in or about opposing the appeals exceeded the amount of costs which on taxation he recovered from the appellants by the sum of 1321. 58., and on the 19th Nov. 1896, at a meeting of the watch committee in the matter of the licensing appeals, and in the matter of the respondent's costs, it was resolved, That the committee direct the payment of Messrs. Adamson and Adamson's account, amounting to 1321. 5s., being the difference between the fees paid to counsel and the amount allowed on taxation. The question for the opinion of the court was, whether the resolution of the council or the agreement by the defeudant corporation to indemnify the chief constable against the costs, was ultra vires, and if any payment pursuant thereto, or any payment of the costs by the defendant corpora. tion pursuant to the direction of the watch committee, would be ultra vires and void. The Queen's Bench Division (Grantham and Wright, JJ.) held that the council of the borough CT. OF APP.] ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. MAYOR, Aldermen, &C., OF TYNEMOUTH. [CT. Of App. could not pay to the chief constable, expenses which had been incurred by him in opposition to the express orders of the watch committee, and upon that ground granted the injunction prayed f or. The case is reported ante, p. 129, and in 76 L. T. Rep. 566. The defendants appealed. Feb. 8-Asquith, Q.C. and Macmorran, Q.C. for the defendants.-The payment by the corporation to the chief constable of his cost incurred at the licensing appeals is allowable under sects. 140 to 143 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882, under schedule V. part 2, clause 5 (d) of the same Act and under sect. 2 of the Borough Funds Act 1872. Under sect. 140 of the Act of 1882 the question whether it is intra vires for the corporation to pay any particular expenses, is a question for the corporation to decide. The only question which the court can decide under that section is whether such expenses are reasonable : R. v. Prest, 16 Q. B. 32; R. v. Mayor of Norwich, 30 W. R. 752. In 1895 the chief constable was properly made respondent in the licensing appeals and was liable to pay costs: Price v. James, 67 L. T. Rep. 543; (1892) 2 Q. B. 428. He acted on the instructions of the watch committee, who thought it advisable in the interests of the borough, that he should appear as respondent at the quarter sessions. The case is on this ground within sect. 2 of the Borough Funds Act 1872. Lawson Walton, Q.C. and T. Willes Chitty for the relators. Macmorran, Q.C. replied. Besides the cases cited in the judgments the following cases were referred to: Reg. v. Mayor, Aldermen, and Burgesses of Exeter, R. v. Council of the Borough of Stamford, 13 L. J. March 11.- SMITH, L.J. read the following judgment: This is an action by the Attorney. General at the rela'ion of the Newcastle Breweries, Limited, against the mayor, aldermen, and burgesses of the borough of Tynemouth, and the short but important question raised by the special case is, whether the borough fund of that borough can be used by the town council for the purpose of opposing publicans seeking to obtain renewals of their licences. The facts are these: In the month of August 1895, the watch committee, as also the council of Tynemouth, authorised the chief constable of that borough to obtain legal assistance and attend the brewster sessions and object to the renewal of licences to certain publicans occupying houses in the borough. This he did successfully, and the defeated publicans appealed to quarter sessions. Whilst the appeals were pending, at a meeting of the watch committee of the borough held upon the 10th Oct. 1895, it was resolved that the council of the borough should not be asked to authorise the chief constable to act as respondent in the licensing appeals then about to take place at quarter sessions, and that he should not be indemnified against the costs thereof, and that no permission should be granted to him to take his witnesses there. Five days, however, after this resolution of the watch committee the council of the borough resolved the contrary, and that the chief constable should oppose the appeals, and that the council would indemnify him against costs. Upon the 18th Oct. 1895 the chief constable appeared at quarter sessions by counsel specially retained from London and with his witnesses and opposed the appeals, and has thereby incurred costs to the amount of 1321. 58. over and above what can be obtained upon taxation from the appellant publicans whom he defeated. So matters rested until the next month, by which time a new watch committee had come into office. This new watch committee, upon the 19th Nov. 1895, made an order directing the payment of the abovementioned costs which had been incurred before they came into office. It is intended to pay these costs out of the borough fund if it can be legally done, and the question is whether it can be. The borough fund of the borough of Tynemouth has no surplus. These being the facts, I come to the four points raised, two under the Municipal Corporations Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. 50), one under the Borough Funds Act 1872 and one upon which the Queen's Bench Division decided. I will, before dealing with these points, state what must first be considered. Part 9 of the Act of 1882 comprises a group of sections which deals with the appointment of a watch committee and the powers they have over the police of the borough. It is headed, "Police. Watch Committee; Constables." It will be seen that sect. 191 of this group has reference to the powers and duties of the watch committee in relation to the borough police, such as their appointment, supervision, dismissal, and making the force generally efficient. The watch committee have nothing whatever to do with the carrying out of the licensing laws in their borough. As regards the formation of the borough fund, sect. 139 provides what payments are to be made into it so as to constitute the fund, and sect. 144 provides for the making of a borough rate should the borough fund be insufficient "for the purposes to which it is applicable under this Act or otherwise by law." Sect. 140 is the section which deals with the application of this fund when formed. By sub-sect. 1 of this section it is enacted that the borough fund shall be applicable to and charged with the several payments specified in the 5th schedule. Sub-sect. 2 of this section enacts that the payments specified in part 1 of this 5th schedule may be made without order of the council; those specified in part 2 may not be made without such order. By sub-sect. 3 it is enacted that no other payment shall be made out of the borough iuud except under the authority of Parlia ment, or by order of the council, or by order of the court of quarter sessions for the borough, or by order of a justice in pursuance of this Act, or in cases in which the Court of Quarter Sessions for a county or a justice of the peace might make an order for the payment of money on the treasurer of the county. Sect. 141 enacts that an order of the council for payment of money out of the borough fund shall be signed by three members of the council, and countersigned by CT. OF APP.] ATTORNEY-GENERAL U. MAYOR, ALDERMEN, &C., OF TYNEMOUTH. [CT. OF App. the town clerk, and by sub-sect. 2 any such order may be removed into the Queen's Bench Division, and may be wholly or partly disallowed or confirmed with or without costs. Sect. 143 enacts: "If the borough fund is more than sufficient for the purposes to which it is applicable under this Act, or otherwise by law, the surplus thereof shall be applied under the direction of the council for the public benefit of the inhabitants and improvement of the borough." I will return to those sections hereafter, and I pass on to the 5th schedule to see what payments under it the borough fund is to be applied to and charged with. It is under this schedule that the first point is taken by the corporation, and it is said that it authorises the payment of the costs in question out of the borough fund. It is headed, Part 2 Payments out of the Borough Fund." Part 1 authorises the payment out of the fund without order of the council of the remuneration of the mayor, recorder, town c erk, and other officers appointed by the council; moneys certified to be due to the treasury in respect of election expenses and remuneration of assistant recorder. authorises the payment out of the borough fund, but only upon the order of the council of the following payments; (1) expenses of overseers or town clerk in the inrolment of burgesses and holding municipal elections; (2) the expenses of the town clerk in providing a court for election petitioners; (3) the expenses of providing and maintaining and improving the corporation buildings, including justices' room; (4) fees payable to the clerk of the peace and to the borough coroner; (5) the payments to be made under this Act to or in respect of the borough police, including the following payments, namely—(a) such salaries as the watch committe (here come in in this schedule the watch committee for the first time) with the approbation of the council may direct; (b) such further sum as may be awarded by the watch committee subject to the approbation of the council to a borough coastable for extraordinary diligence or as compensation for wounds received by him in the performance of his duty, or as may be awarded by the watch committee subject to the approbation of the council as an allowance when disabled by bodily injury or worn out by length of service; (c) extraordinary expenses which a borough constable appears to have necessarily incurred in apprehending offenders and executing the orders of any justice. such expenses having been first examined and approved by that justice; (d) all other charges and expenses which the watch committee, subject to the approbation of the council, direct to be paid for the purposes of the borough constabulary force. This schedule is explicit as to what payments are to be made out of the borough fund. It was argued for the corporation that sub-clause (d) of this schedula authorised the payment of the costs incurred in opposing publicans seeking to obtain renewal of their licences out of the borough fund. In my judgment it is out of all reason to attempt to strain the words "in respect of the borough police ""for the purposes of the borough constabulary force" into covering the costs of the counsel and witnesses of a litigant chief constable acting hostilely at quarter sessions to an appellant publican in a licensing appeal. Such a proceeding is not in respect of the borough police nor for the purposes of the borough constabulary at all; it is for the purpose of opposing a publican obtaining a renewal of his licence and nothing else, which is no part of the duty of a police constable, nor of the watch committee, nor of the council of a borough. A chief constable may well attend quarter s-ssions as a witness to give information if required, but it is no part of his duty to act as a litigant party thereat. I do not understand that the recent case in the House of Lords of Boulter v. Kent Justices (77 L. T. Rep. 288; (1897) A. C. 556) has any bearing upon this case. Blackburn, J., in Reg. v. Liverpool Cor. poration (41 L J. 175, Q. B.), when dealing with sect. 82 of the Municipal Corporation Act 1835 (5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76), which is a similar section to clause 5 of the 5th schedule, he d that the last clause therein, which was similar to (d), was to be construed as referring to matters ejusdem generis with those previously mentioned, and Was confine and is to be contined to acts affecting the constabulary force. In this I entirely agree; and I am clearly of opinion that no part of the 5th schedule, whether you take the words at the commencement or the end of clause 5, authorises the payment of these costs out of the borough fund, and that this point does not avail the corporation. I now come to the next point which is taken upon the Borough Funds Act of 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 91) by the corporation. In the year 1871, in the case of Reg. v. Sheffield Corporation (24 L T. Rep. 659; L. Rep. 6 Q. B. 652), upon a rule calling upon the council of the borough to show cause why a writ of certiorari should not issue to bring up two orders of the council ordering payment of two sums out of the borough fund to be quashed, the Court of Queen's Bench held that, under the provisions of the Municipal Corporation Act 1835 (5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76), s. 92, the borough fund could not be charged with the costs and expenses incurred by the council in opposing before justices certain regulations proposed by a water company which would impose onerous conditions upon the consumers, and in opposing a Bill in Parliament subsequently promoted by the company which was also detrimental to the interests of the inhabitants. It was sought by the corporation to justify the expenditure as being costs and expenses within, in the words of that Act "all other expenses not herein otherwise provided for which shall be necessarily incurred in carrying into effect the provisions of the Act." It was, however, held by the court that, unless the borough fund had a surplus, the borough fund could not be applied to the payment of these costs and expenses. It will be seen that these costs and expenses were incurred on behalf of the inhabitants of the borough, who were resisting onerous obligations being imposed upon them by a water company, and yet it was held that the borough fund could not be applied to these purposes under the terms of that Act. In the next year, in cousequence, as it appears to me of this decision, the Borough Funds Act of 1872 was passed to authorise the application of funds of municipal co porations and other governing bodies in certain cases. Sect. 2 enacts that, when in the judgment of a governing body it is expedient for such governing body to promote or oppose any local and personal Bills in Parliament, or to prosecute or defend any legal proceedings neces |