Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900, 14 N. C. C. A. 597, and Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart (U. S.) supra. They rely especially upon Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia (1921) 257 U. S. 233, 66 L. ed. 210, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 89; Grant-SmithPorter Ship Co. v. Rohde (1921) 257 U. S. 469, 66 L. ed. 321, 25 A.L.R. 1008, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 157, and State Industrial Commission V. Nordenholt Corp. (1921) 259 U. S. 263, 66 L. ed. 933, 25 A.L.R. 1013, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 473, 21 N. C. C. A. 862." And after reviewing the decisions, the court said, in conclusion: "None of the later cases depart from the doctrine of Southern P. Co. V. Jensen, and Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, and we think the provisions of the Act of 1922 cannot be reconciled therewith. Without doubt Congress has power to alter, amend, or revise the maritime law by statutes of general application, embodying its will and judgment. This power, we think, would permit enactment of a general employers' liability law, or general provisions for compensating injured employees; but it may not be delegated to the several states. The grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction looks to uniformity; otherwise, wide discretion is left to Congress. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart. Exercising another power, -to regulate commerce,-Congress has prescribed the liability of interstate carriers by railroad for damages to employees (Act April 22, 1908, chap. 149, 35 Stat. at L. 65, Comp. Stat. § 8657, 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 1208), and thereby abrogated conflicting local rules. New York C. R. Co. v. Winfield (1917) 244 U. S. 147, 61 L. ed. 1045, L.R.A.1918C, 439, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 546, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1139," 14 N. C. C. A. 680. This cause presents a situation where there was no attempt to prescribe general rules. On the contrary, the manifest purpose was to permit any state to alter the maritime law, and thereby introduce conflicting requirements. To prevent this result the Constitution adopted the law of the sea as the measure of maritime rights and obligations. The confusion and difficulty, if vessels were compelled to comply with the local

statutes at every port, are not difficult to see. Of course, some within the states may prefer local rules; but the Union was formed with the very definite design of freeing maritime commerce from intolerable restrictions incident to such control. The subject is national. Local interests must yield to the common welfare. The Constition is supreme."

And the decision in Farrel v. Waterman S. S. Co. (1923) 286 Fed. 284, set out in the prior annotation, at page 1042, where the amendment of June 10, 1922, to the Judicial Code, was held unconstitutional, was affirmed on reargument in (1923) 291 Fed. 604, the court holding that Congress has no power to lessen the jurisdiction conferred by the provision of the Constitution for jurisdiction as "to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."

And in the Canadian Farmer (1923) 290 Fed. 601, the Amendment of June 10, 1922, of the Judicial Code, was held unconstitutional in the case of an injury to one while working on a vessel, unloading. The court there said: "Concededly, Congress has full general power to change the form of remedies, determine procedure, and define and declare the maritime law as it shall be administered in the United States. If it chooses to so define and classify claims as to make some nonmaritime, no doubt its action would be effectual. This is very different from leaving a class of claims within the maritime field, and providing that sometimes the district courts may take jurisdiction, and sometimes not, dependent upon whether the states in which the districts are located have provided other remedies."

And the Canadian Farmer Case was relied on in Bloom v. FurnessWithy & Co. (1923) 293 Fed. 98, in holding the amendment of June, 1922, above referred to, invalid in so far as it attempted to deprive the district court of admiralty jurisdiction which it before possessed.

And the same amendment was held unconstitutional in The Mercedes de Larrinaga (1923) 293 Fed. 251, where

would not have jurisdiction over the action against the vessel given by the maritime law, because the act provides that 'the jurisdiction of the district courts shall not extend to causes arising out of injuries to or death of persons other than the master or members of the crew, for which compensation is provided by the workmen's compensation law of any state.' I am of the opinion that under the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and on account of the constitutional requirement that the jurisdiction of the Federal courts in admiralty matters shall be exclusive, the statute is unconstitutional."

the court said: "It seems clear from the history of the clause relating to commerce, and also the clause relating to admiralty jurisdiction, that the Congress exceeded its power in passing the Act of June 10, 1922. It is true that the Constitution does not require inferior Federal courts to be established (U. S. Const. art. 3, § 1), and that their jurisdiction may be changed from time to time (25 C. J. 690, and cases cited; Sheldon v. Sill (1850) 8 How. (U. S.) 441, 12 L. ed. 1147; Geiger v. Tacoma R. & Power Co. (1905; C. C.) 141 Fed. 169). But the history of the commerce clause and of the admiralty courts, together with the general acquiescence in the situation since 1787, shows that Congress has exceeded its power by trying to give to the states part of its admiralty jurisdiction. Martin v. Hunter (1816) 1 Wheat. (U. S.) 304, 330, 4 L. ed. 97, 103. It has always been held that the state courts have no jurisdiction in admiralty. American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton (1828) 1 Pet. (U. S.) 511, 546, 7 L. ed. 243, 256; Rose, Fed. Jur. & Proc. 2d ed. § 130; The Moses Taylor (1867) 4 Wall. (U. S.) 411, 18 L. ed. 397. And see 3 Warren, Supreme Ct., in United States History, p. 137. A curious result of the statute, evidently not contemplated by Congress, would be that in cases where compensation was granted by a state, all other remedies would be abolished. In the present case the remedy which the libellant seeks against the vessel is entirely independent of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and under § 15 of chapter 152 of the General Laws of Massachusetts the longshoreman may elect this remedy, rather than the compensation provided by the act. As the case at bar is one where compensation is provided for the injuries of the longshoreman, the district court

And in O'Hara's Case (1924) Mass. ----142 N. E. 844, it was held that the Act of Congress of June 10, 1922, chap. 216, 42 Stat. at L. 634, Comp. Stat. §§ 991 (3), 1233, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1922, p. 225, amending § 24, cl. 3 and § 256, cl. 3 of the Judicial Code was inoperative in the cases at bar as the injuries occurred prior to its passage, and the court also called attention to the fact that the amendment had been held unconstitutional.

The amendment of the Judicial Code of October 6, 1917, which was finally decided to be unconstitutional in Knickerbocker Ice Co. Stewart

ས.

(1920) 253 U. S. 149, 64 L. ed. 834, 11 A.L.R. 1145, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 438, 20 N. C. C. A. 635, set out in the earlier annotation, at page 1042, was also held unconstitutional in Sudden & Christenson v. Industrial Acci. Commission (1920) 182 Cal. 437, 188 Pac. 803, on the ground that to give it effect would destroy the uniformity of the maritime law. And the same conclusion was reached in Zurich General Acci. & Liability Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acci. Commission (1923) Cal.

563.

218 Pac. J. T. W.

State v. Daniels, 122 La. 261, 47 So. 599; State v. Pointdexter, 117 La. 380, 41 So. 688; State v. Russell, 33 La. Ann. 135; State v. Rohfrischt, 12 La. Ann. 382; State v. Dehart, 109 La. 570, 33 So. 605; State v. Valere, 39 La. Ann. 1061, 3 So. 186; State v. Smith, 5 La. Ann. 341.

The contention that our Anti-trust Law is unconstitutional because one of the objects contained in the body of the act is not in the title is groundless.

State v. Harwick, 133 La. 545, 63 So. 166; State v. Ferguson, 104 La. 249, 81 Am. St. Rep. 123, 28 So. 917; 1 Sutherland, Stat. Constr. p. 199; Shreveport v. Kahn, 136 La. 380, 67 So. 35; Lacoste v. Department of Conservation, 151 La. 909, 92 So. 381; Tremont Lumber Co. v. May, 143 La. 389, 78 So. 650; State v. Dalcourt, 112 La. 422, 36 So. 479; State v. Abrams, 121 La. 550, 46 So. 623; Ruston v. Fountain, 118 La. 53, 42 So. 644; State ex rel. Mioton v. Baker, 112 La. 801, 36 So. 703; Hope v. New Orleans, 106 La. 345, 30 So. 842; State ex rel. Wynne v. Lee, 106 La. 400, 31 So. 14; Allopathic State Medical Examiners v. Fowler, 50 La. Ann. 1358, 24 So. 809; Soniat v. Supple, 48 La. Ann. 296, 19 So. 128; Williams v. Western Star Lodge, 38 La. Ann. 620; State ex rel. Cobb v. Judges Circuit Ct. of Appeal, 32 La. Ann. 774; Hammond v. Lesseps, 31 La. Ann. 337; New Orleans v. Cazelar, 27 La. Ann. 156; Pierson's Case, 44 La. Ann. 90, 10 So. 400.

Messrs. St. Clair Adams, John C. Davey, and Charles A. Byrne, for appellee:

Act 86 of 1890, and particularly § 3 thereof, have been repealed by Act No. 11 of Extra Session 1915, and particularly by 2 thereof, for the reason that said statutes are upon the same subject-matter, and the terms of the former statute are repugnant to and in conflict with the terms of the latter statute; and, furthermore, for the reason that the latter statute contains a repealing clause.

16 C. J. 69; Marr, Crim. Jur. (La.) § 6, p. 14; State v. Clay, 12 La. Ann. 431; State v. O'Conner, 13 La. Ann. 486; State ex rel. Carcass v. Judge of First Dist. Ct. 32 La. Ann. 723; Barnard v. Gall, 43 La. Ann. 961, 10 So. 5; State v. White, 49 La. Ann. 127, 21 So. 141; State v. Callahan, 109 La. 946, 33 So. 931; State v. Hickman, 127 La. 442, 53 So. 680.

An attempt to commit a crime is a separate and distinct offense, consid

ered with reference to the crime itself, involving a separate state of facts and a different definition.

16 C. J. pp. 111-117; 1 Bishop, New Crim. Law, §§ 435, 437; 1 Clark & M. Crimes, 2d ed. p. 177; State v. Harwick, 133 La. 545, 63 So. 166.

Section 3 of the Act of 1890, and § 2 of the Act of 1915, are unconstitutional, because said sections denounce as offenses acts and offenses not set forth or indicated in their titles, and therefore the bodies of said acts are broader than their titles; and are violative of the Constitution.

1 Lewis's Sutherland, Stat. Constr. 2d ed. §§ 102, 120; State ex rel. Lewis v. Pierson, 44 La. Ann. 90, 10 So. 400; State v. Ferguson, 104 La. 249, 81 Am. St. Rep. 123, 28 So. 917; State v. Duson, 130 La. 488, 58 So. 159; State ex rel. Young v. Capdevielle, 135 La. 669, 65 So. 890; State v. Jackson, 137 La. 741, 69 So. 158; Mason v. New Orleans Terminal Co. 143 La. 616, 79 So. 26; State v. Mayfield, 147 La. 994, 86 So. 421.

The term "trade or commerce" as used in § 2 of the Act of 1915 is defined by § 4 of the statute, and its purview is limited and restricted by the definition contained in said section, and, therefore, its meaning cannot be broadened by judicial construction in order to extend to cases not clearly intended by the statute.

Lewis's Sutherland, Stat. Constr. 2d ed. § 422; State v. Gardner, 151 La. 874, 92 So. 369; State ex rel. Moose v. Frank, 114 Ark. 47, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1149, 169 S. W. 333, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 983; Rohlf v. Kasemeier, 140 Iowa, 182, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1284, 132 Am. St. Rep. 261, 118 N. W. 276, 17 Ann. Cas. 750.

The steam laundry business is not 'trade or commerce" within the intendment of § 2 of the Act of 1915, but is a personal service or labor merely.

State ex rel. Moose v. Frank, 114 Ark. 47, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1149, 169 S. W. 333, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 983; Rohlf v. Kasemeier, supra; Com. v. Keystone Laundry Co. 203 Pa. 289, 52 Atl. 326; State ex rel. Star Pub. Co. v. Associated Press, 159 Mo. 410, 51 L.R.A. 151, 81 Am. St. Rep. 368, 60 S. W. 91; State v. Duluth Bd. of Trade, 107 Minn. 506, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1260, 121 N. W. 395; Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, 215 Mo. 421, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 607, 128 Am. St. Rep. 492, 114 S. W. 997; Muir v. Samuels, 110 Ky. 605, 62 S. W. 481; Re White Star Laundry Co. 117 Fed. 570.

Thompson, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

The state appeals from a judgment which sustained a motion to quash the indictment against the defendant. The charge is that the defendant "did unlawfully attempt to monopolize a certain part of the trade and commerce within the limits of this state, to wit, the laundry business in the city of New Orleans."

There are two acts of the legislature (Act 86 of 1890 and Act 11 of the Extra Session of 1915) whose purpose was to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints, combinations, conspiracies, and monopolies. One of the grounds of the motion to quash is that the charge against the defendant is based on Act 86 of 1890, whereas that act was repealed by Act 11 of 1915. It is admitted that the district attorney had before him the Act of 1890 when he prepared the indictment, and this is plainly indicated by the indorsement on the back of the indictment. The language of the indictment, however, follows substantially that of Act 11 of the Extra Session of 1915, and it is to the body of the indictment that we must look to ascertain the crime with which a defendant is charged, rather than to the indorsement, which is no substantive part of the indictment or charge. State v. Pointdexter, 117 La. 380, 41 So. 688; State v. Daniels, 122 La. 261, 47 So. 599.

Indictmenteffect of indorsement.

There can be no doubt that the Act of 1890 was superseded by the Act of 1915. The two acts are inconsistent, the one with the other, in that the latter act makes the crime intended to be denounced a relative felony, while the former made the crime only a misdemeanor. Where two criminal statutes are repugnant as to the punishment that may be inflicted, they cannot stand together. State v. Hickman, 127 La. 442, 53 So. 680. Of course, the defendant could not 31 A.L.R.-34.

Criminal lawrepugnancy of statutes-effect.

be prosecuted under the repealed statute, but, as the indictment follows the language of the later act, it is sufficient, if it is otherwise legal and the defendant is brought within its terms.

Another ground of the motion to quash is that the indictment is bad for uncertainty, because it does not allege or set out in what manner defendant unlawfully attempted to monopolize the laundry business in the city of New Orleans, or what facts and circumstances constituted said attempts to monopolize. It is true that neither the indictment nor the agreed statement of facts informs us of the relation which the defendant bears to the laundry business of New Orleans, and what interest he has therein, whether as owner, lessee, manager, or agent. Nor does the indictment set out in what manner the defendant attempted to bring about a monopoly of the laundry business. Section 10 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of 1921 plainly provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and prosecuting officers would do well more carefully to observe this constitutional requirement; but the rule is well settled that, in prosecutions for purely sufficiencystatutory offenses, statutory it is sufficient for the indictment or information to follow the language of the statute or language equivalent to that used in the statute. State v. Bulloch, 151 La. 594, 92 So. 127. And it is another familiar rule of jurisprudence that, if the indictment does not sufficiently set forth the acts charged against the defendant particularly in matters of description, he waives the defect, if he fails to ask for a bill of particulars. State v. Cleary, 152 La. 265, 92 So. 892; and cases there cited.

Indictment

offense.

waiver of de

fects.

The motion to quash attacks the constitutionality of Act 86 of 1890, on the ground that said act is re