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of the insured, or to his personal rep- he can dispose of by contract or will, resentatives.

nor does such benefit descend to his Arkansas. Henry v. Knights & heirs; and, as the estate is not Daughters of Tabor (1922) 156 Ark. among the 'classes of beneficiaries 165, 246 S. W. 17.

named in the statute, he cannot desIllinois. Kaemmerer v. Kaem- ignate his estate as a beneficiary. merer (1907) 231 Ill. 154, 83 N. E. Supreme Colony, U. O. P. F. v. Towne 133.

(1914) 87 Conn. 644, 89 Atl. 264, Ann. Iowa. Smith v. Supreme Tent, K. Cas. 1916B, 181, supra. M. (1905) 127 Iowa, 115, 69 L.R.A. Where the beneficiary's right to the 174, 102 N. W. 830; Mueller v. Wood- funds on a certificate issued by a mumen of World (1909) 144 Iowa, 228, tual benefit society is forfeited because 122 N. W. 903; Weiditschka V. Su- she murdered the insured, the society preme Tent, K. M. (1919) 188 Iowa, cannot escape liability on the cer183, 170 N. W. 300, 175 N. W. 835. tificate, but the same may be enforced

New York. Simon v. O'Brien by the insured's administrator for the (1895) 87 Hun, 160, 33 N. Y. Supp. benefit of his estate, on the ground 815; Re Smith (1904) 42 Misc. 639, of a resulting trust created in favor 87 N. Y. Supp. 725.

of the estate by the forfeiture of the North Carolina. Little v. Caldwell rights of the beneficiary named. (1912) 158 N. C. 351, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) Schmidt v. Northern Life Asso. 450, 74 S. E. 10.

(Iowa) supra. The court in reaching Pennsylvania. - Jennings v. Grand this conclusion followed the doctrine Fraternity (1917) 67 Pa. Super. Ct. that where there has been no desig139.

nation, or the designated beneficiary England. Cleaver v. Mutual Re

dies or

was ineligible, the associaserve Fund Life Asso. (1892] 1 Q. B. tion holds the money in trust for the 147, 61 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 128, 66 L. benefit of the estate of the insured, T. N. S. 220, 40 Week. Rep. 230, 56 stating that, as the defendant had J. P. 180-C. A.

obligated itself to pay on the death And it has been held that upon

of the insured, the rule of public the death of the insured, in the ab- policy denying the beneficiary in such sence of an eligible beneficiary, a re- case the right to recover on the policy sulting trust in favor of the insured's should not be extended to defeat all estate is created. Schmidt v. North- claims thereon. And it was further ern Life Asso. (1900) 112 Iowa, 41, stated that if the designation of the 51 L.R.A. 141, 84 Am. St. Rep. 323, beneficiary was treated as a bequest 83 N. W. 300, supra, II.; Haskins v. the same result would follow, for a Kendall (1893) 158 Mass. 224, 35 Am. lapsed legacy descends to the heirs St. Rep. 490, 33 N. E. 495; Cleaver of the testator. v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. And under similar facts

a like (Eng.) supra.

conclusion was reached in Cleaver v. But this view has been expressly Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. repudiated by other cases.

Cook v.

(Eng.) supra. Supreme Conclave, I. 0. H. (1909) In Weiditschka v. Supreme Tent, 202 Mass. 85, 88 N. E. 584; Warner K. M. (1919) 188 Iowa, 183, 170 N. W. v. Modern Woodmen (1903) 67 Neb. 300, 175 N. W. 835, where the by-law 233, 61 L.R.A. 603, 108 Am. St. Rep. which provided that, in case an ineli634, 93 N. W. 397, 2 Ann. Cas. 660, 'gible beneficiary was named, the fund supra, II.

should revert to the association, was A member of a benefit society who, held invalid, the estate of the deunder its laws, has the power to

ceased member was held to be entitled designate the person to whom the to the benefit fund where the beneficibenefits shall be paid and to designate ary designated by the member was a new beneficiary, does not have, ineligible. in consequence of such power, a Where the certificate of memberproperty interest in the benefit which ship directed that the proceeds there

of should be paid to the member's incapable of taking the proceeds unestate, and the general purpose of the der the law, the administrator of the statute under which the order was deceased could recover as if no beneorganized, and of the constitution of ficiary had been named. the order, was to make suitable provi- The personal representative of the sion for the welfare of its members assured, as against his widow, who during their lifetime in cases of sick- was not designated as a beneficiary, ness or distress, and to provide for and as against the personal reprethe legal and proper beneficiary after sentative of a beneficiary who had death, the word "estate,” as thus used, predeceased the insured, has been will be construed to mean that the held entitled to the benefit, where the member designed the proceeds to go by-laws, in providing for the mode of to such person, being a competent paying the benefit, direct that they beneficiary, as would take under his shall be paid by check payable to the personal estate under the Statute of beneficiary or the legal representative Distribution, so that the fund will not of the deceased member, the society become a part of the general estate having disclaimed all right to the of the member to the extent that it fund, which it stood ready to pay will be liable for his debts or the pay- as the court should direct. Order ment of bequests under his will. Re of Scottish Clans v. Reich (1916) 90 Smith (1904) 42 Misc. 639, 87 N. Y. Conn. 511, 97 Atl. 863. Supp. 725, holding that the father, The by-laws of a mutual benefit who was alive at the time of the death association, which state that the purof the member, was, under the Statute pose of the order is to provide a fund of Distribution, entitled to the pro- to be paid to the widow, orphans, or ceeds, and directing that the funds legal representatives of a member, should be paid to his administrator should be given a liberal construction, to be disposed of among his next of and, when so construed, in a case kin, he having died after the death where the beneficiary had predeceased of the son.

the member and no other beneficiary And in Henry v. Knights & Daugh- had been designated, the proceeds go ters of Tabor (1922) 156 Ark. 165,

to the member's administrator, upon 246 S. W. 17, where the beneficiary, his death, for the benefit of the surwho had murdered the assured, was viving wife and child, who are enby reason of public policy forbidden titled to the amount they would into collect the benefit, it was held herit from the decedent in case of his that the insurer would not be ab- intestacy, as if the fund were a part solved from payment, but would be of his estate. Sykes v. Armstrong required to pay the benefit to the (1916) 111 Miss. 44, 71 So. 262. And estate of the insured.

the court further held that in no case In Smith v. Supreme Tent, K. M. where there are any of the class liv. (1905) 127 Iowa, 115, 69 L.R.A. 174, ing who were designated as probable 102 N. W. 830, in a action by the beneficiaries in the policy does the beneficiary named, who by statute insurance entirely lapse, or is it unwas ineligible, against the insurance

collectable. company, the proceeds were awarded A certificate of membership in a to the father of the deceased, who was mutual aid society, which designates also the administrator of his estate, the member's wife as beneficiary, is where the father had intervened and payable only to the wife in case of her the insurance company did not resist surviving the husband, and where the the payment of the sum. And while wife dies prior to the death of the the court stated that it had no oc- husband, a resulting trust in favor casion to elaborate on the question as of his estate is created upon his to who was entitled to the proceeds, death. Haskins v. Kendall (1893) 158 inasmuch as the association did not Mass. 224, 35 Am. St. Rep. 490, 33 N. resist payment, yet it was well set- E. 495, so holding notwithstanding tied that where the beneficiary was a by-law of the society provided that

the member could not transfer the or the death of the one designated becertificate without the wife's con- fore the death of the member, the sent.

fund will go to the member's heirs The brothers and sisters and neph

upon his death. ews and nieces not living with or United States. Smith v. Covenant supported by the assured are not legal Mut. Ben. Asso. (1885) 24 Fed. 685. dependents within the meaning of a

Illinois.-Covenant Mut. Ben. Asso. certificate of membership making the v. Sears (1885) 114 Ill. 113, 29 N. E. proceeds payable to such dependents,

480; Baldwin v. Begley (1900) 185 and the proceeds of the certificate Ill. 180, 56 N. E. 1065; Supreme are assets in the hands of the insured's Lodge, K. L. H. v. Menkhausen (1904) administrator. Little Caldwell 209 Ill. 277, 65 L.R.A. 508, 101 Am. (1912) 158 N. C. 351, 39 L.R.A.(N.S.) St. Rep. 239, 70 N. E. 567; Sanders 450, 74 S. E. 10.

v. Grand Lodge, A. 0. U. W. (1910) The provisions of the constitution

153 Ill. App. 7, affirmed in (1910) 246 of a benefit fraternity that no benefi- Ill. 555, 99 N. E. 962; Women's ciary shall have a vested interest in Catholic Order of Foresters v. Hefthe benefit certificate until it has ma

fernan (1917) 206 Ill. App. 70. tured upon the death of the member, lowa. Newman v. Covenant Mut. and of a subsequent clause that "if

Ins. Asso. (1888) 76 Iowa, 56, 1 L.R.A. a single cash payment has been 659, 14 Am. St. Rep. 196, 40 N. W. 87; specified in the certificate, the said Bush v. Modern Woodmen (1915) 182 sum shall be paid to the beneficiary, Iowa, 515, 152 N. W. 31, 162 N. W. 59. or her executors or administrators, Kentucky. Hess v. Segenfelter must be construed together, and, (Morgan v. Segenfelter) (1907) 127 when so construed, mean that the Ky. 348, 14 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1172, 128 member may change the designation Am. St. Rep. 343, 105 S. W. 476. at any time before his death, but upon Massachusetts. Sargent v. Suhis death the money shall be paid to preme Lodge, K. H. (1893) 158 Mass. the beneficiary or her personal repre- 557, 33 N. E. 650; Shea v. Massasentative, so that where the bene- chusetts Benev. Asso. (1894) 160 ficiary named in the certificate prede- Mass. 289, 39 Am. St. Rep. 475, 35 ceases the member, the administrator N. E. 855; Clarke v. Schwarzenberg of the beneficiary is, upon the death (1894) 162 Mass. 98, 32 N. E. 7; of the member, in the absence of an- Boyden v. Massachusetts Masonic L. other designation, entitled to the

Ins. Co. (1897) 167 Mass. 242, 45 benefit. Jennings v. Grand Frater- N. E. 735. nity (1917) 67 Pa. Super. Ct. 139.

Michigan. Michigan Mut. Ben. But it has been held that the ad

Asso. v. Rolfe (1889) 76 Mich. 146, 42 ministrator of a deceased member of

N. W. 1094; Wolfe v. District Grand a fraternal beneficiary organization

Lodge, I. O. B. B. (1894) 102 Mich. has no claim to the benefit fund

23, 60 N. W. 445. due on a certificate of membership,

Minnesota. where no beneficiary was named, by

Devaney v. Ancient virtue of any vested interest which

Order, H. L. I. F. (1913 122 Minn. the member had in the fund at the

221, 142 N. W. 316; Sharpless v. time of his death, for the member had

Grand Lodge, A. 0. U. W. (1916) 135 no right or interest therein which

Minn. 35, L.R.A.1917B, 670, 159 N. could pass to his estate. Order of

W. 1086. Scottish Clans v. Reich (Conn.) supra.

New York.--Bishop v. Grand Lodge,

E. O. M. A. (1889) 112 N. Y. 627, 20 IV. Heirs of member.

N. E. 562; Simon v. O'Brien (1895) A majority of the cases hold that 87 Hun, 160, 33 N. Y. Supp. 815; where there is a failure of the bene- Pfeifer v. Supreme Lodge, B. S. B. ficiary, due either to a failure of the S. (1903) 173 N. Y. 418, 66 N. E. member to designate one, the ineligi

108. bility of the beneficiary designated, Oklahoma. Atkeson v. Sovereign

Camp, W. W. (1923) 90 Okla. 154,

A.L.R. -, 216 Pac. 467. But see Supreme Colony, U. O. P. F. v. Towne (1914) 87 Conn. 644, 89 Atl. 264, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 181, supra, and Lamothe v. Société Laurier (1923) 244 Mass. 189, 134 N. E. 899.

The benefit fund, in an order organized for the purpose of furnishing benefits to the widow, heirs, etc., the by-laws of which provide that the benefit may be payable to the member's wife, husband, children, parents, or other blood relatives, does not lapse on the death of the member, where the beneficiary named in the membership certificate is precluded from taking because he murdered the member, but goes to the children of the deceased member as his heirs. Supreme Lodge, K. L. H. v. Menkhausen (1904) 209 Ill. 277, 65 L.R.A. 508, 101 Am. St. Rep. 239, 70 N. E. 567. The court treated the action as a suit to recover the benefit which the organization undertook by its constitution and by-laws to pay to the person, within certain classes, who should be designated by the member, and not as an action upon the certificate of membership in which the beneficiary who was precluded from taking was named.

Where the certificate of membership provides that the benefit fund is to be paid to the devisee of the member upon his death, the fund does not, upon the death of the member without a will, become a part of his estate, which can be recovered by the administrator. Worley v. Northwestern Masonic Aid Asso. (1882) 3 McCrary, 53, 10 Fed. 227.

But where the certificate provides that the benefit shall be payable to the member's devisees as provided in his last will, or, in the event of their prior death, to the legal heirs or devisees of the holder of the certificate, the legal heirs of the member are, in cases of intestacy, entitled to the fund: Smith v. Covenant Mut. Ben. Asso. (1885) 24 Fed. 685. It will be observed that the contract provision for the payment of the benefit in this case is distinguishable from the contract in the Worley Case

(Fed.) supra, which, from the report, appears to have made no provision for the payment of benefits except to the devisees named in the last will and testament.

And where the beneficiary has forfeited his right to the benefit by murdering the insured, the sole heir of the deceased, who would take in the event of the death of an eligible beneficiary before that of the member, in the absence of a subsequent designation, is entitled to the fund. Sharpless v. Grand Lodge, A. 0. U. W. (1916) 135 Minn. 35, L.R.A.1917B, 670, 159 N. W. 1086.

In Pfeifer v. Supreme Lodge, B. S. B. S. (1903) 173 N. Y. 418, 66 N. E. 108, the fund was awarded to the next of kin of the member, where there was no designation of a beneficiary; the issuing of a certificate designating a beneficiary was held not to be a condition precedent to a right of recovery against the organization.

In Sargent v. Supreme Lodge, K. H. (1892) 158 Mass. 557, 33 N. E. 650, the court construed the by-laws, which provided that in the event of the death of all the beneficiaries selected by the member, before his decease, and his failure to make other disposition thereof, the benefit should be paid to the heirs of the deceased member, or, in case of failure of eligible heirs, that the benefit should revert, to entitle the heirs of the member to the benefit, where the beneficiary named in the certificate was, by statute, ineligible to take. And to the same effect, see Shea v. Massachusetts Ben. Asso. (1893) 160 Mass. 289, 39 Am. St. Rep. 475, 35 N. E. 855.

In Bush v. Modern Woodmen (1915) 182 Iowa, 515, 152 N. W. 31, 162 N. W. 59, the plaintiff brought an action on a benefit certificate issued by the defendant society, in which she was named as beneficiary, and the heirs of the member intervened and claimed the proceeds on the ground that the plaintiff was ineligible as a benefici. ary; the society admitied liability on the certificate and paid the money into court. A judgment in favor of the plaintiff was reversed on the inter

are

en

vener's appeal, the supreme court the fund, as against the heirs of the holding that the plaintiff was not beneficiary, in the absence of any new entitled to become a beneficiary under designation. In this case the fund the Iowa statute.

was awarded to the member's father. The fund under a membership cer- And in Wolf v. District Grand tificate in a mutual benefit associa- Lodge, I. 0. B. B. (1894) 102 Mich. tion formed for the purpose of afford- 23, 60 N. W. 445, it was said that in ing financial aid and assistance to the the absence of a devise or designawidows and orphans, heirs or devisees, tion the heirs of the member of a of its members, the by-laws of which mutual benefit association provide that the sum, which is to be titled to the benefit fund, under the collected by assessments on other rule laid down in the Rolfe Case members, is to be payable to the dev- (Mich.) supra. isees as provided in the member's Where the beneficiary named in the last will, or, in the event of his prior certificate predeceased the insured, death, to the legal heirs of the dev- and there was no other designation isees, is payable to the heirs of a of a beneficiary, and the by-laws promember who dies intestate, and does vided that the benefits should be paynot revert to the association. Cove- able only to the family, heirs, blood nant Mut, Ben. Asso. v. Sears (1885) relatives, dependents, etc., of the in114 Ill. 108, 29 N. E. 480. The court sured, it was held in Devaney v. stated that the meaning evidently was Ancient Order, H. L. I. F. (1913) 122 that the money was to go to the dev- Minn. 221, 142 N. W. 316, that the isees, if there were any, and, if not, heirs of the insured were entitled to then it should go to the heirs, and take the benefit as beneficiaries, and it would be doing great violence to not by descent, there being no provithe decedent's intention, in view of sion in the laws expressly covering the purpose of the association, to hold the situation, and no claim being made that the money should not be paid that the fund should revert to the over to the heirs in case of intestacy. order, or that it should go to the

Where from the agreed statement heirs of the beneficiary. of facts it appears that the first bene- In Hess v. Segenfelter (Morgan v. ficiary, the divorced wife of the mem- Segenfelter) (1907) 127 Ky. 348, 14 ber, is disqualified, and the second L.R.A.(N.S.) 1172, 128 Am. St. Rep. beneficiary is prohibited from taking 343, 105 S. W. 476, where the benethe insurance under statutes of the ficiary designated in a certificate of state and by-laws of the society ap- membership in a fraternal benefit orplicable thereto, the minor children ganization was by statute ineligible, of the first beneficiary, the divorced the court directed the fund to be paid wife of the member, as heirs of the to the only surviving sister of the member, are entitled to collect the member, who was also administratrix insurance. Atkeson Sovereign of his estate, the association having Camp, W. O. W. (1923) 90 Okla. 154, paid the money into court and inter- A.L.R. -, 216 Pac. 467.

pleaded the parties. In Michigan Mut. Ben. Asso. A mutual benefit certificate made Rolfe (1889) 76 Mich. 146, 42 N. W. payable to the devisees of the insured 1094, it was said that the intention becomes payable to his heirs in case of the statute permitting corporations he does not leave a will, for the right to be formed "for the purpose of se- to the avails of the life insurance curing to the families or heirs of any descends to the heirs, as any other member, upon his death, a certain property or chose in action, and the sum of money," was to secure a fund association cannot avoid its obligato the heirs of the member, and not tion by an alleged failure of benefito the heirs of the beneficiary, who ciaries. Newman v. Covenant Mut. was not a member, so that, where a Ins. Asso. (1888) 76 Iowa, 56, 1 L.R.A. beneficiary dies before the member, 659, 14 Am. St. Rep. 196, 40 N. W. the heirs of the member are entitled to

31 A.L.R.--49.

V.

87.

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