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charge of his mother's plantation, considered his premises or place of where he resided, was protected by business. the exception of a person on his own And the exemption was held not to premises in a statute providing that be applicable in Lattimore v. State it should be a penal offense for any- (Tex.) supra, wherein the defendant one to carry around with him on his was a rural mail carrier and carried person, or to have in his manual pos- a pistol while going over his route. session outside of his own home or It was contended that, while the deplace of business, a pistol or revolver, fendant was engaged in the carrying without first obtaining a license. and distributing of mail in a vehicle

So, it has been held that where the as a mail carrier, he was on his own appellant had full control of another's premises and at his own place of pasture and live stock, he was not business. The holding was to the liable for carrying concealed effect that the public roads of the weapon thereon. Sanderson v. State state or a buggy going along them (Tex.) supra.

could not be construed to be either As to effect on rights of employee the defendant's premises or place of of exception permitting carrying of business, in contemplation of law. weapons at one's place of business, In denying the application of the see Miller v. State (1913) 12 Ga. App. exception, the court said that "on 479, 77 S. E. 653, set out infra under one's own premises or place of busiheading, "Person at place of busi- ness," in contemplation of the law, ness."

had reference to a particular localiPerson on public road.

ty, appropriated exclusively to a local One who carries a weapon on

business, such as a farm, store, shop, public highway is not on his own

or dwelling house, and the business premises within an exception to a

only such as was usually carried on prohibition against carrying weapons.

upon a farm, in the store or shop, or Moss v. State (1898) 65 Ark. 368, 45

other appropriate local place, so that S. W. 987; Leigh v. State (1921) 26

woods, prairies, or even public roads, Ga. App. 637, 107 S. E. 284; State v. could in no proper sense be included Perry (1897) 120 N. C. 580, 26 S. E.

within the term, since no right to ex915, 1008; Lattimore v. State (1912),

clusive appropriation could be had. 65 Tex. Crim. Rep. 490, 145 S. W.

In two jurisdictions, however, the 588.

contrary was held where the roads This view was adopted by the court

ran through and over the premises of in Moss v. State (Ark.) supra, where

the accused. State v. Hewell (1884) in it appeared that the defendant car

90 N. C. 705; Ball v. State (1894) — ried a pistol on a public road running

Tex. Crim. Rep. -, 25 S. W. 627; over her husband's lands. The court

Ross v. State (1894) Tex. Crim. held that the rule was not altered by

Rep. 28 S. W. 199. reason of the husband owning the

It was held in Ball v. State (1894) land over which the road ran, as the

Tex. Crim. Rep. 25 S. W. 627, purpose of the statute was to con

that the exception, “on his own prem

ises," should be applied to a public serve the public peace, especially

road which ran through and over the on highways and in other places open

premises on which the accused lived, to the public and not controlled by

so that he could not be held guilty for private individuals.

carrying a pistol while on that porIn Leigh v. State (1921) 26 Ga. App.

tion of the road. 637, 107 S. E. 284, the court said that

And it was similarly held in Ross although a cropper had a right to v. State (Tex.) supra, where the apcarry a pistol without a license any- pellant carried on his person a pistol where on his farm, he had no such while walking on a public road which privilege on a public road, which was ran over the premises where he lived. open to be shared by all the public Licensee. and could under no circumstances be A mere licensee is not on his own

un

premises within the scope of an ex

that, although the exception gave ception as to the carrying of weapons. him a right to carry a pistol on his Nichols v. State (1912) 4 Ala. App. own premises or at his regular place 115, 58 So. 681; Posey v. State (1912) of business, he was confined to the 4 Ala. App. 118, 59 So. 234; Clark two pieces of land controlled excluv. State (1887) 49 Ark. 174, 4 S. W. sively by himself, and could have no 658; Lemmons v. State (1892) 56 such right over the whole plantation. Ark. 559, 20 S. W. 404; Featherston It was held in Lemmons V. State v. State (1896) 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. (1892) 56 Ark. 559, 20 S. W. 404, that 612, 34 S. W. 276, 938; Whitesides v. the exception did not protect a son State (1900) 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 151, carrying a weapon on his father's 58 S. W. 1016; Banks v. State (1906) woodlands, over which he had a mere

Tex. Crim. Rep. —, 98 S. W. 242; license to enter and cut wood. It apSolosky v. State (1922) 90 Tex. Crim. peared that the defendant, an Rep. 537, 236 S. W. 742.

married son living with his father, The exception was held not to ap- cultivated a portion of the farm, but ply in Whitesides v. State (1900) 42 had only a mere license to enter the Tex. Crim. Rep. 151, 58 S. W. 1016, premises where he carried the weapwherein it appeared that the appellant on. The defendant offered as ground carried a pistol over certain pastures of error the refusal of the trial which he had a mere license to use for court to instruct that if the accused the pasturing of his live stock. The was a single person, lived with his court reasoned that the appellant, father on the tract of land, and made having no legal interest in the prem- his home there, he was on his own ises, but a mere license to turn his premises and entitled to carry the live stock into the pasture in common pistol on the premises. The court with others, had no such dominion denied the error on the ground that over them as to constitute his pres- the instruction would make the entire ence there “being on his own prem- farm the premises of the defendant ises,” and bring him within the ex- simply because he lived there, even ception in the statute.

though he had no control, either exIt was held in Solosky v. State clusively or jointly with his father, (Tex.) supra, that the defendant, over any lands except those he culticarrying concealed weapons upon

vated. Thereupon the court laid down premises belonging to his divorced the rule that a son residing on his wife, was not on his own premises father's premises could lawfully carry within the meaning of the exception, a pistol on the grounds habitually and was not exempt from prosecution. used in immediate connection with the The court declared that the judgment dwelling house and forming the soof divorce had devested the husband called curtilage, and as his father's of all legal interest in the premises tenant he had such right also on the in question, and left to him a mere lands which he cultivated, but with permission to enter for the purpose reference to the rest of the farm, inof visiting his children.

cluding the woodlands, he had a mere In Banks v. State (1906) Tex. license and was not entitled to carry 98 S. W. 242, it ap

a weapon thereon. peared that the defendant, found In Clark v. State (1887) 49 Ark. carrying a concealed weapon on

174, 4 S. W. 658, the same provision private road through a plantation, was construed not to apply to the

tenant and cultivated two carrying of a weapon on a common separate tracks of land on the planta- stairway. The evidence showed that tion connected by the road. The ques- the defendant occupied two rooms in tion was whether or not the defend- an office building as his law offices, ant was permitted by the exception that other persons had offices in the in the statute to carry a pistol habitu- building, that all of them used a ally between the two tracts of land. common stairway in order to reach the The court denied the right and said street, and that the defendant carried

Crim. Rep.

а

was

a

a pistol about his person while out such lands as a person on his own on the stairway. In sustaining the premises. Jones v. State (1891) 55 conviction the court held that the Ark. 186, 17 S. W. 719; Reagan v. provision protected only those who State (1915) 16 Ga. App. 369, 85 S. E. had an estate in the real property 353; Zallner v. State (1883) 15 Tex. which constituted the premises, and App. 23; Fannin v. State (1896) consequently did not permit the de- Tex. Crim. Rep. 34 S. W. 280. fendant, who had no legal right to In Jones v. State (Ark.) supra, it exercise authority over the stairway, appeared that a landlord carried a but on the contrary shared its use concealed weapon while attempting to with all the other tenants in the build- eject a tenant holding over after the ing, to treat the stairs as his own expiration of his lease. In deciding private premises and carry a pistol that under the circumstances the thereon.

landlord was not on his own premises, It appeared in Featherston v. State the court said that the tenant still had (1896) 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 612, 34 possession of the premises, even S. W. 276, 938, that the defendant, though the lease had expired, and so city official, made the mayor's office long as he continued in possession of his private business office and carried the lands the house and its curtilage a concealed weapon therein. The were his home. court held that the defendant was not A similar decision was handed down on his own premises so as to authorize in Zallner v. State (1883) 15 Tex. App. him to carry a pistol about his person 23, wherein it appeared that a landin such office.

lord carried a concealed weapon on The defendant in Posey v. State his tenant's land during the term of (1912) 4 Ala. App. 118, 59 So, 234, the lease. The Texas statute (Penal was convicted of carrying a pistol Code, art. 319) prohibited a person while on premises not his own or un- from carrying a concealed weapon der his control. It appeared that he except while on his own premises. entered a room on the premises of In holding that the defendant was another, took up a pistol which was not on his own premises, and was lying on a counter, shot it off, and guilty of violating the statute, the then laid it down again. The court court laid down the rule that the held that the act constituted carrying tenant alone during the term of the or bearing a pistol while on another's lease is vested with the right to conpremises, and that he was not pro- trol the premises, for the reason that tected by the exception.

the landlord's rights are suspended In Nichols v. State (1912) 4 Ala. during the term of the lease, except App. 115, 58 So. 681, it appeared that only such incidental rights as have witnesses saw the defendant hiding been specifically reserved by agreea pistol in the kitchen of a house ment. where they were paying a visit, but It was held in Reagan v. State there was no evidence that the defend- (1915) 16 Ga. App. 369, 85 S. E. 353, ant was carrying the pistol in the that during the continuance of a lease sense of bearing arms. The court the sole right to the possession, use, held that the defendant

not and enjoyment of the leased premises guilty. Although he was a mere li- was vested in the tenant, so that the censee on the premises, there was no landlord could not justify his carryevidence of a criminal intent, or of the ing a weapon thereon, under a statcarrying of a pistol in the sense of ute (Acts 1910, p. 135) which probearing arms in violation of the stat- hibited a person from carrying a ute.

weapon outside of his own home or Landlord.

place of business. A landlord who has sted him

And the same rule was applied in self of all right of control over his

Fannin v. State (Tex.) supra, wherepremises during the term of a lease in it appeared that the appellant is not entitled to carry a weapon on

landlord carried a concealed weapon

was

V.

on

on lands he had leased to a tenant. ing of an exception in an act forIt was held that in contemplation of bidding the carrying of weapons. law he was not on his own premises. Franklin v. State (1913) 12 Ga. App.

The holding in Fields State 483, 77 S. E. 653; Brannon v. State (1914) 74 Tex. Crim. Rep. 70, 166 (1887) 23 Tex. App. 428, 5 S. W. 132; S. W. 1166, was to the effect that an Fields v. State (Tex.) supra. owner working a farm jointly with a In Brannon v. State (1887) 23 Tex. tenant was on his own premises when App. 428, 5 S. W. 132, it was held that he carried a pistol on the lands. It a husband was on his own premises, appeared in evidence that the appel- where his wife was an owner in comlant had not parted with his right of mon with other heirs to the land, it control over the land jointly with his appearing that the defendant and tenant.

his wife occupied and cultivated a Tenant.

portion of the estate, while the other A tenant during the term of his

owners in common occupied other

tracts. lease possesses the premises as his

When charged with unlawown within a provision allowing the fully carrying a pistol about his carrying of weapons on one's own

person in the yard of another tenant premises. Gibbs v. State (1913) 70

of the land, the defendant claimed he Tex. Crim. Rep. 278, 156 S. W. 687;

was on his own premises by virtue of Mireles v. State (1917) 80 Tex. Crim.

his wife's ownership in common. The Rep. 648, 192 S. W. 241; Rodgers v.

court said that, although the defendState (1919) 85 Tex. Crim. Rep. 421,

ant was on his own premises while 213 S. W. 637.

on the portion occupied and cultivated In Gibbs v. State (Tex.) supra,

by himself, his rights did not extend it appeared that the appellant carried

over the whole estate, and in contema concealed weapon

a picnic plation of law he had left his own ground which he had rented for the

premises at the time of the offense.

And the exception was applied in day, and over which he had control. The court held that under the cir

Franklin v. State (Ga.) supra, wherecumstances the premises under the

in it appeared that the accused lived

and worked on a farm which he appellant's control were his own premises, whether the control was to be

owned in common with others. permanent or temporary, and he had Resident. a right, under the exception in the A resident on premises is entitled statute, to carry a pistol thereon. to the benefit of an exception as to

And the exception was applied in persons on their own premises in a Mireles v. State (1917) 80 Tex. Crim. statute forbidding the carrying of Rep. 648, 192 S. W. 241, wherein the weapons. Isaiah v. State (1911) 176 defendant, occupying leased lands, Ala. 27, 58 So. 53; Coker v. State was arrested and conducted off his (1912) 12 Ga. App. 425, 76 S. E. 103, premises, and then searched for the 991; State v. Hewell (1884) 90 N. C. concealed weapon which was found 705; Campbell v. State (1889) 28 Tex. about his person.

App. 44, 11 S. W. 832; Wortham v. And in Rodgers v. State (Tex.) State (1893) Tex. Crim. Rep. supra, the court said that the appel- 23 S. W. 797; Tucker v. State (1907) lant had a right, under the exception Tex. Crim. Rep. 105 S. W. 499; in the statute, to carry a pistol on Craig v. State (1910) 60 Tex. Crim. his own premises, as they were held Rep. 195, 131 S. W. 562. under a lease giving him the sole It was held in Coker v. State (1912) right to possess and control them.

12 Ga. App. 425, 76 S. E. 103, 991, Tenant in common.

son living on his mother's A tenant in common has such do- farm and managing it for her was minion over the premises as to con- on his own premises, and not liable stitute his presence there "being on for carrying a pistol without a lihis own premises” within the mean- cense.

that a

ran

was

The court in State v. Hewell (1884) Tex. Crim. Rep. 105 S. W. 499. 90 N. C. 705, applied the North Caro- In Craig v. State (Tex.) supra, it lina statute (Acts 1879, chap. 127, § 1) was held that the defendant was prowhich provided that it should be un- tected by the exception, where he lawful for any person in the state, lived on premises which he did not except when upon his own premises, own and on which his lease had exto carry concealed about his person pired. The fact that he was staying any pistol or other deadly weapon. there, and had his personal effects It appeared that defendant, a minor, there, constituted being on his own carried a pistol concealed about his premises. person while walking over a public It was said in Coker v. State (Ga.) road which over his father's supra, that a reasonable construction lands. It was held that the defend- of the exception would not prevent a ant was not off his own premises and farmer from carrying a pistol around was not guilty of an offense. The in an open manner anywhere on the court reasoned that the laying out of farm where he resided. the public road did not deprive the The exception

applied in owner of the freehold covered by the Wortham v. State (1893) — Tex. Crim. · road, that the public acquired only Rep. - 23 S. W. 797, wherein it apan easement to pass and repass over peared that the accused, shortly beit, that the father could not have been fore he was seen with a pistol, was convicted of carrying a pistol over the about a mile from his premises, and road, which was his own land and it was very doubtful if he had had his own premises, and that the son, time to go home for it. The court being a minor and living with his held that the accused had a right to father, was in contemplation of the carry a pistol on his own remises, law upon his own premises, and was as was the case when he was found entitled to the benefit of the excep- with the pistol, and that the evidence tion.

did not warrant a conviction, The term “his own premises” has In Isaiah v. State (1911) 176 Ala. been held to apply to a temporary 27, 58 So. 53, the appellant was conresidence. Campbell v. State (1889) victed of carrying a concealed pistol 28 Tex. App. 44, 11 S. W. 832, where in violation of the Alabama criminal the record showed that the defendant statutes (Acts Sp. Sess. 1909, p. 258, carried a pistol about his person $ 2), providing that it should be unwhile temporarily residing in a house lawful for any person to carry a pistol several miles from his

permanent

about his person on premises not his residence. The court declared that own or under his control. The court the evidence failed to show an offense, declared that the statute meant that for the reason that the defendant a person was prohibited only from was upon his own premises within carrying a pistol on premises not his the contemplation of the law, which own or under his control, and that excepted one who carried a concealed the statute was intended to prevent weapon upon his own premises. one person from going armed with a

Where a defendant is arrested in pistol upon the premises of another, his home and forced to go to jail, and did not prohibit the carrying of where he is searched and a knife the same, if not concealed, upon the found on his person, he cannot be held highway or elsewhere than upon the for carrying a concealed weapon out- premises of another. side of his own premises. He had a

Person at place of business. right to carry the weapon in his home,

In two jurisdictions a person's place and was not responsible for carrying

of business is included in the excepit through the streets, as he was

tion “on his own premises," in a statunder compulsion and did not go forth ute relating to the carrying of weapwith it voluntarily. And in contem- ons. Miller v. State (1913) 12 Ga. plation of law he was still on his App. 479, 77 S. E. 653; Page v. State own premises. Tucker v. State (1907) (1894) Tex. Crim. Rep. —, 25 S. W.

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