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impaired or diminished, but the parties were restored to their original position.

In Noyes v. Anderson (1891) 124 N. Y. 175, 26 N. E. 316, the mortgagor, after the mortgage was due, secured an agreement from the mortgagee that he would not enforce the mortgage for a period of time, provided that no taxes or assessments on the premises became due and remained unpaid and in arrears for more than thirty days; a sewer assessment became in arrears within the meaning of the mortgage clause, which, through fault of the city authorities, was unknown to the mortgagor, but which she promptly paid when her attention was called to it, on the day previous to the service of the summons in a foreclosure proceeding on the ground that taxes were in arrears, and the court held that a judgment absolute should be directed for the defendant, to the effect that she be relieved of the consequences of her default in the payment of such assessment. It is to be noted that the decision is placed on the ground that the default of which the mortgagee sought to avail himself would result in a forfeiture from which the court of equity had the power to relieve.

In Swon v. Stevens (1898) 143 Mo. 384, 45 S. W. 270, where the mortgagees sold the premises for the breach of the mortgagors' agreement to pay taxes promptly, it was held that the sale was wholly unauthorized, and was voidable, where the taxes were paid between the time when the property was advertised for sale and the actual sale thereof.

In Germania L. Ins. Co. v. Potter (1908) 124 App. Div. 814, 109 N. Y. Supp. 435, the mortgage provided that the whole debt should become due and payable at the election of the mortgagee upon the failure of the mortgagor to pay taxes, and the mortgagor failed to pay the taxes on the day on which they fell due; the mortgagor paid the taxes on the following day, and elected to declare the whole debt due, and on the same day began a foreclosure action; the mortgagor, after being served with process, immediate

ly tendered the amount of taxes paid by the mortgagee, with interest and cost of the foreclosure action up to that time, which the mortgagee refused to accept. In reversing the judgment of the trial court in favor of the mortgagee, and directing that the mortgagor be permitted to repay to the mortgagee the taxes which it had paid, with interest thereon, it was stated that the failure of the mortgagor to pay the taxes on the first day on which it was possible to pay them was manifestly a merely technical default, and that a court of equity would not entertain an action to foreclose a mortgage on account of such default when it appeared that the taxes were promptly paid by the mortgagor when his attention was called to the default, before the action was commenced, as the mortgagor was not injured thereby; and although it was true that in the case at bar the action was commenced before the offer to repay was made, this was because the action was begun so quickly that there was no opportunity to do so, and as soon as it became apparent that the mortgagee was insisting upon his option to declare the whole debt due, the mortgagee tendered all taxes, with interest thereon.

And it has been held that a supplemental answer alleging payment of taxes after the institution of a suit to foreclose a mortgage for nonpayment of taxes, as provided in an acceleration clause, constitutes a complete defense to the action, since the payment fully restores all rights intended to be protected by that part of the mortgage, and indemnifies the mortgagee or his assignee against all possible prejudice or loss arising from such default. Shaw V. Wellman (1891) 59 Hun, 447, 13 N. Y. Supp. 527.

But it has been held that after the mortgagee has exercised his option, given him by the mortgage, to declare the mortgage debt due for nonpayment of taxes, by commencing an action to foreclose on that ground, a subsequent payment of the taxes by the mortgagor after the commencement of the action does not deprive

the mortgagee of the right secured by the exercise of his option. Plummer v. Park (1901) 62 Neb. 665, 87 N. W. 534. And see Hockett v. Burns (1911) 90 Neb. 1, 132 N. W. 718, where it is said that the plaintiff's right to foreclose is not defeated by the payment of the delinquent taxes by the mortgagor after the commencement of the suit to foreclose, but before the de

cree.

And where the mortgaged premises had been sold for unpaid taxes and the mortgagee had redeemed from the tax sale, it was held in Stanclift v. Norton (1873) 11 Kan. 218, in an action to foreclose the mortgage, which provided for the acceleration of the mortgage debt upon default in payment of taxes, that there was no error in sustaining a demurrer to the defense, which alleged that after the filing of the petition to the foreclosure proceedings, the mortgagor had tendered to the mortgagee the full amount of the taxes, of the penalty, and of all costs accrued of the tax sale, which tender was refused, and further, that the mortgagor repeated the tender and brought the money into court, for, by the express terms of the contract, the entire amount of the debt was to become due upon the failure of the mortgagor to pay taxes.

And in Arkenburgh v. Lakeside Residence Asso. (1897) 56 N. J. Eq. 102, 38 Atl. 297, it was held that the failure of the mortgagor to pay taxes on the premises within ninety days after they became due, as provided in an acceleration clause, matured the mortgage, and the mortgagee's rights were not affected by the fact that the taxes were paid after the filing of the bill to foreclose.

And in Lotterer v. Leon (1921) 138 Md. 318, 113 Atl. 887, where the mortgagor covenanted to pay taxes when legally payable, and the mortgage further provided that, in case of default being made in any covenant or condition therein contained, the debt secured should be due and payable at once, and the mortgagor failed to pay the taxes, it was held that it was clear under the terms of the mortgage that he was in default, and in consequence

of such default the whole mortgage debt was due, and that the payment of the taxes after the decree for sale of the property did not obliterate the default or devest the mortgagee of his right to sell, founded on such default.

It has been held that where the mortgagor, who was in default in payment of both interest and taxes, tendered the amount thereof after notice by the mortgagee of his intention to foreclose for nonpayment of taxes and interest under an acceleration clause in the mortgage, the tender did not devest the mortgagee of his right to exercise his option of foreclosing, notwithstanding that, at the time the tender was made, the foreclosure action had not been commenced. Stewart v. McCaddin (1908) 107 Md. 314, 68 Atl. 571.

And in Thompson v. Hirt (1923) 195 Iowa, 582, 191 N. W. 365, where the mortgage provided for the acceleration of the maturity of the debt secured, upon default by the mortgagor in payment of taxes or assessments, it was held that a tender by the mortgagor of the amount of an assessment which he had previously refused to pay was too late, when it was made after the mortgagee had redeemed the property from the tax sale, and after he had served notice of his election to proceed under the acceleration clause.

And it has been held that the failure of the mortgagor to pay taxes, which are in arrears, within the time specified in an acceleration clause in the mortgage, matures the mortgage unless it is shown that the lapse is attributable in some manner to the conduct of the mortgagee, and the payment of the taxes after the expiration of the time limited in the mortgage, but before the bill to foreclose is filed, does not affect the operation of the acceleration clause. Newark Trunk Co. v. Clark (1922) — N. J. Eq. 118 Atl. 263. The court admitted, however, that there were authorities in other jurisdictions which held that, as the stipulation maturing a mortgage for the nonpayment of taxes was intended to preserve the security, if the taxes were paid before, and even after,

the suit was commenced, and the security was thereby restored, equity would relieve against the forfeiture in case the failure was not wilful, but

stated that it had been ruled otherwise in New Jersey by previous cases. And see Greene v. Richards (1923) 244 Mass. 495, 139 N. E. 175.

G. S. G.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS EX REL. CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION

V.

LEWIS F. BAKER.

Illinois Supreme Court — February 19, 1924.

(311 Ill. 66, 142 N. E. 554.)

Attorney and client conducting quiz classes — unprofessional conduct. 1. It is not unprofessional for a member of the bar to conduct quiz classes to prepare law students who have completed the required course of study for their bar examinations.

[See note on this question beginning on page 748.]

- conduct justifying disbarment.

2. Unprofessional conduct which will justify disbarment of an attorney must have an element of immorality or dishonesty, or be of such character as to be in violation of private interests or the public good.

[See 2 R. C. L. 1089; 1 R. C. L. Supp. 698.]

-conduct prohibited.

3. No attorney at law should be permitted to engage in or continue in a course of conduct which brings the profession into disrepute.

right to revoke license.

4. The right to practise law is merely a privilege, which may be revoked for conduct rendering one unfit to hold a license to practise.

[See 2 R. C. L. 940; 1 R. C. L. Supp. 664.]

- right to disbar.

--

5. An attorney can be disbarred only for good cause shown in a judicial proceeding.

[See 2 R. C. L. 1103; 1 R. C. L. Supp. 703.]

(Dunn and Cartwright, JJ., dissent.)

INFORMATION to disbar an attorney at law. Rule discharged.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Messrs. John Long Fogle, William H. Sexton, and Frank E. Harkness, for relator:

Respondent, being a lawyer with positive duties toward the profession, and as such lawyer being an officer of the court charged with the duty of aiding in the administration of justice, and having well-defined duties toward the public, which obligations he is shown to have wholly or partially disregarded, should be deprived of the license given him by the court.

Re Mosness, 39 Wis. 509, 20 Am. Rep. 55; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. ed. 366; People ex rel. Chicago Bar Asso. v. Berezniak, 292 Ill. 305, 127 N. E. 36; People ex rel. Chi31 A.L.R.-47.

cago Bar Asso. v. Gilbert, 263 Ill. 85, 104 N. E. 1082.

Messrs. Joseph A. Weil, A. D. Cloud, Thomas J. Symmes, John A. Rose, and McKinney, Lynde, & Grear for respondent.

Farmer, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an information to disbar Lewis F. Baker, an attorney at law of the city of Chicago, who was admitted as an attorney at law in 1913, and has since that time been engaged in the practice of his profession in the city of Chicago. The information charges, generally, that

respondent devotes most of his time to instructing and preparing applicants for admission to the bar for taking the examination before the board of law examiners; that for that purpose he conducts conducts quiz classes, for which the members pay him a substantial sum of money, the object being to prepare students, by intensive work under the respondent's supervision, to successfully pass the examination for admission. to the bar, without regard to the student's previous training, or knowledge of or acquaintance with the fundamental principles of law; that respondent is not connected with any college or institution giving instruction to students, but conducts his classes for the purpose of "cramming" applicants to pass the bar examination, and the instruction given by him is limited to the subjects mentioned in rule 39 of this court.

The first count specifically charges respondent has for many years made a practice of cultivating the acquaintance of members of the board of law examiners for the purpose of procuring their good will and to use the same in aid of his business; that he employed a member of the board to draft a cross bill in a suit pending, and paid him $200 for his services; that respondent told said member he was conducting a law school, and induced the member to deliver a lecture in respondent's office to students who were taking his quiz course, for the purpose of causing the students to believe respondent could aid them in passing the examination; that respondent had visited two members of the board distant from Chicago for the purpose of cultivating their acquaintance, in the hope that it would aid him in his business.

The second count charges that in the past there had been rumors that certain applicants for admission to the bar had been able to procure, in advance, questions to be put by the board of law examiners in an examination, and that respondent had been active in encouraging the

circulation of the rumors; that at the July, 1921, examination, through an error, the printed questions to be used in the examination twentyfour hours later by the board were inadvertently passed among part of the applicants, but the mistake was immediately discovered and efforts made to have the lists returned; that one of the lists, or a typewritten copy of it, appeared the same day in respondent's office, and was used by him in preparing his students for the examination; that respondent did not, as it was his duty to do, notify the board of the matter and endeavor to keep it from the knowledge of his students, but posted the list in a conspicuous place in his office, open to the view of the applicants for admission to the bar.

Count 3 charges that prior to the December, 1920, examination, which was held by the board in Chicago, the respondent procured or claimed to have procured advance information of the questions, or some of them, which would be put to the applicants for admission to the bar, and offered to sell the information to Robert J. Shaw for $300, and to C. Lysle Smith without cost to him, to be paid for by Smith's friends.

Count 4 charges that it was the practice of respondent, on behalf of applicants taking his course, who were lacking in the time of study required to be shown by proofs to qualify them for taking the examination, to furnish them affidavits that the applicants had studied, under his personal tuition, the period of time covered by their attendance on respondent's classes, and this, it is alleged, was an evasion of the rule of this court.

After answer filed to the information the cause was referred to a commissioner, who heard the evidence and filed his report, and the case is submitted for decision on the commissioner's report, without exceptions having been filed by either. party. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Asso. v. Gilbert, 263 Ill. 85, 104 N. E. 1082.

The report of the commissioner is

(311 Ill. 66, 142 N. E. 554.)

of considerable length, but the importance of the questions presented is such that we think it should be set out in full. It is as follows:

"I, the undersigned, Roswell B. Mason, a master in chancery of the circuit court of Cook county and special commissioner of the supreme court of the state of Illinois, do now respectively submit the following report pursuant to an order of this honorable court entered June 20, 1922:

"Commencing on July 6, 1922, and at various dates thereafter, down to and including December 4, 1922, I was attended at my office, room 1602 Marquette Building, Chicago, Illinois, by Mr. John L. Fogle on behalf of the relator, and Mr. Thomas J. Symmes on behalf of the respondent. I have taken herein the depositions of Elmer H. Bielfeldt, Lysle Smith, Robert J. Shaw, William B. Hale, Albert Watson, A. M. Rose, James W. Watts, Lewis F. Baker, Albert J. Ginsberg, John K. Monihan, Samuel L. Golan, John J. Whiteside, Morris Fisher, and Albert Woods. Prior to the examination of said witnesses they were each and all duly sworn by me according to law, and their said depositions constitute, together with the instruments in writing described in and attached to said depositions, the entire transcript of evidence in this cause. Said transcript of evidence is in my possession, and I am ready to certify it up to this honorable court in case either of the parties hereto shall so desire. This case was argued before me by counsel for the parties in interest in the month of February, 1923. I have neither asked nor received any compensation whatsoever for taking such evidence and making this report. From all the evidence offered and received before me, being the evidence included in said transcript of evidence and no other evidence, I find:

"1. The respondent, Lewis F. Baker, was by the supreme court of Illinois, on or about October 8, 1913, admitted and licensed as an attorney

and counselor at law of the state of Illinois under the then-existing rules of this honorable court, and his name entered on the roll of attorneys as an attorney and counselor at law of the state of Illinois. Said Lewis F. Baker is now, and has been since said date, engaged in the practice of law in the city of Chicago, in said state of Illinois.

"2. Since the year 1913 said respondent has devoted his time almost exclusively to the business of instructing and preparing applicants for admission to the bar for their respective examinations by the state board of law examiners of the state of Illinois. The method followed by respondent in carrying on such business is to conduct what is known as a 'quiz class' previous to the respective examinations, upon the payment of $25 from each applicant enrolled in the class. Said respondent admits to his quiz class only those who have complied with the rule of the supreme court in reference to preliminary education and previous law study. Said work of said respondent is conducted by him solely for the revenue accruing to the said respondent therefrom, and is of the same nature as that carried on by several other quiz masters in Chicago, some of whom are said to be attorneys at law.

"3. The sole object of such quizclass work and instruction is to insure, as far as may be, that the applicant taking such course, without regard to his actual knowledge and acquaintance with the fundamentals of the law, shall, by reason of such intensive work under the guidance of said respondent, be enabled successfully to meet the test of said board of law examiners at the subsequent regular examination for admission to the bar. Said respondent is connected with no college or institution giving training to such students, and is not engaged in conducting quiz classes covering specifically or generally any course in any college or institution of learning. Said respondent conducts said quiz course entirely independent of

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