are so clear as to leave little room for construction.

II. Coin money.

The gold coins of the United States, of standard weight and fineness, are legal tender in all payments at their face value. Act Feb. 12, 1873, Rev. Stat. § 3585, Comp. Stat. § 6572, 6 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 297.

Silver coins of denominations smaller than $1 are legal tender in all sums not exceeding $10. Act June 9, 1879, Comp. Stat. § 6573, 6 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 301.

The minor coins of the United States are legal tender for any amount not exceeding 25 cents in any one payment. Act Feb. 12, 1873, Rev. Stat. § 3587, Comp. Stat. § 6574, 6 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 298.

Under the act last referred to, 5cent pieces have been held to be "lawful current money." Black v. State (1904) 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 107, 79 S. E. 311 (larceny).

A 5-cent piece is legal tender, though it is worn, defaced, and mutilated, if its weight is not appreciably diminished and its mint marks are plainly discernible. Cincinnati Northern Traction Co. v. Rosnagle (1911) 84 Ohio St. 310, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1030, 95 N. E. 884, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 639. See to similar effect, as to worn or mutilated minor coins: Mobile Street R. Co. v. Watters (1902) 135 Ala. 227, 33 So. 42; Chicago Union Traction Co. v. McClevey (1906) 126 Ill. App. 21; Ruth v. St. Louis Transit Co. (1903) 98 Mo. App. 1, 71 S. W. 1055; Jersey City & B. R. Co. v. Morgan (1889) 52 N. J. L. 60, 18 Atl. 904, affirmed in (1890) 52 N. J. L. 558, 21 Atl. 783.

III. Paper money.

It has been authoritatively settled that Congress has the power to make paper money legal tender. Legal

Tender Cases (1871) 12 Wall. (U. S.) 457, 20 L. ed. 287; Legal Tender Cases (1884) 110 U. S. 421, 28 L. ed. 204, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 122. In the latter case it was said: "We are irresistibly impelled to the conclusion that the impressing upon the Treasury notes of the United States the quality of being a legal tender in payment of private

debts is an appropriate means, conducive and plainly adapted to the execution of the undoubted powers of Congress, consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, and therefore, within the meaning of that instrument, 'necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States.'"

The Federal statutes provide that the following United States paper money shall be legal tender for private debts:

(1) United States notes, Act February 25, 1862, Rev. Stat. § 3588, Comp. Stat. § 6575, 6 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 299.

(2) Demand Treasury notes authorized by the Act of July 17, 1861, and the Act of February 12, 1862, Rev. Stat. § 3589, Comp. Stat. 6576, 6 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 300.

(3) Interest-bearing Treasury notes issued under the Acts of March 3, 1863, and June 30, 1864, Rev. Stat. § 3590, Comp. Stat. § 6577, 6 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 300.

(4) United States gold certificates, Act December 24, 1919, Comp. Stat. § 6577a, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1919, p. 242.

Certain other paper currency is authorized by Congress, which is not made legal tender for all debts.

(1) National bank notes are legal tender for the payment of "taxes, excises, public lands, and all other dues to the United States except duties on imports, and also for all salaries and other debts and demands owing by the United States to individuals corporations and associations within the United States, except interest on the public debt and in redemption of the national currency." Rev. Stat. § 5182, Comp. Stat. § 9721, 6 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 733. The foregoing provision as to debts owing by the United States was also enacted in Rev. Stat. § 3475, Comp. Stat. § 6381, 6 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 636.

(2) Federal reserve notes are made "receivable by all national and member banks, and Federal reserve banks, and for all taxes, customs, and other public dues." Act Dec. 23, 1913, § 16,

An

Gioffre owned a building covered by a policy of defendant company; on January 30, 1920, it was destroyed by fire. The insured made proof of loss March 20, 1920. involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed against him on April 13, 1920. August 28, 1920, the insurance company, without notice of the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding, paid to Gioffre the amount of the policy, less a sum due on a mortgage covering the property. He was adjudged a bankrupt. November 19, 1920, and on December 18, 1920, a trustee was appointed, who subsequently (Gioffre having absconded) began suit to recover from the insurance company the amount of money it had paid the bankrupt, less the sum paid the mortgagee. On the trial the court entered a compulsory nonsuit; the refusal to remove it brought about this appeal.

On first reading there seems to be some confusion among the various cases in which the courts have been called on to determine the rights of those who in good faith have dealt with a bankrupt between the time of the filing of an involuntary petition and the adjudication. These cases are many, and a review of all of them will not be attempted. A discussion of most of them can be found in 1 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 1154. Their careful perusal, having in mind the particular facts of each case, what the court was called upon to determine, the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and its Amendment of 1910 (Comp. Stat. $$ 9585-9656, 1 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 509), dispels at least some of the fog.

Under the Bankruptcy Act of March 2, 1867 (14 Stat. at L. 517, chap. 176), payment to a bankrupt, after filing of the petition, although made in good faith, and without actual notice of the proceeding, was not valid. Judge Sharswood, in speaking of that statute in Mays v.

Manufacturers' Nat. Bank, 64 Pa. 74, 77, 3 Am. Rep. 573, thus characterized it: "This is an unjust and cruel law; and the effect of it may be to make bankrupts of honest and solvent men, who are only desirous of fulfilling their legal obligations. That all the world has notice of a transfer by operation of law, in proceedings in bankruptcy, is a mere fiction,-not true in reality.

The attention of Congress ought surely to be called to this subject, and some suitable provision made to protect those who deal honestly, in good faith, and without notice, with bankrupts."

That Congress did not intend to continue continue this injustice when it passed the Act of 1898 is made manifest by the provisions of § 70a of the statute, which provides that the trustee shall be vested, by operation of law, with the title of the bankrupt, "as of the date he was adjudged a bankrupt." In our opinion, it would take more explicit language than that of the 1910 Amendment, on which appellant relies, to change this provision of the act, and to make its effect similar to that of the earlier statute. The amendment reads: "And such trustees, as to all property in the custody or coming into the custody of the bankruptcy court, shall be deemed vested

with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a judgment creditor holding an execution duly returned unsatisfied." Comp. Stat. § 9631, 1 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 934.

"It was to obviate the prior limitation upon the right of a trustee to attack unrecorded conditional sale contracts and other like liens, that the amendment was passed." 2 Collier, Bankr. 13th ed. 1053.

"For the purpose of fixing priority as between a trustee in bankruptcy and adversely claiming lien holders, the time of filing the petition is the vital date, and a lien invalid on that date cannot be perfected before adjudication, so as to make it valid against the trustee.

The filing of an involuntary petition does not, ipso facto, take

from the alleged bankrupt his dominion over his property; while his disposition of his property may be invalidated and set aside under certain circumstances, such property remains under his control until the adjudication." 2 Collier, Bankr. 13th ed. 1636.

As Congress, in enacting the Amendment of 1910, did not use the language of the Act of 1867, although necessarily familiar with the terms of that statute, it will not be deemed by us, under the dubious language it employed, to have intended to bring about the injustice worked by its prior law. In considering the effect of the Amendment of 1910, we said in Bank of North America v. Penn Motor Car Co. 235 Pa. 194, at page 200, 83 Atl. 624: "The manifest purpose of the amendment was to enlarge the rights, remedies, and powers of a trustee in bankruptcy, and it had the effect of vesting in the trustee the rights, remedies, and powers of a judgment or other creditor having a lien, and of an unsatisfied execution creditor without a lien, at the time of instituting bankruptcy proceedings. In other words, the trustee was given the power to assert every right which such creditors could have asserted during the period of four months immediately preceding the filing of the petition in bankruptcy."

Certain declarations by the Federal courts, such as:

"The filing of the petition by proper parties, making the requisite jurisdictional allegations, operates as a lis pendens, and notice to all the world." Re Billing (1906; D. C.) 145 Fed. 395.

"The filing of the petition in bankruptcy is 'judicial process,' and operates as an attachment or sequestration from that time of the property of the bankrupt, for the equal benefit of all of his creditors, and as a restraint upon its disposition by him." Re Smith (1904; D. C.) 132 Fed. 303.

"The filing of the petition was a caveat to all the world. It was in

"It is as true of the present law as it was of that of 1867, that the filing of the petition is a caveat to all the world, and in effect an attachment and injunction, and on adjudication, title to the bankrupt's property became vested in the trustee, with actual or constructive possession, and placed in the custody of the bankruptcy court." Mueller v. Nugent (1902) 184 U. S. 1, 14, 46 L. ed. 405, 411, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269, 275.

give standing room for the position assumed by appellant, that payment to the bankrupt after the filing of the petition is invalid, but, we believe, other pronouncements of the Federal courts negative the idea which he contends for, as, for instance, Re Mertens (1906) 75 C. C. A. 548, 553, 144 Fed. 823, where it was said: "Under the Act of 1867, no lien could be acquired after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, because the title of the assignee vested as of the commencement of the proceeding in bankruptcy. Now the trustee takes the property of the bankrupt in the condition in which he finds it at the date of the adjudication, unless it has been encumbered fraudulently or in contravention of some of the provisions of the act. The change in the present act, by which the trustee's title is that only which exists at the date of the adjudication, removes any uncertainty which arose under the Act of 1867. It was intended, we think, to permit all legitimate business transactions between debtor and those dealing with him to be carried out and consummated as freely, until he has been adjudicated a bankrupt, as though no pro

ceeding were pending... While the filing of a petition in bankruptcy is a caveat to all the world, the notice ought not to have the effect of paralyzing all business dealings with the debtor, or to prevent lienors or pledgees from enforcing their contracts. This is its practical effect, if the rights and remedies of all concerned are in suspense, until it can be ascertained whether an adjudication is or is not to follow the commencement of the proceeding." Re Zotti (1911) 108 C. C. A. 196, 186 Fed. 84, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 240, determined that a bank could not be required to pay money to a trustee which it already had paid out on checks of the bankrupt, drawn after the filing of the petition, but before the adjudication. In that case the referee ordered the bank to pay over on the ground that the petition was a caveat attachment, and injunction, of which the bank must be held to have had constructive notice, and any payment by it thereafter was invalid as against the trustee. The circuit court of appeals, in reversing, used this language: "Section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 . .

pro

vides that the title of the bankrupt shall vest in the trustee, as of the date of adjudication, inter alia, to (5) property which prior to the filing of the petition he could have transferred, etc. This latter language is intended to define the property which passes, viz., such as the bankrupt owned at the time the petition was filed. The indebtedness of the bank to Zotti was property which he could have transferred. Until the adjudication the title to it remained in him, and if no receiver had been appointed we can conceive no ground on which the trustee's present claim could be rested. As the court did appoint a receiver, it is to be presumed, in the absence of specific directions, that he was to hold as custodian, without title, for the purpose of preservation, and not for the purpose of distribution. The alleged bankrupt might never be adjudicated. The receiver did not

demand Zotti's funds until after the bank had honored Zotti's checks, as it was bound to do without any notice of the filing of the petition. Payments after notice would, no doubt, be in contempt of the order appointing the receiver, but to require it to pay that sum over again to the trustee under the circumstances of this case would be in the highest degree inequitable."

In Re Perpall (1921; C. C. A.) 271 Fed. 466, 468, it was said: "Á transfer made by a bankrupt subsequent to the filing of the petition is not necessarily void. It is merely voidable, if made under such circumstances as to constitute such transfer of preference to the transferee within the provisions of § 60a and § 60b of the Bankruptcy Act. Until adjudication in bankruptcy, the title of the bankrupt's property remains in the bankrupt, and a valid transfer can be made by him. The Bankruptcy Act does not provide that any and all transfers made by the bankrupt subsequent to the filing of the petition and prior to the adjudication are absolutely void. The act provides that transfers may be voided by the trustee if they constitute a preference, and a preference is described by the act. It is only preferential transfers which are voidable. Preference implies paying or securing a preexisting debt of a person preferred. Where one gives an insolvent person value for a transfer of property, where he makes an exchange of property, there is no preference."

It will be noticed that, when International Bank v. Sherman, supra (the language of which has given rise to most of the difficulties in decision), was decided, the old Act of 1867 was still in effect, so that the language used was perfectly correct, since under that statute title vested in the trustee as of the date of the filing of the petition. The same phrase used in that case was used in a number of others, but they all seem to relate to situations where the alleged bankrupt attempted to colorably transfer some of his prop