vey after the expiration of two years under the following clause: "All the rest and residue of my estate, both real and personal, I hereby direct my said executors and executrixes, and give them full power and authority, to sell and absolutely dispose of the same within two years after my decease." III. Limitation for specified purpose. United States. Young v. Bradley (1879) 101 U. S. 782, 25 L. ed. 1044. Massachusetts. Heard v. Read (1898) 171 Mass. 374, 50 N. E. 638. Michigan.-Conant v. Stone (1913) 176 Mich. 654, 143 N. W. 39. New Jersey. Tucker v. Baldwin (1907) 73 N. J. Eq. 224, 66 Atl. 928. New York. Prentice v. Janssen (1880) 79 N. Y. 478, affirming (1878). 14 Hun, 548; Sweeney v. Warren (1891) 127 N. Y. 426, 24 Am. St. Rep. 468, 28 N. E. 413; Trask v. Sturges (1902) 170 N. Y. 482, 63 N. E. 534, reversing (1900) 56 App. Div. 625, 68 N. Y. Supp. 1149; Jackson ex dem. Ellsworth v. Jansen (1810) 6 Johns. 73; Sharpsteen v. Tillou (1824) 3 Cow. 651; Harvey v. Brisbin (1888) 50 Hun, 376, 3 N. Y. Supp. 676, affirmed in (1894) 143 N. Y. 151, 38 N. E. 108. Ohio.-Ward v. Barrows (1853) 2 Ohio St. 251. Pennsylvania - Swift's Appeal (1878) 87 Pa. 502; Wilkinson v. Buist (1889) 124 Pa. 253, 10 Am. St. Rep. 580, 16 Atl. 856; Fidler v. Lash (1889) 125 Pa. 87, 17 Atl. 240. Tennessee. (1870) 7 Coldw. 605. Thus, in Sharpsteen v. Tillou (1824) 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 651, it was said in this connection: "The objects which the testator seems to have contemplated, in directing that his real estate should be sold after the decease of his widow, Murdock v. Johnson have been, to a great extent, defeated by himself, by rules of law, and by events which occurred after his death. His son Edward, being a witness to the will, could take nothing under it; and all the beneficial intentions of the testator towards this son are ineffectual. If the bequest of £150 to his son Isaac M. is considered as payable from the product of the real estate when sold, and such is the sense of the will, this contingent legacy fails, Isaac M. having died before the power to sell was or could be exerted. The intended dispositions of the money which should arise from the sale of the real estate are, to a great extent, impossible, and in these circumstances, the intentions of the testator in giving the power are frustrated. This power to sell cannot be disjoined from the other provisions of the will; the purposes of the testator in giving the power, as in other respects, must be ascertained from all the provisions of the instrument; and the objects of the power must be considered in connection with the power itself. In this case I am of opinion that, by the total nullity of the will in respect to the portions of the estate intended for Edward, and by the failure of the legacy of £250 [sic] to Isaac M., the objects of the power had so far failed that there was not a valid power to sell in 1818, when a sale was made by two of the executors. The power fails because its objects are unattainable." And in Wilkinson v. Buist (1889) 124 Pa. 253, 10 Am. St. Rep. 580, 16 Atl. 856, it was said: "Although the power may be expressed in the most general terms, yet, if the purpose of its creation appears, and that purpose has ceased, there can ordinarily be no further execution of the power, as it will be presumed that the testator did not intend that the power should be exercised after the accomplishment of that purpose." In the case of a power of sale given to trustees by will it has also been said: "Powers of sale of real property given by will to trustees usually end when the trust ends, but if it affirmatively appears that it was the intention of the testator that the trustees should have a power of sale after the trust in other respects has terminated, such powers may be exercised after the termination of the trust." Heard v. Read (1898) 171 Mass. 374, 50 N. E. 638. The right to exercise the power in this class of cases, of course, depends on the intention of the testator. Wilkinson v. Buist (Pa.) and Murdock v. Johnson (Tenn.) supra. So, in Wilkinson v. Buist (Pa.) supra, it was said: "It is the testator's intention with respect to the duration of a power which governs in all cases. When the limitations contained in a settlement by will have expired, and absolute interests in fee have vested in possession in persons sui juris, it may well be supposed that the testator intended that a power of sale will not after that be exercised; but if on the construction of the instrument it appears otherwise, and that the testator intended it should be afterwards exercised, the power will, of course, be upheld, unless it is obnoxious to the rule against perpetuities, or the cestuis que trustent have elected to take the property as it stands. Re Cotton (1882) L. R. 19 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 624. On the other hand, as was said by Sir Edward Fry in the case just cited: 'It is well ascertained that when there is a settlement of real estate, either by will or by deed, and the settlement ultimately carries the land to a person entitled in fee simple, and there are powers couched in general words and without limitation as to time, which are nevertheless obviously intended to be exercised only during the subsistence of the intermediate limitations, there, the moment the estate in fee is vested, the powers are at an end, because it was the intention of the settlement that they should subsist only during the intermediate limitations.' The vesting of the estate absolutely in the persons ultimately entitled is an indication, merely, that, according to the true construction of the settlement, the intention of the settlor was that the powers would, in that event, come to an end." b. Application of rule. In Conant v. Stone (1913) 176 Mich, 654, 143 N. W. 39, the will under consideration, after making certain provisions for the testator's son, contained the following clause: "I further provide that any and all real estate that I may die possessed of shall be sold by executors on or before seven years from the time of my death, and the proceeds invested in several securities so that the income from all my property may be secured to the best advantage for my son above named." It appeared that the son died about a month after his father, and that there had been no sale of the property by the executors. It was held that as the son had died before the power of sale had been exercised by them, the clause conferring the power had become inoperative. It appeared in Sweeney v. Warren (1891) 127 N. Y. 426, 24 Am. St. Rep. 468, 28 N. E. 413, that the testator by his will provided as follows: "I authorize and direct my executors to sell and convey the strip of land heretofore mentioned and described as lying on the Niagara river, and also that piece of land on Sweeney street and on the Tonawanda creek, east of the building known as the Shoe Shop, for the purpose of discharging all my debts." It appeared that the surviving executor had sold and conveyed to the testator's widow the land in question, at which time the executor and widow knew that after payment of all debts and expenses of administration there was a surplus of more than $1,200 arising from the personal estate. Several years later an action of ejectment was begun by the testator's heirs at law against the widow, to recover possession of the lots purchased by her. The court, in reversing a judgment in favor of the defendant, said: "By this provision the lots mentioned are not converted into money out and out, but the executors are empowered to convert them for a specific purpose, to wit, the payment of the testator's debts. When a testator authorizes his executors to sell and convert into money all or a part of his realty for a specific pur pose, which fails, or is accomplished without a conversion, the power is extinguished and the land cannot be sold by virtue of it, or treated as money, but it descends to the heir unless it is devised. . . When the executor sold the lots, both he and the purchaser knew that the testator's personal property exceeded by more than $1,200 the testator's debts and the expenses of administration, which defeated the power to sell under this clause, unless, as it is argued, the testator intended that these lots should be sold and the avails applied towards the payment of his debts, for the purpose of relieving to that extent the personal estate from the burden imposed by the rule of the common law; that it is primarily liable for the payment of debts, and must be first exhausted, unless there is a clear direction that the real estate, or some part of it, shall be first so applied." In Trask v. Sturges (1902) 170 N. Y. 482, 63 N. E. 534, reversing (1900) 56 App. Div. 625, 68 N. Y. Supp. 1149, it was held that, where land is directed to be sold and the proceeds distributed, the parties beneficially interested may, if competent and of full age and the gift is not in trust, elect, before the conversion has actually taken place, to take the land; and where they have so elected, and the election has been made known, the power of sale in the executors becomes extinguished and they cannot thereafter lawfully proceed to execute it. In Jackson ex dem. Ellsworth v. Jansen (1810) 6 Johns (N. Y.) 73, it was held that where the object of the testator in creating a power of sale was to make a provision for his wife, the power, not having been exercised during her lifetime, ceased on her death. In Harvey v. Brisbin (1888) 50 Hun, 376, 3 N. Y. Supp. 676, affirmed in (1894) 143 N. Y. 151, 38 N. E. 108, it appeared that the testatrix had directed a sale of her property, the proceeds to be invested and held in trust during the life of her daughter, with remainder over on the latter's death. The land was not sold during the daughter's life, and it was held that after her death no purpose existed for a sale, and that the power ceased. In Swift's Appeal (1878) 87 Pa. 502, there was an appeal from a decree dismissing a petition for a citation to executors to show cause why an order should not issue for a sale of the residuary estate. It appeared that the will provided that, "in order to enable my executors, hereinafter named, to carry out the requirements of my hereinbefore recited will, I do hereby authorize and empower them, or the survivors or survivor of them, as soon after my decease as it can be done to advantage, to sell at public or private sale, as they may deem best for the interest of my estate, all my goods and estate, real, personal, or mixed, wherever found, not heretofore disposed of, including the coal under the farm I now occupy (except the 3 acres reserved); also the lots on Mount Washington, and to pay the bequests hereinbefore made (without interest), as they have money on hand to do so, in the order in which they are herein given." The court in affirming the decree said: "The power of sale in this case was clearly not an absolute direction to sell, and thereby to convert the realty into money, but was an enabling authority to carry out the requirements of the will as to payment of debts and legacies. It had relation to personal as well as real estate, and defined neither as to its extent, leaving the matter necessarily to the judgment of the executors as to when and what to sell. When the purpose of the will became accomplished by payment of debts and legacies, it is clear that the testator did not command a sale of the realty beyond this finished purpose. We cannot say that the orphans' court erred in dismissing the petition when conversion had ceased to be necessary." In Fidler v. Lash (1889) 125 Pa. 87, 17 Atl. 240, the court, in construing a power to sell as being for the widow's benefit and as ceasing at her death, said: "The devise, as we have seen, is to the widow for life, remainder in fee to Sarah Ermentrout and plaintiff below as tenants in common. It appears to have then occurred to the testator that, for the better and more certain support of his widow, it was advisable to authorize his executors, in their discretion, to sell the real estate, invest the proceeds, etc.; and he accordingly created the testamentary power in question, directing the proceeds of the sale to be invested and interest paid annually to his widow, with the right to use as much of the principal as might be necessary for her support. It is very evident that testator's wife was the chief object of his bounty, and that the power was created for her benefit, and for no other purpose. There is nothing in the will to indicate that it was intended to be exercised for the purpose of converting the land into money to In Murdock v. Johnson (1870) 7 Gas - rule requiring deposit for service - discrimination - validity. 1. A rule of a gas company operating under a public franchise which requires about 10 per cent of its customers to make a cash deposit or furnish a guarantor that their bills will be paid, while the bills of the other 90 per cent are guaranteed automatically by an employee of the company, is void for discrimination. [See note on this question beginning on page 1411.] Appeal absence of prejudice suit on behalf of others similarly situated. 2. A gas consumer who receives all the relief to which he is entitled because of discrimination in the rules of the gas company, requiring deposits or guaranties from certain depositors, cannot appeal from the refusal to permit him to sue on behalf of other consumers similarly situated. [See 2 R. C. L. 52; 1 R. C. L. Supp. 376.] CROSS APPEALS from a judgment of the Chancery Branch, First Division, of the Circuit Court for Jefferson County, granting partial relief in an action brought to recover the amount of a deposit required of plaintiff by defendant and to enjoin defendant from refusing to serve plaintiff with gas or electricity without such deposit; plaintiff appealing from so much of the judgment as refused him the right to sue for others and for an (196 Ky. 268, 244 S. W. 690.) accounting on their behalf, and defendant appealing from so much as holds the rule requiring deposits discriminatory and grants plaintiff relief. Affirmed on both appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Section 25 of the Civil Code of Practice is to be considered as providing two separate states of case, in which the right to sue for all exists. Union Light, Heat & P. Co. v. Mulligan, 177 Ky. 662, 197 S. W. 1081. The subject-matter of a controversy consists of the right to be vindicated and the wrong to be remedied. Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308, 316, 19 L. ed. 931, 932; Hughes v. Cuming, 165 N. Y. 91, 58 N. E. 794; Reed v. Muscatine, 104 Iowa, 184, 73 N. W. 579; Jacobson v. Miller, 41 Mich. 93, 1 N. W. 1013. The course required by the judgment would lead to an injunction against the numerous persons for whose benefit appellant seeks to sue. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Baker, 155 Ky. 512, 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 496, 159 S. W. 1169. Equity, having acquired jurisdiction, will retain the case for all purposes, in order that full and proper relief may be granted. Sanders v. Herndon, 128 Ky. 437, 108 S. W. 908. This case meets every condition laid down in Batman v. Louisville Gas & E. Co. 187 Ky. 659, 220 S. W. 318. Messrs. Alex P. Humphrey and Matthew J. O'Doherty, for appellee: The rule in question would have been reasonable and would be upheld even had it applied only to those making application for such service after its adoption. Defendant, however, wishing to leave no ground for a charge of discrimination, made it apply to all its patrons. Union Light, Heat & P. Co. v. Mulligan, 177 Ky. 662, 197 S. W. 1081; Nairin v. Kentucky Heating Co. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 551, 86 S. W. 676. To enable one or more to sue for the benefit of others under § 25, Civil Code, the parties must have a common or general interest in the subject of the litigation, "a joint right." Each depositor in a case like this has an interest in, or claim to, only the deposit made by him. Union Light, Heat & P. Co. v. Mulligan, 177 Ky. 670, 197 S. W. 1081; Batman v. Louisville Gas & E. Co. 187 31 A.L.R.-89. Ky. 659, 220 S. W. 318; Oswald v. Morris, 92 Ky. 52, 17 S. W. 167; Newman, Pl. & Pr. p. 465; 12 R. C. L. p. 893; Owensboro Gaslight Co. v. Hildebrand, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 983, 42 S. W. 351. Clarke, J., delivered the opinion of of the court: Appellee owns and operates the gas and electric light plants in Louisville, under a franchise granted by city ordinance on March 29, 1913, and has a monopoly of the business. Appellant and many others, but not nearly all citizens, were required by the company to make deposits ranging in amounts from $5 to $100 before gas or electricity would be furnished them. Appellant instituted this action to recover the $5 deposit required of him, and to enjoin the company from refusing to serve him without such deposit; he also sought to sue for like relief for and on behalf of about three thousand other citizens of whom deposits were required, and to have the cause referred to the master to ascertain the amounts due each of them and for an accounting. The city intervened, asking the same injunctive relief as plaintiff. The defendant, after objecting by motion to strike and special demurrer to plaintiff suing for others than himself, for answer, set out the rule under which the deposits were required, denying that it was discriminatory, although admitting that less than 10 per cent of its patrons had made such deposits. The chancellor, holding upon final submission that the rule under which the deposits were made by plaintiff and others was discriminatory as enforced by defendant, gave him judgment, for the amount of his deposit, with interest and costs, and enjoined the defendant from enforcing the rule against plaintiff unless enforced against all citizens alike, but refusing to per |