If our contention is correct, then Mrs. Eaton, the life tenant, is entitled to the rents and is charged with the corresponding duties of a life tenant, and such remainderman as might have occupied portions of the land would be liable to her for rent and not to other remaindermen. It will thus be observed that the determination of the first assignment of error determines the three remaining assignments. If the decree is correct on the first assignment of error it is correct on the other three.

What was the intention of the devisor as he lay on his death bed four days before the dissolution and called his family around him and made this will? They knew nothing of legal phraseology, of estates, of tenures, etc.; they were inexperienced in the art of drafting wills and carving estates and creating tenures. The will itself shows that. Crudely drawn, unintelligible in parts, vague and uncertain in others; but taking those parts that are intelligible and what intention-legal intention -appears? We think that the devisor desired that his family should remain as they were at his death; that his estate should remain intact, the land, and the personal property; that all should remain exactly as it was at that time, the time of making the will (a death-bed will), until when? Until his wife, Mrs. Eamilne Eaton, died. The land should be divided, but not while she lived. The minor son should be raised and also the minor grandson, the appellee, then eight years old; and at her death all should be settled, and the land divided, each child having its own improvements protected in the final division. If such was his intention, the question remains, was it his legal intention, that is, was it put into this will; did he put such an intention into his will? We think he did. What better vehicle af the law could have brought into requisition to accomplish such a purpose than an express life estate with these special privileges to the remaindermen as to their individual improvements?

A life estate is not created expressly, but we contend that there is a life estate by implication. We take it as indisputable that this land was devised to the children and grandchildren, but when should they take? At the death of the devisor or at the death of Mrs. Emaline Eaton Clearly we think at the death of the latter. If such be the case, he has failed to provide who shall take the land until the death of Mrs. Eaton. The law does not permit a vacuum in title. If the holder of the legal title does not dispose of it at his death then the law undertakes the task of disposing of it for him, the law of descent. The legal title to this land vested somewhere immediately upon the death of Mrs. J. M. Eaton. Where? Upon the children and grandchildren? No, they are postponed until Mrs. Emaline Eaton's death.

Then upon who does this title fall? Who would be the proper party to maintain ejectment? Our answer is, Mrs. Emaline Eaton (ma). She takes a life estate by implication, subject however to the right of the remaindermen to continue their improvements as mentioned in the will. To this proposition we cite the following authorities, to-wit:

Blackstone in his rules for the construction of wills states the proposition as follows: "By a will also an estate may pass by mere implication, without any express words to direct its course. As, where a man devises land to his heir at law, after the death of his wife; here, though no estate be given to the wife in express terms, yet she shall have an estate for life by implication; for the intent of the testator is clearly to postpone the heir till after her death; and if she does not take it, nobody else can." Chase's Blackstone (3d Ed.), p. 506.

The rule is stated and discussed in Jarmin on Wills (3d Ed.), 435-437; also, 1 Washburn on Real Property (2d Ed.), p. 88, sec. 7; Langrick v. Gospel, 48 Mich. 185, 12 N. W. 38; Donohue v. McNichol, 61 Pa. (11 P. S. Smith) 73; 20 Am. Dig., p. 1397, sec. 615, life estates by implication.

We think from the whole will considered together that the land was devised to the children and grandchildren after the death of the wife, althaugh it does not expressly say so, yet that is the meaning as we view it.

W. C. Sweats, for appellants.

This may seem absurd, but if the court can learn what the testator intended, that intention must stand. It was clearly the intention of the testator that the land remain unsold until after "Ma's" death, and, as we view it, just as clearly implied that "Ma," the widow, should have a life estate therein. It is also clear that the children and Roscoe should have the land in equal parts, or as nearly so as possible, after "Ma's" death. It is also clear that the widow was to retain all the money to be collected until after her death, and that the boys, Tobe, John, and Bill should collect the outstanding notes, and that this money should be turned over to "Ma." Now we contend that the widow had a right to use that money, or such part thereof as she might need; otherwise, why did he want her to retain the money? What other reason could have have had for wanting her to have it except to use it as it might be needed? He also provides that his old customers are not to be bothered until after Ma's death, after which the matter should close up. That provision may seem unreasonable, but it is clearly expressed, and we can see no reason for declaring it void.

W. J. Lamb, for appellee.

The construction that is attempted to be put on this will by counsel for apellants, that the wife had a life estate in this land, is farfetched and is not borne out by the very instrument on which they are trying to stand; and the conduct of Emaline Eaton since the death of J. M. Eaton shows that she did not so interpret the will, nor did she believe that the intention of the de

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ceased was that she should have a life estate, for, as is shown by apellee's bill, and is not disputed or denied, the widow is living on this land and John, Tobe and Wister Eaton are living on this land without any part of it being set apart to them, using it free of charge and rendering no accounting to any one for the use and occupation of the same, and have continued to do so from the time of the death of their father up until the present time. These same parties were in possession of this land at the very time of the making of the will by the deceased and have continued so.

"As the testator has not, by plain words, expressed such intention, we cannot, by construction, import into his will such words as would clearly indicate such intent, for this would be to make a will for him, and not to construe one made by him. The intention of the testator is the polar star for inquiry in the interpretation of his will, but such intention must be collected from the words which he has employed; the question is not what he wished, but what he has said. Broom's Leg. Max. 555." Johnson v. Delome, etc., Co., 77 Miss. 27.

When it comes to disposing of the personal property the will presents greater difficulties, if possible, than it does when disposing of the real estate, and we think that the chancellor gave the appellants everything they were entitled to under this instrument of writing. We do not feel like wearying the court in presenting a matter ipsa res loquitur. By merely referring to this instrument of writing and reading it, the court can see as plainly that the opinion of the chancellor is as near correct in this case as anything that can be said if we were to write any number of pages on this matter, so we respectfully refer the court to the chancellor's opinion in this case and the instrument of writing purporting to be the will, and let the court ascertain whether the chancellor was right or wrong in his opinion,

This case presents for construction the will of J. M. Eaton. The reporter will set out this will in full.

We concur with the chancellor in so far as he held that the proceeds of the cotton on hand at the death of the testator were bequeathed to the widow absolutely, and also in so far as he held that any money or other personal property than the cotton and the notes passed under the statute of descents and distribution to the widow and his children and grandchildren according to that statute.

We do not concur in his construction as to the title. to the land or the proceeds of the notes. We are clearly of the opinion that the will vested a life estate in the widow in the land, and in the proceeds of the notes by necessary implication.

We also concur in the chancellor's holding that the tenants in common who made improvements should keep those improvements, and, if possible, have allotted to them the land on which such improvements may have been erected, without being charged with rent on his improvements. The land will be divided at the death of the mother, the widow, as directed in the will.

Reversed and remanded.

PER CURIAM. The above opinion is adopted as the opinion of the court, and for the reasons therein indicated the decree is reversed, and the cause remanded, to be proceeded with in accordance with the foregoing opinion.