$5,421.87.

The plaintiff complained that if the defendant was entitled to recover, a larger recovery was warranted by the undisputed evidence, and that such a verdict, being inconsistent with the evidence, was manifestly the result of an unlawful compromise. The court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial on the ground that the jury rendered against it a verdict much smaller than the evidence warranted, and that there was no compromise verdict, as no rule of law entitled the defendants to any particular amount of damages. The court also said that the defendant could submit to the insufficient verdict, and the plaintiff could not complain.

In Strickland v. Hutchinson (1905) 123 Ga. 396, 51 S. E. 348, an action to recover on a promissory note, the defendant interposed a counterclaim which appeared to entitle him to more than the face of the note. The jury found a nonsuit and charged each party one half of the costs. The plaintiff moved for a new trial, and claimed that if the defendant was entitled to the counterclaim, he was entitled to much more than the jury allowed him. The decision of the court was to the effect that such a state of facts furnished no ground of complaint on the part of the plaintiff, who suffered no injury thereby.

It was held in Coutrakon v. Passow & Sons (1915) 193 Ill. App. 447, that the appellants could not complain that the verdict was the result of compromise because it was less than the amount which might have been found due the appellee. The court indicated that the evidence might have warranted the jury in allowing a setoff or partial defense.

"A plaintiff cannot complain because the jury awarded the defendant less than the full amount of his counterclaim." Rudolph v. Hewitt (S. D.) supra, an action on a promissory note set off by a contract of guaranty.

The facts and the law were stated by the court in Lighty v. Overbay (1868) 29 Ind. 433, as follows: "This was a suit by Overbay's administrator 31 A.L.R.-70.

Florida. Interstate Lumber Co. v. Woods (1914) 67 Fla. 202, 64 So. 741. Georgia. Mullins v. Murphy (1882) 69 Ga. 754; Schaefer v. Knott (1882) 69 Ga. 772; Clark v. Thompson (1896) 99 Ga. 221, 25 S. E. 247; Atlanta & B. Air-Line R. Co. V. Weaver (1904) 121 Ga. 466, 49 S. E. 291; Decatur County V. Philyaw (1921) 26 Ga. App. 702, 106 S. E. 799; Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Trammell (1901) 114 Ga. 312, 40 S. E. 259.

Texas.

St. Louis, S. F. & T. R. Co. v. Fenley (1908) Tex. Civ. App. - 118 S. W. 845; Taylor Bros. v. Hearn (1910) 63 Tex. Civ. App. 333, 133 S. W. 301; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. State (1917) Tex. Civ. App. -, 194 S. W. 462, reversed on other grounds in (1919) 110 Tex. 128, 216 S. W. 393, 218 S. W. 361; Farmers' & M. State Bank v. Guffey (1923) Tex. Civ. App. 255 S. W. 462.

b. Application of rule.

Tort against property.

The general rule was applied in Compressed Air Mach. Co. v. West San Pablo Land Co. (1908) 9 Cal. App. 361, 99 Pac. 531, where the plaintiff sued to recover the possession of certain machinery and $673 damages for conversion, or the sum of $1,200 and damages in case the machinery could not be delivered. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the recovery of the machinery, and damages at the rate of $50 per month for the detention thereof, or, in case a delivery could not be had, the sum of $1,200 as the value of the property, and $150 damages for the detention. It was held that the defendant could not object to the find

ing of a smaller verdict than the evidence warranted against it. The court said: "In the case at bar we think it perfectly clear from the pleadings and the evidence of both plaintiff and defendant that, if plaintiff was entitled to recover the possession of the property sued for, it was also entitled to recover as damages the sum of $50 per month from the 7th day of February, 1906. The finding, therefore, of a lesser sum in case a delivery could not be had, could in no wise injure appellant, but was to its benefit. . A judgment will not be reversed or a new trial granted for a mere error, when it clearly appears that the appellant has suffered no injury therefrom."

.

Where a verdict was rendered against a sheriff for a statutory amount for failure to pay over money collected on a fieri facias, he could not complain that the verdict was inadequate, as not including the amount of the execution. Alford v. Samuel (1845) 8 Ala. 95.

The rule was also applied in Interstate Lumber Co. v. Woods (1914) 67 Fla. 202, 64 So. 741, and in Newhouse Mill & Lumber Co. v. Avery (1911) 101 Ark. 34, 140 S. W. 985, wherein action was brought to recover exemplary damages for unlawfully cutting timber, but only compensatory damages were awarded.

And likewise, in Florsheim v. Dullaghan (1895) 58 Ill. App. 593, an action for trespass, the court said: "That the damages are less than the evidence required can be complained of only by the plaintiffs below."

It was contended in Graves v. Negy (1923) 114 Kan. 373, 219 Pac. 286,

that the particular verdict was not sustainable under any view of the evidence. The court, in denying the ground of error, said: "It is true that we can glean no figures in the testimony from which the precise sum, $1,000, can be deduced. Under the evidence a verdict in plaintiff's favor for a considerably larger sum could easily have been found, and apparently ought to have been, but there were a number of loosely proved matters involved. Since plaintiff makes no complaint of the verdict, and it was for a sum well within the evidence, no prejudice to defendants is discernible, and the amount will have to stand."

The holding in Galveston H. & S. A. R. Co. v. State (1917) Tex. Civ. App., 194 S. W. 462, reversed on other grounds in (1919) 110 Tex. 128, 216 S. W. 393, 218 S. W. 361, was to the effect that in an action for statutory nuisance the mere fact that the verdict was for less than the jury might have found under the undisputed evidence was harmless error, and not a matter of which the defeated party could complain.

The rule was applied in Jose v. Stetson (1899) 20 Wash. 648, 56 Pac. 397, an action for negligence, wherein the appellant assigned as error that the verdict for the respondents should have been for $1,925, instead of $1,000 which the jury found. The court held that the error, operating to the injury of the respondents, was no ground of error available to the appellants, who were not injured thereby.

In Coyne v. Galland (1922) Mo. App., 243 S. W. 376, the plaintiff sought to recover for damages to his premises, due to the overflow of water from defective drains. Holding that the defendant could not complain of an inadequate verdict, it was said: "The general rule is that a party will not be heard to complain in an appellate court that the verdict rendered against him was not as large as it should have been."

The decision handed down in Saylor v. Montesano (1895) 11 Wash. 328, 39 Pac. 653, followed the general rule.

The record showed that the city was guilty of negligence in failing to keep a highway in a safe condition. Α verdict was returned for $1 as damages for the injury of the plaintiff's horse. The defendant contended that the verdict was error, in that a recovery, if at all, should have been for a much larger sum. The court held that the error could not be urged by the defendant.

Complaint was made by the defendant in Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Trammell (1901) 114 Ga. 312, 40 S. E. 259, an action for damages for negligence, that the plaintiff's verdict was inadequate. It was conceded that if the plaintiff recovered at all he should have recovered a larger verdict, according to the evidence of damages suffered. The court ruled that the defendant had no right to complain that a verdict was returned against him for a less amount than that sustained by the evidence.

So, it has been held that where inadequate damages are awarded for the negligence of a railroad company in running over live stock, although the verdict is rendered for a sum much less than is warranted by the evidence, the defendant against whom it is rendered may not complain, as he is not wronged or injured by the error. Kansas City, M. & B. R. Co. v. Doggett (1889) 67 Miss. 250, 7 So. 278; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Abernathey (1901) 106 Tenn. 722, 64 S. W. 3.

And the same rule has been applied where inadequate recovery was had for the negligence of a carrier resulting in injury to or death of live stock in transit. Moyers v. Illinois C. R. Co. (1915) 197 Ill. App. 179; St. Louis, S. F. & T. R. Co. v. Fenley (1908) Tex. Civ. App. -, 118 S. W. 845.

A like ruling was made in Trowbridge v. Charleston & W. R. Co. (1911) 90 S. C. 183, 73 S. E. 78, an action for damage for delay of perishable goods.

In Rogers v. Fowler (1908) 151 Mich. 485, 115 N. W. 469, the court applied the rule as follows: "It is claimed that the plaintiff's testimony all tended to show damages aggregat

ing from $345 to $395, whereas a verdict was returned for $240. It is true that the witnesses who placed an estimate upon the value of the property destroyed fixed a value of $345 to $395. But on cross-examination their testimony showed that the barn in question was very old and in a state of dilapidation, and it is quite within the range of possibility that the jury, undertaking to exercise their own judgment as to values, accepted the description of the property, and fixed their own estimate of value placed upon such description, rather than to accept the figures given by witnesses. Whether this was or was not proper, we do not think the defendants are damaged by a verdict for a less sum than the evidence showed the plaintiff entitled to."

The record in Rauen v. Chicago R. Co. (1917) 205 Ill. App. 464, showed that the undisputed evidence as to damages to the plaintiff's automobile, caused by a collision with one of the defendant's street cars, was $566.21. The jury rendered a verdict for $390. The defendant complained that the verdict was manifestly a compromise, and that the recovery, if had at all, was inadequate. The court held that the plaintiff alone could complain.

In the case of Fowler v. Aberdeen R. Co. (1919) 41 S. D. 563, 171 N. W. 816, the defendant objected to a verdict for $100 recovered against it for alleged negligence in colliding with the plaintiff's automobile. It was held

that the appellant had no right to complain of the inadequacy of the appellee's recovery.

The inadequacy of the verdict for the plaintiff in Ross v. Rose (1920) 109 Wash. 273, 186 Pac. 892, was held no ground for the granting of a new trial on application of the defendant, in an action to recover damages for negligently driving an automobile past a horse and causing it to plunge down an embankment.

Tort against person.

"A person against whom a judgment has been recovered cannot reverse it on the ground that it is less than it should have been." Corcoran v. Harran (1882) 55 Wis. 120, 12 N. W. 468 (action for assault and battery).

In Adams v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. (1910) 149 Mo. App. 278, 130 S. W. 48, the courts applied the rule where recovery was had for an assault on a passenger by a railroad employee.

The rule was also applied in Taylor Bros. v. Hearn (1910) 63 Tex. Civ. App. 333, 133 S. W. 301, an action for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution.

Where the appellant was found guilty of negligence resulting in death, he cannot complain that the recovery against him should have been for a larger amount. Atlanta & B. Air-Line R. Co. v. Weaver (1904) 121 Ga. 466, 49 S. E. 291; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Thomas (1906) 87 Miss. 600, 40 So. 257. R. E. La G.

fere with worship of God.

2. A man cannot interfere with the freedom of his wife to worship God according to the dictates of her own reason and conscience.

[See 13 R. C. L. 985.]

-duty to aid husband in controlling actions of wife.

3. Members of a religious sect are under no obligation to co-operate with a man to prevent his wife from attending the services at their place of worship.

-right to invite wife to attend services.

4. Members of a religious sect are not personally liable to a man for in

viting his wife to take part in the religious services of the sect, if there is nothing unlawful, improper, or immoral in such services, notwithstanding the objections of the husband. Trial power to set aside verdict. 5. The court may set aside a verdict which is not supported by the evidence, and also any judgment entered thereon.

[See 20 R. C. L. 277.]

-necessity of granting new trial.

6. A court, in setting aside a verdict for plaintiff for lack of evidence to support it, may enter judgment for defendant, where, if the case were to be sent back, the result must necessarily be the same.

Mr. W. C. Winslow for appellant. Messrs. Henry S. Westbrook, Waldemar Seton, E. K. Piasecki, and Frank Schlegel for respondents.

McCourt, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an action instituted by plaintiff against the defendants to recover damages for the alleged alienation by defendants of the affections of plaintiff's wife. Plaintiff, by his complaint, charges in substance that on or about the 1st day of November, 1919, the defendants entered into a conspiracy to alienate the affections of plaintiff's wife from plaintiff, and to disrupt plaintiff's home, and to destroy the peace and tranquillity thereof, and that the defendants, in furtherance of such conspiracy, did, by artifice, inducement, design, and persuasion, alienate the affections of plaintiff's wife, thereby causing her to disregard and ignore plaintiff in all transactions and all relations, and to disregard and ignore her family duties as a mother to her children. Plaintiff further averred that the defendants, by teaching plaintiff's wife false doctrines and theories, induced her to refrain from medical treatment for the relief and cure of

a cancer, with which she was suffering, that such medical treatment had been offered to her by the plaintiff from skilled and expert physicians, and that on account of the refusal of plaintiff's wife to submit to the same, which refusal was induced by the defendants, her health has been greatly injured, and she has been reduced to such a physical condition as to be no longer able to care for her children or perform other household and family duties, and her malady has become incurable, all to the damage of plaintiff in the sum of $20,000.

Defendants, by their answer, denied all the allegations of plaintiff's complaint, and affirmatively alleged that defendants, in conjunction with other persons, meet in the city of Dallas, Oregon, to worship God, and that their meeting place is known as the Apostolic Faith Mission; that plaintiff's wife has for some time attended said meetings and joined in said worship of her own free will and volition, and without any inducement, coercion, or other influence exerted upon her by the defendants, or either or any of them, and that the estrangement between plaintiff and his said wife, if any