ing Loveland, Bankr. p. 1289, the statement in which, apparently, is based on decisions under the earlier Bankruptcy Act); Beck v. Witteman Bros. (1918) 185 App. Div. 643, 173 N. Y. Supp. 488, 42 Am. Bankr. Rep. 647; Page v. Carton (1909) 64 Misc. 645, 120 N. Y. Supp. 277; American Woolen Co. v. Friedman (1916) 97 Misc. 593, 163 N. Y. Supp. 162. And see Ocean Acci. & G. Corp. v. Beck (1915) 153 N. Y. Supp. 932, and Bell Mfg. Co. v. Cross (1923) - S. C. 117 S. E. 196, 1 Am. Bankr. Rep. N. S. 275. In Beck v. Witteman Bros. (1918) 185 App. Div. 643, 173 N. Y. Supp. 488, 42 Am. Bankr. Rep. 647, supra, the court, in holding that confirmation of a composition does not, by virtue of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, discharge the original debt until promises to make payments at a future time are kept, said that "the effect of the composition as to the parties to it still remains as it was at common law," and "that a promissory consideration suspends the remedy on the original debt until the time of payment comes, and if payment be not made, then, at the election of the promisee, the original debt is revived;" and, discussing the provision of § 14c that "the confirmation of a

composition shall discharge the bankrupt from his debts, other than those agreed to be paid by the terms of the composition and those not affected by a discharge," said: "The language may reasonably be interpreted to mean that the debts to be paid by the terms of the composition shall not be discharged by the order of confirmation itself, but only by the payment of the consideration." Of these decisions, however, it may be said that the dicta in the Kinnane Co. Case is discredited by the reported case (RE MIRKUS, ante, 435), and that the New York cases have been in effect overruled by Jacobs v. Fensterstock (1923) 236 N. Y. 39, 139 N. E. 772, and other New York cases treated in the early part of this annotation.

In Re Carton (1906) 148 Fed. 63, 17 Am. Bankr. Rep. 343, which involved a voluntary composition agreement entirely outside the Bankruptcy Law, it was held, applying the New York law under which a failure to carry out a voluntary composition agreement revives the original debt, that the composition did not operate as a discharge of the original debt, and that the failure to pay notes given pursuant to the agreement revived the original debt. G. J. C.

Messrs. Robert E. Crowe, George E. Gorman, and Hayden N. Bell for defendant in error.

Stone, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

The county of Cook, on December 10, 1921, filed its bill in the superior court of Cook county seeking to enjoin the city of Chicago from enforcing its fire and building ordinances against the county, concerning the construction of a county jail located within the territorial limits of the city. The grounds upon which such injunction is sought are that "these ordinances and requirements are not suitable to the said jail, and that it will be impossible to comply with the ordinances in the building of said jail."

The injunction was also sought on the general ground that the city did not have a right to enforce its ordinances against the county. The city filed a general demurrer to the bill. Upon hearing thereon it was held that the city did not have police power over the construction of buildings erected by the county, and, evidently holding that the statement of the ordinances in the bill was sufficient, the court overruled the demurrer. Two questions, therefore, are presented here: First, is the unreasonableness of the city ordinances sufficiently pleaded? and, second, may the city, under its police power, regulate the construction of a county jail so far as fire hazards are concerned?

The statement in the bill that the ordinances of the city of Chicago were not suited to the erection of a county jail, and that it would be impossible to comply with them in the construction of the jail, were mere conclusions of the pleader. The substance of the part of an ordinance. objected to should necessity of be set out, so the

Pleading

setting out ordinance.

court may see, on reading it, whether

or not the claim that it is not suited and is unreasonable is well founded. The presumption is that an ordinance is reasonable. People ex rel. Morrison v. Cregier, 138 Ill. 401, 28

N. E. 812; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Ashline, 171 Ill. 313, 49 N. E. 521. While it cannot be contended that either the county or an individual is amenable to an unreasonable ordinance, the court cannot take the statement of a conclusion in that regard as sufficient pleading on a bill of this character. The bill was therefore demurrable on that ground.

The principal question argued in the case is whether or not the city council has power to require an observance of its fire regulations by the county in the building of a county jail. This question has never been passed upon in this state, and but few cases have been cited by counsel representing the parties to this proceeding in which the matter has been passed upon in other states. It becomes necessary, therefore, to review some of the underlying principles governing the police power granted to cities and counties under the law.

Among the powers exercised by municipalities are what are known as the police powers State-delegaof the state. These tion of power to municipality. powers rest in the state, and may be delegated to municipal corporations created by the state, to be exercised for the welfare, safety, and health of the public. Under the police power cities and villages may enact reasonable ordinances to preserve health, suppress nuisances, prevent fires, regulate the use and storing of danger- corporationsous articles, control extent of police markets, and sim

Municipal

power.

ilar uses and purposes. The police power is not impaired by the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States (Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357), but every citizen holds his property subject to the proper exercise of the police power, either by the state legislature or by public or municipal corporations, to which the legislature has delegated that power. This power rests upon the principle that one may not so

use his property as unreasonably to injure others. These regulations rest upon the maxim "salus populi suprema est lex."

An ordinance prohibiting washing and ironing in public laundries within a specified district and within specified hours was held a valid exercise of the police power. Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 28 L. ed. 1145, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730. In Butchers' Union S. H. & L. S. L. Co. v. Crescent City L. S. L. & S. H. Co. 111 U. S. 746, 28 L. ed. 585, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652 (known as the Slaughterhouse Case), the right of the city, under the police power, to regulate the operation of slaughterhouses was upheld. Under the police power, cities may destroy buildings to prevent the spread of conflagration. This right existed at common law, and the owner was entitled to no compensation. 2 Kent, Com. 339. The prevention of damage by fire is an object within the scope of municipal authority, either by express grant or by the power delegated to the city to make police regulations.

It was held in Pye v. Peterson, 45 Tex. 312, 23 Am. Rep. 608, that a general grant of power to a city to pass such ordinances, not inconsistent with the laws of the state, as shall be needful for the government, interest, welfare, and good order of the corporation, did not authorize the city to establish fire limits and regulate the character of buildings within such limits. It is, however, generally regarded that the prevention of fires in incorporated towns and cities is a matter for local regulation and that it belongs to the ordinary police powers of the city, and, unless such a course is inconsistent with the legislation of the state touching the subject, a general grant of police powers to pass ordinances for the welfare of the city will also include fire regulation. 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. §§ 143, 405, note, and cases cited.

In Chicago Packing & Provision Co. v. Chicago, 88 Ill. 221, 30 Am. Rep. 545, where an ordinance by the city of Chicago prohibiting slaugh

terhouses within 1 mile of the city limits was attacked on the ground that it was not within the police power of the city, this court upheld the ordinance on the ground that to protect the health and lives of a large number of people living in one community, the state had power to confer, and has conferred, on cities and villages the right to regulate such instrumentalities as slaughterhouses, even though the territory over which the jurisdiction of the ordinance extended embraced other municipalities.

Since the early case of Com. v. Tewksbury, 11 Met. 58, the right to restrain owners of lands in cities from erecting buildings contrary to fire regulations has been established by many decisions. Wadleigh v. Gilman, 12 Me. 403, 28 Am. Dec. 188; King v. Davenport, 98 Ill. 305, 38 Am. Rep. 89. In the last case cited the court upheld an ordinance regulating fire limits, and the character of buildings to be erected within such limits, as a part of the police power delegated to cities. Such power was likewise recognized in Louisville v. Webster, 108 Ill. 414, though it was held in that case that the ordinance was not within the police power given the city by the legislature.

The legislature, by statute in this state, has conferred on municipal corporations, such as cities, villages, and incorporated towns, the police power to prescribe fire regulations and to regulate buildings within their limits in respect to fire protection. Cahill's Stat. 1923, chap. 24, art. 5, ¶¶ 61, 62, 63.

There is a distinction to be borne in mind between municipal corporations proper, such as exist by charters issued by the state, as incorporated towns, cities, and villages voluntarily organized under the general Incorporation Act, and corporations, such as counties and townships, which are frequently referred to as involuntary quasi corporations. Municipal corporations are those called into existence either at the direct request or by consent of

the persons composing them. Quasi municipal corporations, such as counties and townships, are, at most, but local organizations, which are created by general law, without the consent of the inhabitants thereof, for the purpose of the civil and political administration of government, and they are invested with but few characteristics of corporate existence. They are, in other words, local subdivisions of the state, created by the sovereign power of the state of its own will, without regard to the wishes of the people inhabiting them. A municipal corporation is created principally for the advantage and convenience of the people of the locality. County and township organizations are created in this state with a view to aid in carrying out the policy of the state at large for the administration of matters of political government, finance, education, taxing, care of the poor, military organizations, means of travel, and the administration of justice. The powers and The powers and functions of county and township organizations, therefore, as distinguished from municipal corporations, have a direct and exclusive bearing on and reference to the general, rather than local, policy of government of the state. Hamilton County v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109; Askew v. Hale, 54 Ala. 639, 25 Am. Rep. 730; Lawrence County v. Chattaroi R. Co. 81 Ky. 225; Manuel v. Cumberland County, 98 N. C. 9, 3 S. E. 829; Cathcart v. Comstock, 56 Wis. 590, 14 N. W. 833; 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. § 23. Counties and towns, being purely auxiliaries of the state, owe their creation to the general statutes of the state, which confer upon them all the powers which they possess and prescribe all the duties and liabilities to which they are subject. They have been referred to as ranking low in the scale or grade of corporate existence, and for that reason are frequently termed quasi corporations. Hamilton County v. Garrett, 62 Tex. 602; Union Twp. v. Gibboney, 94 Pa. 534.

Under the Act to Incorporate Counties, approved January 3, 1827 (Rev. Code of Laws 1827, p. 107), counties are constituted a body corporate and politic, with power to make and enter into contracts and to sue and be sued in relation to such contracts, and by §§ 24 and 25 of the Counties Act (Smith's Stat. 1923, p. 529), numerous other powers necessary to the exercise of corporate powers of counties are there granted; not, however, including police powers. It has been uniformly held that a right of action for damages does not lie against a county or township. The ground upon which this doctrine rests is that these organizations are not voluntary but compulsory; not for the benefit of individuals who have asked for such a corporation, but for the public generally.

The distinction between counties and townships or quasi corporations, and incorporated cities, villages, and towns, was laid down in the early case of Russell v. Devon, 2 T. R. 667, 100 Eng. Reprint, 359, 1 Revised Rep. 585, 12 Eng. Rul. Cas. 694. It was there held that while an action would lie by an individual against another for injury the former had received, on the ground of personal liability therefor, and while for that reason an action for damages can be maintained against municipal corporations because of their voluntary character, yet as to quasi corporations, such as townships and counties, such action does not lie against them in the absence of a statute authorizing it. A distinction is drawn between the character of these organizations in Riddle v. Locks & Canals, 7 Mass. 186, 5 Am. Dec. 35, where it was held that, because of the limited character and powers and the involuntary nature of quasi corporations, the same may not be sued for damages. A like conclusion is reached in Bartlett v. Crozier, 17 Johns. 446, 8 Am. Dec. 428. This is likewise the rule in this state as established by a long line of decisions. Hedges v. Madison County, 6 Ill. 567;