and even sometimes the vessels. This latter point seems hitherto to have formed a rule when the proprietor of the vessel had voluntarily loaded her with contraband, either in the whole or in part. At present, however, almost all the commercial treaties have abolished this custom entirely, or at least they do not admit it, except in some cases. But where no treaties exist, the conduct observed by the belligerent powers is rather inconstant."

§ 276.

"Freedom of neutral commerce acknowledged in Europe. "But as to merchandises which are not contraband, it is generally adopted, that it is permitted to the neutral powers to trade in them with the enemy, and to transport them to the enemy, except in places blockaded, with which all commerce is interdicted. However, neutral merchant vessels ought in open sea to submit to the customary visitation, or that which is fixed by treaties in almost an uniform manner."

Faithfully translated from the original, by

May 8, 1794.

GEO. TAYLOR, JR.

The deductions from this author are,

1. That the neutral rights extend to every sort of merchandise, and even to arms or military stores, with certain restrictions, which do not affect grain.

2. That the places of an enemy, with which commerce is interdicted, are those only which are possessed by the adversary power, or blocked up, so as to prevent the entrance of every stranger.

3. That treaties of commerce have sometimes classed provisions among contraband, and sometimes among lawful merchandise, and

4. That a commerce in merchandises which do not serve directly or solely for war, is to be presumed lawful, when nothing has been regulated concerning it.

Which, sir, of these deductions confront the doctrines now advanced?

I anticipate, from a passage in your letter, the answer which will be made; that there is no other limitation upon the will of a nation to increase the number of contraband, than that treaties shall not be violated: if this were tenable, the law of nations, instead of being a stable rule, would fluctuate according to the caprice and force of the belligerent parties. But Martens obviates such a consequence by observing, that "these declarations are not so much laws, as notices or warnings." The law is, therefore, to be sought for elsewhere than in those notices-it must have existed before.

Let us now turn from the question of contraband to your second vindication of the instruction, namely, the probability of its successful operation against France. To this end you state, that "at the period of issuing the instruction, the situa tion of France was notoriously such as to point out the prevention of its receiving supplies, as one of the means of reducing it to reasonable terms of peace." And again, that "it is at least a questionable point, whether the interests of humanity be not best consulted by a recurrence on the part of the belligerent power to all honourable means of imposing on an enemy the necessity of submitting to reasonable terms of accommodation, and of thereby abridging the duration of the calamities of war," and that "the expectation of imposing this necessity is the motive, under the influence of which this instruction has been issued, and is the acknowledged ground of your former expla nations of it," &c.

You will not conceive, sir, that I meddle with this branch of the subject farther, than the stress which you lay upon it de mands. In defence therefore of the commercial rights of the United States, I must be pardoned for asking, if the actual situation of France does in truth afford a clear and unequivocal prospect of defeat by famine? The soil, the climate, the population, which can spare from war a quota for labour, the agriculture, the total of the internal resources of France, induce so much of doubt at least as to sanction our complaints against the check to our commerce. If the two seas which wash her territory, and her coasts of many hundred miles, can be so guarded as to render the importation of subsistence impracticable, if she cannot send forth naval convoys competent to protect her transports of provisions from abroad, still who can pronounce upon firm ground that she can be starved? If for the possible difficulty which a scantiness of external supplies might create, if from the possible clamours and tumult which the want of imported bread might stir up, or if from any other speculation, a neutral trade of many years standing is to be suppressed, some of the belligerent parties, in every war, will seize pretexts for harassing neutrals.

To counterbalance the innocence of individuals, and drive all from the course of their commerce, upon the vague suspicion, that the ruling power of France is gathering supplies under their names, as you seem to intimate, is to humiliate and to punish.

Vattel remains to be examined. "Commodities, he says, particularly used in war, and the importation of which to an enemy is prohibited, are called contraband goods; such are arms, military and naval stores, timber, horses, and even provisions in certain junctures; when there are hopes of reducing the enemy by famine."

Well might the principle which has been canvassed, the usage of nations, and the opinions of other respectable writers, be repeated to controvert this dictum. But without dwelling longer on such considerations, if the judge of these hopes of reducing the enemy by famine be one of the warring powers, it must be guided, upon this, as upon every other occasion, affecting an independent people, by the great duty, that " each nation ought to contribute all in its power to the happiness and perfection of other nations." It ought not to thwart, without demonstrable justice, the rights of another nation. It ought not to be seduced by sanguine expectations of advantage, to forget our full claim to whatsoever neutrals can reasonably require. At the very moment when our citizens were navigating the ocean, ignorant of any penalty which they had to avoid, as soon as the instructions had undergone the forms of office, they were the victims. Those who undertake to judge for us should remember what the impression must be, if the proclamation of the President of the United States reached London before they were published; that we were not advised of Great Britain having associated herself in the war through any official channel, for months after it had been brought hither by report, and that the instructions of the 8th of June, operating immediately, and not handed to us by you until the 12th of September, were disturbing our commerce for more than three months, before we were admonished of our danger.

Denmark and Sweden, it is true, are involved in the words of the first clause in the instructions. But if the late tables of Arnould are to be believed, the interest of those nations, in the direct exports of corn, meal, and flour to France, and the car. rying trade in those articles thither, has received no wound, of which they greatly complain. So that in fact "Of the nations inhabiting the shores of the Atlantick ocean, and practising its navigation," the instructions essentially interfere with the United States alone.

2. With our rights thus fortified, we have no room for discussing the moderation which you attribute to the exercise of your pretensions. We are not free from injury by the exemption of rice, or the forbearance to confiscate corn, meal, and flour. We are not compensated for our injuries, because no more than two out of three of our agricultural productions are wrested from the channels, chosen for them by ourselves. Compute, sir, the value of those prohibited goods, and their importance to the growth of our shipping. Although it will always be a serious object to keep our rice markets unclogged, the losses by the instructions are neither covered nor concealed by the indulgence to rice. Its freedom plainly speaks that France was not presumed to be relieved by it; or else the belief of a famine by arresting corn, meal, and flour, was vain.

Hence the profit of this exportation would be an inadequate atonement even upon your own scale, for the other wrongs.

Farther, the original destination of the corn, meal, and flour to France, was dictated by France being notoriously a better market than any other, to which they had access; especially when they were to be conducted into the British ports, under the stigma of being culprit property. It will be necessary therefore, before the temper of the instructions be fairly appreciated, to compare the actual allowance in the English ports with the prices in the true port: to determine what the degree of damage is to a merchant, whose agent lives in France, to have his ship compelled into England; how long it may be before she can be accommodated to this unlooked for situation; what capital may be rendered for some time inactive; what preparations for a return cargo may be ruined at the intended port? and what derangements may overtake an individual whose study and fortune have been fixed to one scheme? When all these items shall be assembled, then, and not till then, shall we know the rate of compensation which is afforded by the omission to confiscate. But, after all, the real question is, whether any belligerent power can thus fetter neutral trade? Nay, if the instructions had terminated only in the demand of security, one of the conditions, upon which vessels may be rescued from the admiralty, even this would have been vexatious. It is very rare, that security can be obtained in a foreign land, where neither an owner nor a correspondent resides without an hypothecation of the vessel.

3. In your letter of the 12th of September, 1793, you contend that the exception in favour of Denmark and Sweden has reference to existing treaties with those powers, and cannot therefore give just grounds of umbrage or jealousy to other powers, between whom and Great Britain no such treaties subsist. As the instructions in the instance of a blockade light upon the United States alone, of all the Atlantic nations, when our remonstrances upon the captures shall be heard, it will probably be again propounded, as it has already been, without any reply in your last letter; "what might not we on the same ground have withheld from Great Britain during the whole course of the present war, as well as the peace which has preceded it." Reluctant as I am to kindle fresh contests, this topick will not at present be dilated. But surely to exact the last iota of a right awakens an unsocial feeling.

4. It is of no consequence, nor do I pretend to ascertain, from whom we have received the first injury. Complaints against one nation cannot be discharged by severity from another. But Mr. Pinckney argued with fitness, that if the United States acquiesced in the instructions of Great Britain, as being consonant to the law of nations, they must acquiesce in the

pleasure of all the world, who by waging war may destroy every foreign market. From any other people, whose acts of fend us, we shall expect satisfaction. We expect no more

from you.

No, sir, we have laboured to cultivate with the British nation perfect harmony. We have not attempted by a revival of maxims, which, if ever countenanced, are now antiquated, to blast your agriculture or commerce. To be persuaded, as you wish, that the instructions of the 8th of June, 1C, are in a conciliatory spirit, is impossible. And be assured, sir, that it is a matter of sincere regret to learn the intention of your government to adhere to them, notwithstanding our representations, which utter, as we flatter ourselves, the decent but firm language of right. I have the honour, sir, to be, &c.

EDM. RANDOLPH.

Mr. Hammond, Minister Plenipotentiary.

True copy,

GEO. TAYLOR, JR.

MESSAGE

FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO CONGRESS, MAY 20, 1794.

In the communications, which I have made to Congress during the present session, relative to foreign nations, I have omitted no opportunity of testifying my anxiety to preserve the United States in peace. It is peculiarly, therefore, my duty at this time to lay before you the present state of certain hostile threats against the territories of Spain in our neighbourhood.

The documents which accompany this message, develop the measures which I have taken to suppress them, and the intelligence, which has been lately received.

It will be seen from thence, that the subject has not been neglected; that every power vested in the executive on such occasions has been exerted; and that there was reason to believe, . that the enterprise, projected against the Spanish dominions, was relinquished.

But it appears to have been revived upon principles which set publick order at defiance, and place the peace of the United States in the discretion of unauthorized individuals. The means already deposited in the different departments of government, are shown by experience not to be adequate to these high exigencies, although such of them as are lodged in the hands of the executive shall continue to be used with promptness, ener