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A sawyer employed in the woods, But in Associated Oil Co. v. Induswho was required to live at a camp 8 trial Acci, Commission (1923) Cal. miles from any other available lodg- -, 217 Pac. 744, an award of compening place, and was injured in his bunk sation to a machinist for an injury at night by a straw from an upper from falling off a bunk-house veranda bunk falling into his throat, has been at his employer's camp on a Sunday held to be "performing services grow- afternoon, while he was trying to keep ing out of and incidental to his em- cool, was annulled upon the ground ployment" at the time of such acci- that the injury did not arise out of his dent, inasmuch as it was part of his employment. It was assumed that he contract of employment that he should was living at the house, which was sleep on the premises and use the provided for those employees who bunk furnished by the lumber compa- cared to live there, although they were ny. Holt Lumber Co. v. Industrial not required to do so, there being pubCommission (1919) 168 Wis. 381, 170 lic rooming houses in a town a mile N. W. 366.
and a half distant. The court distinAn employee who lived in a bunk guished the case at bar from others in house, with about sixty other employ- which it was clearly contemplated in ees, and was injured at night while the contract of employment that the sleeping there, by an attack of one of employee should sleep on the premithe employees who became insane, has ses. But see Larson V. Industrial been held to be "performing service Acci. Commission (Cal.) supra, III. a. growing out of and incidental to his Danville, U. & C. R. Co. v. Industrial employment" at the time of the acci- Commission (1923) 307 Ill. 142, 138 N. dent. The defense contended that E. 289, was a similar case to the Calithis risk was not more hazardous to fornia case just noted. Compensation the employee than to the public at was denied to a dependent of a raillarge, being similar to the danger road-bridge worker who was electrofrom being struck by lightning, but cuted late on a Saturday night, at a the court answered: "Manifestly, the trolley car used as a bunk house, apdanger of accident in such sleeping parently in trying to put out the light quarters was greater to the employees by disconnecting the trolley or otherthan to the public at large, whether wise. The men were allowed to stay the accident came from fire, or from at the bunk house week-ends, when it one of its employees running amuck, was near town, as well as when it was or from any other cause. Where the on the road, but were not required to hazards of the employment combine do so. The employee had a room in with any outside agency to produce town where he sometimes stayed. the accident, and injury results, liabil- The fact that a bridge worker was ity for compensation exists." John in a tent provided by his employer H. Kaiser Lumber Co. v. Industrial preparing to go to bed, when he was Commission (1923) 181 Wis. 513, 195 struck by lightning, does not bring the N. W. 329.
injury within the provision of arising In Aho v. Chichagoff Min. Co. “out of his employment," although he (1922) 6 Alaska, 528, a laborer at a was within the course of his employmine who was furnished lodging at a ment. Griffith v. Cole Bros. (1917) bunk house was not allowed to pro- 183 Iowa, 415, L.R.A.1918F, 923, 165 ceed with a common-law suit against N. W. 577, 15 N. C. C. A. 674. his employer for damages by reason of An injury to a Mexican quarryman being injured by the collapse of the from the fall during a storm of bunk house, since his remedy was un- an overhanging rock on a hillside, der the act, the injury having resulted through a tent where he lived with his from an accident which arose out of family, about 150 yards from the quarand in the course of his employment, ry, apparently on his employer's it having been contemplated that he premises, has been held to have ocshould live there, and he being in fact curred too far from the quarry to be required to do so.
"on, in, or about” it, within the provisions of the act. Alvarado v. Flow- In Malky v. Kiskiminetas Valley Coal er Bros. Rock Crusher Co. (1921) 109 Co. (Pa.) ante, 1082, the killing of a Kan. 192, 197 Pac. 1091.
strike breaker in a bunk house on minAn injury to a track laborer by be- ing property by a bomb thrown by a ing struck by an approaching train on striker during the night, and after the a curve when he was walking along day's work had ceased, was held to the track at night, about half an hour have been within the course of the emafter finishing his work, toward the ployment, it being necessary to house railroad bunk house where he lived, the employee in the bunk house in ordid not "arise out of and in the course der to keep him employed, because of of his employment,” he being not the activity and influence of the obliged to live there or to walk the strikers. (Generally as to the right to track. The court said: “The car in compensation under Workmen's Comwhich Guastelo bunked had no more pensation. Acts for injuries growing connection with the accident than out of labor troubles, see annotation would any boarding house at Delhi in in 13 A.L.R. 549, and ante, 1085, the which he might have been living. later annotation being appended to While, owing to the nature of the the Malky Case.) work, which at times was remote from In Philbin v. Hayes (1918) 87 L. J. where men could secure accommoda- K. B. N. S. (Eng.) 779, W. C. & tion, it was customary for defendant to Ins. Rep. 194, 119 L. T. N. S. 133, 62 furnish bunk cars on a siding near Sol. Jo. 519, 34 Times L. R. 403, (1918] the work for the laborers to use if they W. N. 166, 11 B. W. C. C. 85–C. A., desired, free of charge, it was not com- an accident by the blowing down at pulsory for them to do so, and some night of a hut in which a workman on did not.” Guastelo v. Michigan C. R. a large construction job was living Co. (1916) 194 Mich. 382, L.R.A.1917D, was held not to have happened in the 69, 160 N. W. 484.
course of his employment, for the reaCompensation has been denied to a son that, although he was allowed to laborer who had worked for a rail- live in the hut at trifling cost, as most road, and, upon applying late one of the other workers also lived in simafternoon for another job, was told to ilar huts, there being not sufficient acreport before 7 o'clock in the morning, commodations otherwise for them, yet was given a supper and breakfast and he was not required to live there, but allowed to sleep in a car, but who could have lived elsewhere, as some of failed to report in the morning, sleep- the workers did. The court relied on ing late and staying on the car, and the decision by the House of Lords in was injured in starting to cross the Charles R. Davidson & Co. v. M'Robb tracks for dinner. Brassard v. Dela-  A. C. (Eng.) 304, 87 L. J. P. C. ware & H. Co. (1919) 186 App. Div. N. S. 58, 118 L. T. N. S. 451, 34 Times 647, 175 N. Y. Supp. 359.
L. R. 213, 62 Sol. Jo. 347, 55 Scot. L. R. In Corriveau v. Rex (1918) 18 Can. 185, 10 B. W. C. C. 673–H. L., where Exch. 275, compensation was denied the employment of an engineer on a where a man who had been sleeping, ship was interrupted by his leaving with other workmen engaged in re- the ship for his own purposes, an accipairing tracks, in a freight car on a dent happening to him as he returned siding fitted up as a bunk house, and to the dock. was found dead in bed, having appar
c. Hotels and apartment houses. ently died in the night from indiges
There has been considerable contion, upon the ground that the death did not occur in the course of his em
flict, on the facts of the cases, as to ployment, stress being placed on the accidents happening at hotels and fact that, although the men were al- apartment houses, but the same prinlowed to sleep in the car, they were
eiples apply. not obliged to do so, and, further, that In Rucker v. Read (1916) 39 N. J. another statute appeared to give a L. J. 48, compensation was allowed for remedy.
the death by fire of a domestic servant (311 Nl. 66, 142 N. E. 554.) who lived on the fifth floor of an employer's interest and for its benefit apartment house which was burned at that Zacharachi should be discharged, night, she being apparently required and when Cranney was hired and into live there. The court said: "In this trusted with this general authority, case the risk of injury as a result of which he exercised in a reasonable fire was one which might have been and suitable way, it was contemplated contemplated by any reasonable per- that whatever befell him when acting son entering the employment of re- strictly within the scope of his emspondent. Even though such risk was ployment, even if the time and condian 'extraordinary risk which is only tions could not be forecast, was inciindirectly connected with the employ- dental to and part of the employment, owing to the special nature of ment." the employment, it was a risk inci- An award of compensation to a head dental to such employment. During waitress who lived at a hotel, which the twenty-four hours of ordinary award was based on her contracting days deceased was continuously act- typhoid fever from drinking water ing in the course of her employment; from an artesian well at the hotel, has she was required under her contract been held to be warranted. Franto sleep in the room selected by re- kamp v. Fordney Hotel (1923) 222 spondent; she apparently had no other Mich. 525, 193 N. W. 204. place in which she might sleep; the In Chitty v. Nelson (1908) 126 L. T. duty of deceased to sleep in the bed- Jo. (Eng.) 172, 2 B. W. C. C. 496, comroom involved a risk of fire, a risk to pensation was awarded for the death which she was particularly exposed on of a hotel kitchenmaid by being suffoaccount of the distance from the cated in her room by smoke from a street and the location of the bedroom fire which started in the room immein a building used as an apartment diately under hers, after the servants house, in which a large number of had all retired. There was no quesfamilies resided. If deceased had not tion that the accident happened in the been in the service of respondent at course of the servant's employment, the time of the fire, the accident by but the defense contended that the which she lost her life would not have girl did not occupy an abnormally happened to her. The accident was dangerous position. The court held ‘in the course of the employment of that the accident arose out of her emthe deceased, because it was at a time ployment as well, and said: "In the during which she was employed, and present case it will be conceded that, the deceased was occupying a room but for the fact of the deceased being designated, selected, and furnished by in the service of the respondent at the respondent, which it was her duty un- time of the fire, the accident by which der her contract of employment to oc- she lost her life would not have hapcupy. ... The accident arose 'out pened to her. It will also be conceded of the employment of the deceased, that it was part of her duty to sleep in because it was something the risk of the room assigned to her, a duty which which might have been contemplated involved a certain amount of risk in by a reasonable person when she en- case of fire,-a risk to which she was tered the employment of the respond- exposed not only on account of the disent, as incidental to it.”
tance from the ground, but also from In Cranney's Case (1919) 232 Mass. the fact that her fellow servant was 149, 15 A.L.R. 584, 122 N. E. 266, the an elderly woman suffering from bad shooting of a hotel head waiter by a legs, which naturally would enhance waiter whom he had discharged was the difficulties of any rapid escape for held to have arisen out of the for- her, and also for the deceased, if she mer's employment. The head waiter determined to stand by her, as it is in was eating lunch at the hotel while off evidence she actually did. This being duty, and the fact that he was subject so, I am of the opinion that the fact to call while in the hotel was stressed. of sleeping in this room and sharing The court said: “It was plainly in the it with an elderly and inactive fellow
servant was part of a duty which the the viewpoint of loyalty to one's emdeceased owed to her employer and to ployer, are not only outside of the emherself,-a duty which exposed her to ployee's specific employment and duty, a risk in case of fire more than the but which are in themselves of such a usual and ordinary risk, and the con- hazardous character as that the emsequence of which proved fatal to her; ployee ought not to be reasonably exand therefore, finding this as a fact, I pected or required to do them, except hold that the accident by which the as a matter of immediate necessity or deceased lost her life did arise both emergency, even though they might be out of and in the course of her em- within the scope of the employment. ployment in the respondent's service." This is such an identical case. Even
In Alderidge v. Merry  W. C. if the deceased had been the janitress & Ins. Rep. 97, 47 Ir. L. T. 5,  2 in charge of the building generally Ir. R. 308, 6 B. W. C. C. 450—C. A., she could not reasonably be expected an injury to a work girl's eye by rea- to do the thing she was essaying to do, son of a bit of mortar falling into it for it was peculiarly the work of a from the ceiling of a hotel garret man—and it might even be said of a where she slept was held to be in the young and active man-to climb out course of her employment as servant of a window, find a precarious footat the hotel, and to have arisen out of ing upon
narrow ledge between the employment, she being required to 3 or 4 feet below it, and thence sleep there and having just got out of descend by lean-to stepladder bed in the morning to light a fire in to the bottom of light well response to her employer's call.
nearly 9 feet below the point of In Williamson v. Industrial Acci. exit from the window. We think the Commission (1918) 177 Cal. 715, 171 attempted doing of this act by the dePac. 797, it was held that an injury to ceased, admittedly outside the range a hotel or rooming-house chamber- of her designated duties, was also so maid from climbing into a light well clearly beyond the scope of her emto clean it of litter, to which the own- ployment as to require no further diser of the property had called her at- cussions." tention when her employer, the man- In Daly v. Bates & Roberts (1918) ager of the house, was not on the 224 N. Y. 126, 120 N. E. 118, reversing premises, was not by accident arising (1918) 183 App. Div. 914, 169 N. Y. out of and in the course of her employ. Supp. 1090, a hotel laundress who ment, the cleaning of the light well lived at the hotel injured her wrist being no part of her duties, but she while washing her own clothes at having volunteered to do it to help the night. This injury was held to be outjanitor, who was ill. The court said: side the protection of the act, inas"It is conceded by the respondent much as "she was not engaged in the herein that, in attempting to do said performance of any duty she was act, the decedent did step aside from employed to perform, or directly the sphere of her specific employment, connected with
or incidental to and was thus beyond its scope, but it the work of the employer but is contended that, since the act which her labor there was entirely disshe was undertaking to do was under- associated with the work of her emtaken out of loyalty to the interests ployer.” The court further reasoned of her employer and for the latter's that "had the claimant remained in benefit, the statute should be con- her room in the hotel, and engaged strued so liberally as to allow compen- her time in mending her clothing, sation for the injury sustained in at- and while so engaged met with an actempting to perform it. We think, cident by reason of using a scissors, however, it would be an unwarranted it could scarcely be held that such inextension of the statute to give it ap- jury would arise out of and in the plication to acts done without the course of her employment or was inciknowledge or consent of the employer, dental thereto." which, however commendable from Compensation has also been denied to a superintendent of an apartment 221 Pac. 371, it appeared to be ashouse for an injury received one sumed that a chauffeur who was killed morning on the stairs from an alter- at night in his employer's house by a cation with a tenant in reference to Chinese cook, after he (the chauffeur) a key, following the superintendent's had been reporting to his employer calling on the tenant's wife, the super- and went downstairs with the emintendent being not on his master's ployer to investigate a noise which business at the time, although he was sounded like a burglary, was acting in apparently on duty (Muller v. H. & A. the course of his employment, and, Cohen (1919) 186 App. Div. 845, 174 further, that if he had been killed by a N. Y. Supp. 736); and to a janitress of burglar under such curcumstances an apartment house who, with her the accident would have arisen out of family, occupied an apartment there, his employment. The court considand was injured by the fall of part of ered, however, that he was killed from the ceiling in her kitchen as she was motives of private revenge, there bepreparing to eat breakfast, even upon ing some evidence of a previous scuffle the assumption that she was always between the chauffeur and the cook, on duty when her services were re- and that the latter had no intention of quired, inasmuch as at the time of the killing his employer or molesting the accident she was doing nothing for property, and held that the accident her employers nor anything incidental did not arise out of the employment. thereto (Lauterbach v. Jarett (1919) Lawlor, J., dissented, believing the 189 App. Div. 303, 178 N. Y. Supp. commission's finding to be warranted, 480).
that the Chinaman was a marauder In the reported case (KRAFT v. WEST and that his motive could not be deHOTEL Co. ante, 1245), where compen- termined. sation was denied, it will be noted In Clifford v. Joy (1909) 43 Ir. L. T. that, while the chambermaid lived at 193, 2 B. W. C. C. 32–C. A., compenthe hotel, she was not required to do sation was denied for burns causing so, and the court also stressed the fact the death of a girl servant who had that, in using an alcohol lamp in curl- been drying her hair outside her eming her hair, she was violating an ex- ployer's house, and, upon being called press order, so that the accident did in to take care of a baby in a cradle not arise out of her employment. The near a fire, took a position too close to dissenting opinion, as also the origi- the fire and her blouse was burned. nal opinion of the same court in The court said, in holding that the (1921) Iowa, 185 N. W. 895, accident did not arise out of her emwhich was reversed on the rehearing, ployment: "The real question is considered that the fire occurred after whether the blouse took fire because she had finished curling her hair, and the girl was drying her hair near the that, as she owed her employer the fire. If we came to the conclusion duty to put it out, in order to protect that she was engaged at two operahis property and the lives of the tions,-one in charge of the child, and guests, her burns arose out of her em- the other drying her hair,-the quesployment while saving him in the tion is, Which of the two brought her emergency.
within reach of the fire and set her
clothes on fire? She would not have d. Employers' private residences.
been in the place in which she took Although no case has been found
fire by reason of being in charge of which allows compensation to a serv- the baby, and there is ample proof ant living at an employer's private that the accident wholly arose out of residence upon this particular ground, the operation of being engaged in drythe following cases, in which compen- ing her hair. The risk of taking fire sation has been denied, will be of in- while engaged in drying her hair was terest:
not one within the scope of her emIn Royal Indemnity Co. v. Industri- ployment." al Acci. Commission (1923) Cal. - A lady's maid whose eye was in