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what fully stated, and they are correctly stated. Every word of the record was read at that time. The evidence is the same now as it was then. It seemed to the writer in preparing that opinion, and I feel the same way about it now, that there was no substantial conflict in the evidence on the essentials. An analysis of each circumstance was attempted. To avoid repeating the facts here, reference is made to the former opinion for the facts, as I read them from the record.1 Conceding that it was a close question on the proposition whether there is

1 The opinion referred to is as follows: It may be, as contended by appellants, that there is a conflict in the evidence at some points and some inconsistencies in plaintiff's story, but, if so, the conflict, if any, is as to details and nonessentials. This being so, it becomes a question of law whether plaintiff's injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. There is no question but that she was severely burned, and for several months was in a hospital, and unable to work; that she was in the employment of the hotel company as a chambermaid, and that she was injured while in her room. Νο one was with her at the time. A doctor and her father testify as to the character of her injuries, loss of time, and so on. It is fairly established by the evidence, without any substantial conflict, that in the evening of May 10, 1917, claimant was in her room preparing to retire. She was dressed in underwear, and some sort of an apron dress, perhaps to be used as a nightgown. Soon before the accident she had been engaged in putting up her hair. Some of the other fifteen chambermaids used kid curlers, but in this instance claimant was using a curling iron, and to heat it she put it across the top of an alcohol lamp, referred to by some of the witnesses as a can. It had an open top and no wick; a lid went over the top. Some of the girls used alcohol lamps, and others kerosene, which were kept in their rooms. They had been forbidden by the hotel management from having in their rooms, or using, alcohol lamps such as claimant was using. This was the first time claimant had used such a lamp, and she did not know how to put out the flame. She had finished curling her hair, and then left her room for a moment to find another girl to come and put it out, or show her how, but found none. Returning

any conflict, it seems to me the majority construes every circumstance against plaintiff and nothing in her favor, under the liberal construction to be given in order to carry out the purposes of the Compensation Law, so that the industry shall make some compensation thereof in a smaller amount to those suffering injuries not purposely inflicted, and so on, even though the plaintiff may have been guilty of negligence. In the majority opinion much is made of the circumstance that plaintiff was curling her hair, and that she had violated a rule of the hotel in to her room she saw that the wind had either blown the lace curtain into the lamp flame, which was 4 or 5 inches high, or the flame was blown against a handkerchief, or hair or hemp switch, which were lying a few inches from the lamp on the dresser, on a dresser scarf or spread. The handkerchief and switch were set on fire. The handkerchief was consumed, and the switch partly so; burned on top. She procured a towel at a washstand and began whipping the fire, attempting to put it out, and in the whipping operation her own clothing caught fire, and she was severely burned. She extinguished the fire on the dresser and attempted to put out the fire on her person. She wrapped herself in a blanket, screamed, and ran into an adjoining room. Soon afterwards others came and found her on the bed with the blanket around her, the fire extinguished. Such is the substance of her testimony.

There were 500 or 600 rooms in the hotel, and many guests. Plaintiff's claim is that in attempting to put out the fire she was trying to save the hotel property and its inmates. This was expected of her and the other chambermaids and help. A witness connected with the hotel management so testifies, saying that if plaintiff or any of the maids saw a fire in any of the rooms he would expect them to do the best they could to put it out and notify the management. It is thought by appellant that some matters brought out on cross-examination, and alleged contradictory statements claimed to have been made by her to witnesses testifying for defendant, destroy her testimony, and show that the accident did not happen as she contends. We shall not attempt to refer to all such matters, but enough to show that her story was not substantially shaken, or rendered improbable or unreasonable.

I

(193 Iowa, 1288, 188 N. W. 870.)

regard to having such a lamp. That might be negligence on her part, but this proceeding is not based upon negligence. The purpose of stressing the fact that she was curling her hair is, of course, the basis of the argument that she was engaged in her own private affairs, and that her injury did not arise out of her employment. The hair-curling circumstance is, it seems to me, beside the mark. She had finished curling her hair and gone out of the room to get someone to show her

how to put out the lamp. Upon her return, she found the room or some of the things in the room in flames, took a wet towel, and, in attempting to whip out the flames, her own clothing caught fire and she was severely burned. She was attempting to save her employer's property, the burning of the hotel, and to save the many guests therein.

In my

opinion it was her duty to do that,

and that was within the course of her employment, even had she not had instructions so to do. But the evidence shows that this was expected of her and the other chambermaids and help. A witness connected with the hotel management so testifies, saying that, if plaintiff or any of the maids saw a fire in any of the rooms, he would expect them to do the best they could to put it out and to notify the management. On these essentials which I have mentioned, to my mind there is no substantial conflict or dispute in the evidence. It is clear to me that she was injured in the course of her employment. Many cases are cited bearing upon this point in Reid v. Automatic Electric Washer Co. 189 Iowa, 964, 983, et seq., 179 N. W. 323. I shall not prolong the discussion. I would affirm.

Mr. Justice Weaver joins in this dissent.

ANNOTATION.

Workmen's compensation: injury to servant who lives on employer's premises as arising out of or in the course of the employment.

I. Introduction, 1251.

II. Generally, 1251.

III. Places where accidents happen:

a. Farms and ranches, 1253.

b. Bunk houses, cabins, and tents, 1254.

1. Introduction.

This annotation is not concerned with the question whether a particular employer, e. g., farmer or householder, or employee, e. g., farmer, laborer or domestic servant, is within the class of persons or employments embraced by the Workmen's Compensation Acts, but assuming that they are, deals with the question whether the injury arises out of or in the course of the employment, so far as the fact that the injured servant lived on the employer's premises might be regarded as a factor, more or less distinctive in the result. Cases in which it is apparent that the fact that the employee lived on the premises could

III. continued.

c. Hotels and apartment houses, 1256.

d. Employers' private residences, 1259.

e. Miscellaneous, 1260.

not have affected the question are not included.

Accidents to seamen and others who live on ships, barges, tugs, or other vessels are excluded.

Most of the cases are those in respect to accidents that happen "after hours," or while an employee is off duty, but the annotation is not limited strictly to such cases.

II. Generally.

Injuries to an employee living on the employer's premises, reasonably attributable or incidental to the nature of his employment, or to the conditions under which he lives in carrying on his employment, have been held in the following cases to be within

compensation acts as arising out of and/or in the course of the employment:

Alaska.-Aho v. Chichagoff Min. Co. (1922) 6 Alaska, 528.

California.-Zurich General Acci. & Liability Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acci. Commission (1922) 59 Cal. App. 150, 210 Pac. 51; Larson v. Industrial Acci. Commission (1924) Cal. - 224 Pac. 744.

Colorado.-Ocean Acci. & Guarantee Corp. v. Pallero (1919) 66 Colo. 190, 180 Pac. 950.

Indiana. Re Bollman (1920) 73 Ind. App. 46, 126 N. E. 639.

Louisiana.-Prevost v. Gheens Realty Co. (1922) 151 La. 508, 92 So. 38. Massachusetts. Cranney's Case (1919) 232 Mass. 149, 15 A.L.R. 584, 122 N. E. 266.

Michigan.-Frankamp v. Fordney Hotel (1923) 222 Mich. 525, 193 N. W. 204.

Nebraska.-Dietz Club v. Niehaus (1923) Neb. 193 N. W. 344. New Jersey. Rucker v. Read (1916) 39 N. J. L. J. 48.

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Wisconsin.-Holt Lumber Co. v. Industrial Commission (1919) 168 Wis. 381, 170 N. W. 366; John H. Kaiser Lumber Co. v. Industrial Commission (1923) 181 Wis. 513, 195 N. W. 329.

England. Chitty v. Nelson (1908) 126 L. T. Jo. 172, 2 B. W. C. C. 496; Pepper v. Sayer [1914] 3 K. B. 994, 83 L. J. K. B. N. S. 1756, [1914] W. C. & Ins. Rep. 423, 111 L. T. N. S. 708, 58 Sol. Jo. 669, 30 Times L. R. 621, 7 B. W. C. C. 616-C. A.; Richards v. Morris (1914) 84 L. J. K. B. N. S. 621, [1915] 1 K. B. 221, 110 L. T. N. S. 496, 7 B. W. C. C. 130-C. A.

Ireland. Alderidge v. Merry [1913] W. C. & Ins. Rep. 97, 47 Ir. L. T. 5,

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Illinois. Danville, U. & C. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission (1923) 307 Ill. 142, 138 N. E. 289.

Iowa.-Griffith v. Cole Bros. (1917) 183 Iowa, 415, L.R.A.1918F, 923, 165 N. W. 577, 15 N. C. C. A. 674. KRAFT V. WEST HOTEL Co. (reported herewith) ante, 1245, reversing (1921) — Iowa, 185 N. W. 895.

Kansas.-Alvarado v. Flower Bros. Rock Crusher Co. (1921) 109 Kan. 192, 197 Pac. 1091.

Michigan.-Guastelo v. Michigan C. R. Co. (1916) 194 Mich. 382, L.R.A. 1917D, 69, 160 N. W. 484.

New York. Daly v. Bates (1918) 224 N. Y. 126, 120 N. E. 118, reversing (1918) 183 App. Div. 914, 169 N. Y. Supp. 1090; Murphy v. Ludlum Steel Co. (1918) 182 App. Div. 139, 169 N. Y. Supp. 781, affirmed in (1919) 227 N. Y. 634, 126 N. E. 915; Brassard v. Delaware & H. Co. (1919) 186 App. Div. 647, 175 N. Y. Supp. 359; Lauterbach v. Jarett (1919) 189 App. Div. 303, 178 N. Y. Supp. 480; Muller v. H. & A. Cohen (1919) 186 App. Div. 845, 174 N. Y. Supp. 736; Briskin v. Hyman (1922) 203 App. Div. 275, 197 N. Y. Supp. 111, affirmed in (1923) 236 N. Y. 522, 142 N. E. 268.

Canada. Corriveau v. Rex (1918) 18 Can. Exch. 275.

England.—Craske v. Wigan [1909] 2 K. B. 635, 78 L. J. K. B. N. S. 994, 101 L. T. N. S. 6, 25 Times L. R. 632, 53 Sol. Jo. 560, 2 B. W. C. C. 35—C. A.; Watson v. Sherwood (1909) 127 L. T. Jo. 86, 2 B. W. C. C. 462; Butler v. Burton-on-Trent Union (1912) 106 L. T. N. S. 824, 5 B. W. C. C. 355-C. A.; Martin v. Manchester Corp. [1912] W. N. 105, 106 L. T. N. S. 741, 28 Times L. R. 344, 76 J. P. 251, 10 L. G. R. 996,

[1912] W. C. Rep. 289, 5 B. W. C. C. 259-C. A.; Wray v. Taylor Bros. & Co. [1913] W. C. & Ins. Rep. 446, 109 L. T. N. S. 120, 6 B. W. C. C. 529 -C. A.; Griffiths v. Robins [1917] W. C. & Ins. Rep. 44, 10 B. W. C. C. 90; Philbin v. Hayes (1918) 87 L. J. K. B. N. S. 779, [1918] W. C. & Ins. Rep. 194, 119 L. T. N. S. 133, 62 Sol. Jo. 519, 34 Times L. R. 403, 11 B. W. C. C. 85.

Ireland.-Clifford v. Joy (1909) 43 Ir. L. T. 193, 2 B. W. C. C. 32—C. A.; Hannifin v. Fitzmaurice [1921] W. C. & Ins. Rep. 143, [1921] 2 Ir. R. 44, 55 Ir. L. T. 65, 14 B. W. C. C. 320-C. A. III. Places where accidents happen. a. Farms and ranches. Among the clearest instances of accidents of this sort have been those that have happened on farms or ranches.

Thus, in Zurich General Acci. & Liability Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acci. Commission (1922) 59 Cal. App. 150, 210 Pac. 51, a finding was held to be warranted that an employee living on a ranch, who worked principally at grading, but also helped with horses with the superintendent's consent, was injured in the course of his employment when kicked by one of the employer's horses that he was watering on a night after he had taken a day off from his usual work of grading. The court said: "It is contended that, because he was not to receive wages for the day in which he was injured, he was not in the employ of the Cloman Land & Sheep Company on that day. We think the point is without merit. He cared for the horses and received his board and lodging on that day, which, assuredly, was a part of his compensation for his labor. The situation here is different than would be the situation of a factory worker on a holiday. Here the place of employment was open and accessible to the employee on this day, when he was not actually working at the grading. He was at least encouraged, if not expected, to care for his teams and the other stock around the ranch. He was given some compensation for such labor,-i. e., his board and lodg

ing, and while engaged in this work he was injured. This work grew directly out of his employment, and would never have been performed by him but for his employment on the ranch."

And in Larson v. Industrial Acci. Commission (1924)

Cal. -, 224

Pac. 744, compensation was allowed for injuries to workmen who were obliged to stay at a bunk house on a ranch which was 10 miles from the nearest town, by reason of an explosion at the bunk house after they had finished their work for the day, one of the men having thrown oil on a fire. The death of the foreman, who lived at a cottage on the ranch and had come to the bunk house to give orders to other men, was also held to be within the act.

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An injury on a railroad crossing to a sawmill employee, upon his returning to the plant after his noonday lunch at his home, in one of the employer's houses that were separated from the plant by only the railroad and a public road, was sustained “in the course of his employment" as "having to do with and originating in the work of the employer, received while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of the employer," the crossing being held to bear so intimate a relation to the employer's premises that it could hardly be treated otherwise than as part of them. Lumberman's Reciprocal Asso. v. Behnken (1922) 112 Tex. 103, 28 A.L.R. 1402, 246 S. W. 72, affirming (1920) Tex. Civ. App., 226 S. W. 154. (Generally, as to injury while crossing or walking along railroad or street railway tracks in going to or from work, as arising out of and in the course of the employment, see annotation in 28 A.L.R. 1408.)

And an engineer of a traveling threshing machine that went from farm to farm, who was required to watch the machine at night, received an injury that "arose out of" his employment, where he was struck at night by a wagon bed which fell in a barn on the premises where he was working (not his employer's), he hav

The

ing used the barn for the night as he had been in the habit of doing for years in order to watch the machine better, instead of accepting an invitation to sleep in the farmhouse. court reasoned: "Since he was not only to act as engineer in the operation of the machine, but was to remain overnight and act as watchman, it must be presumed that it was not the intention of the parties that Bollman was to remain awake through each night, but rather that he should sleep on the premises where the machine was left, and be ready for such emergency as might arise. It cannot be said that Bollman could not, and did not, render service to his employer while asleep, though it is not stated that he was asleep at the time of the accident, but that he had retired in the driveway of the barn for the night.' Under the facts stated, he had, as had long been his custom, placed himself not far from the property, so that the noise made by trespassers might the more easily awaken him should he be asleep, and so that he could the more quickly reach the property should help be needed. The accident which caused Bollman's death was due to a hazard to which he would not have

employer ferried him across to see his (the laborer's) wife on the mainland on a Sunday, has been held to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment, upon the theory of an implied contract that he should be allowed to see his wife at all reasonable times, and there being no available means of getting to the mainland other than his employer's boat. It is not clear whether the landing place was a part of the farm, but the laborer had previously lived on the mainland with his wife while working for his employer both there and on the island, and the wife was living with her father, who was also a farm laborer, possibly employed on the same farm. Richards v. Morris (1914) 84 L. J. K. B. N. S. (Eng.) 621, [1915] 1 K. B. 221, 110 L. T. N. S. 496, 7 B. W. C. C. 130-C. A.

b. Bunk houses, cabins, and tents. Such accidents have also frequently happened to workmen on construction or other jobs, living at bunk houses, cabins, and tents that have been provided by their employers, and the test as to whether they were entitled to compensation has generally been whether they were reasonably

been exposed apart from his employ- required or expected to do what they

ment. The accident was the result of a risk which was reasonably incidental to the employment. We therefore hold that the death of Bollman was by accident arising out of his employment by Lewellen." Re Bollman (1920) 73 Ind. App. 46, 126 N. E. 639.

In Pepper v. Sayer [1914] 3 K. B. (Eng.) 994, 83 L. J. K. B. N. S. 1756, [1914] W. C. & Ins. Rep. 423, 111 L. T. N. S. 708, 58 Sol. Jo. 669, 30 Times L. R. 621, 7 B. W. C. C. 616-C. A., compensation was allowed for the death of a farm overseer from a fall in reaching for a key after vaulting to the sill of a cowshed at about midnight, he having been in the habit of looking over the sheds before retiring and doing acrobatic "stunts" of this sort.

The death of a farm laborer whose duties required him to live on an island, where part of the farm was, from falling into rough water in trying to land from a boat in which his

were doing at the time of the accident.

Thus, compensation has been allowed to dependents of a watchman whose duties required him to stay continuously at a mine about 2 miles above sea level, and live there in a cabin provided for him, and who was killed as a result of his blasting stumps on the premises to provide firewood to heat his cabin and cook his food, no loose wood being available. His act of procuring the fuel was held to be an incident to his employment, for his employer's ultimate benefit, and the blasting of stumps under the circumstances was considered to be a proper means of obtaining wood. Ocean Acci. & Guarantee Corp. v. Pallero (1919) 66 Colo. 190, 180 Pac. 95. (Generally, as to whether injury to watchman arises out of and in the course of his employment, see annotation in 6 A.L.R. 578, and 13 A.L.R. 512.)

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