ones had been fatal and disastrous. That, of Waterloo itself would no doubt be iné however, could be done only by repressing cluded. Let it not however be supposed whatever of anarchial, anti-social, and that any wanton or unnecessary exercise revolutionary principles yet remained ; of the power which victory had conferred, and until that was effectually done, he was indulged in. If they saw it necessary could not venture to say that the spirit of to exact certain sacrifices from France, Jacobinism was extinct. What had been they limited those sacrifices to the necesthe effect of the revolution, not only upon sity of them; if they felt themselves comEurope, but upon a great proportion of pelled 'o demand certain limitations, they France itself? ' A general love of order, did not push their demands beyond the and a general feeling of abhorrence at op- strict line of what their safety required. posing upon slight and speculative grounds, That was their policy, and so long as they any existing constitutional government; acted upon that plain and direct line, and he could not applaud the wisdom of though they might exasperate France, allowing those feelings and propensities to they were sure to have the approbation of be overlaid and smothered by the mass all wise and honest men out of France, of revolutionary spirit which still existed in and even in France itself when the efferFrance. The danger of such a catas- vescence of momentary irritation had subtrophe was immediate and formidable ; sided, because there was something in and how was the danger to be obviated ? honest principles which was always cerHe had heard in that House, and knew that tain to extort the ultimate approbation of similar arguments prevailed elsewhere, that all men. we had exasperated France, that we had With respect to the securities which poured insults upon her, and plunged her were demanded, it was not his intention te into a state of deep humiliation. It was, enter into any minute examination of the indeed partly true that such was the fact. character of those which came under & From the circumstances of the case, it was pecuniary compensation. But he had impossible that Europe could interfere so heard it stated that the pecuniary indem. as to overawe the dangerous and alarming nities were those which, of all others were dispositions of the French people, without most calculated to affict her, and that offending them, without inflicting some even territorial cessions would have been mortifications, or withont wounding their less galling. They had been told, in a national feelings. For that inevitable evil tone of much exaggeration, that every the allies ought to have been prepared. time the meanest peasant paid his taxes, The great object with them was, not to be would be reminded of the degradation avoid giving offence, for that was utterly into which his country had fallen, leaving impossible; but to mitigate, as far as they it altogether out of the question, that their could, the exasperation of France. Dia tributes would be blended in the general

. it follow, however, that because the allies taxation of the state, and would not bear must necessarily wound the feelings of the distinct and specific form of a conthe French people, that therefore they tribution towards their victors. But surely were to give up all idea of obtaining the there was no comparison between terrirequisite securities? He contended that torial cession and pecuniary indemoifica. the allies having that particular object in tion, with respect to the influence which view, it was most desirable to obtain, for either might be supposed to have upon its accomplishment, that lapse of time the feelings of the nation. At the expirawhich would soften down the feelings of the tion of five years, the pecuniary indemnination, and contribute to remove those sen- fication would be paid off, and leave ne timents of irritation which might otherwise trace behind, but territorial cessions would impose its operation, and prevent the na- be permanent; they would leave a memory tion from rallying round the throne of the behind them of the subjugation of France, restored monarch. The rule which the which would never be effaced. He was allies had to prescribe to themselves was surprised also to hear it argued that the not to avoid giving mortifications (for army of occupation would be more galling how could they be prevented ?), but to to the feelings of the French people than abstain from all wanton or gratuitous in- territorial cessions. If, indeed it was so sults, and that course they rigidly pursued. terrible to France to have her frontier Some insults, indeed, it was not easy to fortresses occupied by foreign troops, for escape from inflicting, and among these, a short and limited space of time, how in the estimation of the French, the battle much more terrible must it be to see those

fortresses permanently surrendered. But have been the former opinions of the

I it was added, if territorial cessions have people of France, they had been taught by been made, then the armies of the allies circumstances, accurately to distinguish might have been withdrawn from France between the real and the alleged author He would, however, ask the House whes of the calamities which they suffered. In ther, in the case of those fortresses being the prosecution of his argument the hon. surrendered to Holland, the allies would and learned gentleman had alluded to have been justified in disbanding their that part of the treaty by which the allied armies ; whether it would have been safe powers pledged themselves to maintain to leave the Netherlands a prey to the the constitution of France, and Louis overwhelming superiority, and to the am- 18th on the throne of that kingdom. Howbition of France? That, certainly would not ever the passage might be expressed, the have been the way to reduce our standing meaning unequivocally was, that the allied armies, or to reduce the military spirit upon powers were resolved to maintain an orthe continent. The hon. gentleman in his derly government in France. Not only zeal to prove that the Bourbons must have was this passage perfectly consistent with been forced upon a reluctant people, said the other parts of the arrangements which that it was impossible for France to reflect bad been made, but it was essential to upon their restoration without connecting them. There were many parts of the it with invasion and the presence of foreign hon. and learned gentleman's speech, to armies. He apprehended, however, that which at an earlier hour he would have the return and second downfall of Buona trespassed on the House by an endeavour parté had materially altered the case; and to reply. that the meanest peasant in France was There were some topics, however, on now able to draw a just iuference upon which he begged their indulgence while the subject. In the peace which was he said a few words. The hon. and signed in 1814 no harsha stipulations, no learned gentleman had observed a great exactions were made, and they must there. | deal on the relation in which Holland fore feel that whatever of moderation, and France had been left. The security magnanimity, and forbearance they expe- of Holland was in her situation. The rienced from the allies in that year, they treaty had been severely censured by some, owed to the virtues and to the presence because it annexed the Austrian Netherof Louis 18th; while whatever of miss lands to Holland; and the House had fortune and degradation awaited them in heard from the noble lord opposite, an the following year they owed to Buonaparté. appeal on the subject to the established Buonaparte, the man who had raised the principles of European policy. The House, military glory of France to an unexampled however, was not to decide the present height, entered the lists against us with question by the principles on which the every possible advantage, at the head of great statesmen of former times acted one of the finest armies, in point of number, with respect to it. Those persons were bravery, discipline, and appointment, that not at liberty on the subject. They were had ever been assembled in that country. bound by treaty to give the Netherlands That army, however, suffered the con- to Austria. They gave it thus in order summation of military disaster. It sus- to indemnify the emperor of Germany for tained a defeat the most memorable in the the surrender of his pretensions to the annals of European warfare. The hon. throne of Spain. The consequence had, and learned gentleman asked who was the in fact, been most injurious. Was it not author of their disgrace. Who was the true that the Austrian Netherlands had author of it? Did not all France know been the great cause of Holland and Engthat so far from the Bourbons having been land having been drawn into every great the cause of it, had they never existed continental quarrel which had occurred? Buonaparté would not have been able to When the Netherlands were called the save Paris from the presence of the allied Spanish barrier, Louis the 14th perpetually armies, determined as all Europe was, invaded Holland. In later times not a with an intensity of feeling never before single war had occurred in which that experienced, never to allow military des barrier had not been found insufficient for potism again to tyrannize over it. He the protection of Holland. In the war of differed therefore most materially from the 1733, the only continental war in which hon. and learned gentleman on this point; this country had not been engaged, we being fully persuaded that whatever might were prevented from engaging in it by

having previously stipulated for the neu-Continent. The glorious war which we trality of the Austrian Netherlands. When had thus waged, we followed up by a the hon. gentlemen talked of no security peace concluded, not on narrow and ex. being derived to Holland from bringing clusive and local considerations, but with Prussia down to the left bank of the reference to the most extensive and comRhine, they seemed not to have well con- mon interests. He trusted that it would sidered the subject. It was of the utnost be maintained in the same spirit of modeadvantage to Holland that a great power ration and magnanimity; and that we like Prussia should be so placed in rela- should continue to be actuated by the tion to her. It was essential that there same cautious vigilance with respect to should be a great power on the left bank the general affairs of Europe. For to of the Rhine, to protect Holland. In one speak of relinquishing the influence we of the wars of Louis 14th, that monarch, had obtained in Europe, and at the same by negociation and interest, previous to an time, of preserving our commercial preintended attack on Holland, gained over eminence, appeared to him to be one of the principal little powers on the Rhine. the most extravagant of all possible proThe only one which refused to unite with positions ; firmly convinced as he was that him was the elector of Brandenburgh, we could never separate our prosperity who well knew, that the subjugation of from our political influence. Holland must necessarily lead to the Mr. Ponsonby said, he had no objection destruction of Dutch Cleves, on the left to be designated one of the modern Whigs bank of the Rhine.

who had been alluded to by the noble With respect to the question of the lord; but all he wished was, that a definibalance of power, he owned that he had tion of the practice of modern Whigs been a little surprised to hear-first, that should not be given, which had no relaFrance had been left in too powerful a tion either to their opinions or their pracstate, and, at the same time, that it was tice. The noble lord might call his adthe policy of Russia that France should versaries Whigs, but it was too much to be left in the state in which she was left. designate them as fools, for, according to This was surely inconsistent with the opi- the statement given of their opinions, nion, that Russia was a just subject of the they could be called nothing else. The jealousy of Europe. The fact was, that part of this treaty which particularly the security of Europe was to be sought struck him with a horror and detestation not in one power, but in the combination of its consequences was, that we were of powers--not in Holland alone, or compelled to keep up an army of 30,000 Prussia alone, or Austria alone, or France men in France; but although he had read alone; but in the combined force of all through the treaties, he could not see that these states; in the enlightened feeling we were bound to furnish a contingent of which impressed the necessity of main- British armed troops; and if we were not taining it; and, above all, he was sure he bound, why, he wished to know, was it might say in that House without fear of the choice of ministers to make the concontradiction, in the influence and guar- tingent consist only of British troops ? dianship of this country. Our great ob- Why should they not consist partly of ject, as we were not obliged to engage in continental troops? Why was it necesthe minor disputes of the Continent, sary to keep up nearly 100,000 men in would be to preserve, by. our occasional the united kingdom and its colonies, and, interposition, the general balance and in- at the same time, 30,000 men in France, dependence. This was the policy which which, he observed, was termed the ad, at various times we had pursued with suc- vanced guard of the British army? Was

There were three particular cases this an example to the other great powers of British interference with the conti- of Europe to lessen their military estapental powers, to which he would recall blishments? He defied the noble lord to the attention of the House. The first state an instance, where the fall of any was, when we checked the domination of cnpire was not first caused by a standing Spain on our own shores and seas. The army. These were, it was said, idle fears; second was, when we assisted to defeat but were they not supported by history? tlie attempt of Louis the 14th, to subju- Germany lost her liberty by her standing gate Europe ; the third, a hundred years army. Spain shared the same fate ; for afterwards, when we had again defeated when Charles 5th, formed the project, in the efforts of France to triumph over the the plenitude of his power, of destroying the liberties of that country, whom did he principal motive, therefore, that induced employ to execute his designsSpanish him to trouble the House was, to explain arms and Spanish ministers. At that some of the arrangements which had been time it was inquired of the Spanish mi- the subject of discussion, in order that the nister, what power and authority had been House might be able to come to a satisgiven by Charles to adopt such measures? factory determination upon them. In the The minister pointing to the military force first place, he would say a few words rescollected, immediately said, that these pecting an omission which had been imwere the powers and authority which the puted to him, namely, that in the present king had given him. The same was done treaties, the ancient treaties, regularly reby Louis 14th, by his own French troops; newed for so many years, were not to be and in England what did the army do in found. This had formerly been the practbe reign of Charles Ist? It turned the tice, because each peace carried forward parliament out of doors, and took upon with it the arrangements among the states itself the government of the nation. of Europe which had been previously Under these circumstances, was it not made, and withont the recital of whichi, most dangerous, he would ask, to keep up therefore, the treaty concluding the peace a standing army so enormous as that now would have been imperfect. The first intended to be supported? The noble lord departure from this usage was in the had told us, that part of the contribution treaty of Amiens; and it took place on already received had been applied to the the obvious principle, that those ancient erection of a monument for cardinal York. treaties were wholly inapplicable to the By what authority or advice was that modern case, and that any introduction of money sent by the Prince Regent? It was them would have created a system not of rather extraordinary to send it for erect-order but of disorder. Those treaties had ing a monument to the last of that family been fully considered at the congress of who had been expelled by parliament. Vienna; but it was found that, in conseIf the noble lord wanted an inscription for quence of the French revolution, so great the monument, he would propose to him a change had taken place in Europe, and the preamble of the bill of rights. In this more particularly in the German empire, application of the public money he saw the old constitution of which had been neither generosity nor magnanimity; for completely dissolved, that it was in vain to what good had any of that family ever think of referring to the ancient treaties done to England ? It was merely a stu- in the new arrangements. All the statesdied compliment to what was now-a-days men assembled at that congress agreed, called the principle of legitimacy. He that, under such circumstances, to revive felt assured that there was a project to those old treaties would be to plunge the establish the military system in this coun- negociation into inextricable difficulties. try on a footing incompatible with its li- But with reference to all practical purberties, and ultimately dangerous to the poses, this omission was altogether unimgovernment itself. The right hon. gen- portant. The danger of which the hon. tleman concluded an animated speech, gentleman talked as threatened in the of which, from the lateness of the hour at event of the union of the crowns of France which it was delivered, we can give barely and Spain, was really at the present day by expressing his hearty assent to the quite visionary. The law of Europe had amendment, which had been proposed by too long considered those monarchies as his noble friend.

incapable of junction, to warrant any Lord Castlereagh began his reply by serious apprehension from the possibility stating, that at that late hour he would of their falling into each other. And benot attempt to follow all the arguments of sides, as between this country and Spain, the hon. gentlemen on the other side of the treaty of Utrecht, by which the posthe House. Indeed, he was so much in- sibility of such an occurrence was prodebted to some of those who had taken vided against, remained in full force. his view of the question, that he felt he This arrangement had also been confirmed might safely rest his defence on their by the treaty of Seville in 1729. speeches, and more especially on the un- He was anxious also to diminish by.exanswerable argument of his hon. friend planation a great misconception, much of near him, who had exhibited so much which had been ably removed by his hon. solid ability, so much just reasoning, al. friend, namely, that the frontier of the most approaching to demonstration. The Netherlands was, with reference to France, in a state of dangerous weakness. The strongly fortified, that if the revolutionary defence of that frontier would at least not tide did not again flow, it would be perbe inadequate during the next five years. fectly able to resist all ordinary attacks. The question therefore was, how would it The hon. and learned gentleman dealt be left after the expiration of that period ? much in assumption. Where facts did The hon. and learned gentleman opposite not exist, it was convenient enough to spoke of the fortresses as incapable of de- assume them. On these assumptions the fending the frontier. In 1814, the hon. hon. and learned gentleman had built up and learned gentleman's apprehensions the statement that the allied powers had were of a different nature-he then feared, imposed the government of the Bourbons not that the frontier would be too weak, on France by force of arms, and had but that the government of the country thrown over the necks of an unwilling would not be such as he wished it to be. people an odious yoke, from which they He hoped that that fear had ceased; for would endeavour to disengage themselves although the hon. gentlemen on the oppo- on the first opportunity. All this, the site side were disposed to maintain, that noble lord said, he most pointedly denied. anost governments retrograded in the Although the British government and its cause of liberty, it was impossible that allies always reserved to themselves the they could say so of the king of the Ne- right of using all justifiable means which therlands. Let the House consider the were calculated to insure success in the position which Prussia occupied in that object which, in coincidence with all quarter. Prussia came down directly on Europe, they had in view, namely, the the frontier of France. There could be settling of France, they never committed no better pledge of the determination of any act in favour of the Bourbons unwarthe king of Prussia, than that he pressed rantable in itself

. They felt too well what for the possession, and oblained' it, of was due from them to the French nation, Sarre Louis, that he had provided for the and even to the Bourbons themselves; defence of Luxembourg, and that he was whose cause would have been injured, and about to re.fortify Treves. When a most not served, by any such step. It would efficient military power thus took a posi- have been impossible for the allied powers tion on the frontiers of France, strength to have devised any thing more injurious ened by three fortresses, it was not to be to Louis 18th, than an endeavour by expected that it would permit the Nether- furce to produce that manifestation of lands to be conquered, as that conquest feeling towards his majesty, which he must expose it to a more facile attack. In (lord Castlereagh) was, from the very fact, Prussia was deeply interested in the first, convinced liis subjects cherished, and conservation of the Low Countries, and would gladly show, whenever the military would, of course, take good care that impediments to the expression of their atFrance should not turn her flank, and tachment should be removed. The allies penetrate between the sea and Luxem- had done nothing to deserve the enmity bourg. It was a perfect solecism in mili- of France. He was not aware that they tary affairs, that Prussia could remain had done more than this--they had driven tranquil with France in possession of the before them that rebellious army which Netherlands. Prussia must fight for the had betrayed the interests of their king Netherlands as for the frontier of her own and country, to place a usurper on bis territories. He did not hesitate to say,

throne. He did not know that the allies that to that defence Prussia appeared per had been guilty of any offence, but that fectly competent. He did not mean that of defeating that army, and driving it from she was equal to meet revolutionary Paris; and he knew of no violence having France, if France should unhappily again been done to the feelings of the French exert that unnatural strength which had people by restoring their legitimate soveformerly rendered her the scourge of reign. He did not know what sentiments Europe ; but he contended that Prussia, some portion of them might entertain with possessing a population of five millions of respect to Louis 18th, but this he knew, souls, if supported by Great Britain, would having witnessed his second return to the be fully able to check any aggressions that capital, that wherever he made his apFrance, in her regulated state, might be pearance, he had been received with

, inclined to attempt. Not only was that transport by the populace. The noble part of the frontier strong against France, lord said, he had never witnessed a greater but the territory open to Landau was so display of popular affection than had been

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