The appellee, therefore, had a right to require the payment of the license or tax for each motor car operated by the appellant in such street railway business within the city."

But in East St. Louis v. Bux (1892) 43 Ill. App. 276, it was held that power given by charter to a city council to "license, tax, or regulate trackmen and all others pursuing like occupations" was limited to licensing and regulating the business of common carrier wholly within the city. It appeared that an East St. Louis ordinance provided: "No person shall engage in or follow the occupation of transporting goods, merchandise, or other property in any vehicle, or shall keep, own, or use any vehicle for the purpose of carrying goods, merchandise or other property from one place to another within the city of East St. Louis or from places within to places without, or from places without to places within the city, without having obtained a license therefor from the city." It appeared that the defendant carried on the business of carrier of goods for hire in Belleville under a license issued to him there, and occasionally carried goods to and from other cities. The only load hauled in East St. Louis was that on the occasion of his arrest in the present case for failure to show a license to engage in the business of common carrier in East St. Louis. The defendant did not advertise his business in the plaintiff city, or have any of his vehicles there for the purpose. The court held that the city could not hold the defendant liable for the license tax sought to be exacted, and stated its conclusion as follows: "It is quite evident the power granted is limited to the licensing, taxing, and regulating of the business or vocation of common carriers within a city, and the penalty referred to in § 668 is intended to be imposed upon those only who engage in, or carry on, the business of common carriers within the city of East St. Louis without a license."

So, it has been held in Illinois that an express company whose business was not carrying express matter from one place to another within a city for

hire, but the receiving and delivering there of matter transported for hire to the city from outside points, and from the city to places beyond its limits, was not included in the class and vocation of expressmen within the meaning of a statute empowering cities to license, tax, and regulate hackmen, expressmen, and all others pursuing like occupations, and to prescribe their compensation; and that an ordinance making it unlawful for persons carrying on an express business within the city without a license did not apply to such an express business, and that it could not be held liable to pay the license fee or penalty imposed. Cairo v. Adams Exp. Co. (1894) 54 Ill. App. 87.

In Opdyke v. Anniston (1918) 16 Ala. App. 436, 78 So. 634, a carrier engaged in the business of interurban transportation of passengers for hire. was held to be liable for failure to pay the city the license tax for the privilege of operating within the city limits. The case was tried without a jury on the following agreed statement of facts: "That defendant has been operating a motor car for hire during the year 1918, said car having a seating capacity of ten passengers or more, and that the defendant is hired to run said motor car by the Dixie Transfer & Truck Company, a corporation, whose principal place of business is at Oxford, Alabama, and that said car has been run by the defendant wherever customers desired to be transported, provided satisfactory agreement to do so could be reached. That it has no place of business in Anniston, but takes on and lets off passengers along the streets of Anniston as it does elsewhere along the public highways of the county. Said car is operated for hire, among other places, between Anniston, Alabama, and Camp McClellan, Alabama, carrying passengers from Camp McClellan to Anniston, and from Anniston to Camp McClellan, during the year, and also carrying passengers from Oxford, and to and from various places in the state of Alabama, including Jacksonville, Piedmont, Gadsden, and Talladega, Alabama, and that the said cor

poration paid a license tax to the town of Oxford for the year 1918." The city council of Anniston adopted an ordinance requiring a license tax on certain "businesses, vocations, occupations, and professions engaged in or carried on in the city of Anniston," and specified several business occupations, including "automobile or motor car for hire having a seating capacity of ten persons or more, $30." The decision of the court classed the carrier as one doing business within the city, and held the defendant subject to the license tax. The court said: "The company was doing business in Anniston, and subject to the license tax imposed. .

The fact that its principal place of business is in Oxford would not prevent it from doing business in Anniston in such manner as to render it liable to a license in the latter city."

In Young v. Campbellsville (1923) 199 Ky. 284, 250 S. W. 979, it appeared that the appellants operated motor vehicles as common carriers between Columbia and Campbellsville, Kentucky, and plied their business at the railroad station in Campbellsville. The court stated the facts and law as follows: "Appellants, who operated the motor vehicles for carrying passengers and freight to and from the city of Campbellsville, came to the depot and there solicited patronage, loaded up their vehicles, and returned to Columbia, stopping at intermediate points. Manifestly, appellants do business in the city limits of Campbellsville. They ply their regular calling at the depot in that city. In fact, most of their business originates there. Being engaged in business in the city of Campbellsville, they were subject to all ordinances of that municipality applicable to other persons engaged in similar business there. The mere fact that they resided at Columbia did not relieve them from liability for the license taxes imposed upon persons owning and operating motor vehicles in the city of Campbellsville."

In Gulfport & M. C. Traction Co. v. Biloxi (1921) 125 Miss. 626, 88 So. 173, the municipality was allowed to recover a license tax from an interur

ban railway. The record showed that the carrier held a franchise as an ordinary local street railway, but also engaged in carrying passengers on interurban lines. Within the city the carrier transported passengers from place to place and otherwise operated as a local street railway. A municipal ordinance provided: "Street Cars.On each individual, firm or corporation operating a street or interurban car line, on each mile or fraction thereof, $30." The court held that the recovery of the license fee should be sustained on the ground that the carrier operated a local street railway as well as an interurban car line.

Leavenworth v. Ewing (1909) 80 Kan. 58, 101 Pac. 664, arose under a Kansas statute authorizing a municipality to levy and collect license taxes on callings and occupations carried on and operated within the limits of the city, including express companies and agencies. A city ordinance of the plaintiff city provided that express companies or agencies, together with other callings and business occupations, should pay certain license taxes. The defendant, as agent of the United States Express Company, failed to procure the license and was convicted. The defendant contended that the business was not one carried on in Leavenworth, but between Leavenworth and other cities, and even in other states. The evidence showed that the express company had an office and local conveyances in the city of Leavenworth, that it made contracts there for the transportation of goods, and that it carried goods between the office and customers. The court held that the defendant was subject to the license tax on the grounds that the carrier carried on a sufficient volume of business to constitute a business within the city, and that the statute delegated to the city the power to tax the business which the state might have taxed.

So, an express company was held to be subject to a municipal license tax in Southeastern Exp. Co. v. Charlotte (1923) 186 N. C. 668, 120 S. E. 475. The city ordinance exacted a license fee from businesses using the streets,

and applied the proceeds to the repair and upkeep of the streets. But in Plymouth v. Cooper (1904) 135 N. C. 1, 47 S. E. 129, wherein the municipality was authorized to lay taxes for municipal purposes on all persons, property, privileges, and subjects within the corporate limits, an ordinance providing for a license fee on livery stables and persons keeping horses for hire, or doing any delivery business in the town, and stating that it should include any person making contracts for hire in the town, or carrying any person "with a vehicle out of the town for hire," was held unreasonable and beyond the power of the town to pass, so that there could be no conviction of one who resided in another town, where he carried on a livery business, although he drove into the town which passed the ordinance, in pursuance of a contract made outside of that town, took a passenger, and carried him from that town to the town where his stable was situated.

Power denied.

In each of the following cases the power of a municipality to impose a license fee or tax on an interurban carrier was denied, the decision being based in part on the nature and extent of the operations within the municipality and in part on the extent of the charter power: McDonald v. Paragould (1915) 120 Ark. 226, 179 S. W. 335; Argenta v. Keath (1917) 130 Ark. 334, L.R.A.1918B, 888, 197 S. W. 686; Re Smith (1917) 33 Cal. App. 161, 164 Pac. 618 (compare Sacramento v. California Stage Co. (1859) 12 Cal. 134); Com. v. Stodder (1848) 2 Cush. (Mass.) 562, 48 Am. Dec. 679; St. Charles v. Nolle (1872) 51 Mo. 122, 11 Am. Rep. 440 (compare Joslin Transfer & Storage Co. v. Carterville (1911) 160 Mo. App. 186, 141 S. W. 705); Carterville v. Blystone (1911) 160 Mo. App. 191, 141 S. W. 701; Cary v. North Plainfield (1886) 49 N. J. L. 110, 7 Atl. 42, affirmed in (1887) 50 N. J. L. 176, 17 Atl. 1103; Morristown-Madison Auto Bus Co. v. Madison (1913) 85 N. J. L. 59, 88 Atl. 829. See the reported case (PARKER V. SILVERTON, ante, 589).

The power of a municipality to tax is denied in the reported reported case (PARKER V. SILVERTON), wherein it appeared that the plaintiff was engaged as an interurban carrier of passengers for hire between Salem and Silverton, Oregon, by means of motor busses, and received and discharged passengers in the usual way within the defendant city. An ordinance was adopted by the defendant city prohibiting the operation of any carrier or the receiving and discharging of passengers on the public streets of the city, except upon payment to the city of a license fee of $300 per annum for each vehicle. The ordinance by its terms was made applicable to interurban as well as local carriers. The Oregon statute (Laws Sp. Sess. 1921, chap. 371, § 26) provided that the payment of the state license tax by transportation companies should be in lieu of all other taxes or fees to be exacted by the state, or by any municipality within the state, except for necessary and reasonable police regulations. The state license tax having been duly paid, the plaintiff operated busses between the cities of Salem and Silverton, passed over the streets of the defendant city, received and discharged passengers on the city streets in the usual way, refused to pay the city license fee, and brought action to enjoin the city from enforcing the regulation. The court holds that a municipality may not, in the absence of special statute delegating such power, exact a further license fee from carriers not operating wholly within the corporate limits of the city; that in the present case there was no such delegation of authority, but, on the contrary, such power rested in the state public service commission, which had authorized the carrier to engage in the business; and that the plaintiff, conducting his business of interurban carrier in the usual and customary way, was not subject to the license tax imposed by the defendant.

In Re Smith (1917) 33 Cal. App. 161, 164 Pac. 618, the facts and the conclusion were stated by the court as follows: "An ordinance of the city of Tropico, . among other things,

contained a provision in effect making it unlawful, without first obtaining a license so to do, for any person to operate or carry on the business of operating any auto bus or motor vehicle over the streets of said city in carrying passengers for hire from one point to another, both of which points are outside the boundaries thereof. Upon a complaint charging petitioner with the violation of this ordinance, in that on November 21, 1916, he did 'unlawfully operate a motor vehicle engaged in the business of carrying passengers for hire, which said motor vehicle was then and there operated and run over a particular route and between particular points, to wit, between the city of Bakersfield and the city of Los Angeles, through the city of Tropico and over San Fernando boulevard, a public street in said city, without first paying a license fee and obtaining a license therefor from said city of Tropico, contrary to the provisions of Ordinance No. 119 of said city,' a warrant was issued, upon which he was arrested and held in custody by the city marshal. Petitioner contends that the provision of said ordinance with the violation of which he is charged is invalid. While, under its police power, such city may adopt and compel the observance of all reasonable measures intended for the regulation of traffic over the streets by all persons operating motor vehicles thereon, its sole power to levy a tax of this character is found in subdivision 10, § 862, of the charter for cities of the sixth class (Deering's Gen. Laws, 1915 ed. p. 1123), which provides that the board of trustees of said city shall have power to license, for the purpose of revenue and regulation, all and every kind of business authorized by law and transacted and carried on in such city or town, and all shows, exhibitions, and lawful games carried on therein; to fix the rates of license tax upon the same, and to provide for the collection of the same by suit or otherwise.' Under this provision the power of the city to impose a license upon a business is clearly limited to that only which is 'transacted and carried on in such city.' . . . The

business conducted by petitioner, as alleged in violation of the ordinance, is that of transporting passengers for hire, not in the city, but between termini both of which are outside thereof. . . . It cannot be said that the carrying of passengers for hire from Los Angeles to Bakersfield by means of a motor vehicle operated over the public highway, a part of which extends through Tropico, where no stops are made, nor any of the incidental acts of such transportation performed other than traveling along the streets, constitutes a business 'transacted and carried on in such city.' . . . While the use of the streets may be regulated, the city has no power to convert them into toll roads and thus exact tribute from those who, in the conduct of business elsewhere, have occasion to use them solely as highways. . . The provision of the ordinance in question for the violation of which petitioner is deprived of his liberty is invalid." The earlier case of Sacramento v. California Stage Co. (1859) 12 Cal. 134, seems inconsistent with that last cited. That case was an action to recover a license tax claimed under the provisions of a city ordinance. The defendant stagecoach company engaged as an interurban carrier was held liable for the license tax imposed by the city of Sacramento. The ordinance in question provided as follows: "Every person, company, corporation, or copartnership firm engaged in the business of carrying passengers to and from the city of Sacramento, for hire, by means of stage or stages, coach or coaches, or other modes of land conveyance, shall pay for a license to do the same." The defendant carried passengers for hire by stagecoach between Sacramento, solicited its business there, received and discharged passengers within the city limits, and in general made Sacramento the chief place of business. In allowing the city to exact the license fee, the court said: "Under a provision of the city charter, the authorities have power to levy and collect a license tax on theaters, and on trades, professions, and business,' etc. Under this section of the charter, they im

posed the tax on the defendants, who are a company whose office and place of business is in the city, but whose business is the carriage of passengers from and to the city. . . The company receive and discharge their passengers, and make contracts here for their conveyance, and they have their offices and property here, within the protection of the municipal laws. The mere fact that the business of carrying the passengers is not within the municipal limits does not make the receiving and discharging of them and for contracting for them less a business here. If this business is not a business in Sacramento, it is difficult to say where it is. The company have as much need of the protection of the laws of the corporation, and are as much interested in the police expendi tures, especially for streets, roads, etc., as any other persons, and we think are within the words and spirit of the taxing power."

It was held in McDonald v. Paragould (1915) 120 Ark. 226, 179 S. W. 335, that the defendant, operating an automobile for hire between two places, could not be required to pay a license tax to the plaintiff city. The evidence showed that the defendant resided in the plaintiff city, owned an automobile upon which he paid the state license fee, and was engaged in the business of carrying passengers for hire from the city of Paragould to the town of Walcott, 12 miles distant, and from Walcott back to Paragould. It also appeared that he carried passengers to other places outside of the city, but at no time carried persons for hire from one point to another within the city limits. A city ordinance of Paragould provided that "every person owning, keeping or running any hackney coach, automobile or any other vehicle or conveyance for the transportation of passengers for hire within the limits of the city of Paragould is hereby required to take out and procure a license from the city clerk for each hackney coach, automobile or other vehicle or conveyance so used." The court held that the ordinance, properly construed, applied only to the trans

portation of passengers for hire within the limits of the city. The court said: "The ordinance, properly construed, means only to require the owner or keeper of an automobile 'for the transportation of passengers for hire within the limits of the city' to pay the license fee. . The appellant did not keep or operate his automobile for the transportation of persons for hire from and to points within the city. . . . He was not using it for the transportation of passengers for hire within the limits of the city, in violation of the ordinance."

The case of Argenta v. Keath (1917) 130 Ark. 334, L.R.A.1918B, 888, 197 S. W. 686, held that a statute (Ark. Acts 1911, p. 94) empowering a municipality to regulate the use of motor vehicles on its streets did not authorize the municipality to exact a license tax from automobiles for hire operated between the appellant city and another city, or through it between other municipalities. A city ordinance of the appellant city provided that all motor vehicles used as carriers should be licensed and pay a quarterly fee to use the streets of the city. It appeared that the appellee operated a motor bus between Little Rock and Fort Roots, passing through the city of Argenta en route. No passengers were transported from place to place within Argenta. Applying the rule in McDonald v. Paragould (Ark.) supra, the court said: "The legislature did not intend . . . to delegate to municipal corporations the power to make and enforce ordinances, rules, and regulations affecting motor vehicles which are used only for traffic from points within the city to points without, and vice versa, or to and from points without the city limits, but passing through the city en route, and which are not at any time used for traffic between points within the city."

The petitioner in Morristown-Madison Auto Bus Co. v. Madison (1913) 85 N. J. L. 59, 88 Atl. 829 (certiorari to review an ordinance for the licensing of hackmen and others), was convicted of operating a motor bus for hire between Madison and Morristown, New Jersey, without a license