that time, and I took an active part in their discussion, especially in that of the first.

"During this period hostilities with Mexico commenced, and in the legislation which the contest rendered necessary my military education enabled me to take a somewhat prominent part. In June, 1846, a regiment of Mississippi volunteers was organized at Vicksburg, of which I was elected colonel. On receiving notice of the election, I proceeded to overtake the regiment, which was already on its way to Mexico, and joined it at New Orleans. Reporting to Gen. Taylor, then commanding at Camargo, my regiment, although the last to arrive-having been detained for some time on duty at the mouth of the Rio Grandewas selected to move with the advance upon the city of Monterey. The want of transportation prevented Gen. Taylor from taking the whole body of volunteers who had reported there for duty. The Mississippi regiment was armed entirely with percussion rifles. And here it may be interesting to state that Gen. Scott, in Washington, endeavored to persuade me not to take more rifles than enough for four companies, and objected particularly to percussion arms, as not having been sufficiently tested for the use of troops in the field. Knowing that the Mississippians would have no confidence in the old flint-lock muskets, I insisted on their being armed with the kind of rifle then recently made at New Haven, Conn.-the Whitney rifle. From having been first used by the Mississippians, these rifles have always been known as the Mississippi rifles.

In the attack on Monterey, Gen. Taylor divided his force, sending one part of it by a circuitous road to attack the city from the west; while he decided to lead in person the attack on the east. The Mississippi regiment advanced to the relief of a force which had attacked Fort Lenaria, but had been repulsed before the Mississippians arrived. They carried the redoubt, and the fort which was in the rear of it surrendered. The next day our force on the west side carried successfully the height on which stood the bishop's palace, which commanded the city. On the third day the Mississippians advanced from the fort which they held, through lanes and gardens, skirmishing and driving the enemy before them until they reached a two-story house at the corner of the Grand Plaza. Here they were joined by a regiment of Texans, and from the windows of this house they opened fire on the artillery and such other troops as were in view. But, to get a better position for firing on the principal building of the Grand Plaza, it was necessary to cross the street, which was swept by canister and grape, rattling on the pavement like hail; and, as the street was very narrow, it was determined to construct a flying barricade.

Some long timbers were found, and, with packsaddles and boxes, which served the purpose, a barricade was constructed. Here occurred an incident to which I have since frequently referred with pride. In breaking open a quartermaster's storehouse to get supplies for this barricade, the men found bundles of the much-prized Mexican blankets, and also of very serviceable shoes and pack-saddles. The pack-saddles were freely taken

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

as good material for the proposed barricade; and one of my men, as his shoes were broken and stones had hurt his feet, asked my permission to take a pair from one of the boxes. This, of course, was freely accorded; but not one of the very valuable and much-prized Mexican blankets was taken. About the time that the flying barricade was completed, arrangements were made by the Texans and Mississippians to occupy houses on both sides of the street for the purpose of more effective fire into the Grand Plaza. It having been deemed necessary to increase our force, the Mississippi sergeant-major was sent back for some companies of the First Mississippi which had remained behind. He returned with the statement that the enemy was behind us, that all our troops had been withdrawn, and that orders had been three times sent to me to return. Gov. Henderson, of Texas, had accompanied the Texan troops, and, on submitting to him the question what we should do under the message, he realized-as was very plain

that it was safer to remain where we were than -our supports having been withdrawn--to re

turn across streets where we were liable to be fired on by artillery, and across open grounds where cavalry might be expected to attack us. But, he added, he supposed the orders came from the general-in-chief, and we were bound to obey them. So we made dispositions to retire quietly; but, in passing the first square, we found that our movement had been anticipated, and that a battery of artillery was posted to command the street. The arrangement made by me for crossing it was that I should go first; if only one gun was fired at me, then another man should follow; and so on, another and another, until a volley should be fired, and then all of them should rush rapidly across before the guns could be reloaded. In this manner the men got across with little loss. We then made our way to the suburb, where we found that an officer of infantry, with two companies and a section of artillery, had been posted to wait for us, and, in case of emergency, to aid our retreat.

"Early next morning, Gen. Ampudia, commanding the Mexican force, sent in a flag and asked for a conference with a view to capitulation. Gen. Taylor acceded to the proposition, and appointed Gen. Worth, Gov. Henderson, and myself, commissioners to arrange the terms of capitulation. Gen. Taylor received the city of Monterey, with supplies, much needed by his army, and shelter for the wounded. The enemy gained only the privilege of retiring peacefully -a privilege which, if it had not been accorded, they had the power to take by any one of the three roads open to them. The point beyond which they should withdraw was fixed by the terms of capitulation, and the time during which hostilities were to be suspended was determined on by the length of time necessary to refer to and receive answers from the two governments. A few days before the expiration of the time so fixed, the Government of the United States disapproved of the capitulation, and ordered the truce to be immediately terminated, By this decision we lost whatever credit had been given to us for generous terms in the capitulation, and hostilities were to be resumed without any preparations having been made to enable Gen. Taylor, even with the small force he had, to advance farther into the enemy's country. Gen. Taylor's letter to Mr. Marcy, Secretary of War, was a very good response to an unjust criticism; and in the Washington Union' of that time I also published a very full explanation of the acts of the commissioners, and of the military questions involved in the matter of capitulation in preference to continuing the siege and attack.

Gen. Taylor, assuming that it was intended for him to advance into the interior of Mexico, then commenced to prepare himself for such a campaign. To this end he made requisitions for the needful transportation, as well as munitions, including, among other supplies, large India-rubber bags in which to carry provisions for days, and which, being emptied before we reached the desert of sixty miles, would, by being filled with water, enable his troops and horses to cross those desert plains. These and other details had been entered into under the expectation that the censure of the treaty of Monterey meant a march into the interior of

Mexico. Another thing required was a new battery of field-pieces to take the place of the old Ringgold battery, which by long service had become honey-combed. When all these arrangements were nearly completed, it was decided to send Gen. Scott, with discretionary powers, which enabled him to take nearly all the tried troops Gen. Taylor had, including even the engineer then employed in the construction of a fort, and the battery of new guns to replace the old ones, which were deemed no longer safe, but which, under the intrepid Capt. Bragg, afterward did good service in the battle of Buena Vista.

"Gen. Taylor, with the main body of his army, went to Victoria, and there made arrangements to send them all to report to Gen. Scott, at Vera Cruz, except the small force he considered himself entitled to as an escort on his route back to Monterey through an unfriendly people. That escort consisted of a battery of light artillery, a squadron of dragoons, and the regiment of Mississippi riflemen. With these he proceeded through Monterey and Saltillo to Agua Nueva, where he was joined by the division of Gen. Wool, who had made the campaign of Chihuahua.

"Gen. Santa Anna, commanding the army of Mexico, was informed of the action which had been taken in stripping Gen. Taylor of his forces, and was also informed that he had at Saltillo only a handful of volunteers, which could be easily dispersed on the approach of an army. Thus assured, and with the prospect of recovering all the country down to the Rio Grande, Santa Anna advanced upon Agua Nueva. Gen. Taylor retired to the Angostura Pass, in front of the hacienda of Buena Vista, and there made his dispositions to receive the anticipated attack. As sage as he was brave, his dispositions were made as well as the small force at his command made it possible. After two days of bloody fighting, Gen. Santa Anna retired before this little force, the greater part of which had never before been under fire. The encounter with the enemy was very bloody. The Mississippians lost many of their best men, for each of whom, however, they slew several of the enemy. For, trained marksmen, they never touched the trigger without having an object through both sights; and they seldom fired without drawing blood. The infantry against whom the advance was made was driven back, but the cavalry then moved to get in the rear of the Mississippians, and this involved the necessity of falling back to where the plain was narrow, so as to have a ravine on each flank. In this position the second demonstration of the enemy's cavalry was received. They were repulsed, and it was quiet in front of the Mississippians until an aide came and called from the other side of the ravine, which he could not pass, that Gen. Taylor wanted support to come as soon as possible for the protection of the artillery on the right flank. The order was promptly obeyed at double quick, although the distance must have been nearly a mile. They found the enemy moving in three lines upon the batteries of Capt. Braxton Bragg and the section of artillery commanded by George H. Thomas. The Mississippians came up in line, their right flank opposite the first line of the advancing enemy, and at a

threatened the dissolution of the Union. I at first asked to be excused from the committee, but at the solicitation of friends agreed to serve, avowing my willingness to make any sacrifice to avert the impending struggle. The committee consisted of men belonging to the three political divisions of the Senate: the State-rights men of the South; the Radicals of the North; and the Northern Democrats; with one member who did not acknowledge himself as belonging to any one of the three divisions-Mr. Crittenden, an oldtime Whig, and the original mover of the compromise resolutions. When the committee met, it was agreed that, unless some measure which would receive the support of the majority of each of the three divisions could be devised, it was useless to make any report; and, after many days of anxious discussion and a multiplicity of propositions, though the Southern State-rights men and the Northern Democrats and the Whig, Mr. Crittenden, could frequently agree, they could never get a majority of the Northern Radicals to unite with them in any substantive proposition. Finally, the committee reported their failure to find anything on which the three divisions could unite. Mr. Douglas, who was a member of the committee, defiantly challenged the Northern Radicals to tell what they wanted. As they had refused everything, he claimed that they ought to be willing to tell what they proposed to do.

When officially informed that Mississippi had passed the ordinance of secession, I took formal leave of the Senate, announcing for the last time the opinions I had so often expressed as to State sovereignty, and, as a consequence of it, the right of a State to withdraw its delegated powers. Before I reached home I had been appointed by the Convention of Mississippi commander-in-chief of its army, with the rank of major-general, and I at once proceeded with the task of organization. I went to my home in Warren County, in order to prepare for what I believed was to be a long and severe struggle. Soon a messenger came from the Provisional Confederate Congress at Montgomery, bringing the unwelcome notice that I had been elected Provisional President of the Confederate States. But, reluctant as I was to accept the honor, and carefully as I had tried to prevent the possibility of it, in the circumstances of the country I could not refuse it; and I was inaugurated at Montgomery, Feb. 18, 1861, with Alexander H. Stephens, of Georgia, as Vice-President."

The story of Mr. Davis's life for the next four years would hardly be intelligible except in connection with an outline of the great campaigns of the war and the efforts of the Southern States to establish their independence. Accordingly, such a sketch is here presented, from which it will appear that Mr. Davis was, more than any other one man, the animating spirit of the Confederacy.

The Constitution of the Confederate States was an almost exact copy of that of the United States. The essential differences were these: In the preamble it inserted the clause "each State acting in its sovereign and independent character.” It forbade the enactment of any tariff for protection. It gave Congress the power "to prohibit the introduction of slaves from any

State not a member of, or Territory not belonging to, this Confederacy." It forbade the enactment of any law "impairing the right of property in negro slaves.' It made the President's term of office six years, and rendered him ineligible for a second term. It provided that the Constitution itself might be amended by a vote of two thirds of the States (instead of three fourths, as in the Constitution of the United States). It made no mention of any right of secession, except as that might be inferred from the clause inserted in the preamble. Mr. Davis was chosen Provisional President of the Confederacy for one year, and was inaugurated on Feb. 18, 1861. His Cabinet consisted of Robert Toombs, of Georgia, Secretary of State; Leroy P. Walker, of Alabama, Secretary of War; Charles G. Memminger, of South Carolina, Secretary of the Treasury; Stephen R. Mallory, of Florida, Secretary of the Navy; Judah P. Benjamin, of Louisiana, Attorney-General; and John H. Reagan, of Texas, Postmaster-General. Mr. Toombs remained in the Cabinet but a few weeks. Mr. Walker left it in August, 1861, when Mr. Benjamin was transferred to the War Department. Later Mr. Benjamin became Secretary of State, and in November, 1862, James A. Seddon, of Virginia, was made Secretary of War.

In his inaugural address, Mr. Davis said: "We have changed the constituent parts but not the system of our Government. The Constitution formed by our fathers is that of these Confederate States. . . . We have vainly endeavored to secure tranquillity and obtain respect for the rights to which we were entitled. As a necessity, not a choice, we have resorted to the remedy of separation." The seceding States expected to have all necessary assistance from European powers in establishing their independence, and the chief grounds of this expectation were undoubtedly indicated in these passages of the inaugural address: "An agricultural people, whose chief interest is the export of a commodity [cotton] required in every manufacturing country, our true policy is peace and the freest trade which our necessities will permit. It is alike our interest and that of all those to whom we would sell and from whom we would buy that there should be the fewest practicable restrictions upon the interchange of commodities. . . This common interest of producer and consumer can only be intercepted by an exterior force which should obstruct its transmission to foreign markets-a course of conduct which would be detrimental to manufacturing and commercial interests abroad." In the process of secession, it had become manifest that there was a strong Union element in most of the Southern States. With this element, especially in Georgia, the argument had been used that separation would be but temporary, and that all the States would probably unite again under a constitution so far changed as might be necessary to give the South all that it claimed. Mr. Davis said in his address: "It is not unreasonable to expect that the States from which we have recently parted may seek to unite their fortunes to ours under the government which we have instituted. For this your Constitution makes adequate provision; but beyond this, if I mistake not, the judgment and will of the people are,

that union with the States from which they have separated is neither practicable nor desirable."

The forts, arsenals, and other property in the Southern States belonging to the United States Government had been seized by the State authorities as each State seceded, with the exception of Forts Sumter and Moultrie in Charleston harbor and those at Pensacola. These seizures were acts of war, but the first gun was fired when Fort Sumter was bombarded for thirty-four hours, April 12, 13, and on the 14th the garrison surrendered and marched out with the honors of war. This battle created the most intense excitement in both sections of the country, and gave a definite form to the conflict which the congressional debates and political movements of many years had foreshadowed. President Lincoln, on April 15, issued a proclamation calling for 75,000 men to defend the flag of the republic, and appealed "to all loyal citizens to aid this effort to maintain the honor, the integrity, and the existence of our national Union, and the perpetuity of popular government, and to redress wrongs already long enough endured." Mr. Davis addressed his first message to the Provisional Confederate Congress on April 29. In this document he set forth elaborately the arguments for State sovereignty and the right of secession, with the grievances that in his opinion justified the Southern States in their action; he accused Mr. Lincoln of unconstitutional action in calling for an army to make war upon a foreign nation, without first obtaining the consent of Congress; he complained that his commissioners sent to Washington to treat for peace between the two countries had not been officially recognized; he recommended the immediate formation of an army of 100,000 men, and that he be authorized to issue letters of marque for privateers to prey upon the commerce of the United States; and in closing, he said: "All we ask is to be let alone-that those who never held power over us shall not now attempt our subjugation by arms."

In both sections of the country the call for troops was answered by the offer of more than could be accepted. In Virginia, the convention called to consider the question of secession at first refused to take such action. After the fall of Fort Sumter, another vote was taken, and the convention decided that the State should secede, provided the act of secession were ratified by a vote of the people on the last Thursday in May. Without waiting for this vote, the Governor immediately turned over to the Confederate Government the entire military resources of the State, and in May the Confederate capital, in accordance with Mr. Davis's advice, was removed from Montgomery to Richmond. The residence of James A. Seddon, in that city, was purchased for an executive mansion. The action of the convention was ratified by the people, though the western counties (now West Virginia) threw a heavy vote against it. The accession of Virginia necessarily brought North Carolina also. The Confederacy, as first formed, had consisted of South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. Arkansas seceded on May 6, giving the Confederacy ten States, and it also claimed Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri, and admitted representatives from VOL XXIX.-17 A

those States to its Congress, though its authority was never established there.

Mr. Davis convened the Confederate Congress in Richmond on July 20. The Congress of the United States had convened on July 4, and had voted to raise 500,000 men and appropriate $500,000,000 to carry on the war. Mr. Davis, in his message, asked for authority to raise a similar army; accused the National forces of flagrant and barbarous violations of the laws of war; congratulated the Southern people on their abundant harvests and the alacrity with which they had responded to the Confederate Government's call for a loan in cotton and provisions; and declared that to speak of subjugating such a people, so united and determined, is to speak in a language incomprehensible to them." He had previously referred to the blockade of Southern ports by the National Government as a mere paper blockade, which he hoped the European powers would refuse to recognize; and he now cited this blockade, the non-intercourse by land, and the raising of a large army, as proofs that the United States Government was no longer able to keep up the pretense that it considered the secession movement a mere insurrection or riot on a large scale.

The next day (July 21) the Battle of Bull Run was fought near Manassas Junction, Va., between the National forces, under Gen. Irvin McDowell, and the Confederate forces, under Gens. G. T. Beauregard and J. E. Johnston. After a stubborn fight that lasted nearly all day, the arrival of fresh Confederate forces by rail from the Shenandoah valley, and their attack on the flank of the National army, turned the scale, and the defeat quickly resulted in a panic and disastrous rout, a large portion of the beaten army not stopping in the retreat until they arrived in Washington. The Confederates had already been accorded belligerent rights by the European powers, and this victory not only elated them with the hope of a speedy achievement of independence but gave them great prestige abroad. Gen. Johnston says it did them more harm than good, because it gave them a false idea of the task that was before them, while thousands of them, thinking the war was virtually over, left the army without permission and created a wide demoralization in the military forces of the Confederacy. It is probable, also, that it did much to prevent any European government from assisting the Confederates, by creating the idea that they did not need assistance.

In his message addressed to the Confederate Congress on Nov. 18, 1861, Mr. Davis congratulated the people of the Confederacy on their military successes at Bethel, Bull Run, Springfield, Lexington, Leesburg, and Belmont. All these (with the exception of Bull Run) were very small affairs in comparison with the battles that took place in the next three years; but they were the principal actions thus far fought, and compared well with the operations of such minor wars as Americans then living remembered, and Mr. Davis, from all that he could see, was fully justified in drawing from them the strongest hopes for ultimate military success. A more deeply significant part of his message was that which related to the blockade of the Southern ports, wherein it was evident that he was seriously dis