interest to the extent of his fees for services already rendered, and a much more important interest as the representative of others, for, if there was no will, he had exclusive jurisdiction and control of all the personal property of the decedent . . for the purpose of administration. He represented the beneficiaries, who were the substantial owners of the property. Probate of a will, however, would deprive him of power to administer, and leave the validity of all his acts before he heard that there was a will open to question. He had an interest to protect and the right to become a party to the proceeding, so as to see that no paper purporting to be a will of the decedent was admitted to probate unless it was genuine and executed by a competent person according to law."

Also in Watson v. Alderson (1898) 146 Mo. 333, 69 Am. St. Rep. 615, 48 S. W. 478, it was held that, independently of the pecuniary results to them of the contest, children of the testator, who, in the absence of a will, had a right of administration, were interested parties, entitled to contest the will, since their title to the personal estate of the deceased was involved and their right to administer it would be devested by the probate of the will or established by its rejection; so that a refusal to permit them to contest the will, based on the ground that they would take the same under the will as by inheritance, was held erroneous.

In Doran v. Mullen (1875) 78 Ill. 343, among doubtless other cases of the kind, consideration was given on the merits to an appeal from the probate of a will, by an administrator appointed prior to the discovery of the will, the right of the administrator to appeal not being apparently questioned.

A different conclusion has, however, been reached in other jurisdictions.

Thus, in Harris v. Harris (1878) 61 Ind. 117, the court, in holding that the administrator and the heirs of the decedent did not have a joint cause of action to contest the admission to probate in that state of an alleged

will of the decedent which had been admitted to probate in another state, said that the complaint failed to show a cause of action in any aspect of the case in favor of the administrator, either in his own right or in his representative capacity, or jointly with his coplaintiffs; and that it was very clear that the administrator of a decedent, even in the case of a domestic will, cannot maintain an action to contest its validity and resist or set aside the probate thereof.

And in Re Sanborn (1893) 98 Cal. 103, 32 Pac. 865, in holding that the public administrator had no right to contest the probate of a will, the court said that "the probate of a will can be contested only upon the written grounds of opposition' filed by a 'person interested,'—that is, interested in the estate, and not in the mere fees of an administration thereof."

So, in Re Parsons (1884) 65 Cal. 240, 3 Pac. 817, where, after appointment of an administrator, a document purporting to be the will of the deceased was offered for probate and the administrator successfully contested probate of the same, the court, in holding that fees of attorneys for services rendered in the contest were not a proper charge against the estate of the decedent, said: "It was the affair of the heirs, as such, to contest, if they wished, the probate of the document,-not of the administrator. The latter is an officer to administer the estate for the benefit of those interested, leaving interested parties to settle their own differences."

It has been held, also, that the contingent right of administration of a husband's estate possessed by his widow, who is not bound by the will, is not an interest in the estate entitling her to dispute the will. McMasters v. Blair (1857) 29 Pa. 298.

And in Fallon v. Fallon (1898) 107 Iowa, 120, 77 N. W. 575, it was held that the right of administration conferred by statute first on the widow did not of itself give her such an interest in the estate as entitled her to contest the will. The court said that, since the share of the widow could not be affected by the will without her con

sent, her interest in the administration of the estate was little more than that of a stranger.

To similar effect is Egbert v. Egbert (1920) 186 Ky. 486, 217 S. W. 365, where, under statute, the widow had a preferred right to administer on her husband's estate, it being held that as the court had a discretion in the matter of her appointment, and her right of administration was therefore not absolute, but contingent, it did not give her such an interest in the estate as entitled her to contest the will.

It was held in Re Wempe (1921) 185 Cal. 557, 197 Pac. 949, that the fact that one petitioned to be administrator with the will annexed did not preclude a subsequent contest of the will on the ground of lack of testamentary capacity, where, in his petition, he stated that he did not know whether or not the decedent was of unsound mind when the instrument, which was offered for probate by a third person, was executed, but prayed that, if it were admitted to probate, he should be appointed administrator with the will annexed.

III. Executors.

The authorities are in conflict, in result at least, as to the right of an executor named in a will to contest a subsequent will or codicil. The re

ported case (HELFRICH v. YOCKEL, ante, 323) is an important one, denying this right, and its decision is supported by the Iowa case from which it quotes (Stewart v. Ferry (1898) 107 Iowa, 117, 77 N. W. 574), in which it was held that persons whose only interest was as executors were not entitled to oppose probate of a codicil in which their appointment was revoked.

It may be observed that in the HELFRICH Case, which holds that the executor named in a will has no interest enabling him to caveat the probate of a codicil revoking his appointment and appointing another executor, the executor first named was a stranger, whose only possible interest to oppose the probate of the codicil arose apparently from the commissions which he would have received as executor,

the codicil making no change in the will except to substitute the testator's son as executor. So that the case did not call for a decision as to the executor's possible duty to defend the will as a representative of other interested parties. The same observations apply to the Stewart Case (Iowa) supra, the codicil making no substantial change except to revoke the appointment of the executors and substitute another in their place.

Opposing in result the conclusion reached in the two cases above cited is Re Greeley (1873) 15 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 393, in which it was held that executors in a will of prior date to that propounded had a right to oppose the probate of the subsequent will. And there is an intimation that this is true even if the beneficiaries in the former will have released their interest under it. It was said: "Our statute . . . provides that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in any last will, or any person interested in the estate, may have the will proved. Any interest, however slight, and even, it seems, the bare possibility of an interest, is sufficient to entitle a party to oppose a testamentary paper. The executors named in the will of 1871 have clearly, by statute, an express right to have that will proved, if they can establish the fact that it is the last will, and they may rightfully contend against the validity of any alleged subsequent will as an obstacle in the way of establishing the will under which they claim. Their interest in this regard is very apparent. For, if they can succeed in establishing their will, the title to the movable goods of the testator, though in ever so many different and distinct places, vests in them, in possession.

If, however, the will of 1872 should be established as the valid last will, then the title would be elsewhere. Thus the proponent and contestants are trying their alleged titles."

And in Re Murphy (1922) 153 Minn. 60, 189 N. W. 413, it was held that executors named in a will had such a representative interest in the allowance in probate thereof as entitled them to contest the probate of ar

alleged subsequent will, making other disposition of the property, on the ground that the latter was not executed by the decedent or, if so, was procured by fraud and undue influence. It was said: "Whatever may by the rule elsewhere, . . it must

be deemed as settled in this state that the executors named in a will have such a representative interest in the allowance and probate thereof as entitles them to appear as champions of the same in the courts of the state. . . . They are in the same position, from a legal viewpoint, as a legatee in a will claimed to have been revoked and superseded by one subsequently executed."

So, in Re Langley (1903) 140 Cal. 126, 73 Pac. 824, it was held that an executor in a prior will apparently valid, as to which probate proceedings were pending, was entitled to oppose the probate of an alleged subsequent will. The court said that it was the right and duty of the executor named in the prior will to defend it. And it was held not necessary in such a case that it should appear that the prior will had been admitted to probate, the executor named therein having a prima facie right to oppose the subsequent will.

To similar effect is Connelly v. Sullivan (1893) 50 Ill. App. 627, holding that one appointed executor by a will admitted to probate has the right to appeal from the probate of a subsequent will, in which he is not named.

And in Re Coursen (1843) 4 N. J. Eq. 408, the court was of the opinion that one of the executors name in the will may caveat against proving a codicil which substitutes a new coexecutor to act with him. It was said there might be strong reason why this substitution should operate injuriously to the caveator, and that, as a general rule, all persons who might be injured in admitting a will or codicil to probate might caveat against it.

The admission of the validity of the will by the testator's widow, through her qualification as executrix, as named in the will, was held in Gaither v. Gaither (1857) 23 Ga. 521, not to be conclusive upon her, and not to estop her from subsequently seeking

to revoke probate of the will, where the other interested parties were not shown to have acted upon such admission. The court took the view, also, that the motion to set aside the probate was not the equivalent of an application for leave to renounce the executorship, so as to bring the widow within the rule against permitting one who has intermeddled as executor from renouncing the same.

And in Molander V. Anderson (1919) 214 Ill. App. 446, it was held that one who was a beneficiary under a will was not estopped merely by the fact that he was also a qualified executor thereof, from contesting a codicil which diminished his legacy. It did not appear, the court said, that the defendant had been placed in any different position to her injury by reason of the complainant's qualification as executor under the will. In this instance the contestant, after the bringing of the suit to set aside the probate of the codicil, had resigned and been discharged, but his right of action was held not to be affected by this fact. And it was held that the principles forbidding one who acts in a trust capacity to deny the validity of the trust while continuing so to act, and forbidding a tenant or trustee to claim adversely to the title under which he entered land without surrendering possession, were not applicable.

Mansfield v. Shaw (1818) 3 Phillim. Eccl. Rep. 22, 161 Eng. Reprint, 1246, and Boston v. Fox (1860) 29 L. J. Prob. N. S. 68, 4 Swabey & T. 199, 164 Eng. Reprint, 1493, support the proposition that an executor in a prior will has a right to call for proof in solemn form of an alleged subsequent will, and to interrogate the witnesses.

But it was held in Vinet v. Robert (1920) Rap. Jud. Quebec 59 C. S. 147, that executors named in a will did not represent the succession, for the purpose of attacking the validity of the will, but that such representation belonged to the heirs only; and that the executors could not themselves attack the will under statute giving them the right to intervene in an action in which the validity of the will was attacked. R. E. H.

Co. 124 Cal. 112, 56 Pac. 779; Brown v. Farmers High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. 26 Colo. 66, 56 Pac. 183. Messrs. Bond, Melton, & Melton, for appellees:

The commission had the power to make the order requiring defendant to furnish the natural gas to the plaintiff company for distribution.

Guthrie Gaslight, Fuel & Improv. Co. v. Board of Education, 64 Okla. 157, L.R.A.1918D, 900, P.U.R.1917E, 200, 166 Pac. 128; Muskogee Gas & E. Co. v. State, 81 Okla. 176, 186 Pac. 730; Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. State, 78 Okla. 5, 188 Pac. 338; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. State, 23 Okla. 217, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 908, 100 Pac. 11; Washington ex rel. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510, 56 L. ed. 863, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 535; Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Corp. 248 U. S. 373, 63 L. ed. 310, 9 A.L.R. 1420, P.U.R.1919C, 60, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 117; New York ex rel. New York & Q. Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U. S. 345, 62 L. ed. 337, P.U.R.1918A, 792, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 122; Carnegie Natural Gas Co. v. Swiger, 72 W. Va. 557, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1073, 79 S. E. 3; Morgantown v. Hope Natural Gas Co. (W. Va.) P.U.R. 1919D, 252.

Messrs. Cottingham, Hayes, Green, & McInnis also for appellees.

distribution by other companies; it owns and maintains a gas pipe line extending from the Duncan gas field north, through which it conveys gas to supply the towns and cities served by it. This pipe line is located near the city of Chickasha, and at a point in said line approximately 4 miles from the city limits of said city there is a T which may be used for connecting the line with a line into the city.

The Chickasha Gas & Electric Company is a public utility engaged in the business of manufacturing and distributing artificial gas in the city of Chickasha. In the month of October, 1921, it was by said city granted a franchise, authorizing it to use its gas-line system for the purpose of distributing natural gas to the inhabitants of said city. Thereupon it constructed a gas pipe line from the city of Chickasha to a point near said T, in the pipe line of appellant, but this was done without any agreement upon the part of appellant to furnish gas. In fact, appellant had, prior thereto, refused to furnish gas to appellee, and has at all times maintained that it could not

The Chickasha Gas & Electric Company instituted this proceeding by filing with the Corporation Commission its petition praying an order of such commission requiring the Oklahoma Natural Gas Company to furnish and supply the Chickasha Gas & Electric Company natural gas for distribution by it in the city of Chickasha. After a hearing, the commission made and entered the order as prayed for, and from this order the Oklahoma Natural Gas Company has appealed.

The appellant, Oklahoma Natural Gas Company, is a public service corporation engaged in the business of furnishing natural gas to between thirty-five and forty cities and towns in the state of Oklahoma. It owns the franchises in about thirty of these cities and towns, and in others, including Oklahoma City, El Reno, and Muskogee; it furnishes gas for

gas from its said pipe line. Upon the completion of said pipe line by appellee, it instituted this proceeding, which resulted in the order complained of, and of which the appellant seeks a reversal upon two grounds, the first of which is that the Corporation Commission was without power, authority, and jurisdiction to make said order requiring appellant to furnish natural gas to a public utility and to a community which it had never theretofore served, and which it had never assumed, undertaken, or professed to serve, and which it was unwilling to undertake to serve.

By the provisions of chapter 93, Sess. Laws 1913, the jurisdiction of the Corporation Commission was ex→ tended so as to confer upon it general supervision over all public utilities, and the appellant comes within the term "public utility," as defined by said act. Indeed, appellant does