Gambar halaman

But it has been held that an in- Laurier (Mass.) supra. And see Sustruction to the effect that, where the preme Colony, U. O. P. F. v. Towne by-laws of a fraternal organization (1914) 87 Conn. 644, 89 Atl. 264, Ann. provide that upon certain conditions Cas, 1916B, 181, supra. it will pay a benefit to the beneficia

V. Wife and children of member. ries of its member according to a certificate of endowment, the heirs at

It is usually held that, where the law of the member are entitled to

wife of the member is living at the take the benefit when the person des

time of his death, the fund will go to ignated by the deceased member is her in case of a failure of the bene

ficiary. not within the class of persons mentioned who, under the statute, may be

Arkansas. – Runyan v. Runyan designated, was properly refused in

(1912) 101 Ark. 353, 142 S. W. 519. the absence of any by-law providing

Connecticut. Supreme Lodge, N. for the payment of the fund to the

E. 0. P. v. Hine (1909) 82 Conn. 315, member's heirs at law. Lamothe v.

73 Atl. 791. Société Laurier (1923) 244 Mass. 189,

Georgia.-Sons & Daughters of Job 138 N. E. 899.

v. Wilson (1908) 4 Ga. App. 235, 61 In view of the general purpose of

S. E. 134. a corporation formed for the object

Illinois. Chicago Guaranty Fund of assisting and supporting members

Life Soc. v. Wheeler (1898) 79 Ill. or their families in case of sickness,

App. 241; Starcke V. Plattduetsche want, or death, a benefit fund which,

Grot Gilde (1911) 166 Ill. App. 146; under the laws of such corporation,

National Union v. Keefe (1914) 263 is to be set aside to be paid over to

Ill. 453, 105 N. E. 13, Ann. Cas. 1915C, the families, heirs, or legal repre

271. sentatives of the deceased or disabled

Maryland. Meinhardt v. Meinmembers, or to such person as the de

hardt (1912) 117 Md. 426, 83 Atl. 715. ceased, while living, may have di

Massachusetts. Hadley v. Odd rected, will, in the absence of a cer

Fellows' Beneficial Asso. (1899) 173 tificate designating

designating to whom the Mass. 583, 54 N. E. 345. funds shall go, be distributed, as in

Michigan. Switchmen's Union v. cases of intestacy, as a special fund,

Gillerman (1917) 196 Mich. 141, subject to the exemption provided for

L.R.A.1918A, 1117, 162 N. W. 1024. in the act of incorporation, and not

Mississippi. — Carson v. Vicksburg liable for the debts of decedent, or to

Bank (1897) 75 Miss. 167, 37 L.R.A. be taken on process for the payment

559, 65 Am. St. Rep. 596, 22 So. 1. of such debts. Bishop v. Grand Lodge,

Missouri. Lister v. Lister (1898) E. O. M. A. (1899) 112 N. Y. 627, 20

73 Mo. App. 99. N. E, 562. The issue in this case was

Pennsylvania. Arthars v. Baird made and tried as to the existence of

(1890) 20 Phila, 287. any liability on the part of the de- Texas. — Appleby v. Grand Lodge,

S. H. (1920) fendant corporation. And to the same

Tex. Civ. App., effect, see Simon v. O'Brien (1895) 87

225 S. W. 588. Hun, 160, 33 N. Y. Supp. 815, holding

And see Masonic Mut. Relief Asso. that, as the member has a vested in- v. McAuley (D. C.), and Given v. terest in the certificate, his legal

Wisconsin Odd Fellows' Mut. L. Ins. representatives are entitled to the

Co. (Wis.) infra, VI. fund in case of his death without hav

And in some cases the fund has ing designated a beneficiary.

been awarded to the widow and chilBut it has been held that, in case

dren of a deceased member. Supreme the beneficiary named in the certifi- Lodge, N. E. O. P. v. Hine (1909) 82 cate is ineligible, the heirs of the Conn. 315, 73 Atl. 791; Kentucky member are not entitled to the fund, Grangers' Mut, Ben. Soc. v. McGregor in the absence of any provision (1886) 7 Ky. L. Rep. 750 (abstract); in the by-laws of the association to Gibson v. Kentucky Grangers' Mut. that effect. Lamothe v. Société Ben. Soc. (1886) 8 Ky. L. Rep. 520


(abstract); Carson v. Vicksburg Bank statute ineligible to take; the society (1897) 75 Miss. 167, 37 L.R.A. 559, having paid the money into court to be 65 Am. St. Rep. 596, 22 So. 1.

distributed as the court might deterAnd see Beresh v. Supreme Lodge, mine. K. H. and National Union v. Keefe The benefit, in an association or(III.) infra. VI.

ganized for the purpose of assisting And it has been held that the fund “the widows or orphans, or such other willübe awarded to the surviving chil- person or persons as may hold an asdren of a deceased member, in the signment of the certificate of memberabsence of a beneficiary capable of ship at the time of the death of the taking. Sanders v. Grand Lodge, A. member," is, upon the death of 0. U. W. (1910) 153 Ill. App. 7, af- the member, in the absence of a firmed in (1910) 246 Ill. 555, 92 N. E. written designation in the certifi962; Richmond v. Johnson (1881) 28 cate of

of membership of beneMinn. 447, 10 N. W. 596; Grand Lodge, ficiary to whom the fund should be A. 0. U. W. v. Gandy (1902) 63 N. J. paid, payable to the member's widow, Eq. 692, 53 Atl. 142; Handwerker v. and not to the administrators of his Diermeyer (1896) 96 Tenn. 619, 36 estate, where, at the time the certifiS. W. 869; Grand Lodge, 0. S. H. v. cate was issued, the by-laws provided Iselt (1896) Tex. Civ. App. 37 that, in case no person was desigS. W. 377; International Brotherhood, nated to receive the benefit, it should M. W. E. v. Duncan (1917) – Tex. Civ. be payable to the widow for the use App. — 194 S. W. 956; Re Sons of of herself and her minor children, Scotland Benev. Asso. (1910) 2 Ont. notwithstanding that a subsequent byWeek. N. 200.

law had been passed, which the court In Sons & Daughters of Job v. Wil- assumed was applicable to the certifison (Ga.) supra, the holder of a bene- cate in question, providing that the fit certificate failed to designate his bencfit should be paid to such person beneficiary by a will, as provided in or persons as the membership certifithe by-laws of the association; the cate might require, who should have trial court, on evidence that it was an insurable interest as provided in the custom, whenever a member died the section defining the objects of the without a will, to pay the assessment association. Hadley v. Odd Fellows' over to the members of the family, Beneficial Asso. (Mass.) supra. The held that the widow of the member court stated that it thought the words, was entitled as against his estate; in "to such person or persons as the affirming this judgment, the appellate member's certificate requires,” were court said that, as the primary pur

chosen in view of the circumstance pose of the association was to take that certificates were outstanding care of members during sickness and which designated no beneficiary, and to contribute to the assistance of their which, when issued, had the effect of dependents after their death, even in making the benefit payable to the the absence of such evidence the bene- widow, and that it was the intention fit assessment should be paid to the that it should continue to be so paymember's family, where no beneficiary able unless the member made a change was designated, and not to the estate. by designating another beneficiary in

In Meinhardt v. Meinhardt (1912) the manner pointed out by the 117 Md. 426, 83 Atl. 715, on the death amended by-laws. This construction, of a member of a mutual benefit as- it was said, was the most consistent sociation, the court awarded the bene- with the declared purposes of the fit fund to the legal wife of the mem- association, and most in line with the ber, from whom he had been sep- statute regulating death benefit asarated for a number of years, where sociations; while the other theory, the beneficiary designated in the cer- that the intention of the by-laws, was tificate, a woman with whom the de- to make the benefit payable to the esfendant had illicitly lived after the tate in the absence of explicit designaseparation from his legal wife, was by tion, would divert the fund from the declared objects of the association, that, upon the death of the beneficiary and tend to make the death benefit a during the lifetime of the member, simple life insurance, to be disposed the fund should go to the widow and of under the general laws regulating children if no new beneficiary were the succession.

designated. Where the beneficiary department A creditor of a member of a mutual of a fraternal order was established benefit society not being eligible as to provide relief to members and their a beneficiary, in case such person is families in case of the death or total named as beneficiary, the certificate disability of the members, the benefit will be construed, in connection with fund, upon the death of a member who the charter of the society, as a conhas designated a person not eligible tract to pay to the widow and children to take, goes to the widow as the sole of the insured the amount of the member of the family. Lister v. Lister insurance (abstract opinion). Ken(1898) 73 Mo. App. 99.

tucky Grangers' Mut. Ben. Soc. v. In Arthars v. Baird (1890) 20 Phila. McGregor (1886) 7 Ky. L. Rep. 750. (Pa.) 287, a benefit fund in a fraternal And to the same effect, see Gibson organization the object of which was v. Kentucky Grangers' Mut. Ben. “to pledge the members to the pay- Soc. (1886) 8 Ky. L. Rep. 520 (abment of a stipulated sum to such stract). beneficiary as a deceased member may An award of the district court, have designated while living, under which apportions a fund due on a such restrictions and upon such con- membership certificate in a beneficial ditions as the order may prescribe," association, which the association has was awarded to the member's widow paid into court, equally between the as against the administrator of the widow, who was the second wife, and named beneficiary, where the bene- the son of a deceased member who ficiary named in the membership cer

had died without designating a new tificate had predeceased the member. beneficiary after the death of his first There was, however, a provision in the wife, is evidently fair and will not be by-laws which required a married disturbed at the instance of the son's member to name his wife, or wife and guardian, where the by-laws provide .children, as beneficiaries. Nor could that the fund is to be payable to the the administrator of the member re- member's wife, or to such person or cover the fund for the benefit of the persons as he may subsequently diestate, since the member has rect. Rollins v. McHatton (1891) 16 individual property in the fund, but Colo. 203, 25 Am. St. Rep. 260, 27 Pac. only a power to designate the bene- 264. The court stated that it was not ficiary.

called upon to consider what the reThe widow and children, and not sult would have been if the society the creditors, are entitled to the bene- had refused to make the payment and fit of an endowment certificate of a asserted its right to a reversion; the member of a fraternal organization, implication from the opinion seems to notwithstanding that the member had be, however, that the court would changed the beneficiary by substitut- have held that the fund would revert ing for his wife a person whom he to the society, had the society interintended to be nominal beneficiary as posed a claim therefor, as it is said trustee for a creditor, where the con- that the son of the original benestitution of the organization provided ficiary, who had predeceased the memthat the benefit should be for the per- ber, as her heir, had no right to the sons related to or dependent upon the fund, as no interest had vested in the member, and should never be appro- mother as beneficiary; and since the priated to the payment of a debt member had no interest in the fund, against his estate. Carson v. Vicks- but only a power of appointment, the burg Bank (1897) 75 Miss. 167, 37 fund could not in any event become L.R.A. 559, 65 Am. St. Rep. 596, 22 an asset of his estate. So. 1. The by-laws provided, however, A benefit fund due under a certifi



cate of a benevolent order, a by-law of which provides that "each member shall enter upon his application the name or names of the members of his family or those to whom he desires his benefit to be paid, subject to further disposal of the benefit as the member may hereafter direct,” is payable to the children of the member upon his death following the death of his wife, who was named in his certificate of membership as beneficiary, in the absence of any new designation, and the children of the deceased wife by a former husband have no claim therein. Handwerker v. Diermeyer (1896) 96 Tenn. 619, 36 S. W. 869.

In Grand Lodge, A. 0. U. W. Gandy (1902) 63 N. J. Eq. 692, 53 Atl. 142, a member designated an ineligible beneficiary, and the benefit fund was awarded to the children of the member, the association having interpleaded the parties, and there being a by-law of the association providing that, in case of the death of the beneficiary during the lifetime of the meniber, the benefit should be paid to the widow, if living, or, if not, to the children, share and share alike, in case no new beneficiary were designated.

The surviving child of the insured, who is within the class specified by the statute as an eligible beneficiary, is entitled to the benefit fund upon the death of the parent, where an ineligible beneficiary has been designated. Sanders v. Grand Lodge, A. 0. U. W. (1910) 153 Ill. App. 7, affirmed in (1910) 246 Ill. 555, 92 N. E. 962.

And in Grand Lodge, 0. S. H. Islet (1896) Tex. Civ. App.

37 S. W. 377, the child of a deceased member of the benefit association, who was the only person entitled to receive the benefit under the charter, was awarded the fund, as against an ineligible beneficiary named in the certificate. The association in this case did not contest its liability, and in fact asserted that the fund belonged to the said child.

The amount of a benefit insurance certificate does not revert to the order issuing it, upon the death of the mem

ber, where the beneficiary named therein died prior to the member's death, but goes to his surviving children, one of the objects of the order being the protection of the widows and orphans of its members. International Brotherhood, M. W. E. V. Duncan (1917)

Tex. Civ. App. —, 194 N. W. 956.

And where the by-laws of an organization specifically provide who shall take in case the member dies without having legally designated the beneficiary, the estate of the person designated in the by-laws is entitled to collect upon the beneficiary's certificate, where the person named dies after the death of the member, but before the proceeds of the certificate have been collected. Beeson v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen (1917) 101 Kan. 399, 166 Pac. 466.

Where a member of a mutual benefit insurance association names his wife as beneficiary in his certificate of membership therein, and the wife, who during her lifetime made a will devising her property to her husband for life, and after his death to their daughter, died prior to the death of the husband, who during his lifetime made a will giving the proceeds of the certificate to his daughter, and the wills were properly probated, the proceeds of the said certificate, when paid by the insurance company, become the property of the daughter. Brew v. Clement (1893) 48 Kan. 386, 29 Pac. 704. There was in this case no question of the enforcement of the contract between the insurance company and any other person.

And in Re Sons of Scotland Benev. Asso. (1910) 2 Ont. Week. N. 200,the fund was awarded to the children of a deceased member where the beneficiary named in the membership certificate predeceased the member, and the statute in effect provided that in case all the beneficiaries died before the member, the fund should go to the member's children, or, in case there were none, to his estate.

In Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W. v. Muth (1920) 91 N. J. Eq. 460, 109 Atl. 853, a member of a fraternal


organization, following the death of Connecticut. Supreme Lodge, N. his wife, designated as his beneficiary E. (). P. v. Hine (1909) 82 Conn. 315, in the membership certificate held by 73 Atl. 791 (widow and children to him, his wife's stepdaughter, on whom exclusion of ineligible beneficiary); he had become partially dependent, Supreme Colony, U. O. P. F. v. Towne who, under the by-laws which pro- (1914) 87 Conn. 644, 89 Atl. 264, Ann. vided that the beneficiaries under Cas. 1916B, 181 (surviving eligible such certificate should be the wife, beneficiary against estates of member children, parents, brothers and sis- and of deceased beneficiary). ters, or persons dependent upon the District of Columbia. Masonic member, was ineligible as a benefi- Mut. Relief Asso. v. McAuley (1882) ciary; upon the death of the member, 2 Mackey, 70 (widow against personthe benefit being claimed by the bene- al representative of deceased benefificiary named and by the member's ciary). surviving sisters, the organization Illinois, — Chicago Guaranty Fund paid the money into court and inter- Life Soc. v. Wheeler (1898) 79 III. pleaded the parties. It was held that, App. 241; Beresh v. Supreme Lodge, as the organization had paid the fund K. H. (1912) 255 Ill. 122, 99 N. E. into court, it would be treated in 349 (widow and adopted son as equity as the property of the member, against ineligible beneficiary); Grand and would be disposed of on equitable Lodge, A. O. U. W. v. Ehlman (1910) principles, and the sisters having 246 Ill. 555, 92 N. E. 962 (insured's shown no special interest in the fund, heirs against ineligible beneficiary); and there being no question of statu- Starcke v. Plattduetsche Grot Gilde tory prohibition or public policy in- (1911) 166 Ill. App. 146 (widow of volved, the fund was awarded to the insured); Royal League v. Shields stepdaughter in accordance with the (1911) 251 Ill. 250, 36 L.R.A.(N.S.) member's wishes, notwithstanding 208, 96 N. E. 45 (heirs of insured); that the by-laws further provided that National Union v. Keefe (1914) 263 in case of the death of all the bene- Ill. 453, 105 N. E. 319, Ann. Cas. ficiaries named, and in the absence 1915C, 271 (wife and child). of a new designation, and in the ab- Kansas. Boice v. Shepard (1918) sence of wife and children, the benefit 78 Kan. 308, 96 Pac. 485 (father enshould be paid to the next living re- titled, as against insured's adminislation of the member in the order trator). named in the section designating the Maryland. Meinhardt v. Meineligible beneficiaries.

hardt (1912) 117 Md. 426, 83 Atl. 715 I'I. Persons in eligible classes of bene

(widow). ficiories.

Rhode Island. Monroe v. Provi

dence In cases where a statute or the

Permanent Firemen's Relief by-laws or constitution of the society

Asso. (1896) 19 R. I. 491, 34 Atl. 997. name the classes of persons who

Texas. Grand Lodge, C. K. P. v. may become beneficiaries, it has been

Mackey (1907) Tex. Civ. App. generally held, in case of failure or

104 S. W. 907; Carr v. Grand Lodge, invalid designation of a beneficiary,

U. B. F. (1916) Tex. Civ. App. -, and in the absence of express provi

189 S. W. 510 (husband against sions governing such event, that the ineligible beneficiary); International benefit will go to those belonging to Brotherhood, M. W. E. v. Duncan the classes named in the statute or by- (1917) Tex. Civ. App. —, 194 S. W. laws as eligible beneficiaries, in the 956 (surviving children); Appleby v. order named.

Grand Lodge, S. A. (1920) — Tex. Cir. Arkansas. Runyan v. Runyan App. -, 225 S. W. 588 (second wife); (1912) 101 Ark. 353, 142 S. W. 519 Grand Ct. 0. C. v. Welch (1923) (widow of insured).

Tex. Civ. App. 250 S. W. 457 Colorado. Finnell v. Franklin (father). (1913) 55 Colo. 156, 134 Pac. 122 Wisconsin. Given v. Wisconsin (uncle and cousin against heirs). Odd Fellows' Mut. L. Ins. Co. (1888)

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