charge of his mother's plantation, where he resided, was protected by the exception of a person on his own premises in a statute providing that it should be a penal offense for anyone to carry around with him on his person, or to have in his manual possession outside of his own home or place of business, a pistol or revolver, without first obtaining a license.

So, it has been held that where the appellant had full control of another's pasture and live stock, he was not liable for carrying a concealed weapon thereon. Sanderson v. State (Tex.) supra.

As to effect on rights of employee of exception permitting carrying of weapons at one's place of business, see Miller v. State (1913) 12 Ga. App. 479, 77 S. E. 653, set out infra under heading, "Person at place of business."

Person on public road.

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One who carries a weapon on public highway is not on his own premises within an exception to a prohibition against carrying weapons. Moss v. State (1898) 65 Ark. 368, 45 S. W. 987; Leigh v. State (1921) 26 Ga. App. 637, 107 S. E. 284; State v. Perry (1897) 120 N. C. 580, 26 S. E. 915, 1008; Lattimore v. State (1912), 65 Tex. Crim. Rep. 490, 145 S. W. 588.

This view was adopted by the court in Moss v. State (Ark.) supra, wherein it appeared that the defendant carried a pistol on a public road running over her husband's lands. The court held that the rule was not altered by reason of the husband owning the land over which the road ran, as the purpose of the statute was to conserve the public peace, especially on highways and in other places open to the public and not controlled by private individuals.

In Leigh v. State (1921) 26 Ga. App. 637, 107 S. E. 284, the court said that although a cropper had a right to carry a pistol without a license anywhere on his farm, he had no such privilege on a public road, which was open to be shared by all the public and could under no circumstances be

considered his premises or place of business.

And the exemption was held not to be applicable in Lattimore v. State (Tex.) supra, wherein the defendant was a rural mail carrier and carried a pistol while going over his route. It was contended that, while the defendant was engaged in the carrying and distributing of mail in a vehicle. as a mail carrier, he was on his own premises and at his own place of business. The holding was to the effect that the public roads of the state or a buggy going along them could not be construed to be either the defendant's premises or place of business, in contemplation of law. In denying the application of the exception, the court said that "on one's own premises or place of business," in contemplation of the law, had reference to a particular locality, appropriated exclusively to a local business, such as a farm, store, shop, or dwelling house, and the business only such as was usually carried on upon a farm, in the store or shop, or other appropriate local place, so that woods, prairies, or even public roads, could in no proper sense be included within the term, since no right to exclusive appropriation could be had.

In two jurisdictions, however, the contrary was held where the roads ran through and over the premises of the accused. State v. Hewell (1884) 90 N. C. 705; Ball v. State (1894) Tex. Crim. Rep. 25 S. W. 627; Ross v. State (1894) Tex. Crim. Rep., 28 S. W. 199.

that the exception, "on his own premises," should be applied to a public road which ran through and over the premises on which the accused lived, so that he could not be held guilty for carrying a pistol while on that portion of the road.

And it was similarly held in Ross v. State (Tex.) supra, where the appellant carried on his person a pistol while walking on a public road which ran over the premises where he lived. Licensee.

A mere licensee is not on his own

premises within the scope of an exception as to the carrying of weapons. Nichols v. State (1912) 4 Ala. App. 115, 58 So. 681; Posey v. State (1912) 4 Ala. App. 118, 59 So. 234; Clark v. State (1887) 49 Ark. 174, 4 S. W. 658; Lemmons v. State (1892) 56 Ark. 559, 20 S. W. 404; Featherston v. State (1896) 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 612, 34 S. W. 276, 938; Whitesides v. State (1900) 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 151, 58 S. W. 1016; Banks v. State (1906)

Tex. Crim. Rep., 98 S. W. 242; Solosky v. State (1922) 90 Tex. Crim. Rep. 537, 236 S. W. 742.

The exception was held not to apply in Whitesides v. State (1900) 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 151, 58 S. W. 1016, wherein it appeared that the appellant carried a pistol over certain pastures which he had a mere license to use for the pasturing of his live stock. The court reasoned that the appellant, having no legal interest in the premises, but a mere license to turn his live stock into the pasture in common with others, had no such dominion over them as to constitute his presence there "being on his own premises," and bring him within the exception in the statute.

It was held in Solosky v. State (Tex.) supra, that the defendant, carrying concealed weapons upon premises belonging to his divorced wife, was not on his own premises within the meaning of the exception, and was not exempt from prosecution. The court declared that the judgment of divorce had devested the husband of all legal interest in the premises in question, and left to him a mere permission to enter for the purpose of visiting his children.

that, although the exception gave him a right to carry a pistol on his own premises or at his regular place of business, he was confined to the two pieces of land controlled exclusively by himself, and could have no such right over the whole plantation.

It was held in Lemmons v. State (1892) 56 Ark. 559, 20 S. W. 404, that the exception did not protect a son carrying a weapon on his father's woodlands, over which he had a mere license to enter and cut wood. It appeared that the defendant, an unmarried son living with his father, cultivated a portion of the farm, but had only a mere license to enter the premises where he carried the weapon. The defendant offered as ground of error the refusal of the trial court to instruct that if the accused was a single person, lived with his father on the tract of land, and made his home there, he was on his own premises and entitled to carry the pistol on the premises. The court denied the error on the ground that the instruction would make the entire farm the premises of the defendant simply because he lived there, even though he had no control, either exclusively or jointly with his father, over any lands except those he cultivated. Thereupon the court laid down the rule that a son residing on his father's premises could lawfully carry a pistol on the grounds habitually used in immediate connection with the dwelling house and forming the socalled curtilage, and as his father's tenant he had such right also on the lands which he cultivated, but with reference to the rest of the farm, including the woodlands, he had a mere license and was not entitled to carry a weapon thereon.

In Clark v. State (1887) 49 Ark. 174, 4 S. W. 658, the same provision was construed not to apply to the carrying of a weapon on a common stairway. The evidence showed that the defendant occupied two rooms in an office building as his law offices, that other persons had offices in the building, that all of them used a common stairway in order to reach the street, and that the defendant carried

a pistol about his person while out on the stairway. In sustaining the conviction the court held that the provision protected only those who had an estate in the real property which constituted the premises, and consequently did not permit the defendant, who had no legal right to exercise authority over the stairway, but on the contrary shared its use with all the other tenants in the building, to treat the stairs as his own private premises and carry a pistol thereon.

It appeared in Featherston v. State (1896) 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 612, 34 S. W. 276, 938, that the defendant, a city official, made the mayor's office his private business office and carried a concealed weapon therein. The court held that the defendant was not on his own premises so as to authorize him to carry a pistol about his person in such office.

The defendant in Posey v. State (1912) 4 Ala. App. 118, 59 So. 234, was convicted of carrying a pistol while on premises not his own or under his control. It appeared that he entered a room on the premises of another, took up a pistol which was lying on a counter, shot it off, and then laid it down again. The court held that the act constituted carrying or bearing a pistol while on another's premises, and that he was not protected by the exception.

In Nichols v. State (1912) 4 Ala. App. 115, 58 So. 681, it appeared that witnesses saw the defendant hiding a pistol in the kitchen of a house where they were paying a visit, but there was no evidence that the defendant was carrying the pistol in the sense of bearing arms. The court held that the defendant was not guilty. Although he was a mere licensee on the premises, there was no evidence of a criminal intent, or of the carrying of a pistol in the sense of bearing arms in violation of the statute.

Landlord.

A landlord who has devested himself of all right of control over his premises during the term of a lease

is not entitled to carry a weapon on

such lands as a person on his own premises. Jones v. State (1891) 55 Ark. 186, 17 S. W. 719; Reagan v. State (1915) 16 Ga. App. 369, 85 S. E. 353; Zallner v. State (1883) 15 Tex. App. 23; Fannin v. State (1896) Tex. Crim. Rep., 34 S. W. 280.

In Jones v. State (Ark.) supra, it appeared that a landlord carried a concealed weapon while attempting to eject a tenant holding over after the expiration of his lease. In deciding that under the circumstances the landlord was not on his own premises, the court said that the tenant still had possession of the premises, even though the lease had expired, and so long as he continued in possession of the lands the house and its curtilage were his home.

A similar decision was handed down in Zallner v. State (1883) 15 Tex. App. 23, wherein it appeared that a landlord carried a concealed weapon on his tenant's land during the term of the lease. The Texas statute (Penal Code, art. 319) prohibited a person from carrying a concealed weapon except while on his own premises. In holding that the defendant was not on his own premises, and was guilty of violating the statute, the court laid down the rule that the tenant alone during the term of the lease is vested with the right to control the premises, for the reason that the landlord's rights are suspended during the term of the lease, except only such incidental rights as have been specifically reserved by agreement.

It was held in Reagan v. State (1915) 16 Ga. App. 369, 85 S. E. 353, that during the continuance of a lease the sole right to the possession, use, and enjoyment of the leased premises was vested in the tenant, so that the landlord could not justify his carrying a weapon thereon, under a statute (Acts 1910, p. 135) which prohibited a person from carrying a weapon outside of his own home or place of business.

And the same rule was applied in Fannin v. State (Tex.) supra, wherein it appeared that the appellant landlord carried a concealed weapon

on lands he had leased to a tenant. It was held that in contemplation of law he was not on his own premises. The holding in Fields V. State (1914) 74 Tex. Crim. Rep. 70, 166 S. W. 1166, was to the effect that an owner working a farm jointly with a tenant was on his own premises when he carried a pistol on the lands. It appeared in evidence that the appellant had not parted with his right of control over the land jointly with his tenant. Tenant.

A tenant during the term of his lease possesses the premises as his own within a provision allowing the carrying of weapons on one's own premises. Gibbs v. State (1913) 70 Tex. Crim. Rep. 278, 156 S. W. 687; Mireles v. State (1917) 80 Tex. Crim. Rep. 648, 192 S. W. 241; Rodgers v. State (1919) 85 Tex. Crim. Rep. 421, 213 S. W. 637.

a

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In Gibbs v. State (Tex.) supra, it appeared that the appellant carried concealed weapon on picnic ground which he had rented for the day, and over which he had control. The court held that under the circumstances the premises under the appellant's control were his own premises, whether the control was to be permanent or temporary, and he had a right, under the exception in the statute, to carry a pistol thereon.

And the exception was applied in Mireles v. State (1917) 80 Tex. Crim. Rep. 648, 192 S. W. 241, wherein the defendant, occupying leased lands, was arrested and conducted off his premises, and then searched for the concealed weapon which was found about his person.

And in Rodgers v. State (Tex.) supra, the court said that the appellant had a right, under the exception in the statute, to carry a pistol on his own premises, as they were held under a lease giving him the sole right to possess and control them. Tenant in common.

A tenant in common has such dominion over the premises as to constitute his presence there "being on his own premises" within the mean

ing of an exception in an act forbidding the carrying of weapons. Franklin v. State (1913) 12 Ga. App. 483, 77 S. E. 653; Brannon v. State (1887) 23 Tex. App. 428, 5 S. W. 132; Fields v. State (Tex.) supra.

In Brannon v. State (1887) 23 Tex. App. 428, 5 S. W. 132, it was held that a husband was on his own premises, where his wife was an owner in common with other heirs to the land, it appearing that the defendant and his wife occupied and cultivated a portion of the estate, while the other owners in common occupied other tracts. When charged with unlawfully carrying a pistol about his person in the yard of another tenant of the land, the defendant claimed he was on his own premises by virtue of his wife's ownership in common. The court said that, although the defendant was on his own premises while on the portion occupied and cultivated by himself, his rights did not extend over the whole estate, and in contemplation of law he had left his own premises at the time of the offense.

And the exception was applied in Franklin v. State (Ga.) supra, wherein it appeared that the accused lived and worked on a farm which he owned in common with others. Resident.

A resident on premises is entitled to the benefit of an exception as to persons on their own premises in a statute forbidding the carrying of weapons. Isaiah v. State (1911) 176 Ala. 27, 58 So. 53; Coker v. State (1912) 12 Ga. App. 425, 76 S. E. 103, 991; State v. Hewell (1884) 90 N. C. 705; Campbell v. State (1889) 28 Tex. App. 44, 11 S. W. 832; Wortham v. State (1893) Tex. Crim. Rep. 23 S. W. 797; Tucker v. State (1907) Tex. Crim. Rep. 105 S. W. 499; Craig v. State (1910) 60 Tex. Crim. Rep. 195, 131 S. W. 562.

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It was held in Coker v. State (1912) 12 Ga. App. 425, 76 S. E. 103, 991, that a son living on his mother's farm and managing it for her was on his own premises, and not liable for carrying a pistol without a li

cense.

The court in State v. Hewell (1884) 90 N. C. 705, applied the North Carolina statute (Acts 1879, chap. 127, § 1) which provided that it should be unlawful for any person in the state, except when upon his own premises, to carry concealed about his person any pistol or other deadly weapon. It appeared that defendant, a minor, carried a pistol concealed about his person while walking over a public road which ran over his father's lands. It was held that the defendant was not off his own premises and was not guilty of an offense. The court reasoned that the laying out of the public road did not deprive the owner of the freehold covered by the road, that the public acquired only an easement to pass and repass over it, that the father could not have been convicted of carrying a pistol over the road, which was his own land and his own premises, and that the son, being a minor and living with his father, was in contemplation of the law upon his own premises, and was entitled to the benefit of the exception.

The term "his own premises" has been held to apply to a temporary residence. Campbell v. State (1889) 28 Tex. App. 44, 11 S. W. 832, where the record showed that the defendant carried a pistol about his person while temporarily residing in a house several miles from his permanent residence. The court declared that the evidence failed to show an offense, for the reason that the defendant was upon his own premises within the contemplation of the law, which excepted one who carried a concealed weapon upon his own premises.

Where a defendant is arrested in his home and forced to go to jail, where he is searched and a knife found on his person, he cannot be held for carrying a concealed weapon outside of his own premises. He had a right to carry the weapon in his home, and was not responsible for carrying it through the streets, as he was under compulsion and did not go forth with it voluntarily. And in contemplation of law he was still on his own premises. Tucker v. State (1907)

Tex. Crim. Rep., 105 S. W. 499. In Craig v. State (Tex.) supra, it was held that the defendant was protected by the exception, where he lived on premises which he did not own and on which his lease had expired. The fact that he was staying there, and had his personal effects there, constituted being on his own premises.

It was said in Coker v. State (Ga.) supra, that a reasonable construction of the exception would not prevent a farmer from carrying a pistol around in an open manner anywhere on the farm where he resided.

The exception was applied in Wortham v. State (1893) - Tex. Crim. Rep., 23 S. W. 797, wherein it appeared that the accused, shortly before he was seen with a pistol, was about a mile from his premises, and it was very doubtful if he had had time to go home for it. The court held that the accused had a right to carry a pistol on his own premises, as was the case when he was found with the pistol, and that the evidence did not warrant a conviction,

In Isaiah v. State (1911) 176 Ala. 27, 58 So. 53, the appellant was convicted of carrying a concealed pistol in violation of the Alabama criminal statutes (Acts Sp. Sess. 1909, p. 258, § 2), providing that it should be unlawful for any person to carry a pistol about his person on premises not his own or under his control. The court declared that the statute meant that a person was prohibited only from carrying a pistol on premises not his own or under his control, and that the statute was intended to prevent one person from going armed with a pistol upon the premises of another, and did not prohibit the carrying of the same, if not concealed, upon the highway or elsewhere than upon the premises of another.

Person at place of business.

In two jurisdictions a person's place of business is included in the exception "on his own premises," in a statute relating to the carrying of weapMiller v. State (1913) 12 Ga. App. 479, 77 S. E. 653; Page v. State (1894) Tex. Crim. Rep. · 25 S. W.

ons.