the commencement of the will and in the testimonium clause. Shortly before her death the deceased delivered this will, inclosed in a sealed envelop, to a Mr. Fisher, telling him she wanted him to manage for her, and it remained in his custody unopened until after her death. From the affidavit of Mr. Fisher, who was one of the executors, it appeared that both the subscribing witnesses were dead; that the will was written by one of the attesting witnesses, who was the schoolmaster at the place where the deceased resided; and that he, Mr. Fisher, believed the word "Barrall" was written by mistake for "Clarke." The court said: "There is enough to show that the will is really that of the person whose it professes to be. Her mark at the foot or end of it is a sufficient execution, and what somebody else wrote against that mark cannot vitiate it." In Reed V. Hendrix (Reed V. Whaley) (1918) 180 Ky. 57, L.R.A. 1918E, 423, 201 S. W. 482, it appeared that the will of Nancy Wilson Hendrix was signed as follows: "Nancy

"In the case at bar the identity of the testatrix who caused the will to be prepared, and who executed it as her will, is not questioned. The opening clause of the paper and the attesting clause recite that it is the will of Nancy Wilson Hendrix, and the second clause thereof makes provision for those who are of kin to Mrs. Hendrix. Moreover, the identity of the paper is shown by Crouch, who recognized it as the paper he witnessed. Mrs. Hendrix's maiden name was Nancy Wilson, and she was usually called Nancy Wilson Hendrix. But, under the authorities, if she had signed it 'Nancy Wilson' it would have been a valid signature. The mistake of the draftsman, therefore, in adding thereto the name of Whaley, did not invalidate it."

A signature by mark is held to be sufficient, although the testator knows how to write. Re Canterbury (1917) 198 Mich. 743, 165 N. W. 747; Sheehan v, Kearney (1903) 82 Miss. 688, 35 L.R.A. 102, 21 So. 41; St. Louis

v.

Hospital Asso. v. Williams (1854) 19 Mo. 611; Main Ryder (1877) 84 Pa. 217; Taylor v. Dening (1838) 3 Nev. & P. 228, 8 Ad. & El. 94, 112 Eng. Reprint, 771, 1 W. W. & H. 148, 7 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 137, 2 Jur. 775.

In the case of Re Canterbury (Mich.) supra, it was said: "We have no hesitation in reaching the conclusion that a will executed by a testator who can write, by affixing his mark, his signature having been written by another at his direction, is as validly executed as if he himself had written his signature with his own hand."

Where the statute allows a signature by mark "when the person cannot write," it has been held to include all persons who are unable to write from any cause, even though they know how to write. Re Guilfoyle (1892) 96 Cal. 598, 22 L.R.A. 370, 31 Pac. 553.

The Louisiana Code requires that in cases of nuncupative wills by public act, if the testator signs by mark, he must expressly declare his inability to sign. Shannon v. Shannon (1861) 16 La. Ann. 8; Carroll's Succession (1876) 28 La. Ann. 388; Crouzeilles's Succession (1901) 106 La. 442, 31 So. 64. This provision has been held to be complied with by a statement as follows: "In faith whereof said testator, said witnesses, and I, said notary, have each subscribed our names in presence of each other, on the day and date, and at the time of taking said last will and testament, the said testator declared unto me, notary, in presence of said witnesses, not being able to sign his name on account of nervousness, has made his mark." Crouzeilles's Succession (La.) supra. It has been held that the provision was not complied with, however, by a statement that "the said testatrix, being illiterate, has made her mark," for the reason that a person may be illiterate and still be Carroll's able to sign his own name. Succession (1876) 28 La. Ann. 388. To the same effect is Whittington's Succession (1874) 26 La. Ann. 89.

Under the Pennsylvania Act of 1833, providing that every will shall

be in writing, and, unless the person making the same shall be prevented by the extremity of his last sickness, shall be signed by him at the end thereof, or by some person in his presence and by his express direction, and in all cases shall be proved by the oaths or affirmations of two or more competent witnesses, otherwise such will shall be of no effect, it was held that a will could not be properly signed by the mark of the testator. Asay v. Hoover (1846) 5 Pa. 21, 45 Am. Dec. 713; Grabill v. Barr (1847) 5 Pa. 441, 47 Am. Dec. 418. See Cavett's Appeal (1844) 8 Watts & S. (Pa.) 21, 42 Am. Dec. 262. But in Flanning's Will (1855) 24 Pa. 502, the Pennsylvania supreme court held that a testator could sign by mark under a California statute which provided that no will (excepting nuncupative wills) "shall be valid unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by some person in his presence and by his express direction, and attested by two or more competent witnesses subscribing their names to the will in the presence of the testator;" and, in referring to the different rule in Pennsylvania, said: "Our Statute of Wills may be sufficiently different to have called for a different construction. But, if it were not so, we can hardly be expected to charge our peculiarities upon other people, and especially since they have been disowned in our legislature." The Pennsylvania rule, above noted, that a mark was not a valid signature, was changed by the Act of January 27, 1848, which expressly provides that a will may be signed by mark. Long v. Zook (1850) 13 Pa. 400; Burford v. Burford (1857) 29 Pa. 221; Main v. Ryder (1877) 84 Pa. 217; Knox's Estate (1890) 131 Pa. 220, 6 L.R.A. 353, 17 Am. St. Rep. 798, 18 Atl. 1021; Lees's Estate (1887) 5 Pa. Co. Ct. 396. See Vernon v. Kick (1858) 30 Pa. 218. In so far as it affected the will of a person who had died before the statute was passed, the Act of 1848 has been held to be unconstitutional as a deprivation of property without due process of law. Greenough v. Greenough (1849) 11 Pa. 489, 51 Am.

Dec. 567, followed in Shinkle v. Crock (1851) 17 Pa. 159; McCarty v. Hoffman (1854) 23 Pa. 507.

In Missouri, under an old statute, it has been held that a mark cannot be accepted as the signature of a will, where the testator's name is also signed to the will, by another, at the testator's direction or request. St. Louis Hospital Asso. V. Williams (1854) 19 Mo. 609; Northcutt V.

Northcutt (1854) 20 Mo. 266; St. Louis Hospital Asso. V. Weyman (1855) 21 Mo. 17; Simpson v. Simpson (1858) 27 Mo. 288. See also Pool v. Buffum (1869) 3 Or. 438, which comments on the Missouri decisions.

Where the testator made his mark, and another signed the testator's name to the will, but it did not appear whether he signed it at the request of the testator, it was held that the testator's mark would be considered as the signature. Pool v. Buffum (Or.) supra.

In California a statute (Civ. Code, § 1276) provides, among other requisites to the execution of a written will other than holographic, as follows: "It must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself, or some person in his presence and by his direction must subscribe his name thereto." Another statute (§ 1278) contains the following provision: "A person who subscribes the testator's name, by his direction, must write his own name as a witness to the will. But a violation of this section does not affect the validity of the will." It has been held that a signature by mark to a will was sufficient, where it appeared that the testatrix was, by reason of illness, unable at the time to write her name, and requested her legal adviser and one of the persons named as executors to write her name, which he did, adding the words "her mark," and the testatrix then made a cross (X) in the space left between her given name and her surname, and the three witnesses signed the attestation clause, and also signed their names under the words "Witnesses to mark," also written by her legal adviser, who did not, however, write his own name

on the paper, as witness or otherwise. Re Dombrowski (1912) 163 Cal. 290, 125 Pac. 233.

In a case wherein it appeared that a testator signed his name to the will, and acknowledged it before the attesting witnesses, who subscribed it as such, and the testator then placed a mark between his Christian name and surname, it was held that the placing of the mark was wholly unnecessary. Sechrest v. Edwards (1862) 4 Met. (Ky.) 163.

When the testator signs the will by making his mark, he signs and executes the will himself, although his name is subscribed by another at his request. Re Clark (1915) 170 Cal. 418, 149 Pac. 828; Points v. Nier (1916) 91 Wash. 20, 157 Pac. 44, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1046; Wilson v. Craig (1915) 86 Wash. 465, 150 Pac. 1179, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 871. See also Campbell v. McGuiggan (1896) N. J. —, 34 Atl. 383.

In Flynn v. Flynn (1918) 283 III. 206, 119 N. E. 304, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 1034, it seemed to be taken for granted that a testator's mark was a satisfactory signature to a will, the question being whether the signature was satisfactory where the attesting witnesses could not testify that the testator made the mark himself. The probate of the will was upheld.

The fact that a testator is aided in directing the movements of his hand when his mark is made does not invalidate the execution of a will.

Pricket's Estate (1852) 1 Phila. 306; Main v. Ryder (1877) 84 Pa. 217. Washington.-Points v. Nier (1916) 91 Wash. 20, 157 Pac. 44, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1046.

England.

Wilson v. Beddard (1841) 12 Sim. 28, 59 Eng. Reprint, 1041, 10 L. J. Ch. N. S. 305, 5 Jur. 624.

A will has been held to be properly executed where the testatrix, who had dropped her pen, was assisted by her attorney in making her mark, although in health she could write. Re Jernberg (Minn.) supra. See to the same effect, Re Golicki (1921) 116 Misc. 100, 190 N. Y. Supp. 266, where, in addition, the testator's mark appeared, unaccompanied by his name.

In Points v. Nier (Wash.) supra, it was held that the fact that a testatrix, who signed her name by mark, did so with assistance, did not make it the less her signature.

Pricket's Estate (1852) 1 Phila. (Pa.) 306, was decided under a peculiar statute providing that every will should be in writing, and, unless the person making the same should be prevented by the extremity of his sickness, should be signed by the testator at the end thereof, or by some person in his presence and by his express direction. There was held to be no valid execution under such a statute, where the testator was able to indicate a desire to sign his will, and in accordance with this indication another guided his hand while he made his mark. Compare with Cozzens's Will (1869) 61 Pa. 196, and Main v. Ryder (Pa.) supra.

III. Signature by Christian name. A will signed by the Christian name only may be valid, if it is sufficiently shown that the testator intended it as a signature. Knox's Estate (1890) 131 Pa. 220, 6 L.R.A. 353, 17 Am. St. Rep. 798, 18 Atl. 1021, wherein it appeared that the will was written in the form of a letter, and, while addressed to no one, was apparently intended for the testatrix's mother; and it further appeared that the testatrix lived apart from her husband, and had a repugnance to using

his name. The court, in discussing the question what is a sufficient signature, said: "So the form which a man customarily uses to identify and bind himself in writing is his signature, whatever shape he may choose to give it. There is no requirement that it shall be legible, though legibility is one of the prime objects of writing. It is sufficient if it be such as he usually signs; and the signature of neither Rufus Choate nor General Spinner could be rejected, though no man, unaided, could discover what the ragged marks made by either of those two eminent personages were intended to represent. Nor is there any fixed requirement how much of the full name shall be written. Custom varies with time and place, and habit with the whim of the individual. Sovereigns write only their first names, and the Sovereign of Spain, more royally still, signs his decrees only, 'I the King' (Yo el Rey). English peers now sign their titles only, though they be geographical names, like Devon or Stafford, as broad as a county. The great Bacon wrote his name, 'Fr. Verulam,' and the ordinary signature of the poet philosopher of fishermen was 'Iz: Wa:' In the fifty-six signatures to the most solemn instrument of modern times, the Declaration of Independence, we find every variety from "Th. Jefferson,' to the unmistakably identified 'Charles Carroll of Carrollton.' In the present day it is not uncommon for business men to have a signature for checks and banking purposes somewhat different from that used in their ordinary business; and in familiar correspondence signature by initials, or nickname, or diminutive is probably the general practice. What, therefore, shall constitute a sufficient signature must depend largely on the custom of the time and place, the habit of the individual, and the circumstances of each particular case."

In Cartwright v. Cartwright (1923) 158 Ark. 278, 250 S. W. 11, involving the probate of a letter offered as a testamentary instrument, the signature was simply "Lus.," an abbreviated form of Luster, the writer's

As to the sufficiency of a signature by the Christian name alone, under the civil law, see the discussion and citations in Bradford's Succession (1909) 124 La. 44, 49 So. 972, 18 Ann. Cas. 766.

IV. Signature by initials.

It has been held that a will is sufficiently signed by the initials of the testator if he intends his initials to be his signature. In Savory's Goods (1851) 15 Jur. (Eng.) 1042. See McBride v. McBride, 26 Gratt. (Va.) 476. A seal with the testator's initials engraved thereon was held to be a sufficient signature in Emerson's Goods (1882) Ir. Rep. 9 C. L. 443.

In Pilcher v. Pilcher (1915) 117 Va. 356, L.R.A.1915D, 903, 84 S. E. 667, the validity of a holographic will, at the end of which the writer, in order to authenticate the paper, had attached his initials by way of signature, instead of his full name, was upheld. The court said: "Va. Code 1904, § 2514, reads as follows: 'No will shall be valid unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by some other person in his presence and by his direction, in such manner as to make it manifest that the name is intended as a signature; and moreover, unless it be wholly written by the testator, the signature shall be made or the will acknowledged by him in the presence of at least two competent witnesses, present at the same time; and such witnesses shall subscribe the will in the presence of the testator, but no form of attestation shall be necessary.' It will be observed that the statute makes no distinction in the character of the signature, or what constitutes a sufficient signature, be

tween holograph and attested wills. It gives precisely the same force and effect to the former that it accords to the latter. By force of the statute one is made the equivalent of the other, though the manner of proving the two kinds of instruments is different; nevertheless, each possesses the same authenticity. Now all the authorities, English and American (including the quære in McBride v. McBride (Va.) supra), agree that, if this will had been attested, it would have been well signed under the English statute. Therefore, being holograph, it must follow that it is well signed under the Virginia statute, since that statute does not require attestation in such case. Nor does the Virginia statute define what shall constitute a 'signature,' but only prescribes that the will shall be signed 'in such manner as to make it manifest that the name is intended as a signature.' No dictionary,

so far as we are advised, restricts the meaning of 'signature' to a written name; therefore, according to these definitions, what constitutes a signature must largely depend upon the circumstances of each particular case, though in all cases the intent is a vital factor. Whatever symbol is employed, it must appear that it 'is intended as a signature.' Although, as remarked, there is no decision of this court directly in point, authority in this country is abundant for the proposition that the use of his initials by a testator animo signandi is a sufficient signing of his name.

Adverting for a moment to the facts: We have before us a paper which, though exceedingly brief, is distinctly testamentary in character and terms, and by which the disposition of the property, in the circumstances, was a natural one. Testator was a lawyer in full possession of his mental faculties, and there is no question that the paper was wholly written by him, and signed with his initials. at the appropriate place for his signature-the end of the instrument. Immediately before the paper was written, testator said to his wife and her sister, Mrs. Woods, 'I am going 31 A.L.R.-44.

to make my will;' and after it was written, holding the paper up, he said: 'Girls, this is my will. I have left Allie everything I have.' In response to Mrs. Wood's comment on the brevity of the document, he remarked, "The shorter, the better.' When she called attention to the use of his initials, he replied, 'Why, that is as good a will as any man can make; that will hold in any court-almost a mark will go, Bell.' He then said to Mrs. Woods: 'I want you to preserve this. That is my will. I have left everything to Alice. I want you to see that she takes care of it.' This evidence, and it is uncontradicted, plainly establishes testamentary intent, and that the initials were used animo signandi. . . We entertain no doubt, either from the standpoint of reason or authority, that the writing in controversy was executed in substantial compliance with the statute, and, as the chancery court held, is the true last will and testament of Edwin Pilcher, deceased."

In the case of Re Severance (1916) 96 Misc. 384, 161 N. Y. Supp. 452, it appeared that at the foot of the printed form of will used by the testator there was a dotted line, followed by the letters "L. S." in brackets, and intended for his signature. But, instead of signing it, the testator, near the end of the line and partially covering the initials. the initials "L. S.," affixed a wafer seal, printed in colors and containing the inscription, "Merry Christmas. American Red Cross. 1912 Happy New Year," and wrote on this seal the inscription, "C S Seal C S." The court said: "If the testator intended this holiday seal with his inscription upon it as a signature, and adopted it as such, I think it satisfies the requirements of the statute that a will must be subscribed by the testator. It is well settled that a subscription by making a mark, and without any written name, is a compliance with the requirements of the statute (Jackson V. Jackson (1868) 39 N. Y. 153), and it would seem logical to say that a signature by initials is entitled to as much respect as a signature by mark. . . .