the vacant lands of the State, or the development of its idle industrial resources. The funds with which to defray the expense of these important activities, the commissioner was expected to obtain by voluntary subscriptions, donations, "or loan on such security as he can offer; Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall be construed or held as incurring in any manner or creating any claim or obligation whatsoever upon the State of Alabama."

In his message to the legislature, November 14, 1876, Gov. Houston said: "I submit herewith a report from the commissioner of immigration, and invite your attention to its contents, as showing the prospects of the enterprise in his hands. It is gratifying to me, as it must be to yourselves, to know that in many localities of the State considerable numbers of the best class of people from other States have become permanent citizens. They are gladly received and welcomed by the resident population, and will not only make very desirable additions to the society of the respective localities, but will also aid in the general prosperity, wealth and power of the State. . . The tide of immigration has now well set in, and I expect much of these instrumentalities in the future." The legislature, February 9, 1877, so amended the law as to provide for the appointment of as many assistant commissioners as the governor might think necessary, whose terms should not exceed two years unless reappointed.

In order to carry on the work contemplated by the law, Commissioner Seivers accepted employment as a commercial traveler, by which means he visited many sections of the North, Northwest, and West and familiarized himself with the conditions obtaining in those communities which were settled largely by immigrants. This expedient was made necessary by the absence of an appropriation for the work. He issued a report in 1878 in which he recounted his efforts toward securing immigrants and recommended the establishment of a regularly organized State department with a central office at the capitol and funds for prosecuting its work. Nothing was done by the legislature, however, toward making the department effectual.

The immigration acts of March 7, 1876, and of February 9, 1877, were codified as chapter 19 of the code of 1876. This chapter with its seven sections was not carried forward into the code of 1886. The reasons for their omission are thus stated by the commissioners in their report to Gov. E. A. O'Neal, p. 11:

"Sections 1756 to 1762 of the Code of 1876, in reference to commissioner and assistant commissioner of immigration have been omitted as unnecessary, these offices not being filled, and as it is obvious are rather for the transaction of private than of public business."

While there were various commissioners and assistant commissioners, there is no record of their service, if any. No reports were printed, following the report of Mr. Seivers

in 1878, and if any were ever filed, they are not now available.

The next stage in the official promotion of immigration was the incorporation of a provision in the act of February 23, 1883, establishing a department of agriculture, requiring the commissioner "to aid immigration by publishing each year such information as to the agricultural, mineral and other industries and resources of this State as shall be of interest to those seeking homes in the State of Alabama." This duty still remains in force, with the addition of a requirement that the commissioner shall aid those "seeking investments" as well as homeseekers. In the execution of his duty hereunder, the commissioner has published a number of handbooks and other literature of a descriptive nature. He has also advertised the advantages and resources of the State by participating in state, sectional and national fairs and expositions, and by occasional advertisements in leading farm and industrial journals.

Immigration Policy.-During its entire history, the State has maintained a liberal policy on the subjects both of immigration and emigration. Every constitution has carried a provision declaring that emigration from the State should not be prohibited, and that no citizen should be exiled. With the adoption of the constitution of 1875 the fundamental provision was enlarged, and carried forward into the constitution of 1901, viz: "That immigration shall be encouraged; emigration shall not be prohibited, and no citizen shall be exiled." This section was construed in the case of Kendrick v. State, 142 Ala., p. 43. It was there held that an act of the legislature prohibiting emigration agents from plying their vocations within the State, without first obtaining a license therefor, was not violative of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, nor of section 31 of the constitution of Alabama. The license imposed was held to be an occupation tax, designed for the purpose of raising revenue, and that it was not intended to interfere with the freedom of egress from the State, or the freedom of contract.

The present policy is indicated in the following extract from the immigration law of February 11, 1915:

"The commissioner of agriculture and industries shall use lawful means to prevent the induction into this State of immigrants of an undesirable class, and to this end shall investigate the conditions of the applicants for admission through the department, so as to discourage the coming in of [persons of] an anarchistic tendency and paupers, persons suffering from contagious or communicative diseases, cripples without means and unable to perform mental or physical service and idiots, lunatics, persons of bad character, or any persons who are likely to become a charge upon the charity of the State and all such that will not make good and law-abiding citizens."

It is further provided that "immigrants shall be sought from desirable white citizens

of the United States first, and then citizens of English-speaking and Germanic countries and France, and the Scandinavian countries and Belgium, as prospective citizens of this State and conformable with the laws of the United States."

In the early history of the State, however, constitutional provisions and statutes were not necessary to stimulate immigration. One historian declares with enthusiasm that after the conclusion of the treaty of Fort Jackson, "The flood-gates of Virginia, the two Carolinas, Tennessee, Kentucky and Georgia were now hoisted, and mighty streams of emigration poured through them, spreading over the whole territory of Alabama. The axe resounded from side to side, and from corner to corner. The stately and magnificent forests fell. Log cabins sprang, as if by magic, into sight. Never before or since, has a country been so rapidly peopled."

Directors of First Board of Immigration, 1875.-W. H. Chambers, W. V. Chardavoyne, David Clopton, Daniel Coleman, J. C. Foster, J. R. Hawthorn, Thomas H. Herndon, George G. Lyon, Abraham Murdock, Eli S. Shorter, Lewis M. Stone, Price Williams, B. M. Woolsey.

Commissioners (Old law).-C. F. Seivers, 1875; E. R. Smith, 1879; J. J. Alston, 1881; Henry C. Stoutz, 1882.

Assistant Commissioners (Old law. Dates of appointment only are given).—Charles N. Golding, 1876; Jay W. Cowdery, 1876; Norris C. Buxbanne, 1876; J. E. Reimann, 1877; Lewis Heinsheimer, 1877; Joseph Goetter, 1877; George D. Reigal, 1877; W. R. King, 1877; John A. Lile, 1877; Louis Ballinger, 1877; W. J. B. Lansdale, 1878; W. J. Vankirk, 1878; J. M. Alexander, to Paris, 1878; Dr. Thomas T. Pratt, to Paris, 1878; Prof. James F. Park, to Paris, 1878; George Dunn, 1878; C. W. Gee, 1879; J. J. Alston, 1881; Otto Cullman, 1881; Charles Smallwood, 1881; Henry C. Stoutz, 1882.

Commissioners (New law).-R. H. de Holl, 1907; R. H. Walker, 1910-1911; Lee Cowart, 1911-1915.

PUBLICATIONS.—(Old) Address of Commissioner of Immigration, March 20, 1876; Report, Nov. 6, 1876; Report, Oct. 11, 1878. 3 vols. (New) Report, Feb. 3, 1911-Jan. 1, 1915. 1 vol. Alabama's new era, 1911-1913, vols. 1-3; and sundry circulars and leaflets.

See Agriculture and Industries, Department of; Horticulture, State Board of; Industrial Resources Bureau; Population.

REFERENCES.-Constitution, 1901, sec. 30; Codes, 1876, secs. 1756-1762; 1907, sec. 22, subdiv. 14. and secs. 827-837; Acts, 1874-75, pp. 121124; 1875-76, pp. 266-267; 1876-77, p. 125; 188283, p. 193; Gov. George S. Houston, "Message," in Senate Journal, 1876-77, p. 16; General Acts, 1907, pp. 313-316; 1911, p. 689.

IMPEACHMENTS. The grounds, methods of procedure, and the officers subject to removal by impeachment are set out in article vii, sections 173-176 of the constitution of 1901. Certain State and county officers may be impeached, under the provisions of

section 173, "for wilful neglect of duty, corruption in office, incompetency, or intemperance in the use of intoxicating liquors or narcotics, to such an extent, in view of the dignity of the office and importance of its duties, as unfits the officer for the discharge of such duties, or for any offense involving moral turpitude while in office, or committed under color thereof, or connected therewith. ." For these causes the following State officers may be impeached before the senate: governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, auditor, secretary of state, treasurer, superintendent of education, commissioner of agriculture and industries, and justices of the supreme court. Other officers may be impeached for the same causes by the supreme court, namely, chancellors, judges of circuit courts, of probate courts, and of other courts from which appeal may be taken directly to the supreme court, solicitors and sheriffs. Under the constitution the impeachment of other officers may be provided for by legislative enactments. The clerks of circuit courts, criminal courts, and other courts of like jurisdiction, tax assessors, county treasurers, county superintendents of education, judges of inferior courts created under authority of section 168 of the constitution, coroners, justices of the peace, notaries public, constables, and other county officers, and mayors, intendants, and other officers of incorporated cities and towns may be removed from office for any of the causes specified in section 173 by the circuit or criminal court of the county in which such officer holds his office. In such cases it is provided that the right of trial by jury and appeal shall be secured to the defendant.

Under the constitution, the penalties in cases of impeachment or removal from office "shall not extend beyond removal from office, and disqualifications from holding office, under the authority of this State, for the term for which the officer was elected or appointed; but the accused shall be liable to indictment and punishment as prescribed by law."

Pursuant to the provisions of the constitution, a body of law governing impeachment proceedings has been enacted and incorporated in the code of 1907, sections 1172-1177 and 7099-7126. Under the provisions of the code, disqualification is made a ground for impeachment, and proceedings may be instituted upon the information of five resident tax payers. In the impeachment case against Charles W. Buckley, 54 Ala., p. 599, the court held that such proceedings constituted a criminal prosecution. Sections 1172 to 1177 of the code, based on an act of August 13, 1907, govern the impeachment of municipal officers.

The first impeachment case in the State was the famous attempt in 1829 to depose three justices of the supreme court. This case is popularly known as "The Trial of the Judges." It was not an impeachment in the strict sense of the term, as it was not instituted as required by the constitution of 1819,

but was commenced by means of a memorial to the senate under authority of article v, section 13, of the constitution, which prescribed that "the judges of the several courts in this State shall hold their office during good behavior; and for wilful negligence of duty, or other reasonable cause, which shall not be sufficient ground for impeachment, the Governor shall remove any of them on the address of two-thirds of each House of the General Assembly."

At that time judges were elected by joint vote of the two houses of the legislature, and served during good behavior. The supreme court was composed of the judges of the various judicial circuits. The proceedings were begun by William Kelly, a lawyer of north Alabama, who undertook the removal from office of Justices Reuben Saffold, John White, and Anderson Crenshaw, for alleged improper rulings and decisions in connection with the celebrated usury cases. The case was tried before the senate, Arthur F. Hopkins and John J. Ormond acting as counsel for the judges, and William Kelly prosecuting. The judges were acquitted and sustained. In the case of Judge Saffold, the resolution states that "it is the opinion of the Senate that the charges preferred against Judge Saffold by William Kelly, Esq., are not sufficiently sustained by proof to authorize an address to the Governor for his removal." Similar resolutions were adopted in each of the other cases.

Other impeachment trials have occurred since "The Trial of the Judges," as follows:

Ledbetter, clerk Bullock County court; 1846; wilful neglect of duty and incompetency; acquitted.-10 Ala., p. 241.

Charles W. Buckley, probate judge Montgomery County; 1876; corruption in office and malfeasances; acquitted.-54 Ala., p. $599.

William Seawell, justice of the peace, Montgomery County; 1879; corruption in office; acquitted; the court held that charges were too vague and indefinite to uphold the proceedings.-64 Ala., p. 225.

Wiley C. Jones, probate judge Barbour County; 1881; wilful neglect of duty, corruption in office, habitual drunkenness, incompetency, and commission of offenses involving moral turpitude; plead guilty to the charge of neglect of duty, and thereupon nolle prosequi entered as to the others.

F. M. Taylor, probate judge Winston County; 1886; wilful neglect of official duties, corruption in office, and embezzlement; plead guilty to the charge of neglect of duty, and was removed from office.-Atty. Gen., Report, 1886, p. 88.

Robert R. Savage, probate judge Cherokee County; 1889; habitual drunkenness while in office; impeached.-Ibid, 1890, p. 6.

John B. Talley, judge ninth judicial circuit; 1894; wilful neglect of duty and murder; acquitted on first charge, convicted on second, and removed from office.-Ibid, 1894, pp. 7-9.

William C. Robinson, probate judge Lee County; 1895; habitual drunkenness; acquitted.—Ibid, 1896, pp. 6-8.

J. H. Lovejoy, probate judge Etowah County; 1902; corruption in office and wilful neglect of duty; acquitted.-135 Ala., p. 64.

Richard H. Lowe, solicitor eighth judicial circuit; 1901; wilful neglect of duty; impeached and office declared vacant.

J. C. Wood, probate judge Lowndes County; 1903; offenses involving moral turpitude; resigned, and proceedings dismissed.

Frank Cazalas, sheriff Mobile County; 1909; wilful neglect of duty under section 174 of the constitution; impeached.-Atty. Gen., Report, 1908-1910, pp. xxxi-xxxii.

Edgar E. Latham, sheriff Tuscaloosa County; 1910; intemperance in the use of intoxicating liquors; acquitted-Ibid, pp. xxxii-xxxiii.

P. W. Jinwright, sheriff Bullock County; 1911; wilful neglect of duty, incompetency, connivance, etc.; impeached.

William Martin, sheriff Hale County; 1913; wilful neglect of duty and incompetency; State failed to make out a case.

A. L. Hasty, probate judge Marengo County; 1913; wilful neglect of duty, incompetency and corruption in office; acquitted.

John W. Lane, sheriff Chambers County; 1914; corruption in office and offenses involving moral turpitude; acquitted.

Robert I. Burke, probate judge Cullman County; 1914; wilful neglect of duty; acquitted..

W. L. Pratt, probate judge Bibb County; 1915; intemperance in the use of intoxicants; impeached.

J. B. Lyons, probate judge Lee County; 1915; misappropriation of county funds and habitual drunkenness; resigned, and case dismissed.

David C. Almon; solicitor eighth judicial circuit; 1915; corruption in office, offenses involving moral turpitude, wilful neglect of duty; acquitted.

P. M. Daniel, sheriff Russell County; 1916; wilful neglect of duty and incompetency; impeached.

REFERENCES.- -Constitution, 1819, art. v; 1901, art. vii, secs. 173-176; Code, 1907. secs. 11721177, 7099-7126; Acts, 1875-76, pp. 277-284; Savage's case, 89 Ala., p. 1; Falley's case, 102 Ala., p. 25; Robinson's case, 111 Ala., p. 482; Cazalas' case. 162 Ala., p. 210; Latham's case, 174 Ala., p. 281.

IMPORT DUTIES. An indirect tax collected by the United States Government on certain articles and materials imported into the country, at stipulated rates, sometimes specific and sometimes ad valorem. These duties are the only taxes upon imports now collected in the State. Mobile is at present the only port of entry in Alabama where customs duties are collected. Before the organization of the State of Alabama, there were ports of entry collecting tonnage charges on imports at Fort Stoddert and at Blakeley, but there was no customhouse at

IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT. It is provided by section 20 of the constitution of 1901, "that no person shall be imprisoned for debt." The same inhibition was contained in section 21 of the constitution of 1875, and in section 22, article 1 of the constitution of 1868, where it first appeared. Previous constitutions, viz, those of 1819, 1861, and 1865, contained, as a section of the "Bill of Rights" included in each, the following provision:

"The person of a debtor, where there is not strong presumption of fraud, shall not be detained in prison, after delivering up his estate for the benefit of his creditors, in such manner as shall be prescribed by law."

Thus, for practically 50 years, or from the organization of the State government until the adoption of the constitution of 1868, so far as constitutional provisions were concerned, a debtor could be arrested, placed in prison and kept there, at the desire of the creditor, so long as he failed to surrender his estate for the satisfaction of his debts, but no longer, unless there was "strong presumption of fraud." However, after the passage of the act of February 1, 1839, "to abolish imprisonment for debt," a debtor could neither be imprisoned nor arrested for debt, except in cases of fraud. Section 1 of the law provided "that from and after the passage of this act, it shall not be lawful to take the body of any person, in custody, to answer for a civil demand except in cases of fraud as hereinafter prescribed." From the passage of this act until the constitution of 1868 became effective, debtors could be imprisoned lawfully only when fraudulent methods had been used in contracting or in avoiding payment of a debt. Since 1868 imprisonment for debt, whether fraudulently contracted or not, has been held by the supreme court to be unconstitutional. That is to say, a debtor may not be arrested nor incarcerated as a means of forcing him to pay a debt, or as a penalty for its nonpayment, even when fraud has been used in contracting the debt or in avoiding payment.

In Ex parte Hardy (68 Ala., p. 303) the supreme court held, with the chief justice dissenting, that that part of a statute which authorized a court of equity to commit to prison the person of a debtor who refused to comply with a decree of the court requiring the delivery of property in settlement of a judgment for debt, on the ground that such refusal was a contempt of court, was violative of section 21 of the constitution of 1875, and therefore null and void. This ruling has formed the basis of all subsequent decisions.

Old Laws and Practices.-The provisions of the first constitution of the State with respect to imprisonment for debt were simply the embodiment in a single sentence of the substance of the laws of Alabama Territory in effect at the time that instrument was framed. The Territorial code was founded upon the English common law, which sanctioned imprisonment for debt; but the pro

visions of the common law had already been modified in some particulars by the Mississippi Territory when Alabama Territory was created in 1817. The existing laws of the former were carried forward into the organization of the latter, as was the case with the statutes of the latter when the State was organized.

Among the earliest statutes upon the subject was the act of the legislature of Mississippi Territory, passed February 7, 1807, "concerning executions, and for the relief of insolvent debtors." It covered the entire procedure in the collection of debts, and superseded all previous enactments. It authorized the seizure of "the goods, lands, or body" of a debtor upon writs of fieri facias, elegit, and capias ad satisfaciendum, sued out by a creditor holding a judgment of a court of record of the Territory, for the satisfaction of such judgment; and a debtor so imprisoned might be kept in prison until the the debt and the court costs were paid. However, an insolvent debtor might take the oath of insolvency, prescribed in the act, and file

a

sworn schedule of his assets with the courts, whereupon he would be discharged from prison, and could not again be imprisoned on account of the same judgment.

With respect to the support of prisoners for debt, the act provided: "Any person imprisoned in a civil or qui tam action, shall furnish his, or her own sustenance, or pay the gaoler fees for the same, until lawfully discharged; and when any prisoner shall be committed to gaol in a civil action, as aforesaid, and shall provide for his, or her own support, in any way wherein the sheriff or gaoler shall have no concern, it shall be the duty of the gaoler, or prison keeper, to admit to the wicket grate, or small window of a prison, in which such prisoner shall be confined, any person who may come to administer to the wants of such prisoner, by furnishing him or her with meat or drink; which shall be conveyed through such small window or grate, that the security of the prison be not too frequently exposed by opening the doors thereof." It provided further: "That if any person being in prison, charged in execution, [for debt] shall happen to die in execution, the party or parties at whose suit or to whom such person shall stand charged in execution for any debt or damages recovered, his or their executors or administrators may, after the death of the person so dying in execution, lawfully sue forth and have new execution against the lands and tenements, goods and chattels, or any of them, of the person so deceased.

turn himself a prisoner in execution, or be liable to an escape."

On December 11, 1811, the legislature extended the benefits of the above-discussed act to persons "in custody, upon original or mesne process," the same as to persons charged in execution; and on January 15, 1821, the legislature passed an amendatory act for the relief of insolvent debtors, by which it was provided that a debtor arrested upon mesne process, or taken in actual custody, who desired to surrender his property for the benefit of his creditors, might give bond in the amount of the judgment or execution for his personal appearance at such time and place as should be designated by the court, and thus secure his release; and, further, that an insolvent debtor might obtain his discharge from arrest or imprisonment by filing a declaration of his insolvency and a schedule of his creditors with the amount due each. The making of a false return in filing such declaration and schedule made the culprit "subject to all the pains and penalties prescribed by law against perjury," and such person should "never thereafter be entitled to the privileges or benefits extended" by the act. Additional stipulations contained in the act were as follows: "That no person in custody shall have the liberty of the prison bounds, who shall neglect or refuse for sixty days to take the benefit of this act;" and "that all persons ordered to be imprisoned for failing to pay any fine imposed by law, who shall be unable to pay the same, shall have the benefit of this act, subject to the same rules and instructions applicable to other debtors."

With the foregoing modifications, all tending to ameliorate the harshness of the common law, the statutes of Mississippi and of Alabama Territories concerning debtors, solvent and insolvent, remained in effect, unchanged by the provisions of the constitution of 1819, which merely forbade the further detention in prison of a debtor who surrendered his property for the benefit of his creditors, unless there were grounds for a strong suspicion of fraud, until the passage of the act of February 1, 1839, above referred to, which prohibited arrest or imprisonment for debt except in cases of fraud; and with this further modification, continued in force until the adoption of the constitution of 1868.

Thus, prior to 1807 there could be no relief from imprisonment for debt except death or the will of the prosecuting creditor; from 1807 to 1821 a debtor could secure his release by surrendering his estate or by prov ing himself insolvent-his further confinement after taking such action being forbidden by the constitution after the organization of the State in 1819; from 1821 to 1839 he could escape arrest and imprisonment by furnishing bond to appear in court and deliver up his estate, or prove his insolvency; from 1839 to 1868 he could be arrested for debt only in cases of fraud; and since 1868 he cannot be imprisoned, directly or indi