death. They are mere debts due the deceased, for which his administration alone can sue and recover." Claussen v. Claussen (1917) 279 Ill. 99, 116 N. E. 693.

6. Indiana.

Rents which have accrued previously to the death of the lessor are collectable by the personal representative. King v. Anderson (1863) 20 Ind. 385; Dorsett v. Gray (1884) 98 Ind. 273; Watson v. Penn (1886) 108 Ind. 21, 58 Am. Rep. 26, 8 N. E. 636; Lowrey v. Reef (1890) 1 Ind. App. 244, 27 N. E. 626.

Rents which accrued prior to the death of the owner belong to the personal representative, but it is necessary to show that rents did accrue, in order to entitle the administrator to sue for them. Humphries v. Davis (1885) 100 Ind. 369.

Under a statute (Rev. Stat. 1881, § 5223) providing that when a tenant for life, who shall have demised any land, shall die on or after the day when any rent becomes due, his executor or administrator may recover from the undertenant the whole rent due, and if he dies before the day when any rent is to become due the executor or administrator may recover the proportion of rent which accrued before his death, and the remainderman shall recover the residue, it has been held where the lessor, who was a life tenant, died before the lease expired, that his administrator could recover the rent which accrued prior to his death. Henry v. Stevens (1886) 108 Ind. 281, 9 N. E. 356.

7. Iowa.

In Crawford v. Ginn (1872) 35 Iowa, 543, it was held that the administrator is the only person entitled to collect the rents which accrued prior to the death of the landlord, and devote them to the payment of the debts of the estate.

8. Kentucky.

In O'Bannon v. Roberts (1834) 2 Dana, 54, it appeared that the occupant of certain lands of the intestate held under a lease from him. The

court said that all the rents which accrued and became payable in the lifetime of the lessor should go to the administrator exclusively.

9. Maine.

An administratrix may maintain an action to recover rent of land, where the rent accrued previously to the lessor's death. Plummer v. Bowie (1884) 76 Me. 496.

10. Massachusetts.

The rents and profits which accrued before the death of the lessor intestate are personal property and belong to the administrator. Clark v. Seagraves (1904) 186 Mass. 430, 71 N. E. 813.

"If a lessor dies during the term, the rents accrued during his lifetime are personal property, and pass to his administrator." Codman v. American Piano Co. (1918) 229 Mass. 285, 118 N. E. 344.

But it was held in Brigham v. Hunt (1890) 152 Mass. 257, 25 N. E. 468, that there was no Massachusetts statute or common-law right enabling an administrator, without license, to prosecute a real action for rent and for the recovery of the intestate's land obtained by fraud.

11. Missouri.

In Coberly v. Coberly (1905) 189 Mo. 1, 87 S. W. 957, it was held that rents which accrued and became due prior to the death of the lessor did not inure to the benefit of the heirs by descent cast.

12. New Jersey.

It was held in Allen v. Van Houton (1842) 19 N. J. L. 47, that the administrator could not recover a portion of the annual rent which fell due four days after the death of the lessor, but was confined in his recovery to rent which had accrued during the lessor's lifetime.

Where an administrator collects the rents after the death of the landlord, and no objection is offered by the widow or heirs, it must be assumed the rents were due before the death of the landlord and were rightfully received by the administrator as assets. Search v. Search (1876) 27 N. J. Eq. 137.

13. New York.

In Miller v. Crawford (1891) 26 Abb. N. C. 376, 14 N. Y. Supp. 358, in an application for instruction by a receiver of rents of leased real estate of Thaddeus C. Kinnier, deceased, the court said: "The rents of said real estate collected by the receiver are conceded to fall into three classes: First, rents which were payable in advance, and were due on the 1st day of February, 1890, before Kinnier's death. Second, rents which were not payable in advance, and which did not become due until after Kinnier's death, but which were partly earned before his death; and "third, rents which were entirely earned, but which had not been collected when Kinnier died.

Section 6, title e, chap. 6, part 2, of the Revised Statutes (3 Banks, 7th ed. 2295), provides that there shall be included among the property of a decedent's estate which shall be deemed assets and shall pass as such to his executors and administrators as part of the personalty, 'rents reserved to the deceased which had accrued at the time of his death.' . . . There can be no doubt that such administrator is entitled to the rents which were entirely earned, but which had not been collected; . . such rents, in the language of the Revised Statutes, had accrued at the time of his death. I am also of the opinion that the administrator is entitled to the rents which were payable in advance, and which became due . . . three days before the lessor's death. Although payable in advance, the rent was due or had accrued at the time of Kinnier's death, within the meaning of the provision of the Revised Statutes above referred to. It therefore follows, under the provisions of the Revised Statutes, that the administrator of the decedent is entitled to all rents collected by him that had accrued and were unpaid on or before February 4, 1890. As to the rents falling under the second clause above stated, if the Act of 1875 does not apply, it would seem that the common-law rule still prevails."

The holding in the case of Re Foulds

(1901) 35 Misc. 171, 71 N. Y. Supp. 473, was that rent accrued and fully due during the lifetime of the intestate belongs to the administrators as assets of the estate.

14. Ohio.

"If rent has accrued (at the death of the lessor) it goes to the administrator or executor as personal property." Crawford v. Chapman (1848) 17 Ohio, 449.

15. Pennsylvania.

If the person entitled to receive the rent outlives the day on which it becomes due, but dies intestate before it is paid, it will go to his personal representative as a part of his personal estate. Bank of Pennsylvania v. Wise (1834) 3 Watts, 399.

16. South Carolina.

It was decided in Kirkpatrick v. Atkinson (1859) 32 S. C. Eq. (11 Rich.) 27, that the rents and profits which accrued during the lifetime of an intestate belong to the personal representative.

17. Tennessee.

In Rowan v. Riley (1873) 6 Baxt. 67, the court stated the facts and the rule which is applied in Tennessee, as follows: "It appears upon the face of the declaration that a portion of the rents sued for accrued and were due in the lifetime of Elizabeth King, who was the owner of the land; but what portion accrued before, and what portion afterwards, is not stated. The rule is that 'if the landlord dies before the rent becomes due, it goes to the heir as incident to the reversion; but if he dies after it has become payable, it goes to the executor or administrator, as part of the personal estate.'"

It was held in Travis v. Sitz (1916) 135 Tenn. 156, L.R.A.1917A, 671, 185 S. W. 1075, that the heirs at law could not recover rents which had become due during the lifetime of the decedent. See also Rowan v. Riley (1873) 6 Baxt. 67.

18. England.

In Barker v. Talcot (1687) 1 Vern. 473, 23 Eng. Reprint, 600, it appeared

that a son acting as administrator of his father's estate accepted a rent note from a tenant, for rent in arrear on his father's lands. During the period of administration the son died intestate and an administrator de bonis non was appointed for the father's estate. A question arose whether the rent belonged to the representatives of the son or to those of the father. It was held that the rent belonged to the administrator of the son, and not to the administrator de bonis non of the father. The rent note was an alteration of property and constituted payment.

It was held in Dollen v. Batt (1848) 4 C. B. N. S. 760, 140 Eng. Reprint, 1290, 27 L. J. C. P. N. S. 281, 4 Jur. N. S. 835, that where C. leased premises to the defendant, reserving rent to herself, her executors, administrators and assigns, and C. afterwards, by lease and release, conveyed the reversion to D. and another, in trust for the wife of the defendant, the deed containing a power to the trustees to receive and retain their trust expenses, and the defendant underlet the premises, and the trustees assented to his receiving rent in half of his wife, and D., the surviving trustee, died, his widow and administratrix was entitled to recover the arrears of rent accruing in the lifetime of the trustee.

Where a tenant for life made a lease for years, reserving the rent at Lady day and Michaelmas by half-yearly payments, and died on Michaelmas day about 12 o'clock at noon, the rent belonged to the executor, and not to the remainderman. But it was held, that as to rents made under a power of leasing, they still existed, and continued after the death of the lessor in the same manner as they had during his life, and the tenants had until the last instant of those days to pay the rents; and that when the lessor dies before, the rent goes, along with the reversion, to those who are entitled to

fully accrued at sunset, and belonged to the administrator.

b. Where landlord dies testate.

1. United States.

In Boyce v. Grundy (1835) 9 Pet. 275, 9 L. ed. 127, the record showed that in an action against the administrator with will annexed the court appointed a master to take an account of the assets. The master reported no assets except $2,100 received by the administrator as rents of the testator's real estate. The court said that if the rents virtually became the property of the testator during his lifetime, they were to be deemed assets in the hands of the administrator, adding: "We are of opinion that, under all the circumstances, the latter is the predicament in which they are to be viewed, and that the master ought to have reported the sum of $2,100, so received, to be assets."

It appeared in Broadwell v. Banks (1905) 134 Fed. 470, that a testator devised to the plaintiff, his wife, certain leased premises, together with all his personal property remaining after the payment of debts and certain legacies. Action was brought to recover the balance of rents accrued up to the time of the testator's death, and of rents which accrued during the period following the death. It was held that, in the absence of statute to the contrary, the rents which had accrued during the lifetime of the landlord were personal property, and should go to the personal representative as assets of the estate. Such rentals passed to the personal representative absolutely, and not to the heirs at law or to the legatees or beneficiaries under the will.

2. Georgia.

The Georgia statute (Code, § 2279) vests in the personal representative the right to collect and distribute the rents on land leased by the decedent, so far as they accrued before his death. Autrey v. Autrey (1894) 94 Ga. 579, 20 S. E. 431; Strickland v. Thornton (1907) 2 Ga. App. 377, 58 S. E. 540.

3. Indiana.

In McDowell v. Hendrix (1879) 67

The

"It

Ind. 513, 9 Mor. Min. Rep. 96, it appeared that the executor sued for rents and royalties which had matured and become due three months before the death of the testator. court stated the rule as follows: is very clear, we think, that whatever rent or royalty had matured and become due, under the lease in suit, in the lifetime of the appellee's testator, would go to the appellee, as executor, and not to the heirs at law or the devisees of the decedent."

4. Kentucky.

According to the holding in Combs v. Branch (1836) 4 Dana, 547, the personal representative is the only person who can sue for rent accrued, but unpaid, at the time of his testator's death.

It was said in Vance v. Vance (1903) 116 Ky. 520, 76 S. W. 370, that "rents accruing before the death of the testator vested in the executor as assets, but the rents accruing after the death of the testator, and before the confirmation of the sale, belonged to the heirs."

But in Anderson v. Richard (1896) 99 Ky. 631, 37 S. W. 62, it was held: "The rent which accrued after the death of the owner of the real estate belonged of right to the heir or devisee, but we are not aware of any decision which sustains the contention of appellant. More than ten months of the rent of the land in question had accrued (whether due or not) before the death of the testator, and that rent, so accrued, was properly adjudged to the appellee, and the residue to appellant." The evidence in this case showed that ten months of the yearly lease had expired at the time of the landlord's death.

5. New York.

In Hotchkiss v. Auburn & R. R. Co. (1862) 36 Barb. 603, it was held that the rents and profits due before the death of the lessor belong to the executor.

It was held in Van Rensselaer v. Platner (1800) 2 Johns. Cas. 17, that the executor was entitled to rent which accrued previously to the death of the testator.

The court said in Wright v. Williams (1826) 5 Cow. 338, that the executor could distrain only for rent due at the death of the testator.

It appeared in Van Rensselaer v. Hayes (1848) 5 Denio, 477, that at the time of the death of the testator the rent was in arrear on his real estate. The executors sought to recover the rent. The court declared that the rent due at the decease of the testator went to his executors, who had full power to pursue the ordinary remedies by action or distress to recover the same.

6. North Carolina.

The record in King v. Little (1877) 77 N. C. 138, showed that the executor sued to recover the rents which had accrued on his testatrix's leased land. The original lease was given by the testatrix and her husband. Upon the husband's death all rights came to the wife. It was held that her executor could recover the rents which had accrued during the period between the death of the husband and that of the testatrix.

7. South Carolina.

Where rent has already accrued during the lifetime of the landlord, or where the same has been secured by rent note or other obligation of the tenant, the rent belongs to the executor as assets of the estate. Huff v. Latimer (1890) 33 S. C. 255, 11 S. E. 758.

8. England.

In Prescott v. Boucher (1832) 3 Barn. & Ad. 849, 110 Eng. Reprint, 312, it appeared that the landlord seised in fee of land demised it for a term of years, and reserved rent. On the death of the landlord testate, it was held that his executor did not have the remedy of distress for rents accruing during the lifetime of the testator. The testator was not a tenant in fee simple of the rent within the meaning of the Statute 32 Hen. VIII. chap. 37, § 1. The executor was confined to his remedy for the debt.

In Jones v. Jones (1832) 3 Barn. & Ad. 967, 110 Eng. Reprint, 357, it was said that the point was precisely similar to that in Prescott v. Boucher, supra. R. E. LaG.